At long last, the Argentine dictatorship has chosen a president for the "Second Period of the Process of National Reorganization." Videla is to assume his new title at the beginning of August-but his threeyear term began last March 24. With unmistakable sarcasm the editors of the Buenos Aires daily La Nación said May 7: "This is the first time a president has been chosen retroactively."
Nonetheless, this irony could not cover over the fact that the new president was "elected" by three persons, and that his long-discussed and oft-postponed designation brought to light the deep rifts inside the armed forces. The leading voice of the Argentine exploiters rejoiced once the decision had been reached, noting that it had become an imperative need since "at the end of last week the military's deliberations took on dimensions that the political eyes of the country are not accustomed to seeing" (La Nación, May 7).
So there is agreement on the presidential figure for the "Second Phase." But the powers of this president remain to be discussed. The resolution adopted thus takes on mere symbolic value, designed simply to limit the public argument among the military commanders, which has revealed to all the political crisis that the dictatorship is now going through.
In the same communiqué in which it announced Videla's selection, the military junta reported that it had decided "to direct the appropriate bodies to study the specific aspects of the functioning of the governmental system and to make recommendations before July 15, 1978." This involves deciding who is to appoint the cabinet ministers and the provincial governors, and whether or not the president will also be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces-as has been the case since 1853. In other words, what is to be decided is who will actually run the government. After two years without reaching agree. ment, the junta has decided to set a deadline.
The situation can be summed up in a single sentence: Videla is governing as president in his second term, which began March 24 of this year, but only by July 15 will his powers have been decided upon ... and he assumes his new post on August 1.
Whatever the immediate outcome of this crisis, it is clear that in one way or another the dictatorship is entering a new phase. To foresee what its character will be re quires above all understanding what the military junta set out to do and what it has achieved in the past two years.
The Causes of the Coup
The armed forces explained that the coup was unavoidable for two reasonsthe activity of the guerrilla organizations and the existence of a "power vacuum. While more than a few revolutionists let themselves be taken in by such arguments, it cannot stand the least comparison with the facts.
In the first place, in order to talk about a "power vacuum," you have to ignore the fact that long before March 24, 1976, the armed forces had taken over all the key positions in the state. They did this with the complicity of all the bourgeois and reformist parties and even the government of Isabel Perón. (It might be noted in passing that for revolutionists to think in terms of a "power vacuum" implies a curious conception of the bourgeois state and the factors that lead to a breakdown of its power.)
A vast amount of special repressive legislation, the state of siege, and the voluntary paralysis of the Congress gave the military a blank check to carry out their repressive tasks throughout the coun try. Tucumán Province was put under direct military control; a member of the armed forces general staff became chief of the federal police (General Harguíndeguy, now minister of the interior).
It is a big mistake to confuse the paralysis of a camarilla of adventurers in the government with a "power vacuum."
At the same time, the ERP and the Montoneros not only did not pose a threat to this government-nothing could be further from the truth!-but rather were clearly on the wane. The total failure of the ERP's attack on the Monte Chingolo regiment in December 1975, the destruction of the guerrillas operating in the mountains of Tucumán, and the disaster that resulted from the Montoneros' attack on the Formosa regiment demonstrated unmistakably that the guerrilla organizations were approaching the culmination of an irreversible decline that had begun long before. The military coup—or more precisely, the transfer of the government to the military-resulted neither from any fanciful "power vacuum" nor from any imagi nary guerrilla threat.
Rather the coup must be explained on the basis of the bourgeoisie's need to come up with a tactical and strategic response to the challenge of the workers movement. The breakup of the Peronist movement deprived the ruling class of the only instrument it had to control and deflect the activity of the workers on the trade-union and political levels. It became necessary to purge the union bureaucracy-by then incapable of fulfilling its function-and put together a new political force that replace the irretrievably defunct could Peronist movement.
The powerful workers mobilization that culminated in the general strike of June 1975 had shown that the proletariat was moving ahead toward achieving class independence and that even in the government the Peronists were incapable of containing that advance. Replacing the Peronists thus became a pressing task in order to guarantee the long-term survival of the capitalist regime. And so the bourgeoisie set its sights on that.
