The defeat of the Union of the Left in the March legislative elections touched off a crisis in both of the big workers parties that belonged to this alliance. In the SP, it has not yet taken an acute form. On the other hand, the crisis in the CP has assumed unprecedented proportions.
This is not the first crisis that the Communist Party has experienced since the end of the Second World War, that is, since it became the dominant party in the working class. It went through crises at the time of Stalin's break with Yugoslavia, at the time of Khrushchev's report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and during the mobilizations in Poland and Hungary that also came in 1956, at the time of the Algerian war, during the war in Vietnam, and in May 1968.
However, all these crises were relatively minor in scope. They affected intellectuals, youth, veterans of the Resistance-in short, small and rather peripheral layers of the party. The CP's working-class base, in particular the rank-and-file activists in the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail-General Confederation of Labor], who upheld the party's influence in the working class, were hardly touched by them. At most, the problems that gave rise to these crises created a malaise among the CP's working-class activists. The present crisis is both broader and deeper.
The politicalization that developed after May 1968 both in the factories and in the new areas of ferment in society did not fail to have repercussions in the CP. In a slowmoving and bureaucratic way, the leadership gave ground on some points, but it was able largely to maintain its credibility as a result of the signing of the Union of the Left pact and the Common Program. The great majority of the workers saw this as a realistic political perspective for change in a relatively short time. The criticisms of the far left were still listened to, but they had less punch.
An Unanticipated Problem
Shortly after signing the Union of the Left pact, the CP leadership found itself facing a problem that got in the way of its perspectives. The CP and the SP were now allies for the third time. The first alliance was in 1935 in the Popular Front (which included the Radical Party). The second was in the immediate postwar period in the three-party government, along with the
Republican People's
Movement [a left
Catholic party]. In the third case, the Union of the Left, the combination included the Left Radicals.
The first two experiences ended badly for the workers. However, in each case the CP had grown at the expense of the SP. But the Union of the Left was not to produce the same result.
When the agreement was signed in 1972, the SP's electoral strength was relatively small in comparison to that of the CP. After the 1973 legislative elections, it was clear that the SP was growing while the progress of the CP remained more than slow. At the May 1973 Central Committee meeting, Marchais pointed to this fact, and expressed a certain concern.
The same tendency was confirmed at the time of the legislative by-elections in the fall of 1974, and the CP leadership responded by directing violent attacks against the SP leadership over a period of weeks. The CP was and remains dominant in the factories. But for those who looked forward to achieving socialism by the parliamentary road, the fact that the SP was making gains while the CP stagnated was not a secondary problem.
The municipal elections in March 1977- a year before the legislative elections— were more than an alarm signal for the CP leaders. To be sure, the party had won control of some important municipal governments, and it made a public show of gratification over these gains. But its percentage of the vote was down even in the old bastions. On the other hand, the SP had won control of many more municipal governments, and in the number of votes had become the biggest party in France.
Moreover, for the first time, the far left had won a considerable vote in the big city working-class neighborhoods. So, the CP was losing both on its left and on its right. The party leadership steered clear of drawing any public balance sheet on these elections.
The Union of the Left Breaks Up
Shortly after the municipal elections, relations between the CP and SP began to deteriorate. Thinking that victory in the 1978 elections was even more of a sure thing because of the public wrangling between the Giscard and Chirac groups, the SP leaders were interested only in attracting more petty-bourgeois layers. And they tried to do this by watering their already very thin wine.
The CP leadership, seeking both to limit the SP's gains and drive back the far left, put a "left" face on its policy. It criticized the SP for the advances it was making to petty-bourgeois layers, forgetting all about its own previous approach of trying to attract technicians and professionals. At the same time, it started to do some poormouthing in its propaganda, talking in terms of the poor against the rich.
Beginning in September 1977, six months before the elections, the CP's propaganda came to be focused essentially against its "ally." This was done in a way and in terms that could not help but repel SP members, even those critical of their leadership. The CP leaders even left hanging the threat that they might not withdraw their own candidates in the second round in favor of the SP in those districts where SP candidates got the bigger vote. In the days following the first-round elections, the leaders of both parties staged a farce ending in an "agreement" that fooled no one.
We know what the results were in March 1978. The CP did not make any inroads into the vote of the far left. Its percentage of the total declined slightly, even though the voting age had been reduced from twenty-one to eighteen years of age. The CP's only "success" was in holding back the electoral advance of the SP.
