(The following appeared as an editorial in the December 1977 issue of Marcha Operaria, a bulletin published by revolutionary Marxists in Brazil. The translation is by Intercontinental Press/Inprecor.]
The general line of ruling-class policy for the period that is unfolding now seems clearly confirmed. Unless-to quote the bourgeois press-"unforeseen or extraordinary" events occur, everything should follow the path laid out by the Geisel and "Castelist"
grouping [named after the former head of the military regime in 1964- 67, General Castelo Branco].
The government is sparing no effort to prevent the rise of "extremists." On one hand, it has struck quickly at the bourgeois opposition whenever the latter has made a stab at more consistent democratic positions. On the other, it quashed the bid for the presidency by Frota [the recently dismissed minister of war and leader of the "hardliners"], which was an almost irreversible setback for the "hardliners."
In this way, the government has been able to stabilize its position, rejecting as ineffective a further hardening of the regime, while at the same time avoiding a course that might create openings for a strong, organized mass movement to develop.
The solution offered by Geisel-which will have to be put to the test by his successor—is to "institutionalize" the regime, defusing the criticisms of "emergency rule" made by the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement, the tolerated opposition party] and by sections of the ruling class, while at the same time preserving the dictatorship through the regime's notorious "guarantees" and "defense mechanisms." In fact, they are striving to consolidate the dictatorial regime once and for all, by making a rule out of what was originally passed off as an exception.
Reality turned out to be in stark contradiction to the illusions of those who had believed that the regime was undergoing a process of democratization by the Geisel government, or who had thought that the dictatorship was on its last legs.
As a matter of fact, the dominant currents within the ruling bloc are setting up a gradual process of institutionalization, confined, moreover, to what is seen as the necessary minimum. This dominant current is not inclined to run the risk of a democratic opening, such as might be created by convening some type of constituent assembly, narrow as it might be.
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FIGUEIREDO: Geisel's successor.
Above all, the current that favors institutionalization is still strong enough to impose its views both on the masses and on the various sections of the ruling class. The removal of Frota, and the exclusion of the most advanced elements in the MDB from all participation in transforming the regime, offer the most convincing proof of the predominance of the Geisel line.
To carry out its plans, the dominant current does not rule out the possibility of dealing with sections of the MDB. That is what Portela's call for a "dialogue" with the top layers of the bourgeois opposition is meant to accomplish.
Such a "dialogue" is limited to whether or not the MDB will support the long-range plans of the present government and its future successor. The aim is to try to broaden the ruling bloc's base of support, and isolate the more radical elements who call for opening up a process of democratization through convening a freely elected constituent assembly.
In this respect, what Geisel and his successors are really seeking to do is to sidestep the path of democratization, even with the limitations proposed by various bourgeois or petty-bourgeois sectors (Order of Brazilian Attorneys, MDB, intellectuals, liberals).
More to the point, both Geisel and his successor want to maintain the dictatorial regime with new forms and disguises, making it better equipped to defend itself against international criticism and internal differences.
The "dialogue" is important for the elections as well. By dividing the MDB and demoralizing some of its elements, the likelihood of a defeat for ARENA [Alliance for National Renewal, the official party of the dictatorship] could be considerably lessened, and Geisel's plan would win greater support within his own faction and within the ruling bloc.
The plans and pretensions of the dictatorship also include winning greater sympathy from the exploited masses. We need only look at the new projects that are being drawn up for the future dictator [probably General Figueiredo, the present chief of military intelligence and the candidate officially in line of succession] to "upgrade the conditions of the lower layers."
Whether or not this plan will be fully carried out is an open question at the moment, for the following reasons:
First, because given the existing relationship of forces, the possibility of a temporary retreat by the regime on its institutionalization plan cannot be ruled out (this has already happened several times under Geisel).
Second, because a change in the situation brought about by an upsurge of social struggles could completely upset the current plans, and force the government to come up with a new proposal for stabilizing the situation.
However, what seems to us to be beyond all doubt is that the proposed reforms drawn up by the dominant current within the regime will be incapable of stabilizing the political and social situation in the country.
The minor breakthroughs (such as institutionalization) included in the proposals will not satisfy the growing demands of the broadest and most significant social layers (workers, students, intellectuals). Despite their narrowness, these demands can spark broader struggles.
The attempt at institutionalization, even if it demonstrates that the currents favoring the maintenance of the dictatorship are still largely dominant, also shows that the bourgeoisie can no longer act merely according to whim, and feels compelled to accept formulas that in principle may aid in the regeneration of the mass movement.
The current advocating institutionalization is trying to contain this danger as much as possible, but cannot prevent it outright. It also wants to make sure that a budding mass movement does not latch onto these few concessions. In an attempt to derail social struggles, the government may even allow the formation of new political parties oriented toward winning the support of the masses.
To meet the present and future situations, the revolutionary vanguard must take a clear position. It is necessary to expose the plans of the ruling class, to avoid creating illusions among the masses; in other words, to avoid confusing the positive side of the measures the government has been forced to take with the genuine interests of the masses and their struggles.
