[The following is a translation of "Primera Crisis del Gabinete en Portugal," which appears elsewhere in this issue.]
Lisbon
The bourgeois regime in Lisbon entered a period of relative stability after the mass upsurge that was unleashed April 25 had been contained by the Communist party.
But the impatience of the right wing has produced certain changes in the political situation. Although they are not deep, the changes. presage more important political events, since the structural crisis of Portuguese capitalism is sharpening during a difficult conjunctural crisis. Political interests connected to those problems are aggravating the contradictions.
The strongest capitalist sectors, supporters of the coup, were not seriously affected by the wage increases and other gains made by the workers. But the way the gains were obtained did affect them. "A climate of uncertainty" was created by the mass mobilizations, causing the "withdrawal of investments" and a failure of confidence." In addition, these sectors are 1066
worried that "wage increases are not reflected in increased consumption." They want people "not to hold on to their money, but to spend it in order to raise consumption so that this would be reflected in increased production and a dynamic economic life."
That is why the rightist ex-Prime Minister Palma Carlos demanded more power, fundamentally more repressive power —he lacked freedom of action within the coalition cabinet:
"I cannot make concessions with the situation we find ourselves in: there is disorder in the streets, social indiscipline, agitation in the newspapers, and the invasion of public buildings by government functionaries. It happened right here two or three days ago, and some ministers could not get out until 11 p.m. All this creates a climate of indiscipline entirely contrary to my temperament and to my ideas of what democracy is."
In recent weeks, since the passage of the law censoring the press, there have been other signs of the rightwing offensive:
On June 25-26 national guardsmen Marvão and Anjos were arrested for refusing to use force against [striking] postal workers.
On July 6 three national guardsthe sailors brought us to. Leaving their ships, they went inland to the African bush with artillery, cavalry, and infantry, writing shining pages that a nation could be proud of into world history of that time....
"That is what I want to say to you with an aching heart in this moment with an aching heart, in this moment of disorientation and inverted values, values I have seen seriously challenged so many times by confusing heroes with traitors and forgetting the history of our elders and the blood generously shed by our brothers in defense of the homeland....
"As you stood firm in Guinea, I am certain that you will not retreat now, since this time it is the motherland that is being challenged."
It was a shame for him that the sailors did not greet him with a patriotic hymn. Instead they sang "Grandola Vila Morena," a song inspired by the popular uprisings that led to the take-over of National Guard barracks, and which had become the symbol of April 25.
Policy of the Communist Party
The Communist party dedicated itself to acting as attorney for the medium and small-sized enterprises that were left abandoned with the fall of Caetano.
In this capacity it proposes the nationalization of the banks (which, it seems, is going to be carried out) because the banks grant loans only to the big consortiums they are linked to. It also pleads for the subsidization of the construction and tourist industries and of other medium-sized or small enterprises that are in crisis.
In addition, it asks for "speedy development of relations with the USSR and other socialist countries."
Until the CP reached a point at which its own position was in danger because of the right-wing offensive, the axis of its policy had been to brake the mass movement. Then it made one of its about-faces, which we are so accustomed to internationally. Now it says that the main danger comes from the right." It defends and even encourages the workers' protests against "unjustified" firings. It promotes the clean-up (purge of Caetanoist officials) in the countryside, though in a bureaucratic way. Through the National Union of Portuguese Students - an attempt to form a student center - it promotes campaigns of "literacy and political awareness in the countryside."
Prime Minister Resigns
In addition to the economic reasons given, the impatience of the right wing had political motives, the time factor being one of the important ones.
As more time passes, Spinola's prestige declines more, and the masses begin to differentiate among the different sectors that were in favor of the coup.
It is because of this that Palma Carlos posed his three points:
— To move up the election for president of the Republic.
- To postpone the legislative elections until 1976 and draft a provisional constitution that would hold sway until then.
- To strengthen the powers of the prime minister (that is, his own powers).
The Council of State (made up of members of the junta, the Armed Forces Movement, and various "personalities") totally rejected the first two points and partially accepted the last, but in such a way as to "turn over more powers but not turn over power," according to Palma Carlos. It is reported that the vote was 15 to 3.
As a result, the prime minister resigned and four others followed him: Defense Minister Lieutenant Colonel Mario Firmino Miguel, Minister of Economic Coordination Vasco Vieira de Almeida, Interior Minister Malga- Ihaes Mota, and Sa Carneiro, min- August 5, 1974
ister without portfolio and adjunct to the prime minister. The last two are members of the Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic party].
Later the whole cabinet was "forgiven." It was said that Firmino Miguel would be the next prime minister. But the person finally chosen was Colonel Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves, chief representative of the Armed Forces Movement on the Council of State and a member of the movement's coordinating committee.
As of this writing, the composition of the new cabinet is not known. But it appears that it is going to have al-
SPINOLA: "As you stood firm in Guinea ... you will not retreat now."
most the same relationship of forces as the prior cabinet, with the addition of some military figures.
Results of Crisis
For several days, since before the resignation of the prime minister, there were rumors of a rightist coup headed by Spinola. But a turn that sharp did not occur. The program of the Armed Forces Movement received a vote of confidence. We have to remember that this is the "captains movement" that carried out the April 25 coup and that it was persons considered to represent this group who would play the most important role in the new cabinet. Another gain of this movement was the promotion of Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho to brigadier and his being named as second in command of the recently formed Comando Operacional do Continente (COPCON -Continental Operational Command] and commander of the Lisbon military region.
Otelo Saraiva is the "April 25 commander," who conducted the military operations the day Caetano turned power over to Spinola so that power "would not be left hanging in midair." Spinola responded that he was not leading any coup and that he [Spinola] would have to get in touch with the heads of the Armed Forces Movement to ask them if they would authorize it.
During the inaugural ceremony July 13, Spinola no longer spoke of "inverted values, values I have seen seriously challenged so many times," as he did July 11. This time he said that the ceremony represented "a new era of military life in a new climate, in light of new concepts of values."
The brilliant brigadier said that he was happy not because it was his triumph but because it was a triumph of his comrades in the movement. He added:
"We hope the luck that has accompanied us up to now will continue until the final victory, which will be within a year." He was referring to the elections.
COPCON was created by decree of the Council of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to the decree, its purpose is "to intervene directly, in support of civilian authorities and at their command, to maintain and reestablish order." The commander is the head of the Joint Chiefs of the Armed Forces. Nonetheless, Otelo Saraiva, the second in command, interprets the decree as an "application of operational control at the national level, and simultaneously, a force for intervention destined to impose by force compliance with the program of the Armed Forces Movement against possible reactionary maneuvers."
Undoubtedly, COPCON will be an instrument of a Bonapartist policy, which could be used against the conspiratorial and obstructionist right wing and against the most combative sectors of the workers. But at the same time, it seems very clear that the formation of such a body represents one more step in the reconstruction of the repressive forces.