"We view the Arab question through a rifle's sight"-that is the famous declaration of the Israeli general Abraham Yofe some years ago.
After expelling the Palestinians from their homeland and establishing a Jewish state in 1948, the Zionist regime at first considered the Palestinian question merely a diplomatic nuisance, which its delegate to the United Nations had to deal with whenever an Arab state raised the refugee question.
Since 1965, however, confronted with the armed and political struggle of the Palestinian national movement, the rulers of Israel have been determined to eradicate the problem-which has grown into an international question-through the rifle's barrel. And it was this "final solution" that Israel sought to achieve by means of the recent "purifying operation" in the south of Lebanon.
Aim of the Invasion
With an army of 30,000 soldiers, backed up by the air force and navy, Tel Aviv's objective was to strike a deathblow to the Palestinian resistance. Begin's original plan was to invade southern Lebanon, destroy the Palestinian resistance in a blitzkrieg, and create a ten-kilometer "security belt" controlled by the Zionists through their Phalangist ally.
Israel assumed that Syria would respect the tacit agreement that exists between the two countries and thus would not cross the "red line" [i.e., the Litani River]. And, indeed, Syria was unwilling to get into a confrontation with the Israeli army-an attitude that was manifested by all the Arab regimes.
However, the Zionist forces failed to attain their objective, because the Palestinian combatants offered stout resistance and then fell back toward the north and continued to fight.
Aware of its failure, the Tel Aviv government decided to advance its forces north up to the Litani River, hoping that within that territory they would be able to carry out their mission.
stage of the operation
But the second failed too. In spite of heavy losses, the Palestinian resistance retained its capacity to wage war.
The Israeli forces succeeded, it is true, in bringing death and destruction to Le banon: more than 200 Palestinian combatants killed and another 200 wounded; more than 2,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians killed; 265,000 civilians turned into refugees (many for the second, third, or fourth time) seeking shelter in Saida and Beirut; and many villages turned into rubble.
Planned Long in Advance
The Israeli plan was not new. According to some Israeli newspapers, it had already been prepared when the Labour Party was in power. But beyond the details of this specific plan, one can state without hesitation that for years the Zionist army has wanted to perform a "purifying operation" in southern Lebanon. During the Lebanese civil war, the Israeli government intended more than once to carry out an incursion beyond its northern border, but was held back by Washington. It was the latter's estimate that an Israeli attack would provoke a mass mobilization of Palestinians and Lebanese; and hence, although they were militarily much weaker, it was safer to rely on the Arab regimes to deal a blow to the Palestinian resistance.
Israel had to content itself during the Lebanese civil war with patrolling southern Lebanon, giving military training and aid to the Phalangists, and carrying out a naval siege. After the war, it deepened its alliance with the Phalangists, widened the range of its relations with the pro- Phalangist Christian population to include economic ties, and launched small-scale military attacks against the Palestinians and the Moslem villagers.
The timing of the massive Israelı invasion was not accidental. Begin used as a pretext the "bus operation" claimed by Fatah, to justify the offensive as a retalia. tory measure. But it is the wider political context that accounts for the timing of such a large-scale, destructive operation.
A Kick in the Teeth for Sadat
The negotiations between Sadat and Begin had reached a dead end. The Egyptian president had offered something beyond what any Zionist had ever conceived of-recognition of the Israeli state by the biggest Arab country, paving the way for a settlement with the Egyptian regime, and perhaps with other Arab governments; and no less important, a clear hint on Sadat's part that he was prepared to exclude the Palestine Liberation Organization from the negotiating table.
However, the belly-crawling of the Egyp tian leader, the split within the Arab world, and the fact that the United States was not about to exert pressure on its Zionist ally only increased the arrogance of the Tel Aviv government and whetted its appetite.
Thus, Begin rejected Sadat's peace initiative by refusing to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, to consider any political "solution" to the Palestinian question, or to evacuate the Jewish settlements in the territories occupied in the 1967 war (and moreover created new ones during the peace talks).
That arrogance explains the decision made by Begin's government to destroy the Palestinian resistance once and for all. But, intoxicated by its previous successes, it committed one basic mistake-it completely underestimated the determination and capacity of the Palestinian movement to fight back against the Zionist army. That fundamental error spoiled the entire plan.
Counting on a blitz war, Israel believed the fighting would be over before any international factor would interfere. And had it worked out as the Zionists wished, this would not have contradicted American interests; nor would it have been regarded unfavorably by the Egyptian government, which is seeking a peace settlement for which the PLO constitutes the central obstacle.
