The economic and political crisis facing Zambia has continued to deepen and the country is now even less capable of shortterm recuperation than before.
Central as always in determining the scale of these problems is the price of copper-the commodity that accounted for 92% of exports in the first nine months of 1977. After a brief and rather slight revival in mid-1976 and early 1977, copper has now returned to cash values prevailing as long as thirteen years ago.
The problems of this situation are starkly brought home by setting these against the escalation in import prices over the same period. In the fourth quarter of 1977, the London Metal Exchange price for copper was US$0.5518 per pound, compared with US$0.5851 in 1965. On the other hand, import prices rose nearly 150% between 1965 and 1975. Not surprisingly, the result has been a huge balance-ofpayments deficit.
All sectors of the economy are in recession. Unfortunately (and perhaps conveniently for the government) statistics are unavailable on the key indicators of employment and earnings after June 1976. Even by then, however, we find a drop of 8% in total employment from one year earlier (from 398,840 to 368,360)-26% in the key indicator, construction; 8% in agriculture; 5% in manufacturing industry. Almost daily news items since then of closures, layoffs, production curtailments, etc., confirm that this rate of decline has, if anything, accelerated.
In introducing the 1978 budget, Finance Minister John Mwanakatwe gave figures for manufacturing output, which, he said, had undergone a real decline of 4.1% in 1976 and 5.5% in 1977.
For those able to remain employed, wages have stagnated or even declined in cash terms, while inflation has eaten away at their real value. Once again figures are not available. But those up to mid-1976 indicate that average wages for all industries actually declined in the previous year by 5%. Even if we assume that Zambians' wages actually went up by the 5% per annum that the government gives as the officially permitted figure, this would in no way compensate for cost-of-living rises.
Nor, despite years of propaganda for the "rural revolution," has agriculture expanded sufficiently to make any significant contribution to reducing the food import bill, let alone to fulfilling the oftrepeated demand that it become Zambia's chief export earner.
The January 1978 budget reflected Zambia's desperate economic plight and worsened the living standards of its populace. The proposals included a reduction in the subsidy on maize meal, which led to its rising in price by 21.6% and an end to fertiliser subsidies, which will lead to higher prices for all agricultural commodities.
Zambia's economic plight has been the subject of a good deal of attention from the big financial institutions of the capitalist world. This is because it is widely recognised that its government provides one of the most effective instruments for stabilising capitalism in southern Africa. In particular, its role as one of the key "front-line states" makes it inevitably involved in the security of any settlements in Zimbabwe and Namibia.
For the past few years, the country has received periodic loans and outright cash transfers from the leading economies of the capitalist world. March 1978 saw a new step forward with the negotiation of a two-year aid programme with the International Monetary Fund involving a $390 million credit and the rescheduling of an earlier $46.6 million facility. This included certain severe conditions that tie the government's hands:
• An immediate devaluation of 10% was imposed, a move that will inevitably lead to further price increases.
• The government has undertaken to further reduce its budgetary deficit in 1979. This will be achieved largely through more cuts in consumer subsidies.
• A two-year wage freeze has been imposed.
The IMF has cleverly ensured that it will be in a position to police these conditions by paying out only $99 million of Zambia's
Lake Kariba
MOZAMBIQUE Salisbury ® RHODESIA
BOTSWANA
SOUTH
Miles 300
AFRICA
Christian Science Monitor special drawing rights immediately. The other $216 million will come in three monthly installments and be dependent on "good behaviour."
Even this facility is clearly not enough to solve Zambia's immediately pressing economic problems. The April 24 London Financial
Times reported government sources as believing that about $800 mil lion is necessary to pull Zambia out of its economic depression. Consequently, negotiations have now been opened with the World Bank for a further loan, which it is hoped will be worth up to $400 million.
The 'Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie'
The Zambian ruling class is most accurately described as a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie." Because at independence in 1964 almost all industry, commerce, and capitalist farming was in the hands of foreign companies or individuals, the road to economic power for the ambitious lay via the state machine. The nearly fourteen years since independence have therefore seen a vast expansion in the size of the sector of the economy.
state-controlled Now more than half of Zambia's labour force works for it.
The essential beneficiaries of the process that its propagandists variously describe as "socialism" or "humanism" are the top administrators from the cabinet and Central Committee downwards who are charged with administration of the state machine and the economy. Both because of their high individual salaries and because their bureaucratic positions allow them to profit from large-scale corruption, these individuals use their tenure of office to accumulate capital. For them this process is particularly urgent because of the multitude of examples in neighboring countries of the sudden dispossession of political power holders by the military.
