[The following article appeared in the May issue of the revolutionary-socialist monthly Revista de América, published in Buenos Aires. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
The year 1975 got off to a bad start for the Bolivian dictatorship. In the first part of January, Colonel Miguel Ayoroa (a former Banzer minister) called for a coup, and expresident Hernán Siles Zuazo secretly entered the country, causing a new political crisis. This led Banzer to make an unexpected tour of inspection through the military garrisons. A few days later the closing of the miners' radio stations, and along with them Radio Pio XII, property of the church, suddenly aggravated the conflict between the church and the government. And, above all, the regime suffered a harsh political defeat at the hands of the miners, who launched a strike of unspecified duration, demanding the return of their radio stations, a strike that lasted two weeks and forced Banzer to retreat.
While the miners' strike marked another possible ascending wave of strugglesmomentarily at a standstill during the second half of 1974-the clash with the church has continued to worsen rapidly in recent days with the expulsion of two priests' and the campaign for 100,000 signatures organized in response by an ecclesiastical "Justice and Peace" commission.
Everything points toward continued deepening of the already serious crisis of the regime and the rise of workers and people's struggles. This makes it all the more necessary to study and analyze Bolivian reality carefully to prepare the theoretical tools that will enable us to construct what is undeniably the basic need of the Bolivian workers: a revolutionary party, armed with a correct program and method, enabling them to gain power.
In this short article we are not trying to go beyond the necessary discussion about the Bolivian reality-more precisely, about one part of that reality: the character of the
BOLIVIA
400mls
Brazil
Peru
Trinidad
Lake Titicaca
O LA PAZ
• Cochabamba
Oruro
Santa Cruz
Arica .L. Poopo
Sucre •Uyuni
Tarija®
Pacific
Paraguay
• Chile Antofagasta Argentina
Guardian crisis of the regime and the ruling classes as a whole.
The relative economic expansion of recent years-achieved thanks to the influx of capital, the superexploitation of labor, and favorable export business-did not benefit the entire bourgeoisie. Some sectors of it, most of all the powerful mining bourgeoisie, found themselves displaced from a share of the profits. And if interbourgeois frictions began there, the revival of struggles starting in 1973 ended up undermining the unity of the bourgeoisie and the stability of the regime. It was this very rise of struggles that marked the division of the exploiters into two main camps-the "oficialistas"
[supporters of the Banzer regime] and the "institucionalistas" [those favoring liberalization].
Oficialistas in Trouble
The pro-Banzer camp is made up of the vigorous Santa Cruz agribusiness bourgeoisie (main beneficiary of the government's economic policy); Brazilian and imperialist sectors; and at least for now, the new bourgeois sectors born in the heat of the economic expansion of recent years, which are partially a subproduct of the growth of agribusiness. The military hierarchy, the majority of officers of the armed forces (primarily the air force and the navy), and the Falange Socialista Boliviana [FSB- Bolivian Socialist Phalanx]-the traditional party of the Santa Cruz bourgeoisieobey these sectors.
Their position is expressed very well in the January 7 issue of El Diario, which says that "there is an error of perspective among those who expect to benefit by changing the 'schema. This convulsion is the extremely serious evil that has always stopped the progress of the country, leading it to a terrible crossroads."
In other words, to make concessions would mean a greater mobilization of the masses instead of a brake on them. A "democratic" change would lead us again to place "the institutions in danger of being superseded by the eruption of events." That is why it is necessary to close ranks around the dictatorship, because at least "if it is feasible to point to a positive result... of the current government, it is none other than the painfully achieved political and social stability."
In summary, the oficialista wing believes that the only solution to the current crisis is to smash the masses. Moreover it is not willing, for now at least, to make "demoor "nationalist" concessions, becratic"
cause it knows that they would go directly against its interests.
But Banzer is not in a position to carry forward his plans. Each of his steps in that direction has ended up in the most disgraceful retreat. Perhaps the two clearest examples were the rowdy demolition of the ultrareactionary Nuevo Orden in November 1974—a fruit of the miners' strike-and the victory of the miners' strike itself.