But faced with tremendous resistance on the part of the Palestinian national movement, the battle turned into a war, and the Israeli plan was doomed to fail. Acting very quickly, the United States pushed for a UN Security Council vote to establish the United Nations Interim Force in Le banon (UNIFIL); and, indeed, the "blue helmets" arrived in Lebanon on the eleventh day of the invasion.
Role of UN Troops
The primary role of these troops is to move the Palestinians out of their positions along the Litani River and to prevent them from entering the south. The Syrian regime, for its part, offered its forces to restrain the Palestinian resistance in the north. The second step planned by imperialism is to replace the Israeli forces in the south.
But Israel has not yet decided on its next move. The Zionist leadership had not foreseen the complications that arose. It could not. It has never taken into account the possibility of failure.
The failure of the Israeli forces to achieve their objective does not only mean that Israel will be obliged to go on confronting the Palestinian struggle; it has wider political implications both domestically and internationally.
The invasion of southern Lebanon was the first large-scale military confrontation between the Zionist state and an Arab force since the October 1973 war. Since the defeat, which was primarily political, experienced by Israel in 1973, the Israeli leadership has wanted to prove to the world as well as its own citizens that the October War was nothing but a blunder of the army intelligence service. Some army officers have even favoured waging a new war for the sole purpose of proving that the Zionist army cannot be defeated. Such a demonstration has taken on considerable importance in light of the growing alliance between American imperialism and the Arab regimes, and, hence, the mounting fear of the Israeli state that it would no longer be the only force upon which the U.S. would rely.
Differences in Israel
But the October War created deep fissures within Israeli society and opened a period of severe economic, social, political, and ideological crisis. Begin's election to the office of prime minister nourished hopes among the Israeli population that the new strong government would be capable of solving the crisis.
And, indeed, Begin seemed to be in luck during the first months in power. Shortly after the government had introduced its New Economic Plan, which was an open attack on the working class, Sadat made his spectacular visit. Begin was given credit for the renewed dream of peace. His hard-line policy appeared to be paying off. However, the false hopes soon began to evaporate.
The peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt opened a debate within the Israeli leadership-between those who are prepared to make some minor concessions, and those who adhere to the program of the Likud.2
The impasse in the Begin-Sadat talks has sharpened the differences between those who argue that Israel should seize the opportunity and establish political and economic relations with Egypt-although their proposals are far from what could be accepted by Sadat-and those who argue that since peace between the Zionist state and the Arab states can only be temporary, territories controlled by the Israeli army constitute a far better guarantee of its security than any settlement.
2. Begin's governing coalition.-IP/I
Moreover, one should not underestimate the ideological component, which usually accompanies the latter argument, that evacuation of Jewish settlements (a condition for any agreement) implies a negation of Zionism and thus the beginning of its end.
The debate along this line-Zionist hawks vs. Zionist doves-actually began in 1967 with the conquest of new territories. It occurred between political parties, and even more within them. However, since Sadat's visit, it has had concrete implications and consequences.
In spite of the debate, Begin seemed rather well in command. He launched his baptism of fire... but failed. And that was not á failure in a confrontation with an Arab state, but with the resistance movement of the Palestinian people, whose very existence is denied by Israel. It is the invasion of southern Lebanon that brings into the open all the aspects of the crisis of the Israeli state, which Begin sought to hide with a magician's gesture on May 17, 1977, the day he took office.
The invasion of southern Lebanon alerted the United States and convinced it that events were getting out of its control. During the first days of the incursion, Washington observed the developments without comment; but as it became clear that the Israeli forces were meeting fierce resistance and were pursuing their operations and extending the territory that they occupied, Washington was determined to get things back under its control and to keep a firm hand on a situation that was becoming more and more dangerous.
Carter Tries to Pick Up the Pieces
Israel's offensive jeopardized the gains of reaction during the Lebanese civil war. In addition, it could not be watched indifferently for long by the Arab regimes. The U.S. decision to intervene through the United Nations was the first link in the present chain of clashes between Washington and Tel Aviv.
Since the October 1973 war, the United States has been under mounting pressure from its Arab allies, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to compel Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied during the 1967 war, or at least a significant part of them, and thus to pave the way for a peaceful settlement in the Arab East.
However, the course taken by the American government was just the opposite. Except for the case of the interim settlement between Israel and Egypt in 1975, no significant pressure was exerted on the Zionist state; U.S. policy was to grant Israel greater military and economic aid than ever and to exert pressure on its Egyptian ally instead.