It has been said that the CP leadership wanted a defeat, either on Moscow's orders or because it preferred to stay in the opposition during the present economic crisis. These explanations do not hold water.
There are, of course, ties between the CP and the Kremlin. But they are far from involving the kind of subordination that existed in the past. In some areas, the relations between the CP and Moscow are even fraught with conflict.
To say that the CP leadership did not want to win the elections amounts to saying that its whole fifteen-year campaign for the Union of the Left was a sham, and that even now, when the elections are over, it is continuing to support a policy that it does not want to see come to fruition.
The reality is that the CP leadership wanted a Union of the Left victory in the elections. But it was not indifferent as to the conditions in which this took place. Two factors that should not be overlooked weighed heavily in its considerations.
First, for about fifteen years, the CP has been recognized as the dominant party by far in the working class, and it is not reconciled to being outstripped by the SP. That would put in question its entire perspective. The CP's idea is that, as the only party of the working class, it will serve as the keystone of so-called class alliances such as the Union of the Left and the Union of the French People. Then, through electoral victories, it will be able to achieve deepgoing changes that will lead toward socialism.
Continued growth by the SP would put this perspective in question, since the experience of 1947 is well remembered by the CP leaders. At that time, it was an SP premier, Ramadier, who kicked the CP out of the government. They were afraid of the same thing happening again with Giscard's blessing. So, the CP leaders wanted to reestablish a favorable relationship of forces vis-à-vis the SP. That was their primary objective, for which they were willing to risk losing the elections.
The Crisis Explodes and Continues
As soon as the CP leadership started up its furious attacks on the SP in September 1977, voices began to be raised in the party which, while not defending the Social Democrats, expressed disapproval of the way the campaign was being conducted. In the aftermath of the elections, the crisis broke out.
This time, unlike in the past, what was involved was not just peripheral layers feeling the impact of some question that did directly concern the great majority of party members. For years the entire party had participated in the struggle for the Union of the Left, and the ranks could see that the anti-SP campaign was not understood by the masses. For five years at least they had had an almost palpably clear perspective, and then suddenly it vanished, without anything to take its place.
It should be added that there had been some leaks indicating that the Political Bureau was not unanimous on the policy to be taken toward the SP. A discussion in the party was inevitable.
However, the leadership handled this discussion in a way that could only exasperate all those who had criticisms to make. It postponed the Central Committee meeting for about five weeks. At the same time, it said that everyone could speak their mind in the party bodies to which they belonged (cells and branches), and that no sanctions would be taken.
However, the party leadership refused to open "discussion columns" in the party press and stopped the publication of issues in which criticisms were expressed. Those who wanted to address themselves to the members of their party did not hesitate, then, to turn toward the nonparty press. They were prompted to do so all the more because on March 20 the Political Bureau had declared from the outset: "The PCF
[Parti Communiste Français-French Communist Party] bears no responsibility in this situation [the defeat of the Union of the Left]." On March 29, Fiterman [one of the top leaders] dumped the full responsibility on the SP leaders.
In the April 26-27 Central Committee meeting, Marchais presented a report that contained no analysis of the situation, said nothing about the defeat in the elections, and sounded like a diplomatic white paper formally putting blame on an opposing party. In addition, the report distorted the criticisms that had arisen among party members and, without naming them, took a crude swipe at the intellectuals who had voiced these criticisms.
What is more, l'Humanité published Marchais's report and the Central Committee resolution of approval, which was presented as having been adopted by unanimous vote. But the party paper failed to report the remarks made in the discussion. It is now believed that the Central Committee passed the motion of approval by a majority vote and that the motion itself contained the proviso that it would be said publicly that the Central Committee was unanimous.
Before the Central Committee meeting was held, articles had appeared in various papers and magazines, including three articles by Elleinstein and four by Althusser. Far from bringing the crisis to a close, Marchais's report and the refusal of the Central Committee to permit discussion columns touched off an outcry.
Other articles were sent to Le Monde, Le Matin, Politique-Hebdo, Le Nouvel Observateur, and Rouge. Petitions were circulated, signed by many party members. The most important one originated in the party cell at the University of Aix-en-Provence, and got 300 signatures before being published.!
