[In its December 6, 1975, issue, Combate Socialista, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT-Revolutionary Workers party, a
Portuguese group that has declared its adherence to the Fourth International), published an interview with a paratrooper who was on the Tancos base at the time of the November 25 putsch attempt. The paratrooper's statements are of interest as an indication of the attitudes of the radicalized soldiers and also for the light they shed on some obscure aspects of the military rebellion. The translation of the interview and Combate Socialista's introduction is by Intercontinental Press.]
The interview that follows is the testimony of a Tancos paratrooper, and that is how our readers should regard it. We are publishing this eyewitness account because it is helpful in demythologizing the events in Tancos.
This interview reflects the political confusion that existed among the paratroopers and made it possible to manipulate them. On the other hand, it also reflects their just demand for the right to organize and choose their commanders, an aspiration that has often been slanderously misinterpreted.
But, as the comrade interviewed said, "We are ready to continue the struggle, no matter where we have to fight."
Question. Before you take up the paratroopers' opposition to Morais e Silva [the air force commander), I would like you to say something about the question of the Lisbon Military Region command.
A
position attributed to the paratroopers was published. How was this position reached?
Answer. This position was adopted in a general meeting of noncommissioned officers and privates. We did not want Vasco Lourenço as commander; the majority rejected him.
Q. Besides rejecting Vasco Lourenço's nomination, did you present any alternative? What position did you take toward Otelo [Saraiva de Carvalho] as commander? I ask this question because the CP used the opposition of many soldiers to Vasco Lourenço to reinforce its support for Otelo.
A. We, support Otelo? In Tancos we didn't say a word about Otelo. He was not called to the base. We didn't want Vasco Lourenço because we knew what his posi tions were, and so Otelo was left as the lesser evil. But not a word was said about him.
Q. What is the story about Morais e Silva's visit to the Tancos base and your demand for his resignation?
A. He came to explain the case of Rádio Renascença,* to say that this was an order and could not be discussed. It was the draftees who attended the meeting with Morais e Silva. They were taken there by the officers. Almost all the privates were there who had been in the general assembly. The crowd began to boo Morais e Silva, to say that they were sick of him, that they already knew what he thought, that they didn't want to hear anything more, and that they wouldn't let him keep on trying to deceive the paratroopers.
Then, he said the paratroopers had three choices-to support the sixth government unconditionally, to support a leftist minority, or to forget about politics. Finally, when he was leaving, he said: "The paratroop corps is going to be done away with soon."
So, all the officers left; we drove them out. We were on alert. The same night we got
*Rádio Renascença had been occupied by leftists who used it to mobilize demonstrations against the sixth government. The government sent in paratroopers to put the station off the air. During this operation, the transmitter was dynamited. Spokesmen for the soldiers said that they did not know what the objective of the exercise was and that the government had tricked them.-IP
information that the barracks was going to be flattened, and so we stayed at the ready. This was the background for everything that happened later, for the position of the privates and the first sergeants who wanted to drive out Morais e Silva and Pinho Freire [the second in command of the air force].
Q. And the occupation of the bases? How was that decided? Do you think that was the most effective form of struggle to get rid of Morais e Silva, or do you think that it was part of a larger plan that the officers knew about and you did not?
A. The occupation was carried out at night. In the preceding days, there had been no general assemblies. The personnel rushed to the bases. "We are going to get rid of Morais e Silva," that was the idea. But it was certainly part of a putsch attempt. The first sergeants knew about it. They were the ones who gave the orders. And they were also the first ones to leave Tancos on Thursday night [November 27] First sergeants influenced by the CP were involved.
We were surprised by the coup. "A coup, but what we wanted was to get rid of Morais e Silva, and the men knew nothing about this." If we had been sure we had the support of the population, we were ready to go right to Lisbon, to throw out the sixth government, Mário Soares, Alvaro Cunhal. and all the rest in the government who aren't doing anybody any good. If the population had been ready to move ahead. if they had supported it-but this was a struggle for the working masses. We did not go out to carry out a coup. Besides, we knew very well that the military personnel in the northern and central regions were with the sixth government. In addition, some paratroopers also supported the sixth government. It would have been lunacy to stage a coup.
Then, when we saw that we did not have the support of anyone, we thought: "We are alone. OK, let's throw them out." Before this we never thought about overthrowing the government. We knew that it was not a good government; we were against it. But a thousand paratroopers are not going to overthrow a government. After falling into an error-I think it was adventurism to occupy bases to get rid of Morais e Silvawe were inclined to push ahead.
The men thought that by occupying the bases, they were throwing out Morais e Silva. Maybe this was inexperience. Even a lot of us were against this, because it was adventurism and there were other ways to get rid of him. As for the coup, it was only later that we learned that the support of the marines had been promised. Later, and not before.
Q. Was there any attempt by the paratroopers or any paratroopers committee to contact workers commissions or other workers organizations?
A. On Thursday, soldiers went to Lisbon to distribute communiqués and to contact the workers at Lisnave and Setenave. They went to see if we had any support and whether it was worth going on. But when these men came back on Friday, everybody was already leaving. There was a total demobilization, which had been started by the sergeants. The men were demoralized. ("Before they supported this; it was they who started it. And now they are running away.") There were also paratroopers who did not want to fight or shed blood, and they began to leave. Fewer and fewer men were left. And then we held a general assembly: "We've lost, let's go home. There's no possibility to continue the struggle."
Moreover, those who went to Lisbon were liable to get arrested. This was an obstacle to making contact with the workers. There roadblocks in Entroncamento. In were Tancos, the first sergeants, the CP supporters, did not know about our efforts, because for the most part it was the privates who decided that men should go to Lisbon to try to make contacts so that at least we would know where we stood. The men didn't want the sergeants to know: "They don't have anything to do with this, we are going to make the contacts." We had seen that we had been betrayed by the sergeants.
Q. What do you think now?
A. After all this happened, a thousand men broke into tears, one after the other. We were really down, some men wanted to wage armed struggle from the underground. This was lunacy, but the men were demoralized; they didn't know what to do. But I don't think we have lost, we have to go on. I think the men who were in Tancos, after a little while, will be ready to continue the struggle no matter where we have to fight. 102