Q. Laying out a revolutionary strategy today requires recognizing that the reformists are still dominant, for the most part, and that up until now, forces to the left of the PCI have polarized around centrist formations. How do Italian revolutionary Marxists, in an organization that remains extremely weak, envision solving this problem?
A. It is clear to us that the workers movement in Italy will face new crucial tests before there is a radical change in the relationship of forces within it. This is why the problem of what attitude to take toward the masses who are under the reformists' influence, and toward the traditional political and trade-union organizations, remains decisive. This question cannot be avoided by adventures, or by deluded attempts to bypass it; nor can it be solved by adaptation and tail-ending. The problématique of the united front and the workers government imposes stern demands on us.
I do not believe that the fundamental criteria are any different in Italy than in France or Spain. The idea that the problem can be reduced to exposing the bureaucratic leaderships and putting them on the spot is sectarian, and at best propagandistic. Such was not Lenin and Trotsky's conception, even though it is not altogether absent from the documents of the Third International, and especially from the actual practice of the period. I am convinced, likewise, that it is an error to subordinate the need for the united front, which has an objective basis insofar as it presupposes a real convergence of interests, to the relationship of forces between bureaucrats and revolutionists.
On the Italian far left, the idea of the united front has always met with very strong resistance, in fact with strong opposition. This is the result both of theoretical errors and sectarian fears. Some reject the possibility of a united front because they consider the PCI a bourgeois party; others fear that a united front would be a popular front, involving an alliance with bourgeois forces. I do not think we will be able to overcome this resistance if we limit ourselves to simply calling for a united front rather mechanically, as the Trotskyist organizations often did before 1968. The problem, rather, is how to take concrete steps, even modest ones, in every given situation.
To take an extreme example: The problem of the united front cannot be formulated and advanced in the same way both when the workers movement is coming under sharp economic and political attacks from the class enemy, and when there is a prerevolutionary or revolutionary situation. Basically, the need is the same: It is essential to bring about the greatest possible unity of the working class, and draw other exploited layers around the working class, because unity is one of the prerequisites for victory. Still, in the first instance, even the bureaucrats can have an objective interest in seeing the battle won, and convergence can occur more easily. In the second case, the problem does not take the same form, because the bureaucracies have no interest in promoting the anticapitalist dynamic of the mass movement, and, in fact, do their utmost to block it and derail it. In the first case, there are much better chances than in the second of achieving a united front in the full sense, that is, with agreements at the level of the national leaderships, not just the lower levels or certain sectors. Trotsky wrote about applying the united front policy in 1917 at the time of Kornilov's counterrevolutionary attempt; he didn't mention it in connection with the weeks in October. To give a more recent example: Would a proposal to the SP leadership to form a united front have had much credibility in July and August of 1975, at a time when Soares was the main instrument of the "democratic counterrevolution"?
To sum up, in a situation where the working class is under attack by the class enemy, when its gains are threatened, and so on, you have to rely on the united front in the strict sense, formulating it this way: Working-class unity can and must be achieved, including by agreements at the top. In prerevolutionary or revolutionary situations, on the other hand, it has to be understood that unity is attainable chiefly around specific objectives, around transitional demands, and that the preferred organizational framework for the recomposition [restructuring] of the working class can and must be organs of revolutionary democracy, the embryos of dual power.
In Italy at the present time, even without a change in the overall relationship of forces, it is possible to force the reformist leaderships into united-front actions, into de facto united fronts. The precondition for this, however, is a convergence of the entire far left or the great majority of it, around goals corresponding, of course, to the needs and aspirations of the masses. If this takes place, it becomes very difficult for the bureaucrats to oppose united actions, at least without paying a high price for it politically. In this sense, unity of the far left and unity of the workers movement are not counterposed, as is feared by some and claimed by others, but are complementary. The Italian experience has shown, moreover, as for example in the day-to-day activity in the student movement, that a conception of unity that excludes the reformists from the start has a boomerang effect, and that, in the last analysis, it jeopardizes unity of the far left itself.