Such systems then tend to show stability only in periods of economic expansion when the ruling bureaucracy finds few problems in its own self-enrichment. Economic stress of the kind experienced by Zambia since late 1974 when the copper balloon burst produces serious tensions and fissures in an elite scrambling for rewards. Having made these preliminary observations, it is possible to isolate a number of different tendencies currently at work among Zambia's bureaucratic bourgeoisie.
The "Right-wing' Grouping
The representatives of the "right-wing" grouping consist in the main of politicians who have been excluded from office over the recent period. However, some of its proposals have wide support throughout the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Its most longstanding figure is Arthur Wina, a prominent leader in the immediate pre- and postindependence era in the politically volatile Western Province. Three other figures in this grouping, Sefelino Mulenga, Axon Soko, and Aaron Miller, have been dismissed from office. They had all associated themselves with Arthur Wina in Parliament as critics of the government, developing a clearly defined opposition to many of Kaunda's policies:
• It mades constant reference to the closure of the Rhodesian border (effective since January 1973) and blames this for many of Zambia's economic problems. In that respect its representatives particularly delight in pointing out that the border is closed only for Zambia itself. Thus copper from the neighbouring Shaba Province of Zaire travels through Zambia, Rhodesia, and Botswana into South Africa to be shipped from East London. Practically all essential supplies of mining equipment and consumer commodities, including a large part of the food consumption of the province, travel in the reverse direction. Meantime, 90,000 tons of Zambian cargo is marooned Tanzania, its only directly accessible port.
For many of its advocates, reopening of the border is not just a means of cheapening transport costs. They are convinced that such a move would reduce the price of many commodities currently very costly in Zambia because they are brought in from the northern hemisphere. If full trading relationships could be reopened with South Africa and Rhodesia, these could be obtained more cheaply from these more developed neighbours. The problem with this argument is that in the long run such a development could of course have a debilitating effect on Zambia's own infant industries.
At the time of independence, 40% of Zambia's imports came from Rhodesia and a further 21% from South Africa. From 1965 onwards, gradual attempts were made to reduce Zambian dependence on these areas. Because of the much larger markets in the south, a full reopening of the borders would undoubtedly lead to a reconcentration of industry there and a rundown of that in Zambia.
This analysis enables us to see that the "right-wing" grouping that we are discussing here does not in fact articulate the aspirations of most of Zambia's bureaucratic bourgeoisie on this issue. The latter will prefer to strengthen state-owned enterprise, which is their own avenue to wealth and privilege. For these, the border closure has provided fertile ground. It would be more accurate to say that the Wina grouping expresses essentially the positions of international capital, which would of course much prefer to achieve regional hegemony through the concentration of production in one efficient plant.
• This link is reflected again in a second key feature of their attitudes. They are the foremost advocates in Zambia in favour of widening the sphere of openings for foreign investment. They often accuse the government of discouraging its potential contribution to development through nationalisations, bureaucratic controls, etc.
On this issue they won a victory with the introduction of the Industrial Development Bill on August 11, 1977. This was rapidly passed through Parliament and contains an Investment Code guaranteeing the repatriation of profits and capital for private investors. Little attempt is being made to disguise the fact that this represents a major policy change by the government and heavy stress has been laid on the fact that there will be no more waves of nationalisations like that of 1968-71. Less honestly accounted for is why Kaunda has made this reversal. Not only is it in contradiction with the professed aim of "building socialism," but it is also a step backwards for a ruling class whose power is based on the control of state-owned enterprise.
• More clearly directed at members of the bureaucracy is the Wina grouping's increasing stress on reducing the number of office holders in the state. Here they direct most fire at the institutions of Zambia's single party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). This has a twenty-eight member Central Committee earning 12,000 kwacha [about (each US$15,000] per annum plus expenses).
Perhaps most importantly, the Central Committee tends to be generally composed, like the party administration right down the line, of members whose rise to position has usually come through long-time loyalty to the machine. Many of these bureaucrats have minimal education and tend to be regarded with contempt by other sections of the elite who feel they have won their own positions through talent and not "erawling."
Related to this is the fact that the Central Committee has tended to become a parallel organ of government that is not responsible to parliament but is largely under the direct control of the president. It is elected by the National Council, where Kaunda's position is unchallenged. Its general secretary, who is the president's deputy, is appointed by Kaunda. The demand for a cut in its influence has been accompanied by one for the election of its general secretary.
• On two issues, the positions of this "right" grouping find a more dynamic response throughout the bureaucracy.
