(The following article is from the Novem ber 29 issue of Combate Socialista, the fortnightly newspaper of the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT- Revolutionary Workers party, a Portuguese group that has declared its adherence to the Fourth International). The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
1. On the morning of November 25, the "paras" [paratroopers] were tricked into attempting a coup whose immediate declared objective was to force a change in the air force high command and in the representatives of this service in the Revolutionary Council. This action, which amounted to a coup because it was launched completely behind the backs of the masses, was the culmination of conflicts at the level of the state apparatus. In these disputes, the improperly termed "revolutionary military officers," who were enthusiastically supported by the PCP [Partido Comunista Português-Portuguese Communist party], the FUR [Frente de Unidade Revolucionária-Front for Revolutionary Unityl, and to a certain extent, by the UDP [União Democrática do Povo-People's Democratic Union, a Maoist organization anarcho-syndicalism), toward evolving were trying to regain positions lost with the collapse of the fifth government.' Along with the Gonçalveses, Otelos, Fabiãos, and Coutinhos, it is these political forces that bear responsibility for this anti-workingclass adventure, regardless of whether they participated directly in the coup. They are responsible because all of them, along with their military "idols," tried to impose a government behind the backs of the workers and people, or more precisely, against the will of the majority of the population. Above and beyond all the superleft and anticapitalist declarations, the coup was at setting up a regime based on aimed repressive force and bureaucratic control of the mass organizations. On this basis, Portugal would not evolve toward socialism but toward an openly totalitarian capitalist regime.
2. Above and beyond its anti-workingclass objectives, the coup was carried out in such a way that it amounted to a pure
provocation against the working masses. Taking advantage of the political weakness of the embryonic organs of workers power, ignoring the need for them to function democratically, and excluding the majority of the mass movement from their decisions in an ultrabureaucratic way, the authors of this coup tried to present it as an action emanating from these bodies. The Comiss- ões de Trabalhadores [CTs- Workers Commissions], Comissões de Moradores [CMs- Tenants Committees], Intersindical [the CP- dominated national union federation], and most importantly, the bodies that reflected the radicalization in the armed forces themselves, were exploited for this purpose. The fact that this provocation managed finally to draw in only a few sectors of the military units, which, moreover, were tricked into carrying out the actions they did, is explained largely by the following factors: The soldiers assemblies and the de Delegados de
ADUs [Assembleias Unidade-Unit Delegate Assemblies] were relatively isolated. The soldiers committees that were forming were manipulated. The ultraleftists devoted their efforts to sparking "changes by spectacular actions based on the barracks. Also, there was an understandable impatience on the part of the "paras." In addition to this, the attempts to mobilize sections of the mass movement to provide a cover for this maneuver were quashed at the decisive moment by the quiet but unmistakable pressure of the great majority of the population and of the workers themselves.
3. The hatred earned by the antilabor government of Vasco Gonçalves and the discredit into which the Stalinist bureaucracy has fallen led broad strata of the population immediately to reject their antidemocratic propositions. Such opposition on the part of the population was the main reason for the failure of the coup. Isolation led to divisions in the ranks of the "rebels" and paralyzed many of those implicated in the action, while the opposite happened on the government side. When Costa Gomes decided to back the sixth government and turn the Lisbon Military Region over to the Group of the Nine, in opposition to the demands of the putschists, he could present himself and his officers as "democrats," free for the first time from the hostile pressure of the workers. It was not Jaime Neves's* military genius but this combination of circumstances that explains the commandos's success and this new and much more serious defeat for those who sought to move toward a repressive bonapartist regime.
4. Unfortunately this time the defeat of the Stalinists and their ultraleft allies had a certain impact on the mass movement. The provocation sowed confusion and managed to draw in some groups of soldiers, who were later abandoned by their "revolutionary" "leaders" in the adventure. As a result, important sections of the masses came to view such soldiers as a threat to their democratic rights. So, the way was opened for the military hierarchy to launch an attack against the long and difficult struggle waged by the soldiers for democracy and the right to organize. Now the hierarchy is in a much better position to try to wipe out these gains.
5. During the recent period in the workers movement the PCP has tried to support some of the just struggles that have developed against the economic policy of Pinheiro de Azevedo. But at the same time, it has sought to deprive these struggles of a correct political perspective and use these mobilizations to back up its policy of restoring Vasco and other officers to the political scene. In fact, significant sections of the working class in the South and of the rural proletariat in Alentejo were deluded into believing that there would be a rapid "seizure of power." Today the main reaction of these workers is confusion, since these illusions have been transformed into defeat and betrayal. The triumphalism and bureaucratic control that the PCP maintained in the mass movement-with the more than merely objective support of the FUR-and all its perspectives of alliances with the "progressive" MFA have suffered a grave defeat. A similar defeat was suffered by the UDP. Despite all its anti-Cunhal talk, it came finally to be committed to defending Otelo's military positions, and was also, to a certain extent, implicated in the adventure. When the PCP saw that the coup was defeated, it resorted to desperate maneuvers, seeking new points of agreement in order to maintain itself in the government at any price. But these maneuvers will only magnify its political defeat and the discredit into which it has fallen.
