[The following article appeared in the January issue of the revolutionary-socialist monthly Revista de América, published in Buenos Aires. The translation and footnotes are by Intercontinental Press.]
Nine years ago, General [Juan Carlos] Onganía led a coup against the Radical' government, which was almost as discredited as the current Peronist government is. It amounted to little more than a Sunday outing. A small squad drove up to the Casa Rosada.2 The officer in charge said to Dr. Illía:
"Mr. President, you are alone. Not even the Granaderos support you. We beg you not to resist."
In a dignified way, the president replied, "I will leave only if forced."
The officer shrugged his shoulders. Then, from the street, he ordered the government palace blanketed with tear gas. Obviously, the president had to leave hurriedly. A short time later General Onganía was installed with the good wishes of the businessmen and the trade-union leadership, and with the massive support of the middle class and the defeated working class. He announced a new twenty-year era.
2. The presidential palace.
3. The presidential bodyguard.
80 80
It only lasted three, but that is another story...
Last week* in Buenos Aires a group of air force officers, friends of General Onganía calling themselves nationalists and Catholics, entrenched themselves at the Jorge Newbery Airport and Morón Base. They detained the commander in chief of air force operations and seized three radio stations, from which they broadcast inflammatory proclamations against the government.
In their statements they also condemned all the bourgeois opposition parties and, of course, the "unpatriotic subversives," calling on the commander in chief of the army to take power. After five days of confusing negotiations they gave up on terms not known as of the writing of this article.
But although we do not know the terms of the negotiations, in which the intervention of Monsignor Tortolo-the vicar general of the armed forces and chief military chaplain—played a central role, there are two facts worthy of careful attention. One is the almost total isolation of the putschist group, which, in the five days it functioned more or less freely, was unable to gain the support of a single sector of the military or politicians. The other is the isolation and weakness, comparable to that of the putschists, revealed by the Executive Power, whose only support came from a sector of the trade-union bureaucracy.
In the middle, between the government and the putschists, was the overwhelming majority of the bourgeoisie with its political parties, parliamentary majority, and the bulk of the nation's generals and admirals. This saddled the crisis with a much-discussed, provisional, foot-dragging solution showing-exactly as the commander in chief of the army said-that although the army agreed with the views of the putschists, it was against taking power and had faith in "institutional solutions."
What are these "solutions"? They are the ones demanded by the majority opposition in parliament. They could be, like the Holy Trinity, any one of three types, but they all amount to the same thing: to proceed with elections in October 1976, with the president resigning; to proceed with the elections, with a long leave of absence for Isabel Perón; or, if she resists, to proceed with impeachment proceedings against her for Watergate-style administrative irregularities.
The best indication that the coup was in trouble was that the air force officers did not dare to bomb the Plaza de Mayo and government house as they did in June 1955.5 There was also another big difference
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with the 1955 coup attempt-the working class and people showed more concern about the terrible heat, the even worse inflation, or the fight to the finish of the national soccer championship by Estudiantes de La Plata and River Plate. In 1955 thousands of workers rushed to Plaza de Mayo asking for arms to defend the Peronist government. This time, it was only on the fifth day of intrigues between the putschists and the "loyalists" that they complied in great numbers and in a disciplined way with a fifty-minute general strike called by the divided trade-union bureaucracy.
Why did the armed forces and the bulk of the bourgeoisie refuse to take power, as they clearly did when faced with the "gorilla" minority in the air force? Particularly in view of the fact that the government is for all practical purposes defenseless, having been discredited before the people and having only scant support from one part of the official party apparatus, a parliamentary minority, and a divided trade-union bureaucracy.
It is because the main bourgeois leaders, both civilian and military, are debating an extremely serious problem at present: the problem of the militant upsurge of the workers movement. Although statistics have not yet been released, 1975 probably raised the curve of hours of work lost in production because of strikes to a very high point.
Even though the Peronist ministers have reduced real wages (by 13 percent for the married unskilled worker in 1975), this economic setback stimulated the working class's fighting spirit. That spirit is being fanned even more by the fact that the working class feels "betrayed" by a government it had confidence in.