On April 3, Marchais declared publicly that he had received only thirty-one critical letters from party members. On May 29, he said on television that "only five branches and sixty-five cells," representing "at most a thousand members," had taken a position challenging the leadership's policy. The leadership has continued to say that it will not expel anyone, even though the statutes give them the right to do so, and that it will conduct a hard political fight against the oppositionists.
In fact, for some time, l'Humanité has been publishing daily articles of half a page to a page, and sometimes more, to combat the views of people who are not named. In accordance with the worst practices of the Stalin school, these articles try to attribute more or less made-up positions to those challenging the leadership and to present them as more or less conscious instruments of the bourgeoisie and the Social Democracy.
Once again the leadership is taking the tack that could be summarized as follows: the party is right today, and since it will continue to follow the same line, it will be right again tomorrow.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the 'Questioners'
The questioners? are sometimes said to comprise two oppositions, a right-wing around Elleinstein and a left-wing around Althusser. It is true that they are the most representative personalities who have spoken out publicly. It is also true that Elleinstein has a well-defined right-wing line that puts him close to the positions of Santiago Carrillo. This is true not only of his views regarding the Union of the Left but also regarding the splits in the 1920s that led to the formation of the Communist International.
As for Althusser, it can be said in the present crisis that he has taken a step forward. He has moved from the realm of theory, in which he kept himself ensconced up to now and isolated from the bulk of the party membership, onto a more political plane, where his views can be more generally understood.
Althusser's articles, which have been collected in the pamphlet entitled Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans le Parti communiste [What Cannot Go On Any Longer in the Communist Party],3 constitute one of the most vigorous critiques yet made of the party regime and of a number of the party's positions, such as the abandon. ment of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Althusser denounces the Stalinism persisting in the party. He condemns the "theory" of state monopoly capitalism, and so on. This is a critique that could serve to orient a questioning left current.*
However, in my opinion, it would be wrong to try to classify the oppositionists here and now and talk about currents. More than opposition currents, what we are seeing now is the expression of all sorts of criticisms, which may lead those voicing them to different positions.
What is most important to point up in the present stage of the crisis, I think, is the whole wide gamut of criticisms being voiced by members of a party that has never permitted, and in an organizational sense still does not, the expression of the thinking going on within it and the formulation of political positions based on this.
The common denominator for all these questioners is the theme of what they call the lack of democracy in the party. This is the focal point, for example, of the statement of the three hundred, which was signed by Elleinstein and Althusser, among others. It was this statement that at least temporarily blocked the attempt to isolate Althusser from the bulk of the critical elements.
The leadership itself has done its best to impress the lack of democracy in the party on the membership. It was through Marchais's statements over television that the CP membership first learned, for instance, that the party was giving up the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that it would not fight against the independent nuclear striking force but would support a policy of national defense relying on nuclear threats aimed in all directions.
This was before any news of these positions had appeared in the party press and before any discussion in the Central Committee that the members knew about. The membership was told, after the fact, that military questions had long been discussed with "specialists."5
All the questioners, likewise, recognized that the decision to turn the party's fire on the SP had been made and implemented in an unclear way without the real reasons for it and the real objectives being frankly stated.
Now all the questioners feel this same lack of democracy in the way they are being bottled up in the bodies to which they belong. They are not permitted to make their positions known to other party members except through vertical channels, which are blocked at the top. Exchanging views with party members other than those in their cell or branch is denounced as "factionalism," violation of the party statutes-in a word, as an "antiparty" attitude.
However, while expressing their aspiration for a democratic regime in their party, all the questioners declare themselves opposed to forming tendencies or factions. They do not understand that there can be no democracy where members are not allowed to form tendencies, that is, temporary groupings to defend a point of view on a specific question within the party. The ban on tendencies is simply the starting point on the road to a monolithic party.
With a wave of the hand, the CP leadership dumped the dictatorship of the proletariat, although this is a question of principle on which Lenin wrote articles and whole books and on which he got the Communist International to adopt theses.
5. These "specialists" include generals in the French army.
French army.
On the other hand, the Tenth Congress resolution [banning factions] that was used by Stalin to crush all tendencies that formed in the Soviet party had a purely
Spaul
MARCHAIS: Faces mounting dissent.
temporary character. The only justification Lenin gave for it was the gravity of the situation at the moment. At the same time, he said that this rule could not be followed subsequently in electing the Central Committee.
