[The following article appeared in the March issue of Revista de América, a revolutionary-socialist monthly published in Buenos Aires. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
LIMA-The sixth anniversary of the "Peruvian Revolution" in 1974 marked the end of a period of relative bourgeois stability and the opening of a new period marked mainly by crises. The two ministerial crises [President Juan] Velasco had to meet in the course of the past year showed that a critical stage had opened for the national bourgeoisie.
The first crisis was set off by the resignation of the naval minister, Vargas Caballero. This touched off a revolt among naval officers, who issued a public statement voicing solidarity with the former minister. A few days later the minister of housing, Arróspide Mejia, and the head of the Oficina Nacional de Integración (ONIT)' also resigned from the government. Behind this initial crisis were internal contradictions among the bourgeoisie that had been developing and that were reflected in the emergence of various camps in the military cabinet.
Vargas Caballero made statements in support of the Miró Quesada family, owners of the pro-oligarchy daily El Comercio. Velasco found this conduct unacceptable and publicly suggested that he resign. A few weeks later the government passed the decree expropriating the newspapers.
Less than five months later a second cabinet crisis confronted the junta. This one was set off by the discovery of a multimillion soles [1 sol equals about US$0.02] fraud in a state-owned marketing company (EPSA-Empresa Pública de Servicios Agropecuarios?). The minister of commerce, Barandiarán Pagador, whose ministry held responsibility for the company for several months, mysteriously presented his resignation. And much the same thing occurred in the case of the minister of agriculture, Valdés Angulo, who was accused by sectors close to the government of being the main political figure responsible for such a scandalous fraud.
These two cases are only the initial superstructural manifestations of the serious crisis that is undermining Velasco's nationalism. To all outward appearances, the Peruvian military junta seemed, in the Latin American context, a more solidly established government than its counterparts in Bolivia and Chile, the governments of Torres and Allende respectively, which were overthrown by bloody military coups.
The reformist Peruvian Communist party customarily said that this military regime had carried out a democratic and anti-imperialist revolution. That this revolution was building a new society, "neither capitalist nor communist." That the armed forces were completely integrated into the revolutionary process. And that the political, economic, and social crises that marked the previous regimes had been definitively overcome. To make a long story short, that Peru had taken the first step along the peaceful road to socialism.
The present situation itself is enough to puncture such mystifications about the Peruvian government. Even President Velasco himself has become more circumspect when he speaks about the situation and the outcome of the "revolutionary process." Thus in his message to the country on the completion of six years of the "revolution," he announced a campaign to "improve ethics" in the state apparatus. He said, among other things:
"The concentration of power, its nonparticipatory character, and the underwriting of the virtual privileges of those who make an excessive salary-all of these things pave the way for the emergence of interests that create and reinforce the danger of bureaucratization. They serve to create conditions that promote immorality and enrichment of a high bureaucratic strata that thrives at the cost of serious harm to Peru. The Revolutionary Government cannot permit the crystallization of a situation of this sort. It is urgent that steps be taken to counteract the tendencies I just called attention to. In reality, the destiny of our Revolution is much at stake here."
A few days later more than 100 high officials in the EPSA were dismissed and turned over to the military courts, and the two ministers handed in their resignations.
In the period before the opening of this critical stage, the national bourgeoisie had gained a certain economic breathing spell. The budget deficit, for example, had been reduced from twelve billion soles to three billion soles. Foreign reserves, thanks to state control over the exchanges and currency, had grown from $130 million to $500 million. And national production had greatly increased, mainly in the industrial sector, where the rate of growth has shot up to 7.5 percent.
The government brought about this economic recovery by following a policy of reforms and nationalizations. A number of measures-including state control over the fishing industry, some sectors of the mining industry, and the marketing of copper and other raw materials; agrarian reform and the subsidies given to industry—all helped the government to overcome the economic stagnation that marked the previous regimes.
Because of the policy it followed, we characterize this regime as bourgeois nationalist. It implemented some measures aimed at reducing the imperialists' profits and displacing the oligarchic sectors so as to encourage the development of the incipient national bourgeoisie.
But this policy does not make it an anti-imperialist or revolutionary government. If the junta were to expropriate without compensation all the imperialist monopolies (Southern, Occidental Petroleum, and so forth), if it were to turn the factories over to the control of the workers and permit them to oversee the distribution and marketing of goods, if it were to turn the land over to the peasants without paying any compensation or imposing any control or "guidance"-then we would be able to say that Velasco heads an anti-imperialist and revolutionary government.
This is why the Peruvian economy was able to gain only a partial breathing spell, and was unable to shake off the structural crisis engulfing it. It is a crisis that has now reached new heights as a result of the accelerated rate of inflation on a world scale. Inflation has, for example, forced the state to spend vast sums of money to subsidize imports of certain food items. These subsidies have proved, however, to be absolutely ineffective in halting the increase in the cost of living.