Moreover, it is essential to understand that the ruling class is in a situation in which it cannot simply refuse to grant concessions, and that this creates opportunities for the development of mass struggles with tighter organization. Accordingly, we must be able to take advantage of the fissures that are widening bit by bit in the rigid structure of the military dictatorship.
To be sure, the masses cannot struggle directly for power today. But this does not mean that their struggles should be limited to purely economic and trade-union issues. The situation shows that the masses cannot win political freedom (freedom to organize and struggle) except by fighting to obtain it and forcing the bourgeoisie to back down. It also shows that the masses can wrest concessions from the ruling class right now.
Precisely because they cannot yet strug gle directly for power, the masses (the working class above all still have a long struggle ahead of them to force the ruling class to make concessions while the bourgeois regime remains in power.
Consequently, the basic struggles of the masses in the economic sphere will center around the fight for higher wages and better working conditions. In the political sphere, they will focus on the struggle for democratic rights (freedom of speech and association; an end to censorship, political incarceration and torture), culminating in the fight for a constituent assembly, in which the masses can express and fight for their demands and interests, have a say over national decisions, and win their basic demands.
Failing to grasp that the struggles of the masses, now and in the future, must take on a political character, means forfeiting the political arena to the various rulingclass factions and falling into the most shortsighted and dangerous type of economism.
Democratic freedoms and a constituent assembly, viewed from the standpoint of the objective needs and demands of the exploited and oppressed masses, have nothing in common with the interests of the bourgeoisie.
On the contrary, what characterizes our situation as a backward country is precisely the bourgeoisie's incapacity to carry out such a program, which can only be fulfilled through mass struggle, and can only be fully guaranteed by the working class taking power.
Struggles for democratic rights must therefore be seen as part of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle for power, supported by the social layers that are also fighting for this program (peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie).
On the other hand, what must be fought is the reformist strategy that separates these struggles from the struggle of the masses for power. With such a strategy, the reformists try to convert the struggles of the masses for freedom into mere support to the fight for "democracy" of the bourgeoisie or petty-bourgeois sectors.
The reformists call for a class alliance with the "democratic bourgeoisie," and try to forestall independent struggles of the masses. In the name of such an alliance, they say it is necessary to limit the program, demands, and methods of struggle of the exploited.
Foes of Apartheid Protest
More than 4,000 antiapartheid demonstrators marched and rallied in Nashville, Tennessee, March 18, outside the U.S.- South Africa Davis Cup tennis matches. For several months national pressure had been building against Nashville's Vanderbilt University for playing host to the South African team.
The march, sponsored by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), was the culmination of a week of protest activities. The largest of the preliminary actions took place March 17, when nearly 3,000 students from local Black colleges marched to the Vanderbilt gymnasium.
The Davis Cup protests have from the beginning involved the entire question of U.S. complicity with the racist regime in South Africa. As Benjamin Hooks, executive director of the NAACP, said to the March 18 rally: "We've come here to protest the brutal murder of Steve Biko; we've come here to protest the jailing of thousands of Blacks in South Africa; we've come here to say we support economic sanctions against South Africa; we've come here to urge U.S. banks to withdraw their loans from South Africa; we've come here to protest the Davis Cup and Vanderbilt University's complicity with apartheid; and we've come here to tell this nation to stop inviting snakes to the dinner table."
One of the organizers of the March 18
In this respect, the strategy of the reformists is what gives democratic struggles a reformist content. What must be combated in the reformists is their policy of interclass alliances, the subordination of the mass movement to bourgeois sectors, and ultimately, their theory of stages as a whole, as well as the tactics that derive from it.
To us, the program, demands, and methods of struggle and organization of the masses are limited only by their ability to put them into practice. Our role is to promote development of this ability.
Democratic demands must be combined with transitional ones (such as a sliding scale of wages and hours). The fight must be waged with independent organizational methods (through organizing plant committees, action committees, and so on), and methods of struggle (demonstrations and strikes) that are made urgent by the mass movement.
Revolutionary activity in the period ahead must be carried out with such perspectives and orientation. To ensure success, it is essential to build the nucleus of a party capable of carrying out a revolutionary working-class policy.
Davis Cup Match protest commented that "there are more demonstrators outside than spectators inside." In fact, there were only 1,260 persons in the 9,654-seat arena for the final singles matches, and throughout the tournament paid admissions fell far short of what Vanderbilt University needed to break even.
The demonstrations proceeded in a peaceful and orderly fashion despite the provocation of a massive show of force by local authorites. Nashville police were mobilized, helicopters circled overhead, and players were escorted by armed guards in riot gear.
Chilean Christian Democrats Released
Twelve leaders of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party have been released from their internal exile in the city of Arica, Latin-Reuters reported March 3.
The twelve were banished from Santiago in January and sent to remote villages in the Andes Mountains. A court later ruled that the government could not confine them in the villages without convicting them of a crime, so they were moved to a hotel in Arica.
Among the twelve were a former senator, several attorneys, two trade unionists, and student leader Guillermo Yunge Bustamante. Yunge helped organize street protests against Pinochet's January plebiscite.