The imposition of martial law in twelve major cities in Iran September 8-causing 1.000 deaths the first day-represents an important turning point in the deepening erisis of the Iranian ruling class.
This crisis has been marked by the development of the largest mass movement in more than a quarter of a century. In the last year, a spontaneous protest movement against the shah's repressive dictatorship has developed. This movement has turned into a powerful mobilization of millions calling for the overthrow of the monarchy.
The rapid growth of this movement, whose breadth and depth have surprised most observers, might have produced a prerevolutionary situation in Iran for the first time since the CIA coup in 1953, which put the shah back on his throne. At one point, the mass movement assumed explosive and uncontrollable proportions. The growing demoralization in the ranks of the army was threatening the regime's capacity to control the situation.
One day before the proclamation of martial law, nearly a million demonstrators in Tehran alone shouted, "Death to the shah," and asked the soldiers to join them. The Iranian regime, by once again resorting to force and calling out the tanks. has been compelled to recognize that a guarantee of even the most elementary democratic rights could give rise to an explosive mass movement demanding its overthrow
In spite of the fact that more than 50,000 heavily armed soldiers and about 3,000 tanks now patrol all the major cities daily, and that all gatherings of more than three persons are prohibited, the regime claims to be pursuing its "liberalization" policy.
This "policy" has so far resulted in the death of more than 10,000 persons in one year. There are still more than 100,000 political prisoners. SAVAK, the political police, retains complete control over all newspapers and mass media. Prior to the "liberalization" policy, people could at least meet in mosques. Today even that is no longer possible. Above all, the repression has become much more severe, and there is every indication that it will mount. 'Liberalization' With Martial Law?
The Iranian ruling class has justified this by saying that the shah does indeed want to liberalize the country's political life. and that his regime has already begun to guarantee many freedoms. However, he underestimated one problem-the new atmosphere of political freedom enabled the conservative religious leaders to become active and to spur the superstitious Iranian masses to revolt against the "modernizer" shah! Most of the conservative forces have supposedly not been able to accept the rapid pace of reforms instituted by the shah in the early 1960s. Now that they have a chance, they are urging the Iranian masses to rise up against the process of "westernization."
This is the reason why the shah's regime has no other choice but to maintain strict control, while gradually granting political freedoms, even if this means imposing martial law on the whole country!
It is obvious that this makes no sense at all and was cooked up by the propaganda machine of the regime and its imperialist allies. However religious and superstitious the Iranians may be, they nevertheless have the strongest tradition of struggle for freedom against all kinds of reaction and repression in the entire Middle East.
The constitutional revolution of 1906-09, which forced the Qajar dynasty to provide a constitution; the Jangali movement toward the end of the second decade, which led to the establishment of a soviet republie in Gilan; the mass movement against autocracy, during and after World War II, which brought to light the struggles of the Azerbaijani and Kurdish national minorities against their national oppression, and led to the establishment of independent republics in western Iran; the mass movement against imperialism, which culminated in the nationalization of the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company, and which was defeated after the 1953 coup-all of this represents only a few chapters in the history of the Iranian revolution. All of these struggles rapidly became revolutionary mass movements, which could have unleashed the dynamic of permanent revolution in Iran.
The Outbreak of the Crisis
What is behind these upsurges? Iran's integration into the worldwide system of imperialism has resulted in a permanent socioeconomic crisis that could only be contained by the forces of autocracy and reaction, which are supported and armed to the teeth by imperialism. The agrarian crisis, the national question, the low level of industrialization, and imperialist domination together created the conditions that can give a really explosive character to any mass movement against autocracy.
Each time a change in the class relationship of forces has made it possible, the masses have rebelled against the state. Each time, the movement has broadened into revolutionary struggles that take up all the fundamental historic tasks of the Iranian revolution.
Thus, the sudden growth of the mass movement over the last fourteen months is nothing out of the ordinary. But there is a very important difference. In the past, all the revolutionary uprisings in Iran were made possible by sudden changes in the relationship of forces between the classes, owing to sudden upheavals in the international situation and to "external causes" that have led to a sudden weakening of the reactionary forces in Iran.
And once the external factors were removed, the relationship of forces more or less reverted to what it had been originally, enabling the reactionary forces to impose a lasting defeat on the mass movement.
For example, the constitutional revolution took place immediately after the 1905 revolution in Russia. It began in the districts that were under the authority of the tsar's imperialist forces. As soon as the tsarist regime was restabilized in Russia, it helped the Iranian rightists put the revolution to rout.
During World War II, the invasions of Iran by the allied forces, and particularly the presence of the Red Army on Iranian soil, had created a very favorable relationship of forces for the mass movement. But once the Stalinist bureaucracy had made a pact with the Iranian regime, the forces of the central government were able to crush the movement of the oppressed nationalities.
This time, the situation is different. The change in the relationship of social forces, which has weakened the shah's regime and made it possible for the mass movement to develop, is essentially owing to a gradual upset in the internal situation that has taken place over the last two decades. This process has now reached a qualitative stage with the emergence of a structural crisis of the Iranian economy. Nothing will give you a week by week analysis of the most important world events.
indicates that the Iranian ruling class can fundamentally reverse this tendency or resolve the crisis. That is why there is every likelihood that, in spite of martial law, the Iranian masses will not be defeated; and that their movement against the shah's regime will reemerge in the fairly near future.