But then Carter's plan to sell F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, the difficulties Begin met in his recent visit to Washington when Carter introduced his
"peace plan," and Carter's statements hinting that the United States has the means to exert pressure on its stubborn ally who refuses to make any steps towards Sadat once again uncovered the contradiction that characterizes the Zionist colonialist regime: Its very existence and strength is based upon its dynamic of expansion and colonization, but it has to subordinate its expansionist policy to the global interests of the imperialist power that it serves.
Options Not Attractive
Begin succeeded in uniting the whole Zionist camp around him after rumors circulated that the U.S. was attempting to bring about his replacement. But that unity can hardly last long in the face of the options open to the Tel Aviv government, none of which seem to it satisfactory:
(1) Whether to withdraw from Lebanon and keep the surveillance of the south in the hands of the Phalangists with the aid of the UN force, neither of which is capable of preventing the return of the Palestinian resistance combatants; or to keep an army of tens of thousands of soldiers there, which means it would have to pay a heavy price, especially in face of U.S. objections.
(2) Whether to accept the U.S. "peace plan" under which the West Bank would be internationalized for five years and its inhabitants would decide whether to join Israel or Jordan or remain in an "international" status; or to insist on no withdrawal from the West Bank and thus face the possibility that the United States would depart from its policy of using the carrot alone and start operating with the stick as well.
Begin's "hard-line" declarations on his return from the United States, as well as the statement of Ruhas Eliav, a member of the Israeli delegation to the UN, that Israeli troops would probably remain for a long time in Lebanon, indicate that the Tel Aviv government intends to continue its present policy.
But the defense minister's call-without prior consultation with his prime minister-for the formation of a "national peace government," which did not raise great enthusiasm in the opposition, is an indication that while the Israeli leadership needs a national front in order to face possible American pressure, it is not immune from cracks even in its own government.
The Peace Demonstration in Tel Aviv
However, the discord within the Zionist leadership and the disagreements among the various Zionist political parties in regard to the tactics that the government should employ in the negotiations with Sadat, or to prevent pressures from the U.S., or to control southern Lebanon, are completely overshadowed by the new phenomenon that the Israeli state faces: A spontaneous demonstration of 30,000 persons took place on April 1 in Tel Aviv under the slogans "Better peace now than a greater Israel"; "Peace is not a dream"; and "The future of our children matters more to us than the graves of our ancestors."
The failure in peace as well as the failure in war shattered the confidence that military means constitute the solution to all political problems.
The new mass reaction to the government's rejection of Sadat's peace initiative, which awakened just after the invasion of southern Lebanon, is in the opposite direction to that taken by the "protest movement" which developed after the October War. Then, the demand was to remove those directly responsible for the "blunder" that "caused" Israel's failure in the war; today, the protest is against the very claim that war is inevitable.
Just as failure in war alone could not provoke a movement for peace, Sadat's peace initiative in itself was insufficient to create mass opposition to the militarist policy. It needed the failure in the invasion to create mass support to the ideas that were expressed in petitions of reserve army officers and students following the Israeli offensive.
No doubt, the demonstrators in Tel Aviv are far from having broken from Zionist ideology. And Sadat's peace initiative creates illusions that a settlement between the Arab regimes and the Zionist state can bring peace to the masses in the Arab East. But the outcry against the claim that there is no alternative but war collides with Zionism, which is doomed to be engaged in permanent fighting against the Arab masses, creating a deathtrap for the Jewish masses.
This mass reaction provides a glimpse of the possibility of the Arab socialist revolution breaking sectors of the Jewish masses from Zionist ideology.
In that sense one can understand the hysterical reactions of the Israeli leaders ("It smells of a military putsch," the minister of finance said and the fact that no Zionist party is willing or able to lead a movement for peace, although each Zionist party has its "peace plan."
Israel Failed But the PLO Did Not Win
For the Palestinian combatants, the very existence of their national liberation movement was at stake in the fighting
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Lebanon. It was not just another battle against the Israeli forces, but a war to maintain their sole base. After its defeat in Jordan, in September 1970, and after the heavy blows struck against it during the civil war in Lebanon, the Palestinian resistance has defied the Zionist attempt to crush it.
Forced to move north by the Israeli attack, while Syria kept its forces at a certain distance from the "red line,
" the resistance forces consolidated themselves beyond the Litani River. Attacking from there south of the river, they prevented the Israeli joint force of armoured units, warships, and paratroopers from invading Tyre and Rashidiyeh.
