To analyze the situation in Latin America, we must consider the knotty problem of long-term economic trends, of what bourgeois politicians have christened "the new worldwide economic order,"
and which we regard as the new international division of labor. There can be no doubt that the capitalists will carry out extensive restructuring of their system on a world scale in their attempts to overcome its present crisis.
What Economic Prospects?
According to many economistsincluding Samir Amin and André Gunder Frank-the capitalists will proceed in ac cordance with the following schema: A number of underdeveloped countries will continue to be relegated to a traditional role as producers of raw materials. Others will carve out a special place in industries that require an abundant supply of labor (automobile industry, consumer durables industries in general, and even the steel industry). The most advanced countries will develop industries with a heavy concentration of capital and the most up-todate technology, and will further and further expand the industries of the socalled tertiary sector.
We might observe that this schema is already being applied, to the extent that the most modern industries (electronics, nuclear power, and others) remain the nearly exclusive prerogative of a small number of countries, while the engineering industries, steel and so on—and not merely or other consumer goods textiles industries—have developed in Latin America, Iran, and South Korea. Theoretically, there are still possibilities for further development. This is true, for instance, for those Latin American countries that offer favorable conditions for investment (cheap labor power, special political safeguards, norms favoring the transfer of profits abroad, and so on).
At best, however, such a plan can be put into effect on the scale required by the depth of the crisis only if the West European, American, and Japanese workers accept vast shakeups with grave social implications. A more realistic projection would involve chronic unemployment on a hitherto unprecedented scale, a drastic decline in the standard of living, and a rapid buildup of permanently semiemployed layers.
The least that can be said is that the conditions for undertaking such an operation exist nowhere at present, and that they cannot be achieved without major upheavals, which right now are very unlikely. As a matter of fact, the industrialized countries are compelled to defend existing economic structures, including by means of more and more intensive protectionist measures. Far from being able to contemplate a boom in new sectors, the underdeveloped countries-the industrialized ones, at least-are facing serious counterattacks that threaten not only their new industries, but the most traditional ones as well (i.e., textiles).
Thus, under the best of circumstances for the capitalists, the projected "new economic order" remains music of the future, and a fairly distant future at that. In the short and medium term, there is no chance of regenerating the kind of economic growth in Latin America that could compare with what Mexico experienced for two decades after the Second World War, or with Brazil at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. The question that arises is of much more limited scope: What opportunities will the Latin American bourgeoisie and the imperialists have to exploit the favorable combination of circumstances that may arise from time to time in one or another country?
It would be wrong from the standpoint of methodology, and impossible from a practical standpoint, to seek a conclusive answer. It is common knowledge that in the purely economic realm there is considerable variation. In Venezuela-thanks to its energy resources, the bourgeoisie still has substantial elbow room. But in Peru, the rulers seem incapable of halting a downward trend of more and more disastrous proportions. And this is to take only the most important countries. Specific and detailed analyses will be necessary at each step. It is sufficient here to caution against drawing simplistic conclusions from the structural contradictions and long-term prospects we have outlined, overgeneralizations that lead to underestimating the short-term possibilities or the chances of unusually favorable circumstances.
To come back to Brazil: Although it was in very serious straits around the end of 1973 (the oil crisis), it showed an 8.8% growth rate in 1976. (In 1977 the situation was more uneven, with the consumer durables industries in trouble, while growth rates went as high as 15% for some branches of basic industry.) Following the coffee price rises and a growth of exports, Brazil's trade balance, which had suffered seriously since 1973 from the increasing outlays for imported oil, underwent a substantial improvement. In these circumstances, a steady influx of foreign capital was assured.
As for Argentina, its balance of payments improved in 1977. This was, of course, in part owing to a drop in imports related to the recession that affected a whole sector of industry. But it was also owing to an unusually good market for grain (the 1976-77 campaign). Concurrently, after two years of decline, the gross national product grew by around 5% last year (regaining its 1974 level), while inflation fell between May 1976 and July 1977 from nearly 800% to around 130% (nevertheless, it stood at 200% by the end of 1977).
