[The following analysis of the position of Lutte Ouvriere on the electoral program of the French Communist party was published in the January 20 issue of Rouge, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
As the coming legislative elections draw near, forcing all the far-left groups to state their positions, a certain number of political differences have clearly surfaced. The Maoist and ultraleftist groups, by refusing to have anything to do with the elections, are once again showing their inability to address themselves to the working class as it is and not as they would like it to be. The PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié - United Socialist party], after having purged its organization of all revolutionary opposition tendencies, insists on playing the role of red taillight to the Union of the Left. As for the AJS [Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme - Alliance of Youth for Socialism, the Lambertist youth organization), wrapped up in its own special world, it announces that it will be campaigning for a true workers' government, that is, in fact for the Union of the Left as presently constituted, minus its Radical debris!
A good opportunity for studying the position of the Lutte Ouvrière tendency has come with the appearance of its pamphlet on the electoral program of the PCF [Parti Communiste Français - French Communist party] based on a meeting it held in Paris in December 1972.
Lutte Ouvrière chooses to focus its critique of the text of this program on two points:
"It lacks two essential things: first, the determination to give immediate satisfaction to the essential demands of the workers; second, the determination to allow them to assume control over society as a whole, on the economic as well as on the political level."
Let's look more closely at these two criticisms.
Criticize the Common Program by Raising Economic Demands?
In its pamphlet and in its newspaper, Lutte Ouvrière emphasizes, correctly, the altogether moderate nature of the social measures promised by the PCF, as well as the deliberately ambiguous way in which they are formulated — a "progressive" return to the forty-hour week (already obtained legally as far back as 1936!), the "progressive" attainment of a minimum [monthly] wage of 1,000 francs (a demand already put forward in 1968, which the rise in prices over the past five years has deeply eroded), etc.
It is perfectly right in denouncing before the workers in this way the "realism" of the PCF leaders, who are attempting to reassure a section of the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois social layers by the "prudence" of their proposals.
But we have seen just about everywhere, in PCF meetings and elsewhere, that the LO militants have been making this question into an essential critique of the PCF program by raising "more revolutionary" demands, like the thirty-hour week and a minimum wage of 1,500 francs per month. In view of the prodigious development in techniques that has been occurring, there is nothing utopian about these slogans. A massive reduction in the workweek would seem to be an indispensable prerequisite if the workers are to have time not only to live, but also to discuss and to provide leadership.
But focusing everything on this particular aspect of the program is particularly dangerous: It comes down to instilling in the workers a belief that the revolutionists are the best defenders of the workers because they call for a workweek of thirty hours instead of forty hours, etc.
In reality this approach ends up glossing over the fundamental question, which the PCF program holds can be solved through peaceful methods - that of the concrete means neeessary to destroy the domination of the bourgeoisie and to frustrate its counterrevolutionary violence.
This danger stands out clearly in the section of the pamphlet entitled "The Program of the Revolutionists," which takes up the question of state power.
A Political Power Decentralized and Controlled by Whom? The Nation?
LO proposes two alterations in the state power:
45-48), LO speaks of "voters" in general, "citizens," the "nation," the "population." The special basis indicated by such terms for a government of the workers is, to say the least, fuzzy and open to various interpretations.
2. "The decentralization of power and decision-making centers" by "extending the power of local councils" that would be democratically elected. This decentralization theme - very much in vogue all the way from JJ-SS [Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber) to the CFDT [Confédération Française et Dé- mocratique du Travail - French Democratic Confederation of Labor] -remains perfectly ambiguous as long as there is no clarity on the form the central power will take, on the class composition of these "voters," or even on the basic tasks that this power must carry out. One of these tasks could be a bitter struggle against a bourgeoisie that, for its part, is centralized and has powerful means at its disposal. It is doubtful that such a struggle could be waged municipality by municipality.
These formulations, then, are the source of some disturbing confusion. But this confusion stands out even more clearly if one studies in detail what is said on the repressive forces, particularly the police.
A Decentralized Police Under the Control of the Municipalities?!
The Marxist ciassies generally teach that it is illusory for the workers to try to take over the bourgeois state apparatus and make it work on their behalf. Since the experience of the Paris Commune and many others, they have insisted on the need to smash it and to replace it with a new form of power that emerges directly out of the struggle of the workers. So it is with the police, who are an instrument of bourgeois class rule; they must be disarmed and replaced by the armed workers, organized in selfdefense committees.
Imbued with reformist iliusions, the PCF proposes to "democratize the police both in terms of its functions and of its methods of recruitment." Thus Marcellin's police — the same ones who yesterday were still beating Algerian militants and throwing their bodies into the Seine, and who today are beating up and killing people in their headquarters, and bludgeoning strikers — will tomorrow be asked to protect an advanced democracy!
But what does LO's "Program of the Revolutionists" propose on this subject? To retain the police, decentralize them, and take away from Marcellin any control over tem to make sure they don't get mixed up in politics, but only in repressing "delinquency," and finally to piace the police under the authority of local councils and the conirol of the citizenry!
It is worth quoting the passage at some length:
"And among all these decentralization measures, there is one that is even more necessary than the others: that of the police. We are told that the police are necessary, even indispensable, for the protection of the citizens. Fine! But then let's put them at the disposal of the citizens, that is, of local institutions of power. It is the municipalities that need them in order to deal with delinquency. The only reason Marcellin needs them is for political purposes-to suppress demonstrations, to crush strikes, to go after the militants of the far left, and perhaps some day also the militants of the Communist party and trade unionists.