However, the losses suffered by the resistance are enormous: Hundreds of combatants were killed and wounded. Its bases in the south were destroyed. The majority of the Muslim population fled to the north and the remaining Shiite inhabitants have usually been neutral toward the Israeli invaders. Several hundred additional Christian militiamen moved from the north to the territory occupied by Israel, to create a southern army based upon mixed units of Christians and Shites.
Whatever the extent of success of the latter project and whichever force controls the south-the
Zionists, : the Phalangists, the "blue helmets," or a combination of these-it will be much harder for the Palestinian resistance to operate in southern Lebanon (one should bear in mind that it has been restricted since the end of the civil war). North of Litani, Syria deployed its forces, making no secret of its intention to restrain the Palestinian resistance. And along the Litani, the PLO leadership consented to evacuate the Palestinian positions and to hand them over to the UN forces.
Arab Regimes Tighten Grip
Since its creation, the Palestinian national movement has always found itself its alone in the battlefield facing enemies-whether Israel, the Hashemite forces, or the Syrian army. However, it has been less and less able to determine its own policy, as the grip of the Arab regimes on its leadership has tightened.
The acceptance by a majority of the PLO leadership of the proposal for a Palestinian mini-state within the framework of a peaceful settlement in the Arab East has largely conditioned the armed activities initiated by it. That, in turn, has weakened its political power.
Thus, four years ago-when the adoption of the mini-state proposal by the PLO leadership was considered by the Arab regimes as a great achievement by them— the Palestine Liberation Organization gained diplomatic victories that surpassed its gains in the field. Today, PLO gains in the field can hardly be translated to political advantage.
The Tel Aviv Commando Operation
The spectacular operation on the Tel Aviv-Haifa road was meant to serve as a signal to all political forces in the region— notably Egypt, the United States, and Israel-that no peace would be established in the Arab East without the PLO.
Moreover, knowing that Israel would not let it pass unanswered, it probably expected an attack (although not on the scale that occurred), which would oblige all Arab regimes, including Egypt, to form an alliance with it.
Hence the PLO aimed at achieving one of two possible outcomes: either halting altogether the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks or, even better from its point of view, forcing the negotiating parties to integrate it in the settlement.
However, neither one of these seems to have been achieved; and, paradoxically, it is probably the Egyptian government that has benefited from the situation. The growing tension in the relations between Washington and Tel Aviv, on the one hand, and the Palestinians' stout resistance to the Zionist army on the other, will only place Sadat in a better negotiating position in regard to the West Bank and Gaza strip. But the chances that the PLO will be integrated in the peace talks is as slight as it ever was. Washington has made crystalclear statements backing Israel on its rejection of the PLO as a partner in a peace settlement.
At this very moment the PLO leadership is demonstrating most emphatically how it turns its victories to naught. The UN forces, which were sent to Lebanon as a tool of imperialism in its plan to impose order there, took upon themselves as their first task to remove the Palestinian combatants from positions that enable them to fight the Zionist forces-along the Litani. And they were given a warm welcome by Yasir Arafat, who said the following, after his meeting with Maj. Gen. Emmanuel Erskine, the UN commander in southern Lebanon: "On behalf of the PLO and the joint forces, I say that we are giving all facilities to the UN interim force in order that it may carry out its mission in Lebanon."
By "mission" Arafat obviously meant forcing Israel to withdraw. But in the meantime he was ordering his forces to evacuate their positions. In the interim imperialist settlement in Lebanon, Arafat is clearly a partner in the negotiations.
Arafat's policy is not carried out without obstacles. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine declared that there was no cease-fire as far as it was concerned, and among the Lebanese left there is opposition to the UN military presence. The Palestinian combatants and their Lebanese allies, encouraged by the failure of the Zionist operation, reveal no wish to evacuate their positions for the benefit of American and French imperialism.
The West Bank and Gaza Demonstrate Their Solidarity
While facing mounting difficulties in their offensive in southern Lebanon, the Israeli forces were confronted with a new wave of mass mobilization by the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Strikes at schools, a shutdown of the shops, demonstrations, volleys of stones, and fires set to tires expressed their determination to continue the struggle against the Zionist occupation and their total solidarity with the Palestinian combatants in Lebanon. In spite of the repressive measures-firing on demonstrators, killing and wounding some, arresting others-for a few days the military forces were unable to establish their rule.
