On October 23, 1978, Teng Hsiao-p'ing ratified the Sino-Japanese peace treaty that had been signed two months earlier, after long and difficult negotiations begun in 1975.
The Chinese vice-premier's tour of Japan on that occasion-which was nothing short of triumphant-underscored the importance of this major international event, whose impact can hardly be overestimated.
Far more is involved than a mere normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Relations have been more or less normalized since 1972; ie., since the visit of then-Premier Kakuei Tanaka to Peking as a result of the dramatic reestablishment of ties between the United States and China and Richard Nixon's visit to China.
The fact that an "antihegemony" clause is included in the treaty, the scope of the economic accords now being negotiated by the two governments, and the impact on the countries in the region of the rapprochement between the Chinese giant and the major imperialist power in Asia, bear witness to this.
The Japanese government is, of course, seeking to publicly downplay the political significance of this pact. Tokyo has let it be known that in the paragraph condemning "hegemonism," it insisted on including a sentence which stipulates that "the present treaty will in no way affect the positions taken by each of the contracting parties in its relations with third countries."
Premier Fukuda claims to favor an "omnidirectional" foreign policy, seeking friendship with all countries on a strictly bilateral basis. He is, in fact, leery of the reactions of the USSR, which has condemned the new treaty. However, he cannot conceal what Teng Hsiao-p'ing hastened to point out during his visit to Tokyo: The Sino-Japanese accord is part of a two-pronged international strategy on the part of the Chinese leadership and Washington, which aims to isolate and weaken the "main enemy" —the USSR.
Against 'Social Imperialism'
Teng Hsiao-p'ing has made no mystery of his concerns. At an October 25 news conference, he declared that this was the "first time" that a "stipulation" such as the antihegemony provision had appeared "in an international treaty." He noted that the "definitive establishment of the antihegemony principle" carried a "great deal of meaning," and that this provision was the "essence," the "key point" of the treaty between the two countries (Le Monde, October 26).
So the signing of this peace and friendship treaty falls within the contours of Chinese foreign policy, which has one overriding goal worldwide, from Zaïre to Chile (whose foreign minister visited Peking in September), from Iran to Palestine (to be sure, the Chinese government, as of quite recently, was still receiving delegations from the Palestine Liberation Organization; but all the same, it has stopped short of condemning the Camp David accords), and from East Europe to West Europe. That goal is to isolate Soviet "social imperialism.
But the Sino-Japanese rapprochement represents more than just the continuation of a policy that already has plenty of crimes against the world's peoples to its account.
For Peking to support the worst dictatorships in Africa or Latin America, to call for maintaining NATO, or indeed, to endorse ASEAN*, is one thing. It is something else again to call for beefing up the Japan-U.S. security treaty or Japan's military preparedness. We are now witnessing the final outcome of the bureaucratic logic that has made the USSR "the main enemy" and that is driving the Chinese ruling group to ally itself more and more closely with imperialism-in the guise of its international ringleader, the United States, and the dominant capitalist power in Asia, Japan-against the northern "menace." Didn't Teng Hsiao-p'ing, as early as September, declare his satisfaction with "Japan's desire for independence in the area of defense" (Le Monde, October 26)?
The conduct of the Chinese vice-minister of foreign affairs left no doubt as to the support Peking now gives to the ruling party in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party—the principal formation of the Japanese bourgeoisie-and indeed, to its most reactionary wing. In violation of protocol, Teng even asked to visit former Premier Tanaka, now deposed and about to go on trial for accepting bribes from the American aircraft firm Lockheed. Doesn't Tanaka still represent a decisive faction of the Liberal Democratic Party that must be dealt with?
Likewise, when Emperor Hirohito, who symbolizes, both personally and officially, imperial and militarist Japan and the occupation of China and a large part of East Asia, referred in passing to the "unfortunate events" that have troubled "Sino-Japanese history," Teng Hsiao-p'ing is said to have replied with a nonchalant "let us forget, let us forget the past" (Le Monde, October 25).