6. The majority of the Revolutionary Council, now joined by the president, have won more than a military victory. We can also expect that their political position will be reinforced to a certain extent. With the help of the SP leadership they present themselves as the guarantors of democracy and a force that can prevent a civil war, which is all the more feared inasmuch as in the eyes of the people armed clashes appear to have no justification. The broad masses that identify with the SP and look with 1756
apprehension on the military control of political life may be led for some time by Mário Soares to believe that it is correct to trust Costa Gomes and the Revolutionary Council and accept pacts and restrictions on democracy. This will strengthen the Social Democratic maneuver, which is opposed to the Stalinist one but has the same objective: The bourgeois government and its army will be presented as the guarantor of a democratic transition to socialism. The aim is to keep the exploited masses from seeing that their own fighting organizations (the Workers Commissions and other organs of the popular will) are the decisive tools in the struggle for democracy and socialism. This road will be presented as a democratic one, although it leaves intact the fundamental weapon of capitalist dictatorship, the state and its repressive institutions. The objective will be to crush the nascent workers power between the anvil of semidemocracy and the hammer of repression that will be used with all possible violence against those who do not abide by the rules of the game or who get out of control. This perspective explains why today they have resorted to a state of siege. In the final phase of this counterrevolutionary plan, once the workers are demobilized, there might be an attempt to impose a fascistlike solution, and in such conditions, it could have a chance of success. For the present, however, nothing indicates that this will be the inevitable direction of events, because the upsurge of the mass movement has by no means been defeated. As long as the masses maintain their strength, all the government's plans will remain simply plans.
7. Either out of political deception or cretinism, some organizations have been maintaining that the defeat of the "progressive" officers and consolidation of a government in which the SP plays a large role would be synonymous with the crushing of the revolution. The reality is completely different. With the relative exceptions mentioned above (especially in the case of the soldiers), the mass movement has not suffered any decisive defeat. The defeat of the totalitarian plan by which the Stalinists hoped to uphold capitalism is in no way a defeat for the workers. None of the workers' gains have been lost. The mass organizations and embryonic forms of workers power, especially at the plant level, continue to hold intact all their potential. There is no reason for demoralization or pessimism, because the road is open for the revolution to advance.
8. What is more, it is possible that the defeat suffered by the bureaucrats of the Secretariat of the Workers Commissions of the Lisbon Industrial Belt and Intersindical in a struggle rejected by the working class will open up new possibilities for the workers to organize democratically and breathe life into bodies that the PCP intended to make into a mere transmission belt. The masses are ready to advance in a revolutionary direction. They may bring many illusions and errors to the Workers Commissions and other bodies. But real mass participation in these bodies is what will guarantee that workers power will be strengthened, centralized, and tempered in the struggle against the antilabor Economic Plan and its effects, in the struggle for the defense of democratic rights for the masses, in the struggle to assure that the popular will is really respected.
9. Millions of SP workers think that their leaders can lead them in the struggle for the aims they want to achieve-the democracy that will enable us to decide which direction we are going to follow, that is, how to end exploitation. We Trotskyists do not believe in Soares. We believe in the revolutionary capacity of the masses. Alongside the masses, we are going to try to fight for democracy in the unions and in the country. In this struggle, we will show that we are able to defend the right to vote against any totalitarian threat, and we are certain that the most effective way to defend this right, as well as any other, is not making pacts or accepting the authority and discipline of a president, a government, and a Revolutionary Council that nobody voted for.
10. Since this is our position, since this is our fight, we can repeat to every worker what we said before this tragic week began.
What we propose, comrade, is this:
Let us unite to assure that no Workers Commission, no union, and no delegate takes any steps without a mandate from a representative assembly. Unity to assure workers democracy.
Let us unite to make sure that the Workers Commissions and unions make it clear that they have had enough of plans and governments that no one voted for. Unity so that we workers can say no to Costa Gomes, no to the Revolutionary Council, no to Copcon, and impose our own government.
Let us unite so that together with the soldiers and sailors we can demand that no group in the military get away with imposing its opinions by manipulations. Unity with the workers in uniform so that we can put an end to demagogy by direct election of officers and commanders in unit assemblies, thereby eliminating the putschists that no one elected or controls.
Let us unite to struggle for a government democratically elected by the masses without "pacts" or conditions. Unite to assure that this demand is incorporated through resolutions of assemblies in the program of the Workers Commissions and of other organs of workers and people's power.
Let us unite to counter the crisis and the antilabor Economic Plans by developing forms of workers control designed to combat unemployment, inflation, and scarcity, measures that must be discussed by the ranks and coordinated centrally by the Workers Commissions.
Let us unite to build a national congress of Workers Commissions and other organs of people's will on a democratic basis, where, by combining the strength of our fighting organizations, we will have the necessary power to assure the election of a government and to take steps to prevent the economic disaster that has been prepared by the capitalists.
If you don't agree, comrade, let's unite to get the state of siege called off and then we can discuss our differences freely.
Notes
1. The provisional government formed after the Socialist party went into opposition on July 11. The only political party that remained in the cabinet was the Communist party; and the government was headed by the CP's ally Vasco Gonçalves.—IP
2. The leader of the Amadora Commandos who played the major role in crushing the November 25 putsch.—IP