"If it is true that the police are needed to protect the citizens, then they must be at the service and under the control of the citizens. In otner words, the police must be recallable at any moment by the municipality or municipalities that empioy them, and it must be possible to supervise and control all their activities. Citizens' committees elected specifically for this purpose must be able to inspect the police stations at any time, have access to files, hoid investigations on anything relaling to police activity, including, of course, having access to prisons and the freedom to control them."
Thus, the PCF talks about democratizing the bourgeois police, while LO wants to decentralize and federalize them. But both would keep the police. It is true that LO goes further by proposing to place the cops under the authority of the municipalities and to have them controlled by committees that wouid make regular inspections of the police stations. But here, too, a seridus doubt arises: Who will do the leading and who will do the controlling?
And, especially, how can one control armed bands when one is unarmed oneself?
The Paths to Socialism
Not once in the 250 pages of promises made in the PCF's program and in the common program is the fundamental question raised: How do you crush the resistance that the exploiters and their lackeys will not fail to unleash? All that Marchais says is that there will be a "great mass movement." Krasucki adds that "it is reasonable to expect" that the great majority of the exploiters, now put in the position of a minority, "will respect democratic rule." One could not dream up a nicer example of the ingenuousness of the reformists. But what is astounding is that nothing on this can be found in LO's "Program of the Revolutionists."
And we do not think this is the result of an oversight, but rather of a deliberate choice. A few months ago, LO and the LC [Ligue Communiste] decided to work out the text of an open letter to the members of the PCF.
The version proposed by the Ligue stressed the moderate nature of the social measures, pointing out the suspicion to be held of "socialists" like Mitterrand, and then concentrated its fire on the army, the police, etc., and emphasized the need to prepare the workers to struggle against the bourgeois state. In substance, LO's version told the PCF the following: Promise us a thirty-hour workweek, 1,500 francs for everybody, a sliding scale of wages, job security, and better working conditions, and then whatever our differences and whatever we may think about the elections, we promise that we will vote for you! Today it is the very same logic that is inspiring the LO militants. To the advanced workers who are raising questions about "how to get rid of capitalism," LO answers "with good demands" because it is convinced that this is the part of the program "that the workers will remember in the first place, and almost to the exclusion of any other part." It also answers with "workers' control over the economy but also over politics," without, nevertheless, saying anything about 184
the form of the state or about the basic tasks it will face.
Yet many workers want to know more than this. They want to know what the strategy of the revolutionary activists is, how to see to it that a May '68 leads to something more than an electoral rout, what kind of socialism we want to build and how it will contrast with the "models" in the USSR and Czechoslovakia.
By not wanting to raise these problems, for fear of not being understood by the workers or of frightening the least politically conscious among them, it ends up making a critique that, for all its sharpness, remains fundamentally on the same terrain as the PCF.
And so LO sums up its basic objectives as follows (still without saying a word about means):
"The broad outline of the program of the revolutionists includes the immediate satisfaction of the basic demands of the workers and workers' control over the economic and political life of the country." And, it adds: "To be sure, this is only a transitional program, and it will not be socialism. But it is a program that makes it possible to solve the main problems facing the working class today, and that would put it in a better situation for eliminating exploitation, which is our fundamental goal."
One might sincerely wonder whether this is an original conception of workers' control or whether it is simply a variation on the theme of the revolution by stages.
Violence and Revolution
When all is said and done, it is not a complete surprise for us to see LO so discreet on the question of violence and of the paths to socialism. It is a sign of the opportunism and timorous policy that we have been able to observe in practice on various occasions.
In May '68 LO's theoretical magazine, Lutte de Classe, analyzed the German student movement that had thrown rocks at the police and solemnly urged French students not to indulge in acts of violence that the workers would not understand.
Later, several revolutionary groups united to organize a tough demonstration against a neo-Nazi meeting in the Palais des Sports organized by Ordre Nouveau [New Order]. Lutte Ouvrière asked its members to stay home that evening. More recently, a demonstration was organized against the trial of Courbain, a member of the GRS [Groupe Révolution Socialiste - Socialist Revolution Group] and a victim of French colonial repression. Lutte Ouvrière at first agreed, and then withdrew its backing when the demonstration was banned. A strange kind of internationalism that cools off as soon as the shadow of a policeman's cape appears on the horizon!
In theory, Lutte Ouvrière recognizes that it will be necessary to destroy the bourgeois state in order to replace it with a state of workers' coun cils, and it recognizes the need to arm the working class if this is to be done. But in practice what does it do? Does it believe that when the great day arrives, the working class will have no trouble doing what has to be done? Or is the task of revolutionists, beginning today, to assume the tasks that the French Communist party has abandoned, such as carrying out revolutionary propaganda inside the army, forming self-defense picket lines against the CFT [Confédération Fran- çaise des Travailleurs - French Confederation of Workers] and other armed bands of capital, and of supporting international struggles, even if we are only a minority? Does LO think, for instance, that calling the January 20 demonstration in front of the U.S. embassy is an example of militarist ultraleftism?
What needs to be done during this election campaign is, in fact, not to call for "a government that meets the needs of the proletariat" by adding a bit of workers' control, but to clearly state that "we are struggling for the destruction of all the old state apparatuses so that the armed proletariat can itself become the government"!
Notes
1. "A closer conirol by the voters over those they elect" by making recall possible at any moment. To be sure, recall is a useful measure. But one cannot be satisfied with formulas that are this vague; specifying a class content to this power cannot be evaded. Yet, in all these passages (pp. February 19, 1973