[The following article appeared in the April 27 issue of Bandiera Rossa, the fortnightly newspaper of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups, the Italian section of the Fourth International). The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
One year ago the fall of the fascist regime in Portugal marked the opening of a new stage in the crisis of capitalist Europe.
Having realized that it was impossible to maintain the old economic and political structures of the dictatorship or persist in an all-out defense of the old colonial empire, the Portuguese bourgeoisie was forced to undertake a long-range reconversion operation. This reconversion was to include shifting from the traditional colonialism to neocolonialism; integrating the Portuguese economy into the more modern forms of the international capitalist economy, especially the Common Market; and a political restructuring that would provide Portugal with institutions similar to those of the bourgeois democracies in other West European countries.
This plan, which undoubtedly reflected the long-range objectives of the bourgeoisie and was prompted by needs that had become urgent, ran up against very serious obstacles in essentially three areas.
In the first place, the attempt at integration into the European economy came at a time when the world recession was hitting almost all the capitalist countries and was having very grave repercussions on the economy of Western Europe. Thus, a reconversion that in any case would have been burdensome, involving heavy general costs, proved extremely difficult to carry through.
At the same time, Portugal was to experience a notable weakening in various sectors of production, a drop in exports, and the closing of the outlets represented by emigration.
Secondly, for a bourgeoisie that had identified itself with Salazarism for nearly half a century, it was not easy to come up quickly with new political instruments, that is, a party or parties through which it could exercise its hegemony by the standard methods of bourgeois democracy, which most of all require an ability to consolidate a firm electoral base.
Finally, and at bottom this was the 728
C
CP LEADER CUNHAL: One-point program of full support to Armed Forces Movement.
decisive factor, strong mass mobilizations developed from the start-although with the inevitable unevenness from region to region and sector to sector and the inevitable ups and downs-and drew in broad sections of the working class and pettybourgeois strata, in some cases the peasants. These mobilizations had a notable impact on the ranks of the armed forces themselves.
The scope and dynamism of these mobilizations in the recent months—the multiplication of strikes and factory occupations, the spread of revolutionary democratic bodies growing up from below, and political demonstrations such as those of January 14 and February 7, which although they had a different content (the first was called by Intersindical' and the second by the Workers Committees') were equally an expres-
1. Intersindical is the national trade-union confederation controlled by the Communist party.
. The Workers Committees in Lisbon that calle o Rehmigry ? march were dominater pacentig! by Maoist groups.
sion of the fighting spirit of the masseswere what prompted the abortive coup attempt of March 11.
The more reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie linked with the "Spinolist" wing of the armed forces felt that it was urgent to halt a trend that they regarded as extremely dangerous and to impose a conservative moderate turn that would necessarily have involved overtly repressive actions against the mass movements. In view of the level of combativity of the masses and the politicalization of growing sections of the army and the navy, the operation was clearly adventuristic and could only end in a miserable failure.
The inevitable result has been an acceleration of the revolutionary process in Portugal. A new impulse was given to the mobilization and politicalization of the masses, whose impetuous and powerful action was the decisive factor in the rapid defeat of the putschists.
The leading group in the armed forces, represented by the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas-Armed Forces Move. ment], could not ignore that fact. It was driven to take more radical steps to cripple the old structures of the Salazarist dictatorship and to disarm the most conservative groups in the bourgeoisie that had resisted the April 25 operation and had been impelled to turn back, that is, to try to restore an authoritarian regime, by the dangers that the advance of a process of radicalization and politicalization posed for the vested interests.
To this end, even more than after April 25 and September 28, the MFA had to seek the collaboration of the organized workers movement, primarily the Communist party. This led to greater openings, including representation in the political apparatus, for the PCP [Partido Comunista Português-Portuguese Communist party] and its ally the MDP [Movimento Democrático Português-Portuguese Democratic Movement], and to an explicit and systematic recourse to ideological themes, which were projected for essentially tactical reasons.
The process we are seeing today in
The process we are seeing today in Portugal shows clear analogies with those that have already occurred in neocolonial, or economically and socially underdeveloped countries. We should not forget, of course, the differences that remain and will remain between imperialist and colonial or semicolonial countries. But this does not detract from the fact that in certain aspects these analogies are relevant.
In the case before us, this analogy consists in the following: In situations where the bourgeoisie finds itself unable to exercise its political hegemony by the normal means-the bourgeois-democratic parliamentary or presidential mechanisms, the formal or de facto dictatorship of a bourgeois party, and so on—in periods of deep political crisis, the military apparatus may emerge as the only force capable of running the state. More precisely, the army can play the role of a ruling party with the capacity to maintain the functioning of the essential mechanisms of the system. This need not necessarily take the form of a reactionary military dictatorship but can occur under the leadership of reformist or populist tendencies in the military (obviously the Brazilian dictatorship falls into the former category, while the Peruvian regime comes under the latter, to mention only the two most prominent examples in Latin America).
