[The following statement on the assassination of Spain's Prime Minister Carrero Blanco was issued in January by the Political Bureau of the Spanish Liga Comunista (Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International). For the point of view of the LCR/ ETA(VI) (Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/ Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna - Revolutionary Communist League/ Basque Nation and Freedom [Sixth Congress]), the other sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain, see Intercontinental Press, January 21, 1974, pp. 62-64. The translation of the Liga Comunista statement is by Intercontinental Press.]
The assassination of Carrero Blanco on December 20, 1973, by members of the organization ETA(V) can only be characterized as an act of individual terrorism.
Except in conditions of civil war, Marxists are opposed in principle to individual terrorism.
Marxists oppose individual terrorism because it sows illusions among the masses, lowers their level of consciousness, demobilizes them, and reduces them to passivity.
In the last analysis, terrorism springs from the same source as reformism, which it also promotes. Both terrorists and reformists look to changing the capitalist superstructure, either through deals or by bombs, as a substitute for mass action. "A terrorist is a liberal with a bomb in his hand."
At the present time, needless to say, there is no civil war going on in the Spanish state; and terrorism does not promote, but rather has negative effects on, the struggle of the workers and the oppressed masses against the bourgeoisie and its dictatorship.
The LCR/ ETA(VI), an organization that claims to be Marxist and Trotskyist, has given total support to the terrorist action carried out by the ETA(V), justifying this with the classical arguments and terminology of petty-bourgeois terrorism: "The disappearance of Carrero Blanco weakens the regime...." "accelerates the crisis of the dictatorship. ..." and "will constitute an encouragment to extending the struggle against the dictatorship."
In taking such a position, the LCR/ ETA(VI) has clearly broken with the Marxist principles and conceptions regarding terrorism.
In opposition to the position adopted by the LCR/ ETA(VI), in opposition to terrorism and reformism, the Liga Comunista as a Marxist organization declares its disagreement with the terrorist act carried out by the ETA(V) and its support for mobilizing the masses in direct action, which was always the line of the revolutionary party led by Lenin and Trotsky and has always been the line of the Fourth International.
Between terrorist action and the arguments of its defenders on the one side and the road of mobilizing the masses for direct, independent action on the other, the difference is not one of opinion or tactics; it is one of principle, of class. Terrorism is a petty-bourgeois method; mass action, a proletarian one.
Against the dictatorship, against the Francoist repression and terror, the Liga Comunista calls for unconditional defense of all people's militants.
[The following is an editorial from the Liga Comunista journal Combate published after the assassination of Carrero Blanco. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
I
The workers movement, and along with it the movements of the other popular strata struggling against the dictatorship, entered the new year in a situation rather more unfavorable than the one existing only two months ago. The causes for this are not limited to the repercussions of the December 20 assassination.
On previous occasions, we have pointed out the breadth of the counteroffensive undertaken by the broad masses in the past months, the possibilities it opened up, the limitations it had not overcome, and the needs it raised.
The breadth of the counteroffensive was shown above all in a wave of struggles by blue- and white-collar workers throughout the Spanish state for economic demands and against the repression. Asturias, SKF, La Seda, Super-Ser, and Indecasa are only some of the high points of the workers' resistance. Its power was shown by a more pronounced tendency to break out of the channels of the CNS [Central Nacional Sindicalista - National Trade-Union Federation, the official fascist industrial organization] and by the use of direct action in scattered battles, and also by the high level of consciousness attained in many of the mobilizations.
This wave of workers struggles was complemented, moreover, by militancy in other strata. The multiplying actions by peasants and stockmen were unprecedented since 1939. At various points, sectors of the new middle strata resumed their struggle. And, in particular, despite the disorientation of the student movement due to the predominance of narrow studentinterest politics and legalism, important sections of the student youth once again demonstrated their militancy. And mass resistance of such power was able to occur despite an intense concentration of all the various mechanisms of repression by the bosses, the academic authorities, and the police.