This resolution was never submitted to vote in the Communist International in Lenin's time. And he presented no reason of principle for adopting it. But it has been made into a dogma by the bureaucratic Stalinist and post-Stalinist leaderships.
The questioners have already produced a voluminous body of writing. Three books have appeared. The one by Althusser has already been cited. There is also Dialogue à l'intérieur du Parti communiste français by Molina and Vargas and Trente ans de parti: un communiste s'interroge [Thirty Years in the Party-A Communist Wonders] by Rony.®
There have been numerous joint statements. One, originally signed by 300 members, has already been signed by 900 more. Another was signed by a hundred members. The most recent was one signed by five party members challenging the CP's position on the "question of women." There have also been many letters, interviews, and so on.
In this material, you do not find a political line or lines, and this is not
6. The Molina and Vargas book was published by Maspéro; Rony's book by Christian Bour geois.
geois.
surprising. Rather, you find a lot of very pertinent remarks and observations. One general thing sets off these documents from those published in previous crises by minorities that soon disappeared: They all declare a determination to stay in the party. At the same time, they attack a whole series of myths that for many represented the fundamental ideology of the party, to use this term in the Marxist sense, that is, meaning false consciousness.
In these documents, we see being challenged the view that the CP is the only workers party, that the party regime is genuine democratic centralism, that the spontaneous action of the working class is dangerous, that the party is always right, and so on. All this obviously did not come out of the blue.
It is the culmination of a long internal process, as can be seen in reading the books by Molina and Vargas and by Rony. And this process is not confined to those who are openly raising questions today but is very widespread in the party, affecting even those sections that today are lined up behind the leadership.
I am not going to make a detailed examination here of what the questioners have already said. Perhaps this should be done at a later stage in the crisis, when things have gone beyond immediate reactions. Instead I want to point up what in all this material seems to me to be a considerable omission and what represents a promising step forward.
What omission do I have in mind? Several of the questioners note that their party's influence is stagnating or ever. declining among the workers. They refer to this in general terms, basing themselves only on the results of the legislative or municipal elections. None has dared raise the problem of the orientation given to the CGT by the CP activists, or to bring up the question of the situation in which the CGT finds itself.
However, all the statistics on plant elections indicate that for years the CGT has been suffering serious erosion. What is involved here is not the incompetence or mistakes of some shop delegates but a tendency affecting many industries and regions.
After June 1936 and in the aftermath of the liberation, the CGT grew enormously and with it the influence of the CP in the working class. May 1968 did not produce a similar result. Since then the CGT has been tending rather to lose ground. This cannot be attributed either to unemploy. ment or a lack of combativity on the part of the workers. The CGT has been losing to the CFDT 7 and even to Force Ouvrière.
One thing is certain. The CP members in the CGT, especially those at the top, bear the major responsibility for leading the confederation, its component unions, and their locals. In this case, they cannot blame any "right turn" by the SP. They drew the CGT behind the CP in its recent electoral campaign against the SP.
The erosion of the CT reflects the decline in the influence of the CP among broad layers of workers on the trade-union level and not just on this level. The CP leadership steers clear of raising this question because, they say, this would be violating the "independence" of the unions.°
The CGT leadership recently had an article published in /'Humanité responding to the statistics that appeared in Le Monde. It tried to minimize the loss of influence in the factories. But it cannot be unaware of the fact and also of the mistake it made in the election campaign. Without admitting it, the CGT leadership is carrying out a retreat. It has swerved from tailending the CP to a narrowly economist approach reminiscent of Force Ouvrière. Thus, it has done nothing to oppose the recent interventions of the French imperialists in Chad and Zaire.
It is essential to make a critical examination of the CP's trade-union policy from May 1968 to the present, because the whole line followed in the Union of the Left flows from this policy. The CP's policy in the labor movement has gone from scuttling the general strike to concentrating on a parliamentary combination with the SP. It is also essential to make such an assessment, as we will see further on, in order to project a perspective for the future.
However, along with this omission, which will weaken the impact of the oppoand recently has been attracted to the renovated SP.
