[The following letter from the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, dated April 23, 1964, was sent as soon as it was learned that the leadership of the Lanka Sama Samaja party (at that time the Ceylon section of the Fourth International) was negotiating entry of the party into a bourgeois coalition government. The letter was addressed "To the Central Committee and Members" of the LSSP.]
Dear Comrades:
On the eve of your Annual Conference we address you on certain issues which we consider crucial for our movement in Ceylon. Indeed, we are of the opinion that some of the questions facing you today could be decisive for the entire course of the working-class and mass movement in Ceylon for many years to come.
From the information at our disposal it is clear that the economic and political situations in the country have entered a phase of severe crisis. First, the financial situation in the country has deteriorated to such an extent that mere palliatives on the part of the government can no longer suffice to tide over the current day-to-day problems facing it. This, in turn, has led to a crisis of government and confusion among bourgeois circles about their perspectives for the future. On the one hand, we witness the inability of the ruling SLFP! to continue much longer in office, expressed in its rapidly dwindling parliamentary majority, its sudden prorogation of parliament and its "behind the scenes" maneuvers to negotiate a fresh lease of life through an alliance with the parties of the left. On the other hand, the current demagogy of the UNP is an admission of its own awareness of the crisis facing bourgeois rule as such, and the growing strength of the mass movement in the country. It is in this
context that we are faced with a spate of rumors about a possible coup d'état and extraparliamentary action from the right.
As far as the SLFP is concerned, two factors appear to motivate its present course of action: (1) lack of confidence in its ability to continue in office for the rest of its constitutional term; (2) a deep-seated fear of an upsurge in the working-class movement and the real possibility of the emergence of a government of the left. Clearly, it is this latter possibility which drives it today to seek a modus vivendi with the left and attempt a realignment of forces through a coalition with the United Left Front.
Its calculations are fairly obvious. It hopes to gain strength by an infusion from the left. It hopes to disorient the masses by taking on left coloration. It hopes to weaken the threat from the left by splitting the left organizations (since acceptance of a coalition would obviously not be unanimous and would most likely open the most bitter factional struggles). It hopes to associate prominent left figures with its rule and thereby utterly discredit them for the following phase when this one comes to its inevitable end and social forces have reached unendurable tension and polarization.
Its primary immediate aim is to stem the tide of rising mass unrest, contain the parties of the left within its own control and commit them to "progressive" formulae within the framework of the capitalist structure. It is clear that the "concessions" proposed by the Prime Minister and reported to the Central Committee meeting remain mere sops insofar as they leave intact the structure of capitalism and in no way touch the essential productive bases of the economy.
It is necessary to declare at this stage, quite categorically, that we oppose our party entering any coalition government wherein decisive control is held by a party that has proved time and again its reluctance to move against the capitalist order, and furthermore has demonstrated in action its essentially anti-working-class character. We do not believe that the character of the SLFP is determined by the
declarations of one or another of its individual leaders. Its character has been revealed by its whole history during its years in power. In this sense we see no reason for changing our characterization of it as a party essentially functioning within the framework of capitalism and utilized by certain layers of the bourgeoisie as a possible bulwark against the growing forces of the working class. Any form of coalition with such a party, as long as it remains the dominant majority within such a coalition, can only lead to the immobilization of the left in advance and its becoming itself a target for the growing resentment of the masses.
It is necessary to hark back to the recent past and draw the necessary conclusions from the results of the policy of support which the party once extended to the government of Mrs. Bandaranaike. As the Central Committee's own resolution expressed it, this was a factor which was partly responsible for the serious setbacks suffered by the party in the Colombo Municipal and other local government elections. The experience of Philip Gunawardena in the government of the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike is a demonstration of the futility of a captive minority within a bourgeois government seeking to utilize its position to change the social structure of the country. Despite the changed circumstances, despite even the emergence of a socalled left wing within the SLFP, we see no reason to foresee any other outcome for a similar "entry tactic" on our part.
The realistic alternative road for the party is evident from the crisis itself. The government could make its offer to the United Left Front only because it saw the ULF as already a power, as the key formation to the left, as the one potentially in position to install its own government. This quite evidently is how the political brains in the present government read the situation. There is no doubt they are right. This is shown by the huge rally alone where most significantly, all political currents in mass movement were impelled to the participate. What the government sees and wishes to counter-by moving forward to meet it—is the possibility that vigorous and systematic development of the ULF, particularly through a series of well-considered actions and organizational measures, could quickly bring the ULF to power. Only one conclusion is possible in principle, and it also happens to be the most practical and realistic. The party must now fight hard and in a determined way for nothing short and in a determined way for nothing short of a government of the United Left Front. For the first time in the country's history there has grown an unprecedented unity among the working class. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie has proved its bankruptey and a lack of confidence in itself. The alternative to a UNP government must therefore be a government of the United Left. But such a struggle must not be conceived purely within the limitations of the parliamentary framework or purely in terms of parliamentary arithmetic. It must become a means of actively mobilizing the masses in action, above all through the unfolding struggle of the united trade unions. To make the United Left Front a living reality it is also necessary to continue within it the struggle for our perspectives, never surrendering for a moment our own independence and freedom of criticism. In struggle we must seek to make of it a dynamic center of polarization for the important working-class forces that still remain outside it. Every effort must be made, in action, to draw in the forces of the plantation workers and the unions led by the Peking inspired Communist party. Every anti-working-class manifestation even within the ULF must be fought consistently and not glossed over or ignored in the name of a formal unity. The United Left Front will be a viable force only to the extent that we lead it in struggle and seek to make it a center for all the sectors of the developing mass movement in the country.
Comrades, it seems to us from afar that a most favorable situation is unfolding in Ceylon which can well bring the left to power if they now proceed self-confidently and in a businesslike way. Your tactics in this situation can make the decisive difference between success and the possible decimation of the working-class movement and the eventual consolidation of the right in its most reactionary form. You face, it seems to us, a great historic opportunity. The United Front of the Left, strengthened by mass struggle and directed to the establishment of its own political power on a genuinely socialist program, provides a means for stemming the tide of reaction and uniting the masses and the ranks of our own party for the ultimate realization of our perspectives. Ceylon can become another Cuba or Algeria and prove to be of even greater inspiration to revolutionary-minded workers throughout the world.
No coalition at the expense of socialist principles and the possibility of a socialist victory!
Forward with the masses in struggle for a government of the United Left Front!
With warmest comradely greetings,
The United Secretariat
Notes
1. Sri Lanka Freedom party-Holy Ceylon Freedom party. Led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, it is essentially the party of the national bourgeoisie. The party also has strong support among the peasantry, based on demagogic appeals to Sinhala chauvinism and Buddhism at the expense of the Tamil minority.—IP September 22, 1975