Innumerable times, we Trotskyists have repeated that it was essential to promote and organize a counteroffensive of the entire working class and all the oppressed against the assault on wages and working conditions, against the general attack on social standards and in particular against the General Education Law, and against repression and all forms of oppression. We explained and stressed that the leaderships of the workers movement had to promote a general plan of defense in all areas and that they should begin by pushing for the unification of all the comisiones obreras [workers commissions] and of the all-inclusive organs of struggle in other social strata, and for coordination between the comisiones obreras and these other bodies on all levels. Other initial steps, we explained, should include developing subsidiary plans for every locality, or zone, as well as district plans; struggle against the dictatorship's bargaining policy and against the CNS; promoting methods of direct action, which alone would make possible united and effective action; centralizing actions and giving an important role in these actions to central actions and days of protest, which should be organized by direct-action methods and focused on mobilizing people in the street.
In these conditions, this scattered counterattack could have easily been transformed into the most powerful chain reaction ever faced by the dictatorship. It could have forced the regime to retreat and thereby aggravated its contradictions and its crisis at the very time when it most needed cohesion and strength in order to carry forward the offensive plans of the Carrero government. Even despite all the previous refusals to try to achieve these conditions, December 12 and 20 could have been big steps forward toward accomplishing this, as the Political Bureau of the Liga Comunista noted at the time.
Important steps forward were carried out at scattered points, especially in certain areas of Euzkadi. If, in contrast to the general situation in the rest of the state, there was on December 20 a solid general strike in the factories of Pamplona and a milk strike in the valleys of Navarre, Guipúzcoa, and part of Vizcaya, this reflected the fact that the bypassing of the leaderships had gone beyond the level of isolated factories and schools. As a result, some of the fundamental requirements for organizing a broad action had been met, if only partially.
In fact, the workers in ten of the most important plants in Pamplona, as well as the workers in some localities in Guipúzcoa, agreed to present a joint list of demands. This was only an incomplete step, since the leadership of the comisiones obreras continued to refuse to back it up with a more complete plan of action, and to refuse to make a clean break with the CNS and to extend the unity to include a multitude of smaller plants that were precisely the ones that most needed to incorporate themselves into a general struggle. But despite this and despite the divisions reopened by the timing and the responses of the bosses, this step was a positive one for the workers, and the Indecasa struggle was able to serve as the starting point for a new convergence of efforts.
While the Navarre comisiones obreras severely limited the scope of the December 12 day of struggle, in the following week the Indecasa workers broke with the CNS and adopted a line of direct action, organizing pickets that brought the workers out at key plants like Super-Ser and Imenasa. The strike in the industrial areas, the demonstration of the Super- Ser workers in the center of the city, and the organized self-defense of the workers against the repressive forces led up to the general strike of December 20.
The lessons of the milk strike were similar. Committees uniting a broad vanguard proved their effectiveness, impelling the peasants to organize themselves in assemblies and elected committees, constantly and openly confronting the liquidationist line of the Hermandades de Labradores y Ganaderos [Brotherhoods of Laborers and Stockmen], and calling on the comisiones obreras for support. The only thing that was lacking was precisely what could not be provided by the stockmen-the general political conditions, the broad struggle, that would have made it possible to block the deliveries of imported and powdered milk.
Nonetheless, except for these and some other cases, while the workers more and more frequently overrode the divisive attitude of the PCE [Partido Comunista de España — Communist party of Spain], the comisiones obreras, and the other opportunist leaderships, this occurred only on the level of individual plants and isolated centers. This divisive line was expressed in the consistent failure to draw up general plans for the different industries and localities. Instead of doing this, these leaderships supported the CNS bargaining policy and its arbitrators. This line resulted further in the failure to prepare the way for, and give impetus to, a real struggle against the General Education Law. In the working class, these leaderships abandoned this struggle. In the student movement, instead of a real struggle, they carried on a sectoralist and legalist struggle that made the movement incapable of uniting with the workers and confronting repression.
At certain moments, this policy led to giving up the struggle against concrete, selective repressive measures that posed an acute and immediate danger. At the same time, this line was reflected in separating the struggle in the places of work and study from the general struggle against repression, thereby undermining both. As for the fight against repression, on some occasions and in some places these leaderships openly rejected it; on other occasions they transformed it into remote appeals, sometimes physically far removed from the centers of struggle. They also approached it with methods that could not effectively organize it or maintain it.
Above all, when these leaderships found themselves forced to call some days of struggle, they put no serious effort into the preparations or building. The December 12 day of struggle was a "clandestine" one as far as the broad masses were concerned. Although in some respects, there was more preparation for December 20, it also was not built with sufficient coordination, adequate agitation, or effective methods. Now these opportunist leaderships will blame the limitations on the assassination of Carrero. Of course, this event played a large part in diminishing the actions.
