Chaban-Delmas, Giscard d'Estaing, and Mitterrand are the only candidates who can hope to become president. Mitterrand is sure to be ahead on the first round, and thus remain a candidate on the second round. Of the two others, only the one who outdistances the other will be able to run on the second round.
Although the Socialist party's alliance with the Communist party has been denounced by Mitterrand's op-
ponents, it is not the main issue in the first round. The "Communist danger" is a much less useful argument than in the past, and it will really be heard only after the first round, when they're trying to pull together as many votes as possible against the candidate of the Union of the Left. The anti-Communist argument has been relegated to the background by many other things that are preoccupying not only working-class voters but all social categories.
These problems, to which all the candidates have had to give priority treatment in their campaigns, are inflation, job security, and unemployment. Who cares about France's "grandeur" and other hollow formulas when prices rose more than one percent in March, which means a forecast increase of more than fifteen percent for the year? The job outlook, already pretty dismal for the fall, has worsened; during the last week in April, the crisis struck the automobile industry, where sales were down by 20 percent in March. The big automobile firms are closing some facd'ESTAING
tories at the end of the month for a day or two.
On social questions, all the candidates mentioned above are making almost the same promises: to raise the minimum monthly wage to 1,200 francs [100 francs = US$20]; to lower the age of retirement and institute a sliding scale on pensions; and to increase the interest rate on savings deposits (it has been six percent for several weeks, while the currency is depreciating at more than double that rate each year). The outgoing majority had already made similar promises last year, in its "Provins program." It is doubtful that a single candidate, once elected, would keep more than a small part of his promises in this area. For the real problem, one to which they all give vague replies, is what they propose to do in order to stop the rise in prices and to head off the recession that is developing.
Mitterrand is advised on economic matters by former Premier Pierre Mendès-France and by United Socialist party leader Michel Rocard (who belongs to the upper crust of the civil service, the Inspectorate of Finances) and has unveiled a number of shortterm and longer-term measures. He wants to obtain an immediate agreement with the unions on the issue of workers demands-to achieve in a "cold" way a new "Grenelle," without being subjected to the upheaval of major workers struggles, as in May '68.
The CGT [General Confederation of Labor, the Stalinist-led labor union] and the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor, of Social- Democratic inclination] will be prepared to accede to that request. They have already scheduled a big festival featuring sausages and white wine as a substitute for the May Day demonstrations. They have also lowered their demand for a basic minimum wage of 1,500 francs, which was formulated just fifteen days before Pompidou's death, to 1,200 franes in order to bring it into line with Mitterrand's promises. Georges Séguy, the general secretary of the CGT, is showing his "reasonableness" with statements like this: "After fighting for [the Union of the Left], we would be inconsistent if we risked compromising its success through demagogic demands." (Note that the term "demagogic" is aimed at the workers' demands, not the candidates' promises.)
Mitterrand proposes to stop the rise in prices by reducing the sales tax on items of immediate necessity; that can at best bring about a leveling off of prices for several months, as was illustrated when, as finance minister, Giscard d'Estaing did the same thing with meat prices before the March 1973 legislative elections. Mit-
terrand also says that he will revalue the franc, to put it on a par with other European currencies. Apparently this would be the contrary of the devalua-
tion that seemed likely for the end of the year. This monetary maneuver is probably designed to lower the cost of imports and shield France against recession within the Common Market; but once again, it is only a monetary manipulation that will not basically change things.
Mitterrand says that he will use the budget surpluses (the amount is not known) to keep his commitments to aid the disadvantaged sectors of the population, and that he will borrow 10,000 million francs at the current rates of interest. That sounds likefighting the crisis by using deficit financing procedures for economic recovery. In the past such procedures effectively helped to lessen the impact of recessions, but they also laid the basis for the present international monetary crisis, a general depreciation of currencies, and an inflation that has reached the rate of fifteen and twenty percent or more in the highly developed capitalist countries. So, it is really taking a big risk.
Mitterrand's proposals contain monetary manipulations, but nothing that hurts the interests of big business, and nothing to counter the flight of capital that would be inevitable if he were elected. In sum, his program is full of limited and temporary palliatives. Moreover, the other candidates are supporting measures that are not much different.
Giscard is simply trying to show that he is more concerned with saving money, balancing the budget, and so on. He charges that Mitterrand and Chaban-Delmas would empty the state 588
reserves. Chaban states that the Ministry of Finance is a state within the state, that it is sabotaging reforms, and that in the future, responsibility for the budget must rest with the prime minister and not with the minister of finance.
These two bourgeois candidates are waging the liveliest struggle before the first round, despite the nonaggression pact they had agreed to at the beginning. The first blows were dealt by their stand-ins, but now the candidates themselves are on the attack. Chaban, who appears to be in difficulty, if trends in the public opinion polls are to be believed, has taken the bull by the horns, denouncing the "conservatism" of his opponent, who, he says, is "allied to the right." Giscard is more veiled in his attacks, Knowing that part of the UDR [Union for the Defense of the Republic, the main Gaullist party] is turning his way. When thieves fall out, honest men can sometimes find advantage. Thus, in the overseas territories and departments, traditionally the scene of great electoral frauds benefiting the UDR, there will be controllers this time, sent by the constitutional council and the election control commission in order to avoid such frauds.
One more word on the attitude of the bosses in the campaign. They are not expressing any preference between Chaban and Giscard, as shown by the fact that they are dividing their campaign contributions between the two.
One quite remarkable result of the Mitterrand campaign is that the Communist party -this "first party of France," this "party of the working class," this party that has always boasted that it would never play second fiddle- is filling precisely the role of second fiddle to Mitterrand's candidacy in the present campaign.
Mitterrand is treating the CP with what appears to be the smoothest politeness, but in reality with arrogance and disdain. Up to now, he has monopolized the left's radio and television appearances; it can be expected that next week he will accord a few minutes to Georges Marchais [CP general secretary], but also the same amount of time to Mendès-France, the Left Radical Robert Fabre, and to Rocard.
A single big meeting has been organized in Paris under the sponsorship of the Union of the Left. All the big meetings outside Paris are organized
by the Mitterrand "support committee," in which the CP is just one participant among many. Although the CP is producing its own leaflets and posters, at no time has it appeared as an independent political force. Mitterrand can afford to have the attitude he has because he knows that the CP can do nothing else.
As far back as the day after the March 1973 legislative elections, Marchais was forced to observe that the Union of the Left, the fruit of fifteen years of CP perseverance, had turned out to benefit the Socialist party, and not his party.
The present election is showing even more that this policy of the Union of the Left makes the members of the CP work for the Socialist party. And, what's worse, the CP has no alterna-
tive policy; it can't outflank Mitterrand on his right, or in any case it wouldn't gain any advantage from doing so; nor can it tack to the left without running the risk of playing into the hands of the far left, which is what it fears above all. This dilemma of the CP cannot help but have some repercussions in the end.
Paris, April 25, 1974 Intercontinental Press