First, Zambia's dire financial position has led to demands for economy through the restoration of fee paying in schools and hospitals. Through such a move, it is argued, the quality of these services, currently deteriorating in disastrous fashion, could be improved. Clearly of course this would apply only to those who would then be able to afford them. The financial position of most members of Parliament is clearly shown by their overwhelming support of such proposals.
Second, Zambia's "Leadership Code" is supposed to apply to all civil servants with incomes exceeding K2,000 [about US$2,500] per annum, who are officially forbidden to have incomes from any private business. On September 9 the annual meeting of managing directors of FIN- DECO (Financial and Industrial Corporation, embracing all of Zambia's parastatal companies) called for the restriction of the code's application to persons in political positions only. They alleged that its embracing of persons like themselves with money to spare for investment was effectively slowing down the potential rate of growth in the economy. Once again their plea gained overwhelming parliamentary support, particularly from the "right-wing" grouping.
As long as most of these complaints of the "right" were heard only in frequent speeches by members of Parliament, they could safely be largely ignored by Kaunda. A potentially much more dangerous threat was posed, however, when many of them were contained in a Parliamentary Select Committee report presented November 29 and unanimously accepted by the House the next day. Amongst other things, it proposed:
• A "recipient contribution" be instituted for social services.
• All consumer subsidies to be phased out over the next three years.
• Further encouragement to be given to overseas private investors.
• Revision of the Leadership Code.
• Making the Central Committee elective from regional conferences of the party.
• Electing the general secretary of the party by popular vote.
• "Some form of coercive redeployment" to be implemented for urban unemployed.
Kaunda reacted angrily to the report. In his opening speech to the National Council of the UNIP December 11 he attacked Parliament strongly for taking up matters that lay outside its constitutional prerogatives, such as the call for changes in the functioning of the party. He insisted, "I
regard Parliament as a committee of the National Council."
But despite the bluster, Kaunda did not feel strong enough to take action against Mwanakatwe or the other two ministers involved. Furthermore, it is now clear that on economic and social questions the government is moving in the direction pointed to by the committee.
Reemergence of the UPP, A 'Populist' Current?
On September 9, 1977, a press conference of prominent leaders of the ex-United Progressive Party (UPP)-Simon Kapwepwe, John Chisata, Justin Chimba, Peter Chanda, and Musondo Chambeshiannounced their reentry into the UNIP.
The first test of popularity of the ex-UPP members came when one of them, Chambeshi, entered for the by-election held in the Roan constituency, Luanshya. Chambeshi won 1,126 votes, 56% of the total in a poll now down to 13% of the electorate. This happened despite heavy-handed attempts to prevent his victory and Kaunda's own last-minute intervention.
In face of this intervention, Chambeshi's victory must be seen as a very clear indication of the low level to which Kaunda's popularity has now sunk. On the other hand, unfortunately, it cannot be seen as a conscious opting for any radical alternative politics.
Before its banning in January 1972, the UPP was notable for its opportunism and its willingness to use tribalism as a means to win support. It got a great deal of support on the Copperbelt through exploiting economic discontent during the early 1970s recession, complaining about, among other things, the governmentimposed wage freeze. On the other side, it lined up with the distinctively right-wing African National Congress, whose main base lay in the Southern and Western Provinces and which complained persistently of the adverse effects of the scaling down of contacts with the white-ruled south. Its origins as a party lay in the factional disputes of the late 1960s inside the UNIP in which alignments were formed on tribal lines. The UPP was associated overwhelmingly with the Bemba, who are dominant on the Copperbelt and in Northern Province.
That they intend to attack once again through appealing to their "natural" constituency among the Copperbelt working class is apparent from an aggressive speech made by Chambeshi in Parliament on March 29. Kaunda has frequently suggested that Zambia's economic problems arise from its people's tendency to prefer foreign "luxuries" to good traditional food and drink. He has called for reestablishing nshima (boiled maize meal) as the basic national dish. Chambeshi commented that some leaders who at this moment call for eating nshima in place of bread will tomorrow be suggesting we should return to our ancestors practice of eating only one meal a day. Instead of posing such false solutions to economic problems, the govern-
KAUNDA: Popularity plummets.
ment must look for the real causes and recognise that many people, even among those who are working, have difficulties in affording even nshima.
On the political front then, Kaunda's leadership is now confronted with a dual threat. It can be safely predicted that the route to success in the general election that is due to take place this year will be increasingly outspoken criticism of government policies. Those who have been longest associated with such opposition (in particular the clear outsiders of the ex- UPP grouping) will benefit the most.
Just now it seems unlikely that a candidate will emerge to challenge Kaunda in the simultaneous presidential election. While Kapwepwe is the strongest political rival, he may feel that for the present his remains too narrow to make an base effective challenge.
