(The following article appeared in the March 31 issue of Inprecor, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]
The municipal elections held in France March 13 and March 20 have an importance that goes well beyond the local context in which they took place, first of all because of the situation in the country and second because everyone viewed them primarily as a kind of "first round" prelude to the legislative elections to be held in March 1978, if not before.
France is one of the four countries of Western Europe in which the crisis of capitalism is preparing great struggles which will not be limited to the economic questions over which they will probably break out. In face of the economic crisis, the Raymond Barre government, formed last autumn, has implemented an "austerity plan" which essentially amounts to a barely concealed plan to freeze and even reduce wages. Under the terms of the plan, wages cannot rise by more than the increase in the officially recognized price index. In the meantime, after approving a balanced budget for 1977, the government has since been compelled to present a "corrective" bill which records an initial deficit of 10,000 million francs (about $2,000 million)-and the first quarter of the year is not over yet. The trade deficit for last year was more than 21,000 million francs and the balance of payments deficit was 27,500 million francs. The exchange value of the franc has declined by about 17% in the course of one year. Production is stagnating, except in the automobile industry. Unemployment will inevitably rise under the Barre plan. Officially, one million people are listed as unemployed, but the real figure is more like a million and a half. Unemployment has risen 4.6% during the past two months. Among the unemployed, 48% are less than 25 years old and 41.2% are women. Such is the economic situation after six months of a government headed by the man President Giscard d'Estaing has called "the best economist in France." The only positive result this government can boast about is the reduction of the rise of the cost of living index to 0.3% for January 1977; but it is notorious that this index, false even in normal times, was further rigged on the eve of the elections.
In a previous article in Inprecor (No. 57, September 9, 1976), written on the occasion of the change in government at the end of last summer, we explained the factors that had provoked division among the bourgeois leadership. After the cantonal elections (March 1976), which recorded an advance for the Union de la Gauche (Union of the Left, the bloc of the Socialist party, Communist party, and Left Radical politicians), Jacques Chirac, who was then prime minister, began beating the drums for early legislative elections, his aim being to catch the Communist and Socialist parties unawares. Giscard opposed this, suggesting that even if the Union de la Gauche won the 1978 elections, he would stay in office until the end of his term, 1981. Clearly, he believed that by keeping his post even if the 1978 elections went against him, he would be in a position to retain control of the situation when the inevitable crisis broke out between the Union de la Gauche and his government. Dismissing Chirac, he called upon Barre to draw up a "plan" aimed at bringing about an improvement in the economic situation before the 1978 elections.
Tension between Giscard and Chirac has steadily increased since then, and the municipal elections brought this tension to the surface in a striking manner. Giscard won the CNPF, the French employers organization, over to his side against Chirac. Chirac retaliated by creating a sort of association of small and middle-sized entrepreneurs, leaders of the unions of supervisory personnel, and leaders of the big peasantry. (The association is known as the GIR, Initiative and Responsibility Groups.) Up to now, this has not amounted to much and it is doubtful that such an association has a great future. On the other hand, Chirac does command a solid political machine, the old Gaullist UDR (Union of Democrats for the Republic), which has since been transformed into the RPR (Rally for the Republic). The RPR's caucus in parliament has sufficient strength to force early elections at any moment.
With arrant clumsiness, Giscard decided to use the municipal elections to challenge Chirac and the RPR. The Gaullists have held the majority of the Paris city council ever since 1947, when De Gaulle managed to have his mafia elected behind the leadership of his own brother, who has since died. The Paris elections took on special importance this year because the capital city now has a new status. For the first time, a mayor of Paris will be elected-a person who, in terms of the number of votes he represents, will be the second-most powerful figure in the country and could thus become a competitor of the president. Giscard's candidate for this post was Michel d'Ornano, the present minister of industry, close to Giscard both personally and politically. The aim was to cut down on the number of Gaullist elected officials. In other words, it was an attempt to challenge the RPR and simultaneously carry off a very ripe plum. Under the Fifth (Gaullist) Republic, the president of the republic must be an uncontested figure, in particular not dependent on what essentially a rump parliament; such is the fundamental exigency of the Bonapartist constitution, which was tailored to fit De Gaulle. But since his election, Giscard has exhibited enormous weakness, and since he dismissed Chirac as prime minster, incident after incident has reduced the Bonapartist aspect of the regime to nothing. The parliament has become unmanageable, the president contested by the very majority which elected him (just barely). The RPR rose up in arms after Giscard's designation of d'Ornano, and, rising to the challenge, Chirac decided to counterattack by presenting himself as the Gaullist candidate for mayor of Paris. His objective, although he denied it, was clear: to create a current in his support which, after winning him the mayoralty of Paris, would carry him into the presidency. Toward this end he relied on his Parisian petty-bourgeois base, among other things.