Structural Crisis of Iranian Economy
All the major economic indicators show that after two decades of considerable growth, the Iranian economy has entered a profound crisis since the end of 1976. After a rapid growth of the industrial sector, the urban population, and capitalist agriculture, and the expansion of the industrial work force, the Iranian economy has now entered a crisis that is growing deeper and deeper.
The agricultural sector is in a state of near-total collapse; the industrial sector has stopped growing; the number of urban poor has grown to the point where it now reaches several million. Despite its enormous oil revenues, Iran now has a large balance-of-trade deficit. The final straw is a galloping rate of inflation that is now higher than 30%.
The annual rate of overall formation of fixed capital in industry fell by nearly 45% between March 1976 and March 1977 relative to the previous year. The biggest reduction-more than 70%-is in large investments of more than 100 million rials More than 80% of all investmly to have been put into existing plants rather than into new projects. The flight of capital from Iran has risen to the astounding figure of more than $3.5 billion (six times greater than total exports, not counting oil and gas).
Unemployment and underemployment have increased severely, and for the first time in years, the number of wageworkers has begun to decrease.
It is clear that for the first time in Iranian history, we are faced with a capitalist crisis of overproduction. But what is involved is not just a temporary crisis of overproduction. It is a structural crisis that results from the integration of the Iranian economy into the worldwide market, and it is hard to see how this crisis can be overcome without a complete withdrawal from the world market.
Changing Role of Iranian Economy
To understand the structural nature of the crisis and its effects on the class struggle, we must look more closely at the changes that have occurred in Iran in the recent period
(since the 1960s). These changes, associated with the shah's "white revolution" and his "modernization" program for Iran, have their immediate origins in the new phase of the international centralization and concentration of capital corresponding to the period of late capitalism." With the growing importance of revenues stemming from payments for transfers of technology, the principal source of monopolistic superprofits, certain changes in the fundamental role played by the underdeveloped countries within the worldwide capitalist economy have become necessary.
During this phase, the international monopolies have become less interested in these countries as outlets for their excess capital than as major markets for the export of goods and technological services.
This is reflected in the fact that today, unequal exchange has replaced the repatriation of capital and monopolistic profits as the principal mechanism for the transfer of value from the underdeveloped countries to the advanced capitalist centers. Moreover, exported capital itself is no longer invested only in the production of raw materials for the international market, but also in the production of goods destined for the domestic market of the underdeveloped countries, which nowadays is no longer negligible.
This phase in the development of the worldwide capitalist system, which has been associated with what is referred to as the policy of neocolonialism, has led to a number of important changes in the relations between the underdeveloped coun tries and the advanced capitalist countries. During this phase, contrary to what happened in the early stages of imperialism, the advanced capitalist countries can no longer control the internal capital market in the underdeveloped countries, nor do they want to.
In fact, the international monopolies are now very interested in promoting the formation of a native bourgeoisie and in facilitating the internal accumulation of capital in the productive sectors. In order to transform the underdeveloped countries into outlets for the overproduction of technological goods, it is necessary to encourage productive investments by the "national bourgeoisie." That is why the dependent regimes in these countries are now playing a different role than in the past.
Previously, their main function had been to compel the "national bourgeoisie" to invest in the unproductive and subsidiary sectors of the economy, so as to guarantee that competition between the "national" and the imperialist bourgeoisie was always resolved in the interest of the latter. Now, they must create the conditions for the development of an indigenous class of capitalist entrepreneurs technologically dependent on the advanced capitalist countries, who can exploit and expand the internal market of the underdeveloped countries jointly with foreign capital. The Condition for Change
Iran was one of the few countries in market, and the considerable resources from foreign trade owing to oil revenues created favorable conditions for this transformation to take place. This was done by eliminating several obstacles in the way of capitalist accumulation that had been created in the preceding phases of capitalist rule in Iran. Through direct state intervention, all the structural problems of the Iranian economy that prevented the transformation of savings and accumulated wealth into productive investment were eliminated. All of the basic institutions that were needed to provide financial, technical, and management assistance to the new capitalist class were established.
With the help of the "second economic plan" (1955-62), financed by oil revenues, loans from the World Bank, and aid from the U.S. government, the changes in the infrastructure necessary to ease the way for the internal circulation of merchandise were cárried out. More than 15% of the budget was spent to upgrade the transportation and communication networks, generate electricity, and increase the capacity of Iran's major seaports.
The regulation of foreign trade was gradually transformed between 1958 and 1961, leading to the replacement of the "open-door policy" of earlier periods by a strict and selective control over imports of consumer goods, and by heavy restrictions on imports of durables and the products necessary to produce certain consumer goods. This new policy forced many big Iranian merchants and foreign companies to begin to produce in Iran itself the commodities that had formerly been imported.
The agrarian reforms forced a large part of the peasantry to leave the land and led to the transformation of wealth accumulated in agriculture into capital invested in the newly established industries. Millions of peasants were compelled to migrate to the cities in order to ensure a supply of cheap labor power, and the land purchased from the big landed proprietors was paid for with shares in the new industries.
In 1957, the state-owned Industrial Credit Bank was established to provide cheap, long-term loans to aid in the construction of big plants. This bank itself participated in many joint operations and "pilot" projects to ease the way for the growth of industry. Later, in 1969. a sim. ilar bank was created-the Iranian Bank for the Development of Mines and Industry-which is a mixed bank combining participation by the state with that of foreign banks. This bank has enabled international monopolies to locate Iranian clients, either for joint operations or simply to buy factories ready to go.