From the standpoint of Zambia's labouring masses, of course, there can be no advantage in supporting any one of these contenders for bureaucratic power and privilege. With the complete absence of any real alternative, however, it is certain that large numbers of "protest" votes will go to these "rivals," particularly in the elections to Parliament.
The situation would be more hopeful were there any signs of a revival in the trade-union movement, which at leadership level is a thoroughly integrated part of the party and government machinery. Objective conditions, however, militate against this, and the past year has seen a continuation of the sad history of workingclass defeat in nearly every struggle.
On June 1, 1977, thirty-two "strike leaders" were sacked at Reckitt and Coleman's factory in Ndola.
On December 16, "strike ringleaders" were sacked at Livingstone Motor Assemblers. The management action was endorsed without question by the National Union of Transport and Allied Workers executive January 20.
On March 12, 1978, about 100 workers were fired at Zambia Clay in Kitwe after a three-hour strike protesting delays in the implementation of a negotiated wage agreement.
Given the ready availability of thousands of unemployed, the totally bureaucratic leadership of the unions and the absence of any important traditions of struggle, the Zambian working class is disabled in crippling fashion from conducting any real economic fight.
The one section of the class with which the government has until now assiduously avoided any confrontation and which has a history of strike action going back to 1935 is the labour force in the copper mines. But right now their position is gravely weakened by the fact that this is being gradually run down through a deliberate process of premature retirement and that the mines are running at a loss because of copper prices.
The situation of the trade-union movement then poses gigantic tasks for revolutionists. Only when sections of the class can be won to a programme that takes up demands like the sliding scale of wages against inflation, generalisation of all struggles, and the posing of workers control against that of the state bureaucracy, can the present logjam be broken.
Those massive external developments in southern Africa that are not dealt with here but which have formed an essential part of the Zambian political scene will continue to play an increasingly important role in this process. It is highly likely that proletarian revolution in Zambia will come about ultimately only as part of an upsurge of the entire region, in which the central role will obviously be played by the Black proletariat of South Africa.
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Selections From the Left gauche
"The Left," French-language paper of the Revolutionary Workers League,
Belgian section of the Fourth International. Published weekly in Brussels.
In a news analysis column in the June 29 issue, François Massion unmasks the latest phase of Belgian imperialist intervention in Zaïre:
"People are talking about the return of the paratroopers from Shaba. What's not being talked about so much, however, is that ninety new Belgian paratroopers were sent to Zaire to take their place. Our government is really displaying a great deal of 'humanitarianism.' A few weeks ago, the pretext that was used for the first
'Red Beans, operation, code-named vanished-the Europeans' were repatriated. The highly inventive general staff came up with a new justification for maintaining a Belgian military presence in Zaire.
"Officially, the purpose of the new mission-nicknamed 'White Beans'-is to distribute food and medical supplies provided by Belgium to the population. A neat subterfuge-for it will probably take quite a while before the people of Shaba see the true colors of this Belgian aid.
"The cabinet announced at its June 23 meeting that the government would main. tain a Belgian division in Africa after the return of some of the paratroopers on June
30. A few days prior to this decision, the UPI and Reuters wire services reported that Kinshasa had furnished the Western governments with information indicating that a regroupment of 1,000 'rebels' had taken place near Luashi, and had asked these governments to step up their military aid. (Le Monde, June 20).
"A sixth sense tells us that there must be a cause-and-effect relationship between Mobutu's new quakings and the outpouring of humanitarianism on the part of our government. We can understand how Mobutu feels—after all, 2,400 troops of the all- African force, plus a team of Chinese military instructors, plus 'white' experts directly overseeing Mobutu's state apparatus, plus a decaying army, doesn't add up to much when it comes to holding back the anger of an entire populace.
"For once, we agree with the chairman of the Socialist Party in Flanders, Karel Van Miert, when he says: 'It is unacceptable that things should still be portrayed as though our aid were benefiting Zaire, when, on the contrary, it winds up in the pockets of Mobutu and his advisers. ... Furthermore, it is unacceptable that Belgian paratroopers should continue to function as Mobutu's gendarmes.'
"What is equally unacceptable is for ministers or parliamentary deputies who claim to defend the interests of labor to participate in, or sanction, a government that sends military aid to an increasingly isolated dictatorship."
United Irishman
Newspaper of Sinn Féin the Workers' Party, published monthly in Dublin.
At the end of 1974, the "Official" republican movement began degenerating rapidly into a Stalinist economist sect. The circulation of its paper plummeted. The June issue of the United Irishman indicates that this process has reached a new low point.