The election campaign in Paris set the national political tone, one of division in the bourgeois camp, even though nearly everywhere else the candidates of the presidential majority (whether Giscardians or Chirac supporters) defended themselves against the Union de la Gauche. We will leave aside the many incidents, great and small, which marked this campaign, except to mention that in the Paris municipality the crisis of bourgeois leadership was expressed in an exchange of public letters among ministers which was so heated that it nearly broke up the unity of the government.
As far as the Union de la Gauche is concerned, there is little to say about its behavior during the campaign. A certain degree of rivalry between the Communist and Socialist parties continued to exist, but it remained limited to the first round vote in seventeen cities with populations greater than 30,000, for it was understood that wherever SP and CP candidates were running against each other on the first both cadilcandidates wassupport ta parties would the support ound.
This agreement was implemented everywhere, without the slightest discord. The leadership of the Communist party, which had been burned by the by-elections which had occurred since 1974, tried to avoid clashes with the Socialist party, provided the latter would not take too much distance from the CP. Places were left open on the Union de la Gauche lists for some "Left Radicals," "left Gaullists,"
and members of the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU-United Socialist party), but in nearly all cities the lists were made up in their great majority of members of the Socialist and Communist parties.
In many cities "ecology" candidates ran in the elections; they were most often difficult to classify politically before the second round. To a not inconsiderable extent this phenomenon is a by-product of May 1968, which generated a reaction against the "consumer society," as well as a desire to "change life," the development of consciousness of the dangers of pollution, the dangers of the nuclear industry, and so on. In general the people who first began to conduct "ecologist" propaganda were known to consider themselves as among the left, such as Professor René Dumont. Since then, however, the issue has been taken up by all sorts of people, some quite sincere, others simply looking for a way to gain personal publicity. These candidates scored relatively high votes on the first round, to such an extent that the distribution of their votes on the second round could have been decisive in about fifteen cities. It should be added that wherever pre-election polls indicated that the ecology lists would win some success, all the candidates-including, of course, those who had done their best in the recent past to pollute the cities and make life there unbearable-suddenly became warm partisans of ecology and began making the most glorious promises, never giving a thought to the social spending that would be necessary to carry these promises out. The candidates of the presidential majority thus forgot all about the "Barre plan." In general, those who voted "ecology" on the first round cast their second-round ballots for the candidates of the Union de la Gauche in considerable proportions, although the ecology candidates themselves did not issue any call for support to any particular list on the second round.
Let us now examine the overall results, the results in Paris, and finally, the results of the revolutionary lists, as well as the conditions under which they were formed.
Electoral victory of the Union de la Gauche
Except for Paris, the Union de la Gauche won an incontestable victory even on the first round. Its second-round victory was so great that even Minister of the Interior Michel Poniatowski could no longer find any way to present the figures in any other way. The Union de la Gauche now controls 70% of the cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants (155 out of 221). The government candidates had previously controlled fifteen of the country's twenty largest
Spain
GISCARD D'ESTAING
cities; the Union de la Gauche now controls twelve. The Socialist party was the big winner, now directing 80 cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants. It should be emphasized that before these elections, in the cities which the SP already controlled, it was generally on the basis of combinations with the center bourgeois parties. But this time the SP won these cities by ousting the members of the bourgeois formations from the city councils and replacing them with members of the Communist party. This was the case in Marseille and Lille, for example.
The CP also benefitted extensively from the Union de la Gauche victory. It now controls 22 cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. In addition to Havre, it now also directs such important cities as Reims, Le Mans, Saint-Etienne, and others. In addition, the CP will have council members in many cities with Socialist mayors. Since the Union de la Gauche was formed, second-round Communist votes have gone almost exclusively to SP candidates who lead in the first round, but the reverse had not always occurred. This time, however, second-round Socialist votes went to CP candidates without any important exceptions.
In the municipalities in the Paris region the Union de la Gauche further reduced the number of people who cast ballots for bourgeois parties. One point quite characteristic of these elections was that the Union de la Gauche swept the West of France, a region which had been one of the most conservative in the country, a result of the influence of the Catholic church. There were also some important Union de la Gauche successes, although with some delay and less force, in the East, the other large conservative region of the country.