8. This group originated in a split led by rightwing Social Democrats at the beginning of the cold war. It claims to defend the independence of unions from political parties and has attracted syndicalists and others alienated by the CP's heavy-handed control of the CGT.-IP/I
9. An interview given to Rouge by Garaudy has become an issue in the present crisis of the CP. It provoked furious statements from the CP leadership and Séguy. Garaudy presumed to reveal the content of some discussions in the CP Political Bureau in May 1968. Slanders, said his opponents, without specifying what statements they considered slanderous. Séguy added that the Political Bureau had not violated the "independence" of the CGT. Who are they going to get to believe that the Political Bureau did not discuss the events of May-June, that it did not want to "end the strike," as Thorez did in 1936, and that Séguy did not tell Marchais that that was a hard thing to do and could cost the CGT dearly? In his book, Rony alludes to this question when he says: "The Common Program was both the child of May-June 1968 and revenge for the humiliation that this mobilization represented for the left parties" (p. 167).
sitionists on the CP's working-class activists, some of the questioners have taken a step forward that can have the greatest importance for the coming battles of the French proletariat. Some of them have not limited themselves to criticizing the CP's internal regime and the lack of democracy in the party. They have understood and shown that this internal regime had a no less bureaucratic carry-over into the CP's relations with the working class as a whole. In substance, they say that the party leadership runs, or tries to run, the working class movement in the same way the bourgeois government runs the society.
"By combining the model of compartmentalizing with the model of parliamentary democracy, the party cannot help but reproduce in a still stronger way the bourgeois mode of political functioning" (Althusser, op. cit., p. 77).
... It is well known that from 1972 to 1977, nothing was done to stimulate or promote rank-and-file initiatives and forms of unity between manual and intellectual workers. What is more, any suggestion that people's committees would be a good thing was rejected on the grounds that there was a danger that they would be 'manipulated"" (Althusser, op. cit., p. 115).
Without saying it in so many words, other questioners have accused the party leadership of conducting the fight against the SP for a so-called "updated" Common Program as if it were a wrangle between head-office staffs and in such a way that it seemed alien to the ranks of both parties and to the working class.
Here a really fundamental criticism has been raised. The lack of rank-and-file bodies, of democratically elected committees, was the French workers movement's greatest weakness in the three great national struggles it waged, first in June 1936; second, at the end of World War II; and, third, in May 1968. In all three cases, mobilizations were channelled the throughout by the party and union leaderships, who did everything to smother the initiative of the workers rather than stimulate it. Even today, despite the example of Lip, the idea of rank-and-file committees is still not widespread.
But regardless of the initial demands they are formed around, no matter what names they might take (even if they were to be called Union of the Left committees), as long as they are genuine mass committees functioning democratically and allowing all the workers and all the currents within them to express their views, such rank-and-file committees offer a real road that can lead to workers power.
In this respect, it might be pointed out that in a Central Committee meeting in October 1974 Thorez made a
"selfcriticism," saying that it was a mistake that the party had not created rank-andfile committees at the time of the Popular Front and of the liberation. But this was a statement that would lead to nothing. It is the sort of thing said after battles are lost and always forgotten during mass upsurges.
The idea of rank-and-file committees is obviously equally valid on the trade-union level. But both Séguy and Maire [leaders respectively of the CGT and the CFDT] share a hostile attitude toward them. This view was also repeated recently by Bergeron [leader of Force Ouvrière]:
"The stance of the CGT/FO must never be subordinated to decisions made by hand vote in factory courtyards. We know where this leads. I would rather say this now than see Force Ouvrière activists get involved tomorrow in adventures that they will not be able to keep under control" (speech at the congress of FO functionaries; quoted in Le Monde, June 8, 1978).
The idea of rank-and-file committees must be applied initially by electing strike committees in the course of economic struggles. These should be committees to which the unions and parties will bring their advice and propositions but where the representatives elected by the workers in struggle will make the ultimate decision.
A New Political Perspective
It was inevitable that the activists would begin by making a critique of their party's past policy. It was also inevitable that the developing crisis would be focused first mainly on the internal problems. In fact, this was essential. But the situation cannot remain at this stage.
The leadership is making some sharp denunciations of the questioners, but it assures that it will not take organizational measures against them. It is probably hoping that time will work in favor of those who hold the apparatus.
Moreover, the leadership has already begun to use an argument that while threadbare still has an effect on the less political elements. It says that the government and the bosses are on the offensive now and this is the time to stand up to it and counterattack, but instead of this a handful of people are getting off track and attacking the party, and so forth.