It goes without saying that the policy of the Chinese ruling group has dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese left and labor movement, which has already been weakened by its divisions and extreme opportunism. This is especially true inasmuch as the historic ties between the Japanese left and China have been very close. Before breaking with the Chinese CP in 1966, the leaders of the Japanese CP had long found refuge in Peking. As late as 1972, the chairman of the Association of Sanrizuka Peasants who were fighting the construction of Narita airport was given a hero's welcome in China.
Furthermore, both the Japanese left and the Sohyo trade-union federation have made condemnation of the Japan-U.S. security treaty (which incorporates Japan into the U.S. military network) a constant feature of their policy for a long time, at least as far as official statements are concerned.
Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit to Tanaka aroused indignation. In response to this, Tanaka cynically explained that "Teng has a good sense of humour. He doesn't ask about Lockheed. It would be nice if the Japanese had a sense of humour too" (Far Eastern Economic Review, November 3).
The agitation over this visit reached as far as the Liberal Democratic Party milieus. And an SP deputy bluntly declared: "Not only is this an insult to the Japanese nation, but we might also ask ourselves whether the Chinese would be willing to return the favor and allow us to meet with someone under indictment" (Le Monde, October 25).
More generally, it is Peking's support for the Japan-U.S. alliance that puts the Japanese left in an awkward posture. The chairman of the SP, Asukata, was told in Peking when he restated his party's traditional position toward the United States that the SP's policy was "fifteen years behind the times" (the dominant faction in the SP has pro-Moscow sympathies). And Ueda, a member of parliament and managing editor of the CP paper Akahata, declared at the time of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit that "by approving the security treaty with Washington, and Japanese rearmament, China is taking a position contrary to that of a socialist country" (Le Monde, October 20).
Washington's Blessing and Tokyo's Pocketbook
Tokyo, of course, is not showing the slightest signs of political independence from Washington in signing the peace and friendship treaty with China. It was owing to the thaw in relations between China and the United States in 1971 that Japan once again opened up to its continental neighbor. The buttressing of Japan's role in the region corresponds to the wishes of the U.S. government, which after its defeat in Indochina would like to see a better division of the burden of "defending the free world."
An indispensable part of this, in the eyes of the Pentagon strategists who are worried about Soviet naval power in the Pacific, is beefing up Japan's military strength, regardless of the country's staunchly pacifist constitution. And imperialist Japan has an invaluable role to play in stabilizing the dictatorial and neocolonial regimes in Southeast Asia.
It is considered naive in both Washington and Peking to treat the other two "superpowers" even-handedly; it is necessary to pick the "main enemy" at a given moment. For both, this means the USSR, which explains why the objectives of Chinese and U.S. world policy are now converging so frequently and so closely.
Obviously, the Japanese rulers and capitalists see something in this for themselves. They would also like to see Japan's military might brought more into line with its economic might. The Liberal Democratic Party is riddled with an intense factional struggle over choosing the next party chairman and thus the next premier. Friendship with China has become one of the key elements of this internal strife, which partly explains why Fukuda was able to hush the objections of a good part of his own faction, which has traditionally been pro-Taiwan. As for the Japanese capitalists, they expect a great deal from the increase in Japan-China trade.
As early as February, an eight-year, $20 billion trade agreement was signed between the two countries. Contracts valued at $5 billion have already been signed. On top of that, the February agreements were reportedly extended for a period of five years, and the value of the anticipated trade was said to have been quadrupled. Japan has just signed a contract to build a steel-refining complex in Hopei, which promises to be one of the biggest in the world with an annual production capacity of ten million tons of steel. It is helping to build another complex in the Shanghai region, and to modernize a steel mill near Peking.
Of course, the tricky problem of financing Chinese imports remains to be settled. Peking hinted broadly that it would be willing not only to turn to international credit institutions, but even to accept loans from foreign governments, which would represent a spectacular political turnabout. But nothing seems firmly settled yet. China has also offered to pay in exports of crude oil. In theory this is a prime concern of the Japanese, who are trying to diversify their energy sources. But Chinese oil is of an inferior grade, and Japanese industrialists are ill equipped to refine it without launching into major investments.