Nonetheless, how many workers, how many students, how many people went to demonstrate at and around the court building on the morning of December 20? (At that time very few people knew of Carrero's death.) How long had strikes been planned in the plants? This also cannot be blamed on the assassination. Moreover, even with this event, if consistent preparatory work had been done, the working class would have had a far greater capacity for putting up strong resistance against 1,001 [the trial of the leaders of the comisiones obreras].
But what is indisputable is that the leadership of the PCE and the comisiones obreras preferred to stand in the way of the needs of the workers and people's movement at every point for the sake of "broadening the front of struggles" through an alliance with "democratic" bourgeois politicians and the Church hierarchy, who in reality are sworn enemies of independent mass action and whom we were very soon to see weeping inconsolably over Carrero.
Thus, the policy of the "Pacto para la Libertad" [Freedom Pact] and other class-collaborationist policies helped the dictatorship keep the counterattack of the masses dispersed. Thereby they created the conditions that permitted the Carrero government in its last month to mount concentrated attacks on the masses. And even before this, these leaderships sabotaged the general struggle that they themselves had called, so that the government was able to impose its decree-laws and sentence Camacho and his companions without encountering any serious resistance from the masses. When, after postponing the case out of fear, the authorities decided to try the representatives of the comisiones obreras, these organizations did not throw one hundredth of their weight into the scales.
This was what was decisive in our black December. The working class and the people held the stage; not the crisis-racked dictatorship, and still less the petty-bourgeois terrorists. But while the proletariat could barely stammer, the petty-bourgeois politicians expressed their incapacity eloquently and big capital spoke with a commanding voice. We are suffering the results and will continue to for some time to come.
If the workers and popular movement had not been reduced to such impotence by the refusal to push for an overall plan of defense and concretely to build the December 12 and 20 actions in a serious way, the bourgeoisie would not have found it so easy to close ranks after Carrero's assassination, and the new cabinet would have had to take over in more difficult conditions.
II
Marxists are not opposed in principle to using terror at any time or in any circumstance. To the contrary, recapitulating a long experience of the workers movement, the Communist International declared in 1921 in its Third Congress:
"Against the acts of white terrorism and the fury of white justice, the communist party must keep alive in the minds of the proletariat the idea that at the time of insurrection it must not let itself be deluded by the enemy's appeals to its clemency. It will set up people's courts, and with proletarian justice settle accounts with the torturers of the proletariat." 1
To the accusations of the renegade Kautsky against the Russian revolution, Leon Trotsky replied:
"The man who repudiates terrorism in principle—i.e., repudiates measures of suppression and intimidation towards determined and armed counterrevolution - must reject all idea of the political supremacy of the working class and its revolutionary dictatorship. The man who repudiates the dictatorship of the proletariat repudiates the Socialist revolution, and digs the grave of Socialism." 2
We Marxists reject any "moral" judgment of acts such as the assassination of Carrero Blanco. It was Leon Trotsky also who said in Their Morals and Ours:
"Is individual terror, for example, permissible or impermissible from the point of view of 'pure morals'? In this abstract form the question does not exist at all for us. Conservative Swiss bourgeois even now render official praise to the terrorist William Tell." 3
So, we denounce the vile hypocrisy with which the bourgeoisie and their spokesmen hide their class interests behind allegedly humanitarian scruples against violence "from whatever source."
We Marxists sympathize completely with the just anger of the oppressed against their oppressors, with the anger of the Basque, Irish, and Palestinian terrorists against the national and political oppression suffered by their peoples.
III
Our judgment of terrorist acts, on the other hand, does not depend on the subjective motives or revolutionary intent, but on their relationship to the needs of the mass struggle. In this sense, we consider that the assassination of Carrero Blanco was a clearly negative act from the standpoint of the workers and people's movement.
In the statement it made public taking "responsibility for the attack that caused the death of Señor Carrero Blanco, chairman of the present Spanish cabinet," the ETA(V) said:
"Throughout the struggle in south Euzkadi [the part of the Basque country within Spain's boundaries] and throughout the Spanish state, the repressive forces have clearly demonstrated their fascist character, arresting, jailing, torturing, and murdering those who have fought for the liberation of their people. In a very short period, the criminal fascist forces in the service of the Spanish big bourgeoisie have murdered nine of our compañeros: Txabi, Txapela, Xenki, Mikelon, Ibarra, Txikia, Jon, Beltza, and Josué. Likewise, they have murdered other worker militants simply for defending their most elementary rights."