(It should be noted in passing that moving up the elections, a necessary part of the plan given the total paralysis of the governing camarilla, had already led to considerable success in achieving a political alternative for the bourgeoisie. The reformists, populists, and centrists, with the guerrilla organizations in the forefront, had thrown themselves enthusiastically into building a popular front and were getting ready to run Cámpora' in the elections they naively believed would be held.)
But neither the bourgeoisie's political maneuvers-in which the AAA played an important role-nor the reformist-populistcentrist betrayal, nor the blindness of hose who refused to see the deepening o he class struggle could hold back th force against which the entire political plan was aimed-the proletariat. Achieving again the level reached in the mid-1975 struggles, streetses, eye teared sheeturned zations the workers returned the treets.
throughout the country, once again got out of the control of the bureaucracy, and
Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (Argentin ntcommunist Alliance). armed paraDo l units.
reconstituted their coordinadoras. With the Coordinating Board of the Cordoba Unions* in the vanguard, the proletariat began to seek national leadership and political direction for its struggle.
On the horizon loomed a new general strike, but at an incomparably higher level than the one six months before. The bureaucracy could not repeat its maneuver of calling a general strike in order to regain control of the movement. But it could not avoid one either. Not only would a general strike have aborted-or made extremely difficult—the political plans of the bourgeoisie, but it would also have blocked the military coup.
Despite the total absence of a revolutionary leadership, the accelerating advance of the workers movement cast a shadow over all the plans of the counterrevolutionaries. Unless drastic measures were taken their immediate perspectives would be jeopardized. The decision was made-a military coup was unavoidable. The national radio network was made available to all the bourgeois leaders, who explained without mincing any words that a military coup was the only solution.
The top bureaucrats assured the workers again and again that "everything has been worked out," while they collaborated effectively to prevent the development of any national leadership for the mobilization. The reformist-populist-centrist bloc cheerfully continued to prepare its popularfront presidential formula. Revolutionary leadership was conspicuously absent. Around mid-February the military gangs began jailing and kidnapping classstruggle workers leaders. On March 24, Isabel Perón was transferred to a fortress in the south and the three military commanders installed themselves in the Casa Rosada.
In such conditions, could one expect anything but a setback for the working class?
The 'Reorganization' Begins
On March 25 the Communist Party issued a long statement supporting the "process of reorganization," pointing out that it was necessary to avert a "rightist coup," and calling for formation of "a broad democratic coalition cabinet" to carry out the "reorganization"
All indications being that there would be no elections, the guerrilla sector of the popular-front bloc called for a "people's war against the military junta." Others, proclaiming that the working class had suffered a historic defeat, went into hibernation.
To be sure, a number of revolutionary- Marxist organizations did not fail to raise their voices in a courageous way. Through-
The coordinating committee of class-strugg positions from all factories and brancheg: industry in Córdoba.
out the process these groups had sought to provide an answer. But for historical reasons that I am not going to go into here (their smallness, their divisions, and all the political weaknesses that spring from this), they were unable, both before and after the coup, to put forward a credible political alternative, a concrete proposal for overcoming the lack of a workers leadership.
In this context, once the military junta was installed in power, with the backing of a solid bourgeois front, what could be expected but that the workers movement would suffer further, still graver, setbacks?
But is it permissible to say, as some have, that this situation is the result of some "intrinsic weakness" on the part of the proletariat? Certainly not! Still less acceptable are the conclusions drawn by those who, while they correctly understand the causes of the coup, think that the workers movement amounts to no more than the sum total of exiles, dead, prisoners, and kidnapping victims. On this basis, they come up with the idea that there is no organized vanguard in Argentina today, that the class is atomized and lacks even so much as trade-union organization, and that we must start from less than zero to organize the resistance.
The facts demonstrate quite the contrary. These are highlighted, for example, in a statement of "support for the government" published May 7 by the Rural Association-which represents the cattleraising oligarchy whose interests are tightly linked to big monopoly capital and imperialism. The Rural Association says: "The situation in the labor field has still not been clarified, nor has the system been brought into harmony with the guiding principles of the process.