The presidential majority is composed of three factions: the RPR, the Independent Republicans (Giscard's party), and other varieties of bourgeois centrists. In the provinces all these factions suffered defeat. They all tried to console themselves by citing the cities they managed to retain control of with great difficulty.
The vote in Paris
Paris-that is, the section of the Paris region which administratively constitutes the city of Paris-is a particular case in the sense that for years the regime has deliberately provoked the displacement of large numbers of workers from the city itself. Thus, since 1971 there has been a decline of about 300,000 voters; the number of workers living in the city has fallen 26%, while the number of well-off white-collar workers and members of the liberal professions has risen by the same figure. It was because Paris has undergone such a sociological transformation that the bourgeoisie believed it possible to give itself a mayor of Paris, which it has rarely done during the two centuries it has been ruling the country. Hence, a gigantic thrust to the left would have been required to oust the bourgeoisie from the Hôtel de Ville, the city hall.
The shift to the Union de la Gauche which occurred throughout the country was also manifested in Paris, to a relatively appreciable extent considering the social composition of the city. On the first round the candidates of the Union de la Gauche won 600,000 more votes than they had in 1971 (the previous municipal elections); on the second round they gained 3% over their score in the presidential election in 1974. The result is that the Union de la Gauche not only preserved the five sectors it had held previously but also gained a new sector in the center of the city, thus increasing its number of council seats.
But the bourgeois parties continued to hold the majority, and it was between them that the struggle was fierce. Chirac clearly beat Giscard, whose stalking horse, d'Ornano, was beaten by the Union de la Gauche in the 18th arrondissement. Other anti-RPR Giscard supporters were also beaten, such as the government minister Françoise Giroud. Chirac will thus become the mayor of Paris, heading up a city council composed of 52 candidates from his own list, 17 from pro-Giscard lists, and 40 council members of the Union de la Gauche. Nevertheless, this Chirac victory, won at Giscard's expense, is not of such a character as to be able to give any great impetus to the RPR in counterbalancing the spirit generated throughout the coun try by the victory of the Union de la Gauche. We will return to this question when examining the prospects opened by the March 13 and 20 elections.
The revolutionary lists
Given the political importance of these municipal elections, the Ligue Commu-
Révolutionnaire
(LCR- niste Revolutionary Communist League, French section of the Fourth International), believed it was indispensable for candidates to run in a form suited to defending a revolutionary program. The election laws make it difficult to present such candidates. Unlike the legislative elections, the municipals require a relatively important local base, for one cannot become a recognized candidate without being inscribed on the voting lists of the city. Thus, being on the ballot in all the sectors of Paris meant presenting 200 candidates; the proportions are even higher in the provinces: in a city of about 200,000 inhabitants, Clermont-Ferrand for example, more than 80 candidates were needed. Another problem which had come up during by-elections in past months in the city of Tours and in one arrondissement in Paris was the competition resulting from the presentation of different candidates of far-left formations. In the two cases mentioned there were four or five such candidates; the voters were unable to distinguish the differences among them and the audience of each was consequently reduced.
The need to have a local base certainly limited the second danger, but did not eliminate it completely. Thus, the LCR proposed the formation of united lists, a proposal to which Lutte Ouvrière (LO- Workers
Struggle) and the Organisation Communiste des Travailleurs (OCT- Communist Workers Organization) responded favorably. These three organizations signed a common national platform (see Inprecor, No. 66, January 27, 1977, for the text of the platform).! Other organizations which were in agreement with the platform and wanted to participate in the establishment of a common list and the waging of a common campaign in the framework of the political principles set down in the platform were invited to sign as well. The platform declaration put forward a revolutionary program against the capitalist system and warned the workers against the incapacity of the Union de la Gauche to resolve the problems and satisfy the demands of the workers. The platform also made it clear that the common lists, called "Pour le socialisme, pouvoir aux travailleurs" (For socialism, power to the workers), would support Union de la Gauche lists composed of candidates of the SP and CP on the second round. Thus, revolutionary lists were presented in all eighteen sectors of Paris and in some thirty cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants.