That was the first mobilization on such a mass scale in the West Bank since 1976. The weakening of the Palestinian resistance in the civil war in Lebanon, the political blind alley into which the PLO has been placed, and the steep decrease of its armed struggle have been reflected in the West Bank by a lower level of combativity compared to 1975 and 1976. Hence, Sadat's peace initiative created no active reaction among the masses in the West Bank.
However, the fact that the Zionist army failed to crush the Palestinian resistance gave an impetus to the recent mass demonstrations and strikes in the West Bank.
Spectators at the Invasion
While the Zionist army was attempting-unsuccessfully-to strike a deathblow to the Palestinian resistance, it succeeded-unintentionally-in breaking up former alliances and creating new ones in the Arab region.
The Arab "Steadfastness Front," which had never put up any resistance during its short life since Sadat's initiative, collapsed. Its conference of foreign ministers ended in a split pitting Syria and Algeria, which approved the entry of the UN forces, thus joining the states favoring a settlement with Israel, against Libya and South Yemen, which opposed the UN occupation. Egypt came out of its semi-isolation and hosted an Arab League foreign ministers meeting in Cairo. All member states were in attendance except Iraq and the four states of the "Steadfastness Front."
Although they have different and conflicting interests, all the Arab states were united in their determination to keep out of the Israeli-Palestinian fighting and to put an end to it if possible. Not one of the bourgeois Arab regimes wanted to confront Israel militarily.
At the same time, however, they cannot afford to remain aloof while the Palestinian struggle stands as a living proof of their own weakness. A continuing war
BEGIN: Target could undermine their stability-feeble, in any case-at home even more. And the only way to get out of the impasse was to exert pressure on Washington so that it would exercise its power over the Israeli state and compel it to withdraw.
Although acting as spectators-active ones, indeed-in the bloody scene, there are winners and losers among the Arab regimes, too. For the "Steadfastness Front," things are moving from bad to worse. Sadat's statement that this front was ineffectual proved to be correct, and their noisy defense of the Palestinian cause appears now more ridiculous than ever.
But it is Syria that got the worst of it. The Israeli invasion challenged Syrian control over Lebanon. Wishing to avoid any confrontation with the Israeli army, the Syrian regime had to become its collaborator. Its 30,000 soldiers stationed in Lebanon respected the tacit agreement with Israel to stay north of the Litani. Furthermore, after the UN decision to send the "blue helmets" to Lebanon, it declared a complete ban on entry into Lebanon of arms and reinforcements for the Palestinian resistance.
A Lift for Sadat?
It is the Egyptian regime that relatively benefits most from the situation created by the Israeli invasion. Sadat, who was critic-
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ized on account of his peace initiative with Israel, has a chance now to regain his place in the Arab world, as his critics did not move a finger to prevent the Zionist forces from invading Lebanon. Furthermore, the Israeli invasion has made a peaceful settlement an urgent task for American imperialism, for the Palestinian question proved again to be a central factor undermining the social order in the Arab East. Thus, the chances that Washington will exert pressure on Israel over the question of the West Bank and Gaza are higher than before.
The Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon has raised three principal issues, the focus of which is the Palestinian question.
The most immediate issue is Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. Whatever alternative it chooses-withdrawal and letting the Phalangist and the UN forces take control in southern Lebanon, or leaving its army there-the Tel Aviv government will have to pay a very heavy price. Neither the Phalangists nor the UN troops are capable of preventing the Palestinians from returning to the south. The Christian militias are too weak and a mixed Christian-Shiite army does not seem to be a realistic prospect.
As far as the "blue helmets" are concerned, although the PLO leadership is reluctant to engage them in an armed confrontation (UN approval is needed in order to be integrated in the peaceful settlement), it is unlikely that the PLO will stop its armed struggle when nothing is given in exchange.
Keeping its forces in southern Lebanon would mean that Israel was maintaining a large occupation army permanently enlarge occupation army permanently engaged in war against the armed resistance. But that is not in the interests of the financial backers of the Israeli army. The U.S. aim of restoring order in Lebanon and marching toward an overall settlement rules out an Israeli presence in another country.
The second issue is the future of the Lebanese state. Bringing troops to
Lebanon through the intermediary of the UN, the interest of American imperialism is to rebuild the Lebanese state. And the Palestinian resistance is the major obstacle to that goal. In spite of its policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Arab states, its very existence as an autonomous armed force engaged in struggle against Zionism has undermined bourgeois order in Lebanon. Its very presence was a dominant factor in the upsurge of the Lebanese mass movement, and in bringing about the collapse of the central authority of the Lebanese state.