Semantic discussion about words that are more or less arbitrarily interpreted is not very important. Only a totally irresponsible person could fail to recognize the hard, extremely hard, blows that the workers movement has suffered in Argentina. What is important, however, is for it to be clearly understood that (in the words of the club of the Argentine counterrevolutionists) "the system has not yet been brought into harmony with the guiding principles" of the dictatorship. In our own words-the working class has not yet been smashed. Its trade-union structures have not yet been dismantled. And the bourgeoisie has not yet been able to inflict on it a defeat that could demoralize it and break the inexorable and uninterrupted line of its development toward class independence.
Why is it especially important for us to make this clear, as the decisive question? Because the "not yet" in the statement by the Rural Association means two things. In the first place it means that despite the indescribable repression that we must confront, we Argentine revolutionists do not have to work in a wasteland or preach in a wilderness.
Quite to the contrary. We sow on fertile soil. We are swimming with the tide, not against it. The harvest we seek to gather has not been felled by the murderous hand of the bourgeoisie. We speak our words to eager ears that have already learned to pay no heed to the false voices of the enemies of the revolution! Is this what is pointed up by those who tell us of a deepgoing defeat, a terrible defeat, an historic defeat? Obviously not.
In the second place, this "not yet" means that the most economically powerful sector of our class enemy believes the job has not been done... and is calling for finishing it. Now that the heroic resistance of the workers, the economic disaster, the disintegration of the bourgeois front, and the divisions inside the armed forces are all coming together in a crisis, big capital says in its document: "What is to be called for from citizens is reflection and sober judgment, and from the government, energy, so as to keep outdated solutions from being tried again."
Whatever disagreements we might have, we revolutionists must respond with one voice to this declaration by the class enemy: that the government must be energetic-because it has not yet smashed the workers movement!
What Is the 'Second Period'?
The conflicts that arose in choosing a president for the "second period" of the dictatorship are only the reflection on the institutional level of the following crucial problem: The dictatorship is supposed to represent the bourgeoisie's strategic answer to the workers movement, but after two years in power and despite its bloodthirsty rampage it has not fully carried through the first tactical step to enable such a long-term solution to begin to take shape.
At the same time, the dictatorship has been losing its base of support. The divisions among the bourgeoisie are being carried over into the ranks of the military. And the climate of passivity and confusion that made it possible for the regime to accomplish what it did in its first months has dissipated. The first period is thus obviously over, but the dictatorship has not yet been able to get into a position where it could open a second stage. Since there is neither agreement nor predominant support inside the armed forceseither for "acting energetically" or for "trying outdated solutions again"—an open crisis looms.
To provide a solution at this critical turning point, a "political plan" was presented, at the very moment the military junta announced that Videla had been named president for the next stage. The plan illustrates the kind of room for maneuver that the bourgeoisie has today; it is all the more revealing since it was drawn up by the Asociación de Bancos Argentinos (ADEBA-Association of Argentine Banks). In 359 pages it analyzes political and economic developments since 1930 and projects the study to the year 2000.
The bankers'
plan proposes a constitutional reform to assure that political parties ("the central axis of the state and government in democratic societies") will be governed by new principles. These principles would include:
a. A stipulation that the role of political parties is to further the fundamental values of the constitution and that they are not above those values.
b. A constitutional obligation to deny the opportunity to function as a political party to those who in their platform do not explicitly subscribe to the basic values of Argentine society.
c. A provision for stripping political parties of all their rights if, in exercising governmental power, they violate the fundamental rights and liberties of society and citizens, or if they fail to openly, repeatedly, and clearly meet their obligations to society and individuals.
d. A provision that no party be allowed monopoly control of the representative bodies, and that candidates in municipal elections run as individuals.
ADEBA, not wanting to leave any room for improvisation, proposed further conditions beyond the above "principles": (1) the abolition of compulsory voting; (2) no voting rights for illiterates, ie., all those who have not completed their primary schooling (the dropout rate from primary schools reached 50 percent in the last decade); and (3) raising the voting age from eighteen to twenty-one years.
ADEBA also states that the executive branch is to predominate over parliament, although at the same time, in another respect, the office of the president is to have its powers cut. The president would not be commander-in-chief of the armed forces and could not designate military commanders, directors of the Central Bank and state enterprises, or supreme court judges. The president would have a role to play nonetheless, since ADEBA's draft accords the chief executive: "a. the sole power to initiate laws; b. the power of veto, which cannot be overridden by the congress."