Thus, in conditions of underlying stagnation or very limited growth, some countries may be able to make gains in particular sectors or in specific conjunctures. In this way, they may be able to avoid being thrown in the short run into a catastrophic crisis. (It goes without saying that any such gains that may be made can be abruptly placed in jeopardy by international factors, both economic and political).
Social Trends and Their Implications
If the hypotheses I have put forward are sound, they lead to the conclusion that in most countries, even if the process of capital accumulation picks up somewhat, this is not going to be enough to assure the incorporation in the productive process of the broad masses that have been excluded from it as a consequence of increased unemployment or a semi-unemployment that has now become chronic. Increases in production will be obtained essentially through stepped-up exploitation. Some stability-in terms of prices, national and foreign debts-will be sought through further lowering, or at best failing to improve, the tragically low living standards for the overwhelming majority of the masses.
It follows that in the political arena, the general tendency will be toward maintaining or reestablishing authoritarian regimes. The goal of such regimes, whatever their specific form at any given moment, is insofar as possible to prevent the masses from asserting their needs, from democratically choosing their representatives, and from having the freedom to develop any effective organization for their struggles. "Strong" regimes more than ever correspond to the built-in needs of the native ruling classes and imperialism.
Such tendencies may exacerbate a whole series of contradictions and lead to spectacular explosions. Political factors, both long-term and conjunctural, will obviously intertwine with economic ones. But in order to draw the most concrete possible conclusions, it will be necessary to answer the following two questions: How much have the structural changes of the last four or five years affected the dynamic and attitudes of social classes? To what extent have the sweeping repressive crackdowns been able to tear apart the fabric of leaders and activists essential for reorganizing and reactivating the workers movement?
Generally speaking, as we have seen, the economic crisis has brought with it a structural weakening of the working class or at least a halt to its growth as a social force. In some countries, even before the crisis, or starting in its initial phases, there was a marked evolution in this direction. Chile is the most tragic example. In the wake of massive layoffs and the thinning out of the administrative apparatus itself, unemployment reached record levels. (around 30%, with even higher percentages in some industries).
The Uruguayan case is no less grave. The country's entire socioeconomic equilibrium was shattered, and for economic as well as political reasons emigration took on massive proportions. In Argentina as well, the process of economic dismantlement was extensive, involving an unemployment rate such as the country had not seen in decades and perhaps never in its history (there are almost no statistics, but the figure must be close to 20%).
It would be a grave error to minimize the consequences that such conditions have had, or will have, on the social cohesion of the working class and still more on the morale of broad sectors of the masses. To take but one example: Are the new sections of the Argentine proletariat, whose coming of age in the 1960s underlay the working class upsurge of 1969, going to remain unaffected by the setbacks and instability of the automobile industry? (As against a productive capacity of 500,000 units per year, 140,000 units were produced in 1976—as many as in 1965—compared with 300,000 in 1973. There was a slight recovery in 1977, but new difficulties appeared at the beginning of this year.)
The downward trend in the rural population has not been halted by the economic crisis either.! On the contrary, it has gone hand in hand with adopting more typically capitalist forms of exploitation on a wider and wider scale (ie., not only in Brazil, but in Bolivia as well). And since the industrial labor market is shrinking, this continuing reduction of the population on the land brings about even more dramatic forms of social disintegration than in the 1950s and 1960s.
This is still more likely inasmuch as the tertiary sector cannot continue to expand artificially. Overwhelmed by staggering budget deficits, civil-service administrations are much more inclined to reduce their staffs than to increase them. It is sufficient to note the substantial layoffs in the Chilean administration and the firing of tens of thousands of workers in two years' time from the state-owned sector of industry and from the railroads in Argentina." All of these hardships as well as the "austerity" measures have already hit large layers of the least well-off petty bourgeoisie, and will continue to do so.