The motivation of ETA(V) is clear - anger against the capitalist terror, against the criminal repression by which the Spanish state maintains its oppression of the Basque people. But this repression is seen only from the narrow point of view of a small group. On this basis, the struggle against the dictatorship might come to mean a "duel" between the mercenaries of the Spanish state and this group, the ETA. On the contrary, the struggle against the capitalist terror requires a clear strategy, capable of sustaining effective action. Clear strategic aims and a fruitful approach are, however, both incompatible with the general political line of the nationalists in ETA and specifically with such terrorist actions.
"The operation the ETA has carried out against the state apparatus of the Spanish oligarchy in the person of Luis Carrero Blanco must be seen as a just revolutionary response by the working class and the entire Basque people to the death of our nine compañeros and of all those who have helped or who are helping to bring about the final liberation of humanity from all exploitation and all oppression.
"Luis Carrero Blanco, a 'hard-liner' with a brutal, repressive attitude, was the kingpin that guaranteed the stability and continuity of the Francoist system. There is no doubt that without him the tensions within the regime (between Opus Dei and the Falange) will mount dangerously.
"We believe that the action we have carried out against the premier of the Spanish cabinet will unquestionably represent a fundamental step forward in the struggle against national oppression, for a socialist Euzkadi, and for the liberation of all oppressed people in the Spanish state.
"Today the workers of all peoples in this state, of Euzkadi, Spain, Catalonia, and Galacia, and all antifascist and revolutionary democrats throughout the world have been freed from a major enemy.
"The struggle continues. Forward for national independence and socialism! Long live a free and socialist Euzkadi!"
This triumphal manifesto is based on a conception of political action always applied by petty-bourgeois politicians to the struggles of oppressed peoples and the working class. Here we have a small organization deciding to sharpen the contradictions in the regime. In other cases, it might say that its aim was to wear out the state, pick off its personnel, and provoke social changes by means of its own conspiratorial activity outside of the mass struggle.
We find the same logic here that inspires the liberal, parliamentarist conceptions of those who claim to act "on behalf of the proletariat and the people by intervening "directly" in the political superstructure of bourgeois rule, who claim to represent the masses, which they regard as incapable of rising to such lofty tasks. This basic conception stands in complete contradiction to promoting direct and independent mass action, on which Marxist politics are based. In the two cases, violence and legal work are subordinated to completely different dynamics. Terrorist attacks have no more in common with organizing the revolutionary violence of the masses than the "parliamentary struggle" of the liberals has with a Marxist party using parliament as a platform.
Unlike the liberals, reformists, and terrorists, we Marxists regard the state as the guarantor of the relations of production on which one class bases its rule over other classes. For the ruling class the state is an instrument for systematic oppression of the other classes. Only because of their failure to understand this reality can terrorists overestimate actions against state officials as such, in isolation from the conflicts between the classes.
Thus, the greatest naiveté is revealed in ETA's arguing that Carrero "guaranteed the continuity of the regime." This is really incredible! It is clear that even many spokesmen for the regime did not believe this when they proclaimed it. In the face of the rise of the mass movement (which is a secondary factor for the terrorists), Franco himself could not guarantee the "continuity of the regime," even if he lived forever, as he promises.
Lack of confidence in the ability of the masses to carry their action through to insurrection is common to terrorists, liberals, and reformists (in the last case, contempt for the masses combines with fear). Likewise common to all these is prostration before the stability of the bourgeois order. The ETA(V) communiqué claimed that, thanks to its action, "the tensions within the regime will mount dangerously." As if the crisis of capitalism did not create enough tensions and contradictions! As if you had to help it along! There have been and are more than enough contradictions in the Francoist regime so that if these were decisively aggravated by the blows of the mass struggle, the masses could destroy it. On the other hand, no tension inside the regime will be of any help unless the workers and the people are in a position to exploit it. As long as they are not, the conflicts in the bourgeois apparatus will remain within the framework of the play among the various political forces of capitalism and their agents, of the continual process of greater or lesser readjustments in the front against the working class and the oppressed masses.
IV
What were the real effects of the assassination? For Marxists this is the same as asking: What consequences did it have on the developments of mass action? This is what counts. For a group that wants to be effective, this alone is what is worth working for.