Still more guarantees were apparently thought necessary, and so the moneybags proposed that the new constitution establish that "the armed forces shall have constitutional responsibility for preserving the liberties and fundamental rights of individuals and society against attacks by the state or by social groups." Also proposed is a "constitutional security clause, which would become operative like a red light whenever the government openly and systematically violated rights and fundamental liberties, created social chaos, or gravely neglected its responsibilities for maintaining security."
Another innovation is that all provinces would have an equal number of representatives in the congress, regardless of their population.
There are, of course, some preconditions that must be achieved before this ambicapacin
"PRESIDENT" VIDELA
tious plan can be put into practice to open "a historic stage of renovated institutions." ADEBA notes three:
1. Effective public peace and security, that is, total monopoly of force on the part of the state.
2. Economic improvement, of such scope and continuity that the society will be able to see tangible benefits.
• Develonment bv the armed forces of a olitical action program with three essentia goals: (a) acceptance by the citizenry of a set of principles that can act as the cement of renovated institutions, (b) the embodiment by stages of the principles into institutions, and (c) the achievement of an orderly, controlled process of succession in government, the basic premise of which would be continuity of the established political order and program.
This is only one of the many projects under discussion today. Basing themselves on Pinochet's concept of "authoritarian democracy," some are putting the stress on "democracy" and others on "authority." All, however, agree that the above preconditions must be achieved before the "new historic stage" can begin. The "second period" would then be marked by the achievement of "social peace" and "substantial and ongoing economic development," along with the implementation of a "program of political action."
As we have seen, this process is not loes represent a of the toming, starting off too well for the bourgeoisie. But this does represent an attempt to tackle the decisive problem of the coming years: to achieve "acceptance by the citizenry of a set of principles that can act as the cement of the institutions." Put bluntly, this involves replacing the Peronist movement with one or more political formations capable of binding and gagging the proletariat. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that this third prerequisite is intimately bound up with the other two, let us see what steps have been taken toward achieving it.
A United Front Against the Workers Movement
It must be noted first of all that varied forces have converged at the international level to carry out this task. Imperialism, taking a lively interest, has advanced its pawns-Social Democracy, the church, the bureaucratic union federations-in an open offensive against the independence of the Argentine workers movement. The most striking example of this has been the 1977 turn of the bulk of the Commission of the Twenty-five toward Social Democratic positions. This has involved link-up with the ICFTU, as well as abandoning all references to the "third position" and other folkloric formulas of Peronism.
There have been repeated visits from ICFTU and AFL-CIO bureaucrats. The top bureaucrats of all currents have had meetings with Cyrus Vance, Terence Todman, and Franz-Josef Strauss. These comings and goings formed the prologue to an impressive political campaign. Among other things, they have set up a weekly periodical aimed at "working people" (Tribuna de la República), another weekly aimed at the small and middle bourgeoisie (Tribuna Económica), and a monthly exclusively for pensioners (Tribuna del Jubilado).
The AFL-CIO organized a cadre school in Washington for apprentice bureaucrats. Another school lasting more than a month was held in Bariloche, an exclusive tourist center in the southern part of the country. The Jesuits as well organized various short courses with the same objectives. These were conducted by Msgr. Quarraccino, the bishop of Avallaneda; union bureaucrat Miguel Gazzera; and Jorge Gualco, the leader of the People's Christian Party.
At a meeting last November the Latin American Workers Federation (CLAT), a regional Christian body funded by the Adenauer Foundation, ousted Raimundo Ongaro from his post and put Miguel Gazzera in his stead. In his new capacity, Gazzera opened an "office of CLAT af-
So end indier foremier on tereness of fairs" in Buenos Aires.
5. A coordinating committee of the leaders of
For its part, the ORIT (Inter-American Regional Workers Organization)-the discredited Latin American section of the ICFTU-has seriously set about changing its name and founding a new continental federation based in Buenos Aires.