Other reflections of this weakness include the "social pact" launched in February of this year (which apparently was stillborn), the attempts to establish agreements with the trade-union and peasant bureaucracies, the obvious incapacity to repress the bourgeois and military opposition, and so on. Banzer's only more or less "popular" card-to win an outlet to the sea'-has not succeeded in unifying the bourgeoisie or giving it prestige within the armed forces. On the contrary, the failures and erosion of the oficialista position have given increased weight to the "institucionalistas" inside and outside the armed forces. Even the unconditional defenders of the oficialistas are beginning to seek another solution.
The opposition is made up of a wide range of parties, personalities, and institutions: from the main bourgeois party, the MNR —party of the mining bourgeoisie with influence among the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and even among layers of the working class-and other smaller parties like the PRA, PDC, PSD, MNRI, and so forth;* to the church, the Confederación de Abogados Lawyers Confederation], the Cámara de la Minería Chica [Small Miners Bureau], and sectors of officialdom-above all of the army.
The position of the "institucionalistas" focuses on the need to initiate a bourgeois democratic course—or at least a nationalist one-right now, before the masses take the entire system apart. Thus they hope to be able to create illusions and false expectations that can derail the upsurge.
But the problem facing the opposition is the absence of a solid party or figure of sufficient prestige with the masses. This is the main problem of the entire exploiting class. The only real mass party, the MNR, is very discredited and divided by deep internal disputes. The most diverse positions are voiced within it: from the almost oficialista line of the Fortún Suárez sector, or the negotiators of its central core (composed of the two branches led by Paz Estenssoro and Ciro Humboldt, which are momentarily reunified under the leadership of Paz), to those of the "left," who are supported by some sectors of the ranks linked to the workers movement or to the students. Not one of the other opposition parties has sufficient social, economic, or political weight to group the rest of the opposition around it or around a common program.
The opposition already has a body (a certain mass base, support in the armed forces and in the political parties) and legs (the support of some bourgeois sectors, like the mining sector), but it still does not have a head. And if the MNR at present cannot become its head, neither can any "nationalist" figure in the army. The only solid, prestigious institution with sufficient social and political weight left is the church. That is why the church has taken on a growing role as the shock troops of the institucionalistas" against Banzer. The church, possessing an acute political instinct and centuries of experience in the art of protecting its interests, knows very well that Banzer is no longer any guarantee and that not only the opposition but also the bourgeoisie and the imperialists as a whole lack a sure card to play. The church is perfectly willing to try to fill the vacuum, but preferably not by itself.
The action of the "Justice and Peace" commission, along with the encouragement given to "radicalized" sectors like the Oblates, promoted by the ultrareactionary Catholic hierarchy, does not flow from party; Partido Demócrata-
4. Partido Revolucionario Auténtico-Authentic Revolutionary
Cristiano-Christian Democratic party; Partido Social Demócrata-Social Democratic party; Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de
Izquierda-Left
Revolutionary Nationalist
Movement.—IP July 14, 1975
Mundo
BANZER
sudden sympathies for the masses (whom they helped to smash in 1971). It flows from the need to create the conditions for a change that the church views as urgent.
Thus, there are two reasons why the dictatorship still has not fallen in spite of its weakness and all the sudden attacks it has been suffering. In the first place-and this is the essential determining reason— the masses have not yet totally recuperated from the consequences of the 1971 defeat. In the second place, the bourgeoisie as a whole does not yet have an alternative to the present deteriorating regime.
Up to now neither the opposition nor those in office have been able to find a solution to this dilemma. In addition, it is undeniable that imperialism and strong sectors of the bourgeoisie, lacking a better card to play, prefer Banzer for now. This, although it is very "costly" for them socially and politically (and also, in a certain sense, economically, given the luxuriating bureaucratic apparatus that has developed), assures them of fabulous profits, which they would have to share under another regime.
Aligned with these interests are the military hierarchy and the immense state and repressive bureaucracies, linked to those in office and to various sectors of that same bourgeoisie that stubbornly refuses any change.