However, Japan's economic recovery is slow in coming, despite government promises of a 7% annual rate of growth for 1978. The Chinese market represents considerable potential, and affects key sectors of the economy, such as the steel industry. The general opinion is that the rewards outweigh the risk, as Susumu Awanokara noted in the November 3 Far Eastern Economic Review:
"China is embarking on a massive industrial revolution which will absorb enormous amounts of exports from Japan, as well as other suppliers of plant and equipment, and the chances of success seem great enough for foreigners to be willing to gamble."
Teng Hsiao-p'ing's 'Four Modernizations'
For the Chinese leadership, the overture to Japan not only meets the requirements of the fight against "social imperialism." It is an extension of the policyindispensable in its view-of bureaucratically rationalizing the country's economy, a policy upheld by Teng Hsiao-p'ing under the name of the "four modernizations." A month does not go by without new developments in the offensive being waged by the vice-premier against the Maoist legacy and those who oppose his decisions.
As for the political personnel, General Wu Teh has been relieved of his functions as mayor of Peking, and several provincial leaders have been dismissed, notably in Liaoning province, where the new first secretary is leading the ideological offensive. It was his job to point out that "practice is the sole criterion of truth," although some comrades "persist in the mistaken notion that Mao Tsetung Thought constitutes a criterion of truth" (Le Monde, October 3).
As for Chairman Mao's famous little red book," it is now being reviled as a stupefying collection of "maxims" taken out of their logical context, and is apparently headed for the junkpile.
An expert at "quotable quotes," Teng Hsiao-p'ing recently suggested that reunification with Taiwan would take place "only by the peaceful road and in the distant future" (Le Monde, October 27).
In the economic realm, the major shift the regime has embarked upon is taking shape more and more systematically. The new chairman of the Academy of Sciences, Hu Chiao-mu (a "rehabilitated" victim of the Cultural Revolution, of course) described the broad outlines of this shift in an article in the October 16 People's Daily. It contains all the old themes that were earlier denounced as proof of an "ideological" return to capitalism in the USSR.
The idea is to raise productivity by bringing into play the economic "laws of value," by giving workers direct material incentives "and control" over their productive output, by disciplining those whose factories or communes produce little, by multiplying legally contracted barter arrangements among the various economic units, including within the same commune, by giving a bigger role to the system of bank credit, by introducing specialization of enterprises, and by learning the rules of efficient management from the bourgeoisie.
Hence the plans to send 10,000 students to Japan. These students are supposed to live among the population rather than in separate dormitories, the better to absorb the golden rules of capitalist management. Teng Hsiao-p'ing has had to come to terms with the deep-rooted democratic spirit of the Chinese masses and announce that, from now on, plant supervisors will be elected by the workers in their unit up to the level of department head. But his liberal mask fell when he declared in front of the 2,000 delegates to the Trade-Union Congress October 11 that "the workers must deepen their glorious traditions of hard work, self-sacrifice, and discipline, accepting [job] transfers with good grace, and loving their workplaces as they do their homes."
"The trade unions must educate their members in a spirit of respect for a highly centralized administration... and for the complete authority of the command structure of production" (Le Monde. October 14).
Teng Hsiao-p'ing has embarked on a vast project of making production profitable through bureaucratic means. But his policy will run into much opposition—not only from the workers, who may not see eye-to-eye with Teng on the role of factory managers, but also from sections of the bureaucracy.
The fact is that this policy implies a considerable shakeup in the bureaucracy's methods of controlling the country, conferring a new role on the cadres of economic management and involving the spread of contractual arrangements between economic units. Teng is going at it as fast as possible. However, previous experience in the USSR and Eastern Europe has shown how difficult it is to reform these vast bureaucratized state apparatuses.
The overture to Japan and the growth of trade with the world capitalist market—an inevitable outgrowth of his overall policycannot help but have profound consequences in the long run, and may precipitate new political struggles within the regime. The veiled conflict between Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing that is beginning to surface may reflect more than anything else the fears aroused in some sections of the bureaucracy by the "adventure" that Teng's forced march toward "modernization" represents.