Never had there been such silence about such lists on the part of the television, radio, and bourgeois press, as well as on the part of the parties of the Union de la Gauche. Although these lists were never mentioned before the first round, they received national attention after the voting. For never had revolutionary lists attained so many votes, never had they won such high percentages. The table records the scores achieved. It can be seen that the far-left lists generally doubled or tripled the scores they had received in the past. It should be noted that these percentages recurred in widely dispersed cities around the country. It should also be noted that in several cases even higher scores were achieved in working-class neighborhoods in some cities. Thus, in Nancy, where the revolutionary list won 8.3% of the vote overall, it won 14.4% in Haut-de- Lièvre, a concentration of several thousand workers; the list won 11% in the St- Epvre neighborhood. The same phenomenon occurred in Rouen, where the overall percentage was 7.6% but rose to nearly 11% in a concentration of railway workers. In Clermont-Ferrand, where the overall score was 5.6%, percentages in the working-class neighborhoods ranged from 8.1% to 8.3%. In Orléans, where the overall vote was 12%, it sometimes hit 17% and even 18% in one neighborhood, La Source, where the employees of the largest postal check-cancelling establishment in France live. If the results were low in Grenoble, Toulouse, and Montpellier, this was because in these cities the ecology lists placed themselves explicitly to the left of the Union de la Gauche and were sometimes allied to strong local groups, such as Lutte Occitane in Montpellier or the PSU. Even in Paris, the lists "Pour le socialisme, pouvoir aux travailleurs" achieved better scores than ever, even though the particular election conditions in this city extensively contributed to polarizing the firstround votes between the government majority and the list of the Union de la
Gauche, since the latter seemed to have a serious chance of winning because of the division of the majority.
By all evidence, the results obtained by the revolutionary lists have a political significance which ought to be highlighted. There is no point in even bothering to answer certain journalists and Union de la Gauche candidates who claimed that the whole thing was the result of "mistakes" made by the voters-mistakes which seemed to have been committed roughly uniformly throughout the country. The leaders of the PSU explain the high scores by the fact that their own party did not run candidates, since they figured among the lists of the Union de la Gauche this
- to cho it pict time. There is not doubt that the revolutionary lists did pick up votes which had gone to the PSU in the past. But all this proves is that these votes were not the property of the PSU and that the voters concerned have not followed the PSU in its de facto integration into the Union de la Gauche. The political significance of the vote for the revolutionary lists is not affected by the votes cast in previous elections. The most one can say is that the present vote is more conscious politically than the old PSU vote.
It should also be noted that the revolutionary vote was high enough to give the two mass workers parties pause for thought, if only on the municipal level. Thus, in Saint-Etienne and Montpellier the local organizations of the Communist party agreed to give the floor to LCR militants during their meeting and also published the revolutionaries' communiqué announcing their withdrawal on the se cond round. In Lille the outgoing mayor, Pierre Mauroy, a leading Socialist who speaks in a different tone on a national scale, invited our comrades to participate press conference held before the in a second round. We have no illusions in these attitudes. We know what three or four thousand votes can mean to opportunists trying to get elected. But the fact is that this is a rather new situation, one which arises from changes in the relationship of forces.
The more general lessons which can be drawn from the scores of the revolutionary lists are as follows:
a. First of all, these results reflect the general current of radicalization advancing among the French working class. This current is certainly stronger than we could have thought, for during the past year the masses have been thrown onto the defensive as far as economic demands are concerned and have exhibited wait-and-see attitudes politically, because of the prospects of victory for the Union de la Gauche.
b. The results also testify that even before the entry of the Union de la Gauche into the government, there is already a relatively substantial current among the workers which at least has doubts about the capacities and will of the parties of the Union de la Gauche and believes that it will be necessary to take things into its own hands in order to go further than these parties desire. As a whole, the vote for the revolutionary lists reflects not so tor the revolutionary lists retlects not so much adherence to a precise program as distrust of the present policy and projects of the Union de la Gauche.
c. This vanguard current was able to make its weight felt because the three organizations (LCR, LO, and OCT) acted in a united manner in these elections (while not concealing, it should be noted in passing, the differences that divide them). This is an extremely important point, because this factor, unlike the two previous observations, is not an objective feature of the situation of the far-left organizations but is something which depends on them. This united action was able to give the mass parties of the working class pause for thought and contributed to electing working-class city councils in some areas. But it would be much more important and decisive if such unity were realized in other domains of the class struggle, domains in which the masses can intervene in other ways than with ballots, in which the slogans, objectives, and methods advanced by revolutionaries can allow for a much greater intervention than their numbers would appear to permit.