In fact, the government and the bosses, emboldened by an electoral victory that seemed out of their grasp for months, are taking advantage of the disillusion of the working class to conduct a policy that promotes inflation and unemployment.
However, now, less than three months after the elections, there are more and more signs of resistance by the workers. This has reached the point that even Bergeron went to tell Premier Barre that he was tightening the screws too hard.
In any case, the election defeat created a new situation in which the questioners should not let themselves be caught by the CP's game of burying internal criticisms under the day-to-day tasks of the class struggle.
The electoral defeat eliminated the political perspective of a Union of the Left government. If they do not want to let the CP leadership maneuver them into a corner, the questioners must move ahead from a critique of what happened in the past and of the internal regime. They must offer a new political perspective that is not based on combinations at the top and the parliamentary illusions of the past.
The questioners have to offer a perspective pointing toward a generalization of the struggles, not one that limits the struggles of the working class to the sum total of industrial disputes. They have to offer a perspective favoring the development of the movement of "unprecedented breadth" that they talk about, that is, the general strike that the CP and CGT leaders did not want when it came in May 1968 and which they sold out for a mess of potage represented by legislative elections.
The experience of the Union of the Left as it unfolded from 1972 to 1978 is now a closed chapter. The uncritical enthusiasm it aroused has vanished. Distrust has developed between the two parties, and in each party between the ranks and the leadership.
400 March in Guam
The CP and SP leaderships find themselves in an awkward situation. They can trade accusations, which are not without a basis in fact. But the CP leadership has no alternative policy to the alliance, and the SP leadership cannot at present consider a combination with any part of the ruling bourgeois majority without risking the loss of the electoral influence it has gained, and suffering a split.
Both leaderships will have to face a more critical membership and increasing demands for democracy in the workers movement. Therefore, the objective conditions favor a continuation and deepening of the crisis in the CP. It is not clear whether this crisis can lead to anything concrete in the near future, in view of the heterogeneity and political confusion of the questioning elements today.
But in any case, something has changed in the workers movement, particularly in the relationship between the masses and the ranks of the CP and the party leadership. And this is a thoroughly positive change.
suppressed the Chamorros and waged a genocidal campaign, practically decimating the once-proud Chamorro race.
As a result of the Spanish-American War, Spain ceded the island to the U.S. together with Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines which is 1,500 miles to the west of Guam. The cruelties of the Spanish colonial system were thus replaced by the more subtle repression of the U.S. colonizers.
The outlawing of the native tongue and the strict enforcement of the English language in colonial education and government administration sought to accelerate the process of Americanization. Where the Spanish conquistador had used the sword, the U.S. Naval Government employed the American textbook which taught Chamorros to look up to American heroes, to regard American culture as far superior to their own, and American society, with its myths of equal opportunity and fair play, as the ideal model for Guam's colonial society.
In terms of language policy, naval authorities prevented the flowering of Chamorro arts and literature by making the speaking of the local language in schools punishable by fines and corporal punishment. Research by a Chamorro priest, high in the local Catholic hierarchy, has uncovered evidence that authorities even resorted to the burning of Chamorro textbooks during an earlier period.
Today, of the current population of 100,000, the Chamorros constitute over half while the rest consist mainly of Micronesians, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, and U.S. statesiders. In addition there are 30,000 U.S. military personnel and depend. ents situated on U.S. bases that account for one-third of the island's land mass of 212 square miles including its only harbor and some of its best beach and agricultural land.
Despite the overwhelming hardships of the past, the Chamorro people, as well as their language and parts of their culture, have survived. The local legislature composed of mostly Chamorros has increasingly taken nationalist stands and in 1974 passed a law giving the Chamorro language for the first time official standing along with English.
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Notes
1. A translation of this statement appears in last week's іввие, р. 781.—IP/1
2. I use the term "questioners" for lack of any. thing more precise to designate the CP members who are raising questions and criticiems, since I do not want to lump them together.
3. Editions Maspéro.
4. See the critique of Althusser's pamphlet by Ernest Mandel that appeared in the June 8, 9, 10- 11, and 12 issues of Rouge.
7. Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail, French Democratic Confederation of Labor, an originally Catholic federation that evolved in the direction of independent leftism