Although the agrarian reform did enable the sugar-producing sector to double its production, the snail's pace at which it was applied, along with its inherent limitations, were reflected this year in a scarcity of food.
Another important indicator that reveals the opening of a political crisis is the fact that the contradictions among the different sectors of the bourgeoisie have begun to take on a definite shape and a broader scope. The first explosion of these contradictions occurred last year following the expropriation of the daily newspapers. For the first time the right wing mobilized in the streets, demanding the return of the newspapers to their former owners, shouting slogans against the government, and calling for elections.
Later, in the pages of the right-wing magazine Opinión Libre, the various opposition parties called for the formation of a "Frente Civil Constitucional" [Civilian Constitutional Front] to press the government to hold elections. At the same time, the right wing adopted a policy of seeking new allies to come out against the steps taken by the government, taking advantage of all its difficulties. The Bar Association, for example, issued a statement criticizing a contract the Peruvian government signed with two Japanese companies to obtain a loan.
Other magazines, such as the Peruvian Times and Oiga-a weekly that shifted from support to the regime to harsh criticism-publicized the statement.
But what stands out the most in this entire phase of conflicts among the bourgeoisie is the inability of the national bourgeoisie to develop a consistent anti-imperialist and antioligarchical political line. In face of the right wing, the government oscillated back and forth, alternating between repression and concessions.
For example, it first suppressed the "gilded youth" who mobilized against the take-over of the dailies, but then it authorized the reopening of Caretas-which had been closed because of the reactionary campaign it was conducting. It also authorized the return of five leaders of Acción Popular3 who had previously been deported.
Then it closed Oiga, Opinión Libre, and the Peruvian Times, deported ten reactionary journalists, and jailed the Bar Association's entire board of directors. Next it granted amnesty to the jailed lawyers and to the young punks from Miraflores. And, to bring down the curtain, the government issued a communiqué banning mobilizations of any sort.
This policy of vacillation, of swinging back and forth, aids only the rightist sectors in the opposition.
As we said at the beginning, the resignation of the ministers last year testifies to the existence of distinct sectors in the cabinet and the armed forces. A more nationalist sector, headed by the young officers in the army, favors making concessions to sidetrack the rise of the working class. They also want to adopt a more radical policy to serve as a brake on the right wing and the imperialists.
The other pole is more conservative, a sector headed by the naval ministry and having support in the navy. This grouping stands for a more repressive policy against workers struggles and greater conciliation toward the right-wing opposition.
A third grouping, not as strong, lies somewhere between these two sectors. Its main concern is to prevent the internal contradictions from developing to their logical conclusion. To fulfill its role as arbiter-bonapartism, in Marxist terms — this sector favors a combined policy of concessions to both the right and the left, without defining itself as either one or the other.
This bonapartist game has been agreed to by all the sectors. This is why the nationalist sector did not take advantage of its recent gain in strength to push forward a greater radicalization of governmental policy, which would have polarized the right wing. And, in the same way, the navy has promised to maintain unity between the naval forces and the government.
This coincidence of views does not mean, however, that the contradictions have disappeared.
As an example to the contrary, we can cite the press campaign Expreso and Ultima Hora carried out around the Movimiento Laboral Revolucionario [MLR— Revolutionary Labor Movement]. At issue was a body, created by a sector of the government, whose purpose was to mount physical attacks on unions whose leaderships were classified as either class-struggle tendencies or not directly representative of the interests of the government.
Ultima Hora supported the MLR completely, reflecting the point of view of the bonapartist sector seeking to control the mass movement directly-without any intermediary whatsoever. This is why the new leader of Sinamos,4 Sala Orozco, declared his support to the MLR.
Expreso on the other hand, reflecting the point of view of the more populist sector, came out against the MLR, accusing it of being "fascist" and "divisive." Its campaign against the MLR was supported by the CGTP,5 the trade-union federation controlled by the Communist party; and by all the most important federations and unions in the country.
These disagreements have reopened an old discussion, which has now taken a more concrete turn: the question of the formation of a government political party. That is why President Velasco, after making clear that the MLR "is not and will not become the political party of the Revolution," declared that the formation of the government's own political movement was not under discussion, and that for the present, all Peruvians should "form their own groups, their own movements, and begin the task."
Notes
1. Office of National Integration, the government bureau responsible for matters concerning the Andean Common Market organization.
2. Public Corporation for Agricultural Services.
3. Popular Action, bourgeois opposition party led by Belaúnde Terry.
4. Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social — National Network for Supporting Social Mobilization, the government social-service agency.
5. Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos — General Federation of Peruvian Workers.