The following article, signed by D.B., appeared in the March 21 issue of Rouge, the French Trotskyist weekly. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
After the events of March 11 in Portugal, it is important to recall the lessons of the workers' defeat in Chile, and to consider them coolly, unexcitedly, and without exaggeration. For although in Portugal the threat of a putsch has receded temporarily, and the bourgeoisie has undergone a political defeat, it has in no way abandoned the defense of its privileges. As long as private ownership of the means of production remains, the bourgeoisie retains strong roots. As long as the bourgeois state apparatus, courts, and police remain—even if these institutions are "democratized"- the bourgeoisie retains instruments to be used against the workers. Moreover, it has substantial international supporters and allies. Thus the workers cannot rest content with fleeting victories.
The Chilean revolution and working class suffered a defeat on September 11, 1973.
Lessons of the Defeat in Chile It is necessary to understand the major reasons for this tragic defeat. In the first place, it was not an accident, but the result, the culmination, of an entire reformist and suicidal political line.
The Chilean bourgeoisie had in fact prepared the ground and tested the relationship of forces several times.
In October 1972 the reactionary truck owners' strike disrupted the economy and provoked a first test of forces. The workers responded to this attack by forging their own fighting instruments: the "cordones industriales," which coordinated and centralized the workers forces in the industrial zones and suburbs; and the "comandos 456
comunales," which grouped the poor peasants, the people of the poor urban neighborhoods, and the members of the workers parties around the workers. Instead of basing themselves on this spontaneous response by the workers, the reformist parties of the Popular Unity-the Communist party and the Socialist party-made a huge concession to the bourgeoisie. They opened the door of the government to the military. Among the new military ministers were the future hangmen of the Chilean people.
In June 1973 the Chilean putschists launched a premature attempt at a coupthe "tancazo." This time too the workers responded admirably; the "cordones" and "comandos" were strengthened.
These instruments constructed by the workers in the course of their struggle were not used to conduct an energetic purge of the army and police, and to push for workers control in the factories. Instead, the reformists of the CP and SP concentrated on prolonged negotiations with the bourgeois party that was plotting a coup, the Christian Democrats. Once again they opened up the government to the military, including, this time, Pinochet himself. They gave the military the right to search the factories and the workers' houses and to seize arms-disarming the workers and allowing the military to proceed without interference in the preparation of their coup.
It can be said without exaggeration that the Chilean reformists turned the working class of their country over to their hangmen.
Any summary of the causes for the defeat in Chile must therefore emphasize the following points:
1. Before the coup.
• A consistent policy of class collaboration that, instead of relying on mobilizing the workers, centralizing the organs of proletarian power like the cordones and instead of extending the nationalizations under workers control and expropriating imperialist foreign capital, continued to retreat from its nationalization program and used the labor of the Chilean people to meticulously pay off the imperialist trusts, which financed the CIA and the putschists.
2. At the moment of the coup.
The reformists' successive capitulations to the bourgeoisie and their rejection of any revolutionary counteroffensive had thoroughly paved the way for the final capitulation.
Heroically, almost without weapons, and without any direction from their reformist leaders, the Chilean workers resisted the coup in their factories and their neighborhoods.
Broadcasting from the besieged Moneda palace, while he could still use the radio, Allende issued—not a call for general strike, the formation of militias, and a counteroffensive-but only appeals for calm and a stationary defense, factory by factoxy!
These lessons should remain branded with a hot iron in the memory of the workers of the world.
The Lessons of Spain:
Barcelona and Madrid in 1936 The experience of the workers' response to Franco's military uprising of July 19, 1936, has provided us with further valuable lessons. In Barcelona and Madrid the coup was blocked. In Sevilla, Zaragoza, and Córdoba, it was victorious. Why?
In Barcelona, the strong and experienced working class was in a state of alert. Before July 19, the anarchist union leaders had already demanded arms from the Republican government. They had demanded at least 1,000 guns. When the government refused on legalistic grounds, the longshoremen took over all the weapons they could find on the boats, on the night of July 18-19. It was high time!
The next morning, July 19, 12,000 dissident soldiers were to march toward the Plaza de la Cataluña. The soldiers of the Pedralbes barracks began to march. Other garrisons hesitated. The Catalan proletariat, however, did not hesitate. It declared a general strike! Rather than remain on the defensive, it went on the offensive! Millions of workers rushed toward the Plaza de la Cataluña and threw themselves against the soldiers. Many worker militants fell, but the rebel soldiers were overwhelmed by the onrush and driven back onto the defensive.
The determination of the workers made hesitant soldiers incline in their direction and neutralized the more timid. Four thousand soldiers went over to the side of the workers. The garrison at Montjuich shot its officers and distributed arms to the people. On July 20, the rightist dissidents raised the white flag.
In Madrid, the worker militants were also prepared. They had unearthed weapons that had been carefully hidden. Here again, the workers' determination rallied some officers to their support. Five thousand rifles were distributed by an officer who had gone over to their side.
Looking back, we can see that wherever the working class waited or put trust in the declarations of the officers, the putsch was triumphant. At Algeciras, Córdoba, and even Oviedo, a stronghold of the workers movement, the rulers refused to distribute arms to the people because the officers had declared their loyalty to the Republic. This left the initiative to the officers, enabling them to await a turn in the situation and to choose their moment to strike. That is how the working class was defeated at Zaragoza, Córdoba, Algeciras, and Oviedo.
In Sevilla, where the workers movement was strong, the union leaders hesitated, and did not call for a general strike. When they began to resist it was too late: The army had already established its positions, disarmed the soldiers loyal to the Republic, and taken control of the radio. Nine thousand workers were massacred in a heroic rearguard battle.
From September 28 to March 11
September 28, 1974, the day set for the big demonstration of the supposed "silent majority" of the Portuguese bourgeoisie, had been prepared by an extensive political campaign mounted by the right wing. The workers, for their part, had been alerted by a campaign by the workers organizations, including the CP.
On September 28, the railway unions refused to carry demonstrators for the silent majority to Lisbon. Barricades were erected at the outskirts of Lisbon and Oporto, and the workers searched the cars that entered the cities.
There was no call for a general strike. But the workers commissions (for example, at Lisnave, Setnave, TAP, CTT and Applied) took the initiative for a centralized action in the streets by calling the workers to a central counterdemonstration in Lisbon. April 7, 1975