The structural changes within the working class and other oppressed layers do not necessarily involve negative political consequences. Marxists have analyzed the complex dialectical interrelationship between economic crises, mass movements, and political crises too thoroughlystarting with the recession that preceded World War I-to come up with simplistic conclusions about this today. But we cannot be unaware either of the impact that such phenomena must inevitaly have.
In the final analysis, eve.ything depends on the forms and the tempo of the interaction between socioeconomic and political factors. Hence the importance of answering the second question I raised. And this is possible only on the basis of carefully and realistically tallying up the forces that have been able to withstand the worst blows and are capable of going into action on however modest a scale, either in the present stage or the immediate future. Along with this, we have to assess any new forces that may emerge from the experiences of recent years, as well as the chances for reintegration in struggle of thousands of activists subjected to the attrition of prolonged exile.
The events that occurred during 1977 and in the first few weeks of this year offer some encouraging signs.
Reawakening of Mass Movements and Troubles of Dictatorships
On July 19, Peru was rocked by a powerful general strike. On September 14, Colombia was the scene of a paro civico nacional (i.e., a national work stoppage) organized jointly by the four trade-union federations. In October and November, Argentina experienced a significant strike wave in which automobile, electric, and transportation workers mobilized on a wide scale. It resulted finally in some partial victories.
In Brazil, the student movement took to the streets, for the first time in a long while, setting an example that gave impetus to the struggle for democratic rights. In Chile, there was a succession of economic struggles, work stoppages, and examples of working-class resistance over a period of months. And, at the time of Pinochet's referendum farce, street demonstrations also broke out.
At the beginning of January, following the assassination of a representative of the moderate opposition, Nicaragua was swept by unprecedented mobilizations in which urban workers and peasants stood side by side.
Finally, in Bolivia, powerful mobilizations and dramatic hunger strikes forced Banzer to grant a general amnesty.
The question arises, Has Latin America entered, or is it entering, a new phase?
Elements on which to base an answer have emerged on three levels. The first level is that of the mass movement, which we have just looked at. Recent events seem to indicate that even in those countries that have suffered the harshest repression, there has been a recovery of strength and morale by some sections of the working class. This process was unquestionably aided by the appearance of more and more open conflicts among the bourgeoisie and ruling military groups themselves.
So here we come to the second level of elements for our answer: The ruling classes have begun to reexamine their political options, and sections of the military factions have begun to develop differences among themselves and come into conflict with each other.
It is undeniable that some of the dictatorships have undergone serious wear and tear, if only because they have lasted so long (the Brazilian dictatorship has already outlasted Hitler's regime in Germany; in Peru, in spite of numerous ups and downs, the military government has been in power for nine years).
The most conscious sections of the bourgeoisie are aware of the danger that the armed forces can no longer offer a last resort, since they have become a constantly used political weapon. Thus there is a danger that the effectiveness of the military may be profoundly compromised, while no alternative to it exists. This is the reason for the attempts at, or plans for, "institutionalization." These range from a partial loosening up of the Brazilian regime and a promise to restore civilian rule in Bolivia, to the calling of a constituent assembly in Peru and to a promise to legalize the traditional bourgeois parties in Uruguay.
On the third and final level, while they played a prominent role in installing the dictatorships, the U.S. rulers have rediscovered "human rights" and criticized some of their puppets. After the defeat in Vietnam, after Watergate, Washington needed to spruce up its image at least somewhat, and the Carter administration wanted to give the impression of turning over a new leaf. Regaining credibility in Latin America was a necessary ingredient in this operation.
Washington was also motivated by a desire to counteract the moves of the West European and Japanese imperialists, and to reestablish its ties with those sectors of the native bourgeoisie whose interests had suffered the most from the course adopted in the previous period.
The convergence of all these factors unquestionably brought about changes in the situation. To try to determine at this point whether what we are witnessing is the first signs of a new upsurge, or of an interlude on the way to a readjustment of ruling groups and political structures, or even a mere flash in the pan, would be idle speculation.