Q. How have you presented the need for a workers government? How was it presented after June 20 and after the Andreotti government was formed?
A. The slogan of a workers government was raised based on our analysis that it was necessary to fight for an overall political alternative, especially once an economic crisis had broken out. We emphasized the class content of this formula, which rules out all participation by bourgeois parties and all forms of class collaboration, and therefore also rules out the specific form of class collaboration represented by the historic compromise. How to assess the "government of the left" formula put forward by Proletarian Democracy, of course, depended on how this was interpreted. In some cases the PdUP, and even AO and LC left the door open to possibly including bourgeois parties other than the DC in the government of the left, notably La Malfa's PRI (Partito Repubblicano Italiano-Italian Republican party]. This is an unacceptable position.
Just as in France, the question arises of whether we should merely talk about a workers government in general, or whether we should put forward this formula in a concrete form. There is much to be discussed on this point. But I think that, from the standpoint of the criteria, the question is fairly simple. When the situation requires us to raise the slogan chiefly in a propagandistic way, it is better to use the most general formula, expressing the class nature of the government that must be established and the basic lines of its program. When it becomes necessary to move into the area of agitation, and a workers government is considered objectively attainable in the short run, it is absolutely necessary to be precise about the political forces that are to make it up. This is why it was correct for years in Italy to use the formula of a "workers government," and then, beginning in mid-1975, to fight for a government of the PCI and PSI. In the present conjuncture, the problem will have to be reexamined very concretely. But, in general, it is necessary to combat the tendency to drop all governmental slogans. The consequence of this would be failure to offer a general political perspective for the struggle against the Andreotti government.
Q. Is it correct to see the united front in connection with a struggle to oust the Andreotti government, which, in fact, is supported by the PCI and the PSI?
A. We cannot in any way give an endorsement to a government which is not only bourgeois but which has launched the sharpest offensive against the working class in fifteen years. It is necessary to prepare the way for a mass mobilization strong enough to get rid of this government and at the same time prevent it from being replaced by one with the same outlook, or one even more conservative. However, it is necessary to take note of the fact you called attention to, that the PCI and PSI do not want to topple this government. This does create problems for us in our relations with the masses influenced by these parties. Those who say that a unity accord presupposes agreement on the need to get rid of Andreotti, in my opinion, are taking an ultimatistic position. It would be even worse to make this a precondition for any agreement in elections for shop delegates, as the LC comrades tried to do. We have to say: Let us fight the measures taken by Andreotti. These measures are, in fact, arousing strong reactions among the masses, including those sectors that look to the PCI and the PSI. If unity can be achieved on this basis, and a strong enough movement can be built, the Andreotti government will very probably fall.
Q. Before June 20, the far left debated the problem of what attitude to take toward a government of the workers parties. What is your opinion of this?
A. If the workers parties had won a majority in the elections, and formed a government, this would have deepened the crisis of leadership of the bourgeoisie and the structural instability of the system. From this standpoint, it was necessary to campaign for the central slogan of a "government of the PCI and PSI." Still, the formation of such a government could obviously not be confused with the proletariat taking power. In no case should revolutionists identify with a government of the reformist parties, or reduce their role to that of a pressure group. They should always act from the standpoint of the interests of the working class, the need to build and strengthen the mass movement, and to organize it on the basis of revolutionary democracy. It goes without saying that this need not exclude either giving critical support to measures directed against capitalist interests, or defending a government of the reformist parties against all reactionary attacks.
The 35-Hour Week and the Sliding Scale
Q. During the recent struggles around renewing the contracts, revolutionary Marxists raised the slogans of a thirty-five-hour week and a 50,000 lire [US$56.55] across-the-board salary increase. Only Lotta Continua shared this perspective. Moreover, in recent months, even within Lotta Continua, opposition has been raised to such an axis, which, according to the critics, represents an economist deformation, and arouses no response among the masses.