The prospects
Since the results have just been released, it is still a bit too early to draw definitive conclusions about the prospects. Raymond Barre, the head of the government, after noting the success of the Union de la Gauche, declared that the government would continue to apply his "plan" in the economic domain and called upon his "majority" (which has now become a minority in the country) to "unite" to win the 1978 legislative elections. Economically, the bourgeoisie, whether it supports Giscard or Chirac, has no choice as to the means by which to make the working masses bear the costs of the crisis. In the more strictly political realm, all factions of the bourgeoisie have responded to their defeat by screaming, "Unity, unity, unity." But unity behind whom? Unity how? Undoubtedly, there will be no lack of worthy souls to come forward with good advice for these gentlemen. But everyone knows that just as nothing succeeds like success, nothing heats up tensions and differences like defeat. The president and the head of the government now stand between a left which holds a majority in the country and a Gaullist party which, while asserting that it stands behind the chiefs of state and government, no longer has confidence in them and commands a position of strength in the capital itself. Attempts at reconciliation will be made, but there will inevitably be no lack of
Results of the Far Left in the
Presidential elections of 1974 (Krivine and
Elections
Municipal elections
City
Aubervilliers
Belfort
Besançon
Bordeaux
Bourges
Caen
Carcassonne
Cenon
Clermont
Colombes
Dijon
Grenoble
Lille
Lyon
Marseille
Montbeliard
Montpellier
Nancy
Orléans
Paris
Perpignan
Rennes
Rouen
St-Etienne
St-Ouen
Strasbourg
Toulouse
Tours
Vierzon
Villeurbanne
Venissieux opportunities for tensions to be manifested. And neither Giscard nor Chirac has any real possibility of asserting hegemony.
The government's policy can only accentuate the class struggle. The "Barre plan" is now moving to the attack in an area complementary to its attack on wages, that of social security, a particularly sensitive point for the workers at a time when unemployment is steadily rising. The workers have gained self-confidence through the municipal elections. The situation will thus be very favorable for actions that could bring down such a fragile government. In such a situation, what serves the bourgeoisie more than anything is the foot-dragging policy of the leaders of the Union de la Gauche. Their only objective is to win the 1978 elections, riding the current favorable to them while doing nothing to really utilize it.
The leadership of the CP is primarily busy savoring its electoral victories and consolidating its positions. For his part, SP leader François Mitterrand is no longer in a hurry to enter the government; e too, while sharpening up his sarcastic nd derisive remarks about the men in power (a game in which he excels), is
Laguiller)
2.7%
2.7% 1.7% 1.4% 2.9%
2.2% 2.8% 2.5% 1.9% 1.9% 2.4% 1.8% 1.8% 2.2% 1.6% 1.6% 2.05%
2.0% 2.2% 2.0% 2.2% 2.8% 1.1% 2.2% 1.3%
thinking only of 1977
6.7% 4.7% 3.3% 4.6% 4.7% 8.3% 6.0% 6.4% 5.6% 4.8% 5.2% 1.4% 6.4% 5.5% 1.8% 9.5% 1.9% 8.3% 12.0% 2.88% 3.1% 2.31% 7.6% 3.2% 9.5% 5.0% 1.9% 4.2% 4.6% 2.4% 9.8%
about consolidating his party and avoiding adding fuel to the fire. In a television interview during the election campaign he expressed his fear that "the atmosphere of extreme polarization between now and March 1978 could be prejudicial to France and the French people."
The far-left has increased its forces of intervention in the class struggle, but not to the point that it could take decisive initiatives to set broad masses in motion. It is the development of the class struggle which could energize a spontaneous movement before 1978 which could upset the electoral calculations of the leaders of the Union de la Gauche. In any event, revolutionary militants, particularly those of the LCR, must more than ever call for action to oust Giscard, Barre, and Chirac, contrary to the leaders of the two mass workers parties and the two central tradeunion federations, the CGT and the CFDT, whose eyes are fixed on 1978 while the government and employers are continuing their attacks on the living and working conditions of the working class.
Notes
1. See also Intercontinental Press, February 28, 1977, p. 212.—IP
2. To indicate its refusal to support the presence of Left Radicals or other bourgeois candidates, the LCR, for its part, called on people not to vote for lists associated with the Union de la Gauche when they were led by such candidates. This was the case, for example, in Perpignan. In such cases, voting for the Union de la Gauche list would have meant electing a city council under bourgeois leadership and not under the leadership of a workers party.