The masses, and first of all the workers, have been condemned to the role of spectators. Some may claim that the assassination had positive aspects because of its "popular impact," or the "sympathy" with which the masses viewed the killing of a prominent figure in the hated regime. We will not even discuss the emotional reactions of the people. Such an effect has no relevance when it comes to judging the supposedly positive political results of the action. At best, it did not help in any way to promote mass action but rather encouraged passivity on the part of the masses.
There is no question but that, despite the hamstringing policy of the reformist leaderships of the workers movement, the mobilizations on December 20 and successive dates would have been larger were it not for the assassination. There was every reason to think that they would have been bigger than the mobilization of December 12; and, in fact, they were smaller.
This retreat by the masses was not the result alone of the opportunist leaderships of the workers movement using the assassination to demobilize the people, which, of course, they did. In large part, this retreat reflected the immediate reaction of the masses, on which the reformist apparatus in turn based themselves. Of course, large-scale mass mobilizations would not have been stopped by Carrero's death. In such a context, the effects of the assassination on the mass movement would have been much less. And therefore, the fundamental responsibility for the failure of these mobilizations still falls on the leaderships of the PCE and the comisiones obreras and their direct collaborators, and not on ETA (V). But the latter organization also cannot wash its hands of responsibility.
What is more, let us suppose that the "popular sympathy" won by the assassination had been a hundred times greater. This would only mean that Marxists would have to make a hundred times greater effort to explain what was wrong with terrorism and discredit it in the eyes of the masses, because it would have a much greater deleterious influence on them. For such an "impact" only sows illusions that later on often bring demoralization that can be capitalized on by legalist reformists.
It is lamentable to have to note once again what the whole history of the workers movement has shown more than abundantly: "Individual acts of terrorism, clear symptoms of revolutionary indignation though they are, and however natural when employed against the lynch justice of the bourgeoisie and their social-democratic lackeys, are in no way fitted to strengthen proletarian discipline and militancy, for they arouse among the masses the illusion that individual acts of terrorism can take the place of revolutionary struggle of the proletariat." 4
"Whether or not a terrorist attempt, even if 'successful,' introduces confusion in the ruling circles, depends upon the concrete political circumstances. In any case this confusion can only be of short duration. The capitalist state does not rest upon Ministers, and cannot be destroyed together with them. The classes whom the state serves will always find new men — the mechanism remains intact and continues to function. But much deeper is that confusion which the terrorist attempts to introduce into the ranks of the working masses. If it is enough to arm oneself with a revolver to reach the goal, then to what end are the endeavors of the class struggle? If a pinch of powder and a slug of lead are ample to shoot the enemy through the neck, where is the need of a class organization? If there is any rhyme or reason in scaring titled personages with the noise of an explosion, what need is there for a party? What is the need of meetings, mass agitation, elections, when it is so easy to take aim at the ministerial bench from the parliamentary gallery? Individual terrorism in our eyes is inadmissible precisely for the reason that it lowers the masses in their consciousness, reconciles them to impotence, and directs their glances and hopes toward the greater avenger and emancipator who will some day come and accomplish his mission." (Emphasis in the original.) 5
V
One of the most immediate consequences of the retreat and confusion of the masses is that they are in an unfavorable position to face the increased repression that has come in the wake of the terrorist actions.
On this point also, the judgment that we make as Marxists is diametrically opposed to that of both the reformists and the terrorists. The reformists' argument tends to be the following: "The terrorists are provoking repression, unleashing a chain reaction strengthening the influence of the 'hard-liners' and shutting off the openings for the dialogue that we are working for." The reformists are worried that their bourgeois allies will be frightened, and so the PCE has an interest in passing off the assassination as the work of "experienced professionals with powerful protectors." (Statement of the Plenum of the Executive Committee of the PCE, December 1973.)
The terrorists follow the opposite line of reasoning: "By the blows we are dealing the reactionaries, we are sowing disarray and demoralization in their ranks, creating a situation that in the long run will lead to the disintegration of the enemy. This benefits the masses, who are inspired by seeing the hated regime suffer blows. So it doesn't matter if the bourgeoisie reacts by stepping up the repression. On the contrary, this enters into the logic of the spiral of action-repression, repression-action, which in the long run is going to bring us victory."