We find that even among revolutionary Marxists there are marked differences in interpretation. These include very "optimistic"
assessments of the tendencies of the mass movement (such as in Argentina) or of the scope of the institutionalization that some bourgeoisies will be led to promote (i.e., in Brazil). Some go so far as to minimize the changes that have occurred, which leads them to place more emphasis on the disagreements among the bourgeoisie than on what is ripening among the proletariat and other oppressed layers.
For my part, I lean toward the interpretation given in the article by Jorge A. Valdes (see Inprecor, No. 15, October 27, 1977). Even if the new political plan of some Latin American bourgeoisies is put into effeet through installing governments based on elections that are rigged to varying degrees, it will nevertheless involve "strong,'
fundamentally authoritarian regimes. The working-class organizations will either remain illegal or will be subject to severe restrictions. The military will hold the key positions of control, while reserving the right to intervene when they consider it necessary.
The "democratization" measures will serve mainly to permit some room for expression and adjustments within the privileged classes. It is significant, in this respect, that among those in line to replace the present rulers are figures who bear responsibility for these regimes. Some had a direct hand in bringing the dictatorships to power, such as Pinto in Brazil. Others paved the way for coups, like Frei in Chile. Still others have long embraced reactionary positions, such as the leaders of the Peruvian APRA, or Balbin in Argentina.
The goal of such "democratization" will be to give a new impetus to mechanisms of capital accumulation that can give a boost to the internal market and provide room for the survival of the crisis-ridden sectors of the industrial and agricultural bourgeoisie. To a large extent, this will depend on the world economic and political context. That is, it will depend on the possibility of regearing the capitalist economy beforeand above all after-the new recession that is at hand. It will depend on the ability of some countries to raise trade barriers, as well as on whether or not growth can be stimulated in certain specific industries, and on other such factors.
Whether or not the bourgeoisie and the imperialists can carry out their plans to patch up the dictatorships or replace them by other authoritarian regimes is bound up largely with the development of the world economic and political situation. But the outcome of the new phase that is shaping up will depend ultimately on the ability of the broad masses to take up their struggles anew, even under the most difficult circumstances, as well as on their capacity to take advantage of all the cracks that open up in the repressive apparatus of the ruling classes.
There is no need here to dwell on the vital role economic struggles, even those with very modest goals, can play in reviving a mass movement after a long period of prostration or stagnation and decay. It is likewise clear what an important role such struggles play in promoting regroupment of the working class. The trickiest sort of questions have arisen and will continue to arise when it comes to choosing the means of organizing struggles. In dealing with such questions, we should not let ourselves be bound by rigid schemas based on overgeneralizations. The difficulty lies in the need both to develop structures that can ensure the independence of the working class-even, I repeat, on a very modest level at first-and to utilize every possible legal opportunity or cover.
Up to now the Brazilian experience has been the most instructive. It has ranged from an exploitation of openings by groups not clearly political in character (i.e., religious or semireligious associations), to the formation of organs of the workers commission type that combine work within and outside the trade unions.
The central role that democratic demands play at the present stage in a number of countries needs no demonstration. It is absolutely clear that a struggle for democratic goals and real freedoms for the broad masses would blow up the plans of the national bourgeoisies and the imperialists. Bringing down the dictatorships would mean challenging the precise forms of accumulation and exploitation that currently exist in many countries in a thoroughgoing way.
There is a danger that the "gorilla" dictatorships will be replaced by supposedly democratic regimes in which freedom of organization and expression and the right of the workers to choose their own representatives will either be denied or seriously curtailed. In order to prevent this and to assure the free exercise of democratic rights without any restrictions, it is necessary to undercut right from the beginning the conservative or reactionary alternatives that the national and imperialist bourgeoisies are trying to bring forward
Obviously all these points about the struggle for democratic rights hold true for the countries of the Southern Cone. But the issue of democratic rights has also come to the fore in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Peru.