Thus, a political issue has been added to the economic one in a confrontation with the government and the bourgeoisie. This was shown clearly during the first half of last July, when thanks to a peculiar combination of forces, the trade-union bureaucracy, parliament, and opposition parties opposed the counterrevolutionary moves by Minister [José] López Rega, the Rasputin of the Peronist cabinet. At that time a mammoth general strike paralyzed the country for fifteen days.
Although the strikes were never again to become so massive and widespread, owing to the poliey of the trade-union bureaucracy, the bourgeoisie faces an extremely hard fight by some sectors of the workers. What are they to do to detour it, slow it down, or eventually smash it? How can they regain control over the factories? How can they create a relatively peaceful political and social future for themselves?
With the December 18 dividing line of the putschist adventure in the air force, we January 26, 1976
Laporte
ISABEL PERON
have their response. Only a tiny sector siding with Onganía-who at the end remained isolated-wants a Pinochet-type gorillaist solution at any cost.
That is because military coups-the all or nothing approach-have been disastrous in the past. In the three recent experiences in which the armed forces took power, they had to abandon it in short order-driven out by the masses-leaving the country mired in formidable crises.
The gorilla dictatorship of Aramburu and Rojas® had to turn over constitutional power to [Arturo] Frondizi after three years. One year after Frondizi was brought down, they had to accept the victory of Illia. And three years after Illia was overthrown came the Cordobazo? and the beginnings of Onganía's road to the cross.
With their fingers burned by such experience, the armed forces rejected a few months ago the fascistic nightmare of López Rega; and they now reject the bonapartist appeal, which, in the name of St. Thomas and the restoration, Onganía's air force friends made.
Interpreting the doubts and fears of the bourgeoisie, the armed forces have leaned once again toward the institutional paththat is, to proceed with elections while
Bogan as est Army roani September pressuring the government, accentuating its reactionary course, and obtaining wage exploitation measures that not even a military dictatorship could achieve. At the same time they will seek to divide, encircle, and absorb the government. This is how the armed forces seek to eliminate the party that has a political hold over the workers. If the workers are divided, the elections would be manageable for the three or four main bourgeois candidates, all of whom hold a hard anti-working-class position in common.
6. Gen. Pedro Eugenio Aramburu and Adm. Isaac
Thus, while the bourgeoisie sharpens its weapons of military, police, and parapolice repression, holding them in reserve for the most explosive workers struggles, in public it leans toward an electoral solution—a solution dictated by its failures with the mass movement and the strength of the current labor struggles. And why not? A speculation that comes immediately to mind is that by not throwing the government out now they may be seeking to avoid a martyrdom that could make Isabel Perón a political trump card.
We do not know whether the Argentine tradition that "nothing happens" during the summer will be respected this time. Normally during that season the leaders go to the beaches and draw pictures in the sand of plans, which are often carried away by the Atlantic winds. If the scope of workers' strikes does not prevent the bourgeoisie from taking vacations this summer, the predominant plans will concern the electoral alchemy of October 1976, the card they are playing to sidetrack the rise of the workers movement.
Sign of the Times
"Two of the three largest banks in the United States have been placed on a supersecret list of problem banks by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency," according to a report in the January 11 Washington Post.
New York's First National City Bank (Citibank) and Chase Manhattan Bank, which have combined assets of $100 billion, were placed on the list after examinations revealed "inadequate" capital at both banks.
Banks are usually placed on the problem list when their total "classified" assets (mainly doubtful loans) exceed 80% of their capital.
Although the Washington Post report said that "there is no indication that either of the giant banks... faces any immediate financial difficulties" it noted that an examination conducted early last year showed that Chase Manhattan had "classified" assets totaling 97% of its capital. The figure at Citibank, in an examination completed last July, was 114%.
Notes
1. On June 28, 1966, President Arturo Illía of the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union) was overthrown.
4. December 18, 1975.
5. The date of a navy revolt against the government of Juan Perón.
7. The 1969 semi-insurrection in the city of Córdoba.