The Korean Buffer
The new Sino-Japanese pact cannot fail to have major repercussions on the regional level as well. Should the current plans succeed even moderately, the existing economic equilibrium in the area - would be upset. Indonesia, for one, fears the competition of Chinese oil, and Australia hopes to profit from the Sino-Japanese "steel boom.
But more fundamentally, it is the strategic equilibrium in East Asia that is liable to be altered. The Sino-Soviet confliet is more and more becoming a dominant feature of the situation in the area, which was never the case in the past. The signing of a friendship and cooperation treaty between Vietnam and the Soviet Union in early November is in all probability a reply to the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty. The repercussions of the latter within the Korean peninsula are still hard to determine. The logic of China's "sponsorship" of North Korea and Japan's "sponsorship" of South Korea should be to exert pressure for a multilateral recognition of the existence of two Koreas.
However, this prospect has always been condemned by the Kim Il Sung regime. The Korean CP is now politically much closer to Peking than to Moscow, as shown by its lineup with Cambodia in the Hanoi- Pnompenh confliet. Moreover, recent indications are that it is being led by "technocrats" of the Teng Hsiao-p'ing school, whose job it is to bail the regime out of its financial difficulties after the international bankruptcy it has suffered. But North Korea is bound by mutual defense treaties both to China and to the USSR. In addition, it is militarily dependent to a large extent on the Soviet "umbrella." What will happen when the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty is formally and finally repudiated?
While in Japan, Teng Hsiao-p'ing made one of the cynical remarks about his allies that seem to be a habit with him. Speaking of Korea, he noted that "divided countries are ultimately unified.... If these problems can't be solved in 10 years, they will be solved in 100 years. If not in a century, then in 10 centuries." (Far Eastern Economic Review, November 3.)
There you have some encouraging words for Kim II Sung! According to Philippe Pons, Le Monde's correspondent in Tokyo, the North Koreans privately admit to wondering "where their country was in Mr. Teng's mind when he decided to go a step further with Japan." (Le Monde, October 26.)
Japan is a key part of the Washington- Seoul-Tokyo military industrial triangle. The interdependence of imperialist Japan and neocolonial South Korea, in defense matters as well as in economic and political areas, is such that the Korean question is considered virtually an "internal" matter in Japan.
The Korean peninsula is part of the "immediate security" zone of the Japanese archipelago. It is also one of the cornerstones of imperialism's military bulwark in the northern Pacific, and is very likely to be affected by the changing balance of naval forces in the area. Therefore, it is impossible to take very many "further steps" with Japan without this having the effect of keeping the situation frozen in the Korean peninsula.
The South Korean masses, who stand alone in their fierce battle for elementary democratie rights against the dictatorial Park Chung Hee regime, will be the first to pay the price for this reinvigorated (but not new) policy of peaceful coexistence.
Southeast Asia today is the object of big diplomatic maneuvers. Visits by Pham Van Dong, the Vietnamese premier; leng Sary, the Cambodian minister of foreign affairs; Firyulin, the Soviet adjunct minister of foreign affairs; and finally, Teng Hsiao-p'ing himself to the ASEAN countries followed one another at two-month intervals. Here again, the Sino-Japanese treaty promises new problems for the peoples of the region.
Of course, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, interviewed by some Thai reporters before leaving for Tokyo, said that, unlike Pham Van Dong on his visit to Bangkok, he would refuse to announce the end of Peking's support to Communist parties involved in guerrilla struggles. While casting doubt on the sincerity of the Vietnamese premier's statements, he allowed himself the luxury of giving the Vietnamese a "lesson in internationalism":
"Pham Van Dong raised this issue to drive a wedge between our two countries. People want to know if Teng is going to say the same thing in Thailand. I can already tell you that if China talked like Pham Van Dong, China would be quite despicable" (Le Monde, October 25).
However, this virtuous statement of intent should not fool anyone. Moreover, Teng already gave his views on this subject to the Thai premier on his visit to Peking last spring. Chinese support to the guerrillas could not be totally cut off, because "then the Soviets would take our place." But, Teng added, "in any case, don't worry, if your governments take repressive measures against these parties, the Chinese embassy will not protest" (Le Matin, November 4).