In the last few days the confrontation between the church and the government seems to have reached fresh intensity. The Catholic hierarchy refused to invite members of the government to Holy Week ceremonies. New pronouncements and the "discovery" made by the archbishop of La Paz, Jorge Manrique, that the government is a "military dictatorship" are added to the demands of the Confederación de Abogados for immediate elections and to the public reappearance of Colonel Miguel Ayoroa. Referring to his famous document "A Soldier's Words"—a virtual call for a coup- Ayoroa ratified all its ideas and said that "what you write with your hand you don't erase with your elbow."
Offensive of the 'Institucionalistas'
These are all very clear signs of a new offensive by the "institucionalista" sectors. Internationally the "freezing" of relations with Chile following the well-publicized Charaña meeting and the rapprochement with Argentina and Venezuela, and domest. ically the legalization of professional and academic groupings (although not of parties and trade unions), the proposal of the social pact, and the negotiations with the bureaucracy, reflect this new change in the relationship of forces between the two factions of the bourgeoisie, which favors the "institucionalistas."
Undoubtedly, there is a greater chance for a coup giving rise, for example, to a new Ovando-type regime that would make populist concessions to the masses and engage in a certain anti-imperialist rhetoric in order to renegotiate Bolivian dependency with the Yankees. Above all, the chances of a coup are greater since the miners' strike - this ought to be analyzed in detail-which has probably contributed to an important degree in bringing into question the stability of the Banzer regime.
The workers have shown with their struggles-from the peasant mobilizations in Cochabamba to the miners' strike-that they are the only ones willing to consistently move against the dictatorship. To place any confidence in the bourgeoisie and military suddenly becoming transformed into "democrats" is to betray the workers and to aid in once again sharpening the knife of reaction, hiding the reality from the workers and contributing toward another August 21, 1971.6
The Bolivian working class must take up
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the struggle-and it has already begun to do so-against the dictatorship and for regaining democratic rights. On this path the working class must not write off unity in action with any forces amenable to such an objective. On the contrary, such unity must be promoted. But, at the same time, the Bolivian working class must remain the Bolivian working class must remain alert to the fact that neither "revolutionary nationalism," bourgeois democracy, nor nor any sort of "social pact" provides a radical solution to its problems. From this it follows that, while it is fighting the Banzer regime along with sectors that today are raising the banners of democracy and nationalism, it must not have the slightest confidence in them, nor form political fronts with them. Such fronts will sooner or later stifle their inner drive and energy for mobilizing in a revolutionary way.
A guide is needed on this road, a guide thoroughly aware that the workers' struggle does not end with the achievement of economic, democratic, and nationalist gains. The correct concept is that the struggle must go forward continually, permanently, toward the winning of a workers and peasants government that will begin the construction of a socialist Bolivia. Such a guide can only be a revolutionary party deeply rooted in the workers and mass movement. This party—as was shown by the failure of the entire left when it was confronted with the Banzer coup-is still to be built. That is the most urgent task for all who claim to be for the workers' cause.
Notes
1. A Belgian and Canadian priest were expeiled from Bolivia on March 14. The Justice and Peace Commission said the action was taken because of the two priests' role in publishing La Masacre del Valle, a description of a January 1974 confrontation that occurred between the army and the peasants of the Cochabamba Valley.-IP 994 994
2. Bolivia lost its outlet to the Pacific as a result of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) with Chile. The issue has been a source of friction between the two countries ever since.—IP
3. Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario— Revolutionary Nationalist Movement.-IP
5. On February 8 Banzer and Chilean President Augusto Pinochet met in Charaña. Following the meeting, Banzer shifted his line of demagogy on relations with Chile. Instead of the former saber rattling on the question of an outlet to the sea, Banzer spoke of the "brotherhood" of South Americans and said that Bolivia's previous "recriminations against those who now possess those territories... has not been a good path."-
6. On August 19-22, 1971, Banzer led a military coup that ousted the government of Juan José Torres.-IP