A. In the first place, the demand for a thirty-five-hour week was more important, in our view, than the demand for 50,000 lire, which, however, it was correct to raise, since in this fight wage demands could not be ignored. I do not agree that the demand for a thirty-five-hour week did not have mass support. Through deceptive manipulations, the bureaucrats might at most be able to show that the majority of workers were not in favor of it. But in those cases where the vanguard fought around this question, the results were very positive. This was the case in a large number of plant assemblies and mass demonstrations in Turin, Milan, and Naples in November and December 1975. As additional proof, at the meetings where the new contracts were presented for a vote, a substantially greater number voted to reject them than in the
However, we cannot be satisfied just with this type of empirical evidence. In the context of the economic crisis, the problem of the employment rate is crucial. We are confronted with fake solutions put forward by the reformists-investment in the South, first of all, and then so-called control over investment (amounting, at best, to the right of information). The only alternative that can be offered to such deceptions is cutting the workweek with no cut in pay. The demand for thirty-five hours was no more than the concrete expression of this perspective. In the given situation, this slogan had a transitional dynamic, for putting it into practice would mean calling into question all of the economic decisions made by the bourgeoisie on a national level, and would disrupt the normal functioning of the system, sharpening the crisis still further. When you don't lose sight of the fact that this demand was raised in the context of a struggle that had mobilized large sections of the working class, and whose political implications were recognized by everyone, it is simply stupid to speak of economism.
Q. So in the debate within the LC, you would line up with those who supported the demand for thirty-five hours..
A. Not necessarily. I have two criticisms to make of LC. The first is that the campaign for a thirty-five-hour week was not consistently carried out, to say nothing of the fact that it was started only very belatedly. Secondly, the demand for the thirtyfive-hour week was sometimes raised as a transitional goal, but at the same time presented as a type of foretaste of communism and associated with a maximalist approach. So it is understandable that negative reactions are now developing within the organiza-
For us, the fight to reduce the workweek, or for a sliding scale of hours, remains central, and must be concretized in the demand for a thirty-five-hour week, or something similar. Some would prefer to put the emphasis on the fight against rationalization of the work force. It would be foolish to minimize this problem. However, in the concrete, what the bosses want to accomplish by means of these rationalizations is to maintain the present level of productivity, or even raise it, while reducing the work force. Thus, the question of jobs arises from this angle as well. It is both possible and necessary, for example, to wage a many-sided struggle, including a fight against overtime, layoffs, speedups, arbitrary transfers, and so on. But if we stay only within those boundaries, we will be locked into a purely defensive struggle, which could even have a suggestion of Luddism* about it. The fight will have credibility, and will have an impact only insofar as the goal of defending jobs and fighting superexploitation is pursued by struggling for the reduction of the workweek-which the introduction of new techniques could, in principle, help to bring about-and for workers control over speedups, layoffs, working conditions, and so on.
Q. So you think that the battles over the coming months should be waged with this type of perspective?
A. Yes, but with one specification. In a more strictly conjunctu-
*Reference to outlook of the Luddites, an early nineteenth movement of English workers who destroyed machines that were taking away jobs.-IP
ral sense, it is necessary to emphasize the need for an uncompromising defense of the sliding scale. The sliding scale has become the target of a furious campaign by the government and the bosses; therefore, first priority must be given to answering these attacks.
Q. You talked about the failure of the far left to project a political and organizational alternative to the reformist parties However, we cannot ignore the extreme weakness of the revolutionary Marxists, and thus our own responsibilities. How could we envisage a change in this situation? There has been a lot of talk about unity of the far left, and the electoral bloc, in which revolutionary Marxists in Italy participated, appeared to pave the way for it. But now it seems that the process of unification is at an impasse, and that a crisis has broken out in the far left, taking various forms.
A. Let's be frank about this: Not only has no revolutionary party developed; there is not even an organization that could offer a sound framework in which to build such a party. The largest centrist organizations cannot do it, and this is even more true of the orthodox Maoist fauna. But it is also true of us.
Q. We are faced with the need for a self-criticism..