Thus, it is indispensable for imperialism to get rid of that threat. However, neither the UN force nor the Lebanese right is capable of carrying out that task. The control exercised by the Syrian army over the Palestinian resistance has proved insufficient; and furthermore, the reconstruction of the Lebanese state will imply removing the Syrian forces. Syria, however, is interested in prolonging the existence of the Palestinian resistance, under its surveillance, as a bargaining chip in negotiations for a settlement.
And in regard to the issue of a peaceful settlement in the Arab East, the Palestinian question is the bone of contention among the negotiating parties-actual as well as potential.
Egypt is proposing "self-determination" for the Palestinian people, the forms of which will be determined by itself and its negotiating partners. Syria's interest is a Palestinian state handcuffed by the Syrian regime. Carter proposes to "internationalize" the Palestinian people. And Israel, which prefers a separate peace with Egypt, relies on its own forces to control the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and to destroy the resistance movement, since it is well aware that as long as the Zionist state exists, so will the Palestinian struggle.
Thus, while all the forces of reaction in the Arab region carry on plans to liquidate the Palestinian resistance-by means of clipping its wings, curbing it, or physically destroying it-the PLO leadership is proposing its own project of liquidating the Palestinian resistance on condition that it receives an autonomous Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. However,
Acheampong Claims Victory
Spain
ACHEAMPONG: Claims divine assistance.
Within days of claiming victory in a countrywide referendum on the future form of government in Ghana, the military junta headed by Gen. Kutu Acheampong banned three opposition groups and arrested scores of persons opposed to military rule.
The three groups that were banned on April 4 were the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice, the Front for the Prevention of Dictatorship, and the Third Force. All had campaigned for a "no" vote in the referendum, rejecting Acheampong's proposal for a nonparty "union government" that would include some civilians but in which the military and police would continue to wield a direct hand.
Amnesty International charged April 13 that up to fifty persons had been arrested, including William Ofori Atta,
Victor gwusu, tuah, all former government ministers in the regimes of either Kwame Nkrumah or Kofi Busia. John Bilson, leader of the Third Force, was likewise detained. Amnesty International called on the Ghanaian regime to confirm or deny the reports and in addition demanded that Acheamtoday, the political forces that advocated such a solution in the past have removed even this compromise from their agenda.
in Referendum pong release several hundred persons detained without trial under the Preventive Custody Decree.
Acheampong originally called the referendum following protests against military rule last year. The "union government" proposal, which Acheampong claimed god had revealed to him in a dream, was designed to give the appearance of moving away from direct military rule.
But the referendum itself offered the population little real choice. A "yes" vote signified acceptance of continued military and police participation in a future regime. It was unclear whether a "no" vote meant approval of the present junta or a desire for the legalization of political parties and the establishment of a parliamentary regime, with greater democratic rights.
However, some of the opposition groups campaigned for a "no" vote on the basis that it would be a display of no-confidence in Acheampong's present economic and political policies. Consequently, supporters of Acheampong's "union government" proposal were accorded ample newspaper space and were allowed to hold public meetings, while opponents were severely harassed by the authorities and a number were beaten up by gangs of hired thugs.
Following the March 30 referendum, in which under half of the electorate voted, the regime claimed to have won about 54 percent of the vote, a bare majority. But even that result is suspect.
The agreed upon system of counting the votes in full public view was overturned when police descended on the polling stations, seized the ballots, and "counted" them in secrecy. After Justice Isaac Abban, the person presiding over the referendum, objected, he went into hiding for several days, charging that his life had been threatened by troops.
In one case, six ballot boxes from a constituency known to be opposed to the "union government" proposal "accidentally" fell into a river. When they were later "recovered," a majority of the ballots were reported as marked "yes."
Acheampong used the announced referendum results as a justification for banning the three opposition groups, claiming that they had been rejected by the voters.
Opponents of Military Rule Arrested in Ghana Opponents of Military Rule Arrested in Ghana
Notes
1. The March 11 Palestinian commando operation north of Tel Aviv that resulted in the deaths of forty-four persons.-IP/l
3. At a summit conference held in Tripoli December 2-5, 1977, following Sadat's visit to Israel, representatives of the governments of Syria, Iraq, Algeria, South Yemen, and Libya called for a "front for resistance and confrontation" to oppose Sadat's "high treason."-IP/I