In Mexico, winning unrestricted democratic rights would drive a deep wedge into the political structure established by the ruling classes decades ago. At the same time, this would encourage the struggle for political and organizational independence of the working class, which is still the main problem that has to be solved in order to unleash a revolutionary dynamic. In Colombia, a struggle for similar objectives could throw a monkey wrench into the attempt to renew the "historic compromise" between the two bourgeois parties. In Peru, it could wreck the operation designed to raise the old traditional political framework from the ashes.
The slogan of a constituent assembly is the centerpiece of democratic demands in several countries. Revolutionary Marxists correctly fight to expose the deceptions of some bourgeois currents and even some military groups that offer "constituent assemblies" whose framework and composition would be predetermined by the current regimes and whose functioning would be strictly supervised, if not rigged outright. They also combat any possible confusion between propaganda for a constituent assembly and accepting bourgeois plans for institutionalization.
At the same time, revolutionary Marxists avoid using sectarian and maximalist formulations—i.e., for a constituent assembly convoked by the oppressed masses or by a revolutionary government-that are liable to limit the response to this slogan among the broadest layers of the masses. They point up the simple idea-which has an explosive potential in the present context-that a constituent assembly means a direct, secret election, without any restrictions, and election of representatives on a proportional basis.
The necessary differentiation of revolutionists from bourgeois or petty-bourgeois groups is not a matter of using more or less rigid formulations but requires meshing democratic demands and demands corresponding to the direct needs of the exploited masses in the logic of the transitional program.
In order to achieve such a task, it is necessary to have a clear strategic outlook. From the fact that democratic demands are on the agenda, reformists of every stripe draw the conclusion that what has to be done is to prepare for a "democratic" stage of the revolution, and to achieve an alliance with the "national" or "progressive" bourgeoisie. This is an old refrain. But it still poses problems for revolutionists. They have simultaneously to avoid the danger of falling into propagandism (in reaction against the capitulation of the traditional parties) and that of letting themselves be drawn into de facto coalitions with bourgeois formations or into "institutionalization" maneuvers.
We should not underestimate the pressures that may arise from certain sectors of the masses. Under conditions of savage repression, the need people feel to find some way out of the nightmare may lead them to clutch at the slightest hope, to cherish illusions, to let themselves be thrown off balance by an undiscriminating urge toward unity. The opportunistic wavering and lurches of organizations like the Chilean MIR and the Argentina PRT stem, in the last analysis, from pressures of this kind, which in their cases were not counterbalanced by theoretical and political clarity.
Once again, it is necessary to avoid any kind of confusion between democratic rights and bourgeois-democratic institutions, as well as between convergences on specific questions having to do with solidarity, defense of prisoners, and technical requirements, and formal or de facto pacts with bourgeois formations on the level of political strategy. It should also be understood that rejecting any "antifascist" unity or a popular-front line does not mean accepting the simplistic schema that the only alternative is either a proimperialist military dictatorship or a dictatorship of the proletariat."
The essential thing is to assure that the masses' struggle does not stop midway, but that, starting from democratic and anti-imperialist goals, it takes on a dynamic of permanent revolution, i.e., attacks the very framework of the capitalist regime. This does not exclude the possibility that in some situations the bourgeoisie may still have sufficient resources to maintain its domination through some kind of institutionalization that suits its ends.
However, even if such institutionalization is achieved, two very different types of situations may ensue. If this institutionalization takes place on the basis of collaboration by the workers organizations with the parties of the ruling class, the mass movement will be paralyzed. On the other hand, by winning all its democratic rights and creating its own organizations, and by continually mobilizing in a dynamic of will give you a week by week analysis of the most important world events.
offensive struggles, the working class can block attempts at stabilization. A reformist strategy leads to the first possibility. A revolutionary strategy must try to achieve the second.