Once again, equally bourgeois conceptions guide both those who claim that the way to fight repression is by subordinating the mass movement to fawning on bourgeois politicians and those who claim to fight repression by blowing these same politicians sky-high. Both the blandishments and the bombs directed at the hired killers of the bourgeoisie leave out what from a working-class, Marxist, point of view is essential in the struggle against repression (as in all other questions) - impelling the masses to mobilize independently in direct struggle.
We Marxists say that the increased repression for which terrorist acts open the way is important. The stepped-up repression that follows terrorist attacks, unlike that which comes as a response to a rise in the mass struggle, usually has disastrous consequences.
The bourgeoisie does not decide whether or not it will resort to repression on the basis of the pretexts available to it, although it takes advantage of whatever it can use as an excuse for repression and it looks for such pretexts. Nor does this depend on the reformist leaders' "desire for dialogue," although the bourgeoisie exploits such attitudes and seeks to encourage them. What "provokes" repression is the bourgeoisie's need to beat back the workers and people's movement. The only thing that can put a brake on repression is fear of this movement, which in 1970 saved the lives of Izko and his compañeros.
If there is a major strike, the bourgeoisie has a "pretext" for repression. But by their action in such a struggle the masses have raised their fighting spirit to a new level, closed their ranks, and are in a position to wage a vigorous counterattack against repression. As a result, the bourgeoisie weighs its steps, sometimes deciding not to take the "opportunity," and if it does turn to repression, it has to face new onslaughts by the masses.
In the case of terrorist acts, this all changes. The masses are more divided and confused (insofar as they are affected by what the terrorist do), the more vacillating sectors listen to the pacifist whines of the "democrats", and this creates better conditions for big capital to marshal its forces against "disorder," "violence," and against "savagery," and in reality to conduct its repression with greater ease.
Thus, in the balance of forces between the classes the weight of individual terrorism comes down on the side of the bourgeoisie. As we have already indicated, this weight may be more or less, depending on the political context. Coming at the time it did, added to other much more decisive factors, Carrero's assassination has had an eminently negative effect.
VI
The consequences of the attack against Carrero have, thus, been graver than in any previous case of this type. It obstructed the fundamental fight for the release of Camacho and his compañeros. A more ambitious terrorist action than the earlier ones, it occurred at a critical moment, at the very culminating point of a series of setbacks for the workers movement. Thus, it complemented the work of the reformists and served to initiate a closer tightening of bourgeois ranks. Taking advantage of all this, the dictatorship of big capital is stepping up its repression in order to launch still more severe attacks on the standard of living of the masses in all areas.
But the struggle of the masses is undergoing an unquestionable revival. If they are incorporated in systematic work to develop concrete struggles applying the methods of direct action that saved the lives of Izko and his companeros -the methods of the Térmica and Pamplona strikes —agitating and mobilizing against the repression can and must renew the strength of the workers' counteroffensive so that it can overcome the obstacles that in recent months have kept it dispersed. However, reformism and terrorism can only hold back this development, which we Marxists seek to promote in the most deepgoing way through a fight to open up the way for a generalized struggle. To advance the actions in all sectors and localities, a nationwide struggle is more essential than ever. It is more essential and more urgent because there is no other way an effective fight can be put up against all the attacks of the Arias government. Unless such unity is achieved, the actions that are springing up at scattered points with renewed strength will exhaust themselves more quickly than in the past.
At the same time, in order, among other things, to make this work effective, it is essential to develop the most vigorous debate inside the militant vanguard on the grave lessons of the past months. The confusionism prevailing among the fighters continues to be a serious handicap to carrying out the urgent tasks that face us.
Both through this work and through this debate, we will strive to promote the construction of a revolutionary party that can channel the revolutionary energies that today are being diverted by reformism and terrorism.
Notes
1. "Theses on Tactics," The Communist International: Documents, edited by Jane Degras, London: 1971, Vol. 1, pp. 253- 254.
2. Terrorism and Communism, London: 1935, pp. 23-24.
3. Leon Trotsky, Their Morals and Ours, New York: 1966, p. 38.
4. "Theses on Tactics," The Communist International: Documents, Vol. 1, p. 254.
5. Quoted, from an article by Leon Trotsky in a 1911 issue of Der Kampf, the theoretical organ of the Austrian Social Democratic party, in The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report of Hearings on the Charges Made Against Him in the Moscow Trials, New York: 1969, p. 259.