The offensive is not taking place only on the trade-union level, however; it is alsoand fundamentally-political. It should be remembered that the Communist Party has not been declared illegal by the dictatorship. Many of the CP's publications, which invariably support the "process of national reorganization," circulate freely in the country. The Democratic Socialist Party (in addition to the fact that its president, Américo Ghioldi, represents the military junta as ambassador to Portugal) has received obvious support in the tradeunion field. The Radical Civie Union, the only bourgeois party organized at the national level, is seeking membership in the Second International. The so-called "antiverticalist"" sector of the Peronist party, headed by Luder and Robledo, is also involved in this overall plan. The Intransigent. Party (whose principal figure, Oscar Alende, headed the presidential ticket supported by the CP in 1973) is also willing to collaborate in this task and is fighting for a slice of the pie, as are various factions of the Christian Democracy.
Nonetheless, it is obviously a simpler thing to say, "It is necessary to build a big reformist party to replace Peronism," than it is to get concrete agreement on how to go about it. The problem is the more difficult inasmuch as there are no workers parties with even limited support among the workers. The plan has to center around the union bureaucracy-which in turn, in order to exist as such, must respond to the pressing demands of the exploited masses. The economic situation offers no perspective for making real concessions to back up a policy of winning political support among the working class. And the ongoing resistance of the class is driving an inexorably widening wedge into the plans of the dictatorship and the bourgeois parties.
We are now involved in a full-scale battle. Two forces are disputing for the leadership of the workers movement: reformists and revolutionary Marxists. The former are relying on the antiworker united front that we have briefly described. The latter lack a clearly defined plan and a solid revolutionary organization capable of uniting their dispersed forces. The reformists have all the economic resources and the support of the dictatorship. The revolutionary Marxists have no economic resources and very limited organizational means; they are obliged to work in the strictest clandestinity. Between the two stand the populists and centrists. They are still clearly willing to play the reformists' game. But in certain circumstances they can be drawn in as allies behind an independent working-class policy.
This apparently negative relationship of forces changes its sign, however, when one decisive factor is brought into the equation-the living workers movement. The continual resistance and the vitality of the workers movement have thrown all the dictatorship's plans into turmoil. This crisis is expressed in the struggles within the military command, the political paralysis of the dictatorship, the inability of the bourgeois parties to reach a concrete agreement, an economic situation that is out of control, and—a development that is bound to have big repercussions in the futurethe divisions in the bureaucracy.
For Unconditional Unity of the Workers Movement
In early April the "verticalist" sector of the Peronist bureaucracy formed what it calls the Comisión de Gestión y Trabajo® (whose initials happen to be CGT). These forces took on the Commission of the Twenty-five in a sharp public confrontation, fighting for the labor franchise from the dictatorship. The "verticalist" wing is mostly, though not exclusively, made up of the leaders of unions that are under military intervention. (Notably, however, José
secretary of
Rodriguez, general the
Machinists Union, which is under government intervention, is in the opposing gang; he is a stalwart agent of the ICFTU.)
This split in the bureaucracy is still not well defined and at present separates only the bureaucratic tops. While it reflects the objective pressure of the workers coming to bear against the plans of the dictatorship and the bourgeois and reformist parties, it also poses a serious danger that must be dealt with immediately. It threatens to split the workers movement. The struggle to defend trade-union unity can be waged effectively only if a correct response is made to the political maneuver that our enemy is trying to carry out.
There are, broadly speaking, three different projects aimed at constructing a political force capable of "acting as the cement of renovated institutions": On one side we have the dominant sector of the Commission of the Twenty-five, supported by the ICFTU. Their approach is to build a Social Democratic party on the German model. On the other, we have the Comisión de Gestión y Trabajo, which is seeking to refurbish the "national movement"
and restore the continuity of Peronism. In between these are the UCR and some minor bourgeois parties trying to pull the other two forces around their own apparatus.
8. Labor Action Commission. Its initials, CGT, also stand for Confederación General del Trabajo (General Confederation of Labor). The CGT was the main Peronist union federation; it has been dissolved by the military junta,
The overall picture is still quite confused and ill defined. It is nonetheless clear that the minister of labor, along with ex- President Arturo Frondizi's Movement for Integration and Development and the "nationalist" sector of the army, is on the side of the Comisión de Gestión y Trabajo. The "liberal" sectors of the armed forces are divided among the other two variants. A recent meeting presided over by UCR leader Ricardo Balbin brought together the former components of the Hora Pueblo, plus the CP and several factions of the old Socialist Party, around Balbin's slogan "Videla, a general for democracy." This indicated the basis of support for the UCR's project.