Finally, the experiences of 1977—the repression and slaughter that took place in countries like Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador-confirm the fact that the ruling classes will not give up resorting to violence even while carrying out "institutionalization" operations. That is why the question of self-defense is objectively posed, and why broad sectors of the masses have become concerned about it or will be. Revolutionary Marxists should not forget about this.
Does Populist Nationalism Have a Future?
It is very difficult from this vantage point to answer the question of what solutions the bourgeoisies will try to impose if the regimes that exist in a number of Latin American countries should collapse. In any case, it is unlikely, in the context that has been described, that we will see on a major scale the sort of developments that took place during the 1930s, World War II, or even the prolonged boom of the 1950s and 1960s. While not ruling out exceptional cases, objectively there is no room for a new rise of any big or medium-sized industrial bourgeoisie that would have a degree of autonomy vis- à-vis imperialism and be capable of imposing "new" solutions in economic life as well as regards general political orientation. Here we also touch on the question of whether there may be a resurgence of nationalist or nationalist-populist currents.
The answer to this question is clear on the basis of the following considerations: Any notion that nationalist movements are the direct result of increased imperialist exploitation is simplistic and must be rejected. There were objective preconditions for the rise of the populist move. ments, and these cannot be lost sight of. These preconditions no longer exist and cannot reappear at any time in the future near enough to be relevant for our political conclusions.
The most modern and vigorous sections of the Latin American bourgeoisie have maintained their vitality mainly insofar as they have organic ties with international capital and are therefore more enmeshed in the imperialist system than in the past. There is no indication of any reversal of this trend, which already goes back twenty years.
No less important is the fact that the populist nationalist movements have been undergoing a profound process of attrition for decades, and can no longer appear to offer any solution, even in those countries where such movements have been most deeply rooted.
If all these considerations are accepted, the only possible conclusion is that nationalists or populist nationalists will not be able to play a leading role in the stage now opening up. At most they may be able to undertake short-lived operations involving economically marginalized sections of the population rather than any section, however small, of the working class or peasantry.
In the most recent period, a theory has been put forward by some that in certain Latin American countries we may see the emergence of Social Democratic parties with a broad mass following that will be able to play an important or decisive role in the political operations now taking form. The Socialist International is in fact engaged in maneuvers in Brazil, Venezuela, and even Argentina. That is a question that should be discussed elsewhere. Here I would warn against impressionistic analogies. When all is said and done, it should not be forgotten that objective conditions for the rise and renewal of Social Democracy in Western Europe and in other parts of the world do not exist in Latin America, and it is very hard to believe that they will develop in the period ahead.
The analysis we have outlined has explained the constrictive framework that limits the scope of any possible conflicts between Latin American bourgeoisies and the imperialists. This does not rule out the possibility of confrontations between ruling groups or bourgeois governments on the continent and foreign capital or impe rialist governments. Such confrontations do not, in principle, pose any major problem for revolutionists.
If a bourgeois government, whatever the motives for its action, expropriates a multinational company, a capitalist enterprise of some kind, or eliminates an imperialist outpost from its territory, revolutionists will support such measures. At the same time, they would maintain their political independence. (This might, for example, be expressed concretely by a mobilization to oppose paying any form of compensation or for establishing workers control.)
But revolutionists should be careful not to introduce into their programs ambiguous concepts, such as that of an antiimperialist front. I do not want to provoke any sterile arguments over terminology. But it should not be forgotten that the concept of a "front" has often been expanded to include a possibility of longrange agreements with bourgeois sectors. And this goes far beyond the concept of support in specific circumstances for concrete measures, or of convergences with other exploited layers. From this to adopting a policy of collaboration with layers of the ruling class is but a step. Under no circumstances should we run the risk of being in that position.
Notes
1. Mexico is a significant example. Despite the fact that the rural population is still large, the percentage that it represents dropped, according to the official census, from 54.2% in 1960 to 42.5% in 1970, and it has diminished even more since then.
2. Four thousand railroad workers were already laid off between March 1976 and the end of 1977, and 9,000 more are slated to suffer the same fate in 1978.