When the leadership of the Chinese CP calls for maintaining the U.S. presence in the region and for strengthening Japan's role with respect to ASEAN, the old distinction between governmental policy (which is open to the necessary diplomatic compromises) and that of the party (the guarantor of an ongoing, active internationalist policy) no longer holds. One cannot ally oneself with the worst enemies of the masses in the region—U.S. and Japanese imperialism-and at the same time aid the development of revolutionary struggles!
At the time of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit to Rangoon in January, Alain Jacob, Le Monde's correspondent in Peking, noted how discreet the Chinese press had become about the activity of the Burmese CP. He reported that the leaders of this party who were living in the Chinese capital have not hidden from those who have been able to approach them recently the trepidations that Mr. Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit was causing them" (Le Monde, January 28).
It is the Thai resistance that is now at stake in a group of confliets that go beyond it. Like all the parties in the area, the Thai CP is influenced by Maoist ideology. But when Teng Hsiao-p'ing visited Thailand, he was given an outstanding welcome. The Chinese statesman was invited to attend the formal Buddhist ceremony marking the ordination of the crown prince. This is unprecedented. It shows what type of relations are dominantparty-to-party or government-togovernment.
The chief beneficiary of these successive diplomatic visits to Thailand is none other than General Kriangsak and his military regime. Since China no longer regards the revolutionary movements in the region as anything but a means of leverage, over which it must keep ideological control to keep them from falling under the influence of the pro-Soviet bloc; and since Vietnam is caught in a stranglehold, with its leadership ready to do anything to loosen the grip, these movements have no other choice but political neutrality toward the Sino-Soviet conflict and its local ramifications.
In general, it is Chinese foreign policy that is clearly the more aggressive in Southeast Asia. Despite the uneasiness that may surface inside ASEAN in view of the dynamic of the Sino-Japanese treaty, and despite the pole of attraction that the People's Republic represents among communities of Chinese immigrants in these countries, it is mainly against the Soviet- Vietnam bloc that the neocolonial regimes in the area are turning. Japanese-U.S. interests prevail. Teng Hsiao-p'ing apparently thinks everything is wrapped up—even while he was visiting Bangkok, two high officials from Peking-CP Vice- Chairman Wang Tung-ling and Deputy Premier Yu Chiu-li-were arriving in Pnompenh as a reminder of China's support for the Khmer regime in its conflict with Vietnam.
With the help of its overture to Japan, the Chinese leadership is certainly hoping to speed up the modernization of its armed forces. It experienced some problems on its fishing trips to Europe, mainly because of Soviet pressures on arms merchants such as France. Tokyo seems willing to help in this, and has asked Cocom, the organization that oversees sales of military and strategic goods to the socialist countries, to bend its rules.
But in the game of mutual rearmament, China risks being the loser. Japan does not have nuclear weapons, but it is incorporated in the U.S. military network. The well-known Japanese "self-defense forces" already number 288,000 and are said to rank seventh in the world in equipment. These forces are undergoing modernization.
To help Japan to rearm, while at the same time helping to politically disarm the Japanese workers movement in the face of this danger, is to put deadly teeth in the jaws of the imperialist giant. It is to play the sorcerer's apprentice, to sacrifice the interests of the population of the entire region, including those of the Chinese people, on the altar of the narrow interests of the ruling bureaucracy.
In a different context, of course, it nevertheless recalls Stalin's terrible policy toward Germany on the eve of World War II. There, too, it was a question of fighting the "main enemy" at the price of total blindness to the real nature of Berlin's policy toward the USSR.
In the last analysis, it is the Chinese workers state that will be threatened by the strengthening of the imperialist alliance in east Asia, which is being promoted by the current orientation of the Chinese leadership. This orientation is all the more criminal in that it tends to restore the equilibrium of imperialist domination in the region, which had been thoroughly shaken by the defeat of the U.S. intervention in Indochina, and which was threatened by the process of attrition affecting the Liberal Democratic Party regime in Japan.
Notes
*Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which includes the governments of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.