The revolutionary-Marxist program expressly stipulates that, under certain circumstances, the formation of a labor party can be a positive step in the struggle for political independence of the workers movement and in the process of building a revolutionary workers party. But there are specific prerequisites for supporting such a development, the primary one being that the party in question be based on genuinely proletarian organizations. The operation being attempted by the UCR, which has supporters in the Commission of the Twenty-five as well as in the Comisión de Gestión y Trabajo, runs directly counter to this. It must therefore be exposed as a project that is contrary to the immediate and historical interests of the workers movement.
As for the other two variants, since they were given their push by the support of the Social Democracy or the current represented by the minister of labor and are aimed primarily at dividing the workers movement, they constitute a danger that must be immediately averted by revolutionary Marxists. In the present situation this task can be accomplished only with a perspective that combines defending the unity of the workers movement and fighting for its political independence from the parties of the bourgeoisie. And that perspective takes concrete form in the battle for an independent workers party.
Democratic Rights—A Key Struggle
While the fight to roll back the wage cuts is the main concern of the workers at the moment, this struggle links up directly with the problem of democratic rights. The slogan of "free collective bargaining" combines these two aspects of the struggle in a concentrated form. To discuss wages freely presupposes the military getting out of the unions, full restoration of trade-union life, and repeal of the laws that have abolished the right to strike, to hold meetings, and to organize, as well as freedom of expression and other rights.
In addition to all that, thousands of jailings and kidnappings and the total lack of personal security under the conditions of the repression have given rise to a de facto antidictatorial front embracing the immense majority of the population. The bourgeois parties have had to respond to this in spite of themselves.
While the workers movement must unconditionally defend its independence, it also needs allies in the fight for democratic rights. It must expose the reactionary character of the parties that try to present themselves as democrats, and lead a strug gle of the workers and popular masses against the dictatorship. To this end, it should raise demands that those persons kidnapped be produced and that the human rights recognized by the constitution be fully observed. This program leads logically and unavoidably to calling for the overthrow of the dictatorship and for the convoking of a national constituent assembly.
Propagandistically, the formulation of this demand should call for the constituent assembly to be convoked by a provisional government of the CGT and the parties and organizations of the workers and popular masses. However, the slogan will have to be adjusted as events unfold, so as not to impede the revolutionary Marxists in struggling for their program in the concrete situation.
But at the same time that we confront the dictatorship, we also have a big battle to carry out against the enemies of the social revolution inside the workers move. ment. This battle begins with the organization, factory by factory, of the clandestine resistance, and culminates in the political struggle against the dictatorship. It demands that the revolutionary Marxists unify their forces and lay the basis for a big party-the Argentine section of the Fourth International-which can offer an alternative adequate to meet the historic challenge that we face.
The dictatorship is in crisis. It must begin its second stage without having achieved the objectives of the first. The world economic situation holds nothing in store for it but new and still greater diffi culties. The present state of affairs can lead either to a redoubled offensive by the bourgeoisie aimed at finally breaking the back of the proletariat, or to a complete collapse of the dictatorship, the failure of all the plans of the bourgeoisie, and the opening of a new chapter in the history of the Argentine proletariat. On this point, what the Trotskyists and the Fourth International do will be decisive.
Notes
1. Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (Revolutionary People's Army).
2. Héctor Cámpora, a Peronist leader elected president in March 1973. He resigned three months later and was succeeded by Perón himself.
6. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Founded at the end of World War II as an alliance between the European Social Democratic union bureaucracy and the U.S. AFL-CIO. The latter has since pulled out.
7. The wing of the Peronist leadership that sought more room for dissent within the central. ized, "vertical" command structure of the movement.
9. The Hour of the People-a front of bourgeois parties and a faction of the Socialist Party formed in 1970 to press for a greater role for political parties under the Onganía dictatorship.