In Portugal after the breakup of the Salazarist regime and the explosion of the impetuous mass mobilizations we have noted, the situation has been characterized precisely by the growing inadequacy of the traditional political apparatus and the absence of a bourgeois party with a mass base sufficiently broad to allow it to exercise hegemony, say, in the manner of the Italian Christian Democracy or the English Conservative party. The only solid apparatus, the only relatively cohesive force, remains the armed forces, and precisely for this reason they are emerging as the dominant political force. The MFA, which arose and developed in this context, has thus become the real political leadership of the country.
Of course, as we have already noted, the MFA needed the collaboration of political forces capable of representing broad masses. This is why it has come to an agreement with the PCP, and the greater difficulties notwithstanding, with the PSP [Partido Socialista Português-Portuguese Socialist party] itself.
In Marxist terms, this form of exercising political hegemony is defined as "bonapartist." Such a characterization, which appears in the documents of our Portuguese comrades of the LCIS (section of the Fourth International), is entirely justified in this case insofar as it cannot be said that the bourgeoisie exercises political hegemony directly today in Portugal but rather is obliged to resort to an intermediary. The
MFA is fulfilling this role, seeking the indispensable support of the masses, and on the international level, trying to exploit the margin for maneuver offered by the crisis of imperialism and the interest that the Soviet
TRALLE
Mundo
GONCALVES: Needs Stalinists' help to remodel Portuguese capitalism.
Union has in encouraging a certain dynamic and a relative independence of Portugal from the imperialist bloc.
The economic program the MFA has adopted, even after the recent developments (nationalizations of the banks and the insurance companies, the announcement of nationalizations in certain sectors of industry, and so forth), points, in the last analysis, toward a rationalization of the system aimed primarily at assuring the investments needed for reconversion, including foreign investments, and at guaranteeing the development of key productive sectors, for example, through aid to exporters. The mechanism of capitalist accumulation has not been put in question by the measures that have been carried out or those that have been projected. In fact, if these measures are successfully implemented, this mechanism will be put back on an even keel and gain a new-relative-stability. In this sense, the MFA in the last analysis is defending the fundamental interests of the bourgeoisie, even though its decisions may strike at sections of the bourgeoisie and often prevent the bourgeoisie from exercizing its political hegemony directly. We should not forget on the other hand that the program of the Portuguese government includes a substantial wage freeze, preaches austerity, and has imposed laws that seriously restrict the right to strike (the fact that it has been able to enforce them only very partially is another story).
The most recent political decisions topped off these measures. The MFA struck at the right, eliminating a national party with no real impact from the electoral competition. But above all it gave a warning to the extreme left by dealing a blow to the MRPP [Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado-Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party, the most extremist of the Maoist sects] and the AOC [Aliança Oper- ária Camponesa-Workers and Peasants Alliance, a Maoist grouping allied with the SP]. Still more significant was its compelling the parties to sign an agreement that largely voided the Constituent Assembly and explicitly sanctioned the dominance of the MFA. Various military spokesmen have not hesitated to dot the i's and cross the t's. We cannot rely on the parties, we have no assurance that the people are mature enough, we do not want to take any risks, the control must remain in our hands (one even said that it was an error to allow the formation or reconstitution of parties after April 25!).
The working class and the revolutionists cannot endorse a political operation whose meaning cannot but be clear to anyone who has eyes to see. No elucubrations or apologeties-and il Manifesto has once again taken the lead in this field with an article by Rossana Rossanda-can wipe out the fact of an economic program designed to rationalize the capitalist system, political methods inspired by a vulgar paternalism, voiding the political rights of the working class, and the repression already carried out or threatened against sections of the vanguard.
The Portuguese revolutionists mobilized against the March 11 "coup," and are ready to mobilize again whenever necessary. To oppose a fascist or authoritarian restoration, they are for a united workers front, a united front of all the organizations in the workers movement. But they cannot give their support to a class-collaborationist government, to a bonapartist political leadership. For this reason, the comrades of the LCI have waged a struggle, on the electoral front as on others, for a revolutionary strategy opposed to the strategy of the reformists. It was for this reason that they refused to sign the agreement drafted by the MFA, which was signed not only by the PCP but also by the PSP, the PPD [Partido Popular Democrático-Democratic People's party, the main bourgeois party], and other formations.
Notes
3. Liga Comunista Internacionalista-Internationalist Communist League.