The paper is now notably smaller than it was when the "Officials" still played a role in the national struggle. Whereas it was once an organizer of anti-imperialist actions, it now testifies to the way that these former republicans have turned into their opposite.
For example, the June issue reports a speech by an "Official" spokesman, Séan O Cionnaith, who argued that the Dublin premier began to call for a united Ireland just to divert the people's attention from economic problems.
"Jack Lynch, the man who stood idly by in 1969, is now all for a United Ireland. Why? Not because he seriously wants a united Ireland but in order to stop the people down South worrying or talking about the 180,000 unemployed."
Since the "Officials" are proving unable to understand the new rise of antiimperialist feeling and the pressures it exerts on Irish political life, they seem destined to become still more isolated and politically paralyzed.
ekopaon
"Sosialistike Ekphrase" (Socialist Expression), central organ of the youth affiliate of the Cypriot Social Democratic Party. Published fortnightly in Nicosia, Cyprus.
The June 16 issue contains a letter from a group of EDhEK [the Cypriot Socialist Party] and independent Cypriot students in Romania. The statement says:
"In the recent period it has been noted that students are leaving the Union of Cypriot Students in Romania. Specifically, a whole group of students left this organiin the city of Cluj. The former zation members complain of antidemocratic procedures prevailing in the student union. It is anticipated that there will also be resignations from the organization in Bucharest, Ploesti, and other cities in Romania. Students are walking out of the Union of Cypriot Students in Romania en masse.
*The reason for these events is the determination of the students attached to AKEL [the Cypriot Communist Party] to hold on to the leadership of the student union by any means, legitimate or illegitimate.
"With the decision of the Romanian government three years ago to accept paying students in the country, the small Cypriot student union there, which has consisted overwhelmingly of scholarship students sent by AKEL, grew to perhaps the largest Cypriot student organization in the socialist countries. The students attached to AKEL tried, shrewdly, to present the student union as a nonpartisan body and managed to get all the Cypriot students to go into it, while they kept the leadership in their hands....
"Recently the officers of the student union (which is supposed to be nonpartisan, we repeat) all exhorted the members to contribute to an AKEL fund drive, and the money was collected by the treasurers of this 'nonpartisan' organization.
"In Cluj in particular the situation reached an impasse. The student committee in this city consisted of four supporters of AKEL and one supporter of EDhEK, who was never called to meet with the other four and never knew about the decisions of the committee of which he was supposed to be a member.
"Once the students who were not supporters of AKEL began to act together, the student committee in Cluj was forced to resign. It admitted to all the students that it had been functioning in violation of the statutes. Elections were then expected to choose a new committee.
"What followed can be compared only with a coup d'état. The students attached to AKEL announced in record time to a number of students that a general meeting was being called (they did not say what would be discussed). Other students were not informed at all of the assembly. The non-AKEL member of the committee was informed of this 'assembly' only minutes before it began, so that he was unable to attend.
"Thus, only two of the five members of the committee (which according to the statutes is the only body that can call elections) were present. They announced that elections would be held right then, violating both the statutes and democratic principles. This touched off a storm of protest from the non-AKEL students. They demanded postponement of the elections and for the candidates to present programs on student questions and the Cyprus situation. The AKEL-dominated committee responded to these protests and proposals by calling for a vote to hold elections immediately. The AKEL 'majority' that had been carefully summoned outvoted the opposition....
"So, with the withdrawal of all the oppositionists, AKEL was left alone with its 'majority' in the 'strictly nonpartisan' Union of Cypriot Students in Romania. ...
"It is a disgrace that those who claim to be democrats have staged elections reminiscent of those carried out by the junta in its seven years of rule [in Greece].
"In concluding, we want to make one thing clear, the Romanian authorities intervened in no way in this affair. They have maintained a consistently neutral stand. This problem arose among Cypriot 'democrats' and democrats. We await the response of the Cypriot organizations that have an interest in the matter."
ippu
"Banner," monthly organ of the Finnish Social Democratic Youth League. Published in Helsinki.
ssue No. 3 for 1978 has a column or outh unemployment by Hannu Kuikk
"The crisis of the capitalist market economy makes life very insecure for young people. A young person who has finished school has been prepared to take up the task allotted him or her by society-to work. Work is the basis of all human activity and of everyone's livelihood.
"Typical of capitalism is a large 'reserve army' of labor. And Finland certainly has a large enough one, since 200,000 workers are without jobs. [The country's total population is under five million.]
"In central Finland, the percentage of youth employment is higher. One out of two unemployed workers is a young person. Their prospects for the future do not look very bright.
"The youth are being driven to Sweden or to the unemployment offices...