A new National Assembly will be elected in France on March 4 and 11. The present legislature was elected in the wake of the defeat of the May movement, after the PCF [Parti Com-
Français - French Commumuniste nist party] and the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail-General Confederation of Labor, the PCF-controlled labor organization] refused to carry the general strike to the point of overthrowing the Gaullist regime and torpedoed the mass movement in exchange for the government's agreeing to hold immediate elections. At that time the UDR [Union des Démocrates pour la République- Union of Democrats for the Republic, the main Gaullist formation] won an overwhelming majority. The upcoming elections will produce a very ditferent lineup.
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to think, as the PS [Parti Socialiste- Socialist party] and the PCF do, that these elections will decide the fate of France. It would also be wrong to think, as the Maoists and spontanéists do, that they have no importance whatsoever. Both parliamentary cretinism and antiparliamentary cretinism would lead us astray in trying to determine the role of these elections. Because of the context in which they will take place and their probable results, the elections have an importance that lies outside the parliamentary arena.
Background of the Elections
It is impossible to understand the present situation in France without going back to May 1968. This revolutionary crisis was the grandiose inauguration of a social crisis affecting the most diverse realms. Replacing de Gaulle with Pompidou has not strengthened the state power in the way hoped for by the bourgeois current that carried out this operation through the April 1969 referendum. The majority is more ridden with 142
divisions and cliques than ever. It was only with great difficulty that it managed to achieve a certain common front for the campaign. Scandals, some of them very sordid, are popping up everywhere in these circles. Not even a relative equilibrium has been restored in the educational system. Furthermore, other institutions, including some of the most reactionary (the churches, the courts, the police...), have been shaken by profound crises. Finally, all sorts of social categories are raising demands and they are doing so primarily in the streets.
As for the working class, its combativity has not been damaged by the fact that the May 1968 movement did not achieve what it could have. To the contrary, it has demonstrated very strong militancy, notably by resorting frequently to tough methods (kidnapping managers, ...), in the numerous struggles that have occurred since then. But all these struggles have had a sectoral, partial character and have not shown a tendency to spread. Of course, the predominantleaderships in the working-class movement have done everything possible to stamp out such a trend. But even where these leaderships have lost control of strikes, as has happened quite often, the tendency to spread has not been very strong.
The main reason for this has been that as a result of its experience in May 1968 the working class realized that a mobilization of such scope needs a political perspective in order to succeed. Revolutionary Marxists scarcely need note that a general strike is not the arithmetical total of economic strikes but that it constitutes a general political struggle which, as it develops, can pose the question of power. May 1968 caught the leaderships of the left organizations as well as the government by surprise. A rupture occurred between the PCF and the FDS [Fédération de la Gauche Dé- mocrate et Socialiste - Federation of the Democratic, Socialist Left, an alliance between the Social Democrats, the Radical party, and the Convention of Republican Institutions] as well as a split within the FDS. Besides showing that the PCF vote was holding steady, the May 1969 presidential elecregistered the collapse of tions the Socialist candidate, thus confirming the absence, even on the electoral level, of any political perspective.
The leaders of the PF and the "new" PS realized rather early that a situation marked both by their failure to offer any political alternative and by considerable working-class militancy involved a real danger of larger and larger strata of the working class turning toward revolutionary solutions to find a way out of the social crisis. The February 1972 demonstrations against the murder of the worker Pierre Overney at the gate of the Renault factory, called and led by the revolutionary far left, were a clear expression of this danger.
Thus both leaderships felt a need for getting together on a solution that could channel the discontent of the masses and their aspirations for a profound change into a reformist framework and in a way that would benefit them. Although for almost two years they exchanged pleasantries as well as frequently embittered polemics, suddenly, in less than three months, they reached an agreement to put their signatures to a "common program." So, in the first instance, the Union de la Gauche [Union of the Left, the PCF-PS coalition] and its joint program are an indirect consequence of May 1968. They represent the response of the reformist leaderships claiming to represent the working masses and the cause of socialism to the challenge of this development, their attempt to divert the rising mass movement of revolutionary struggle for the conquest of power into parliamentary channels and to keep it within the bounds of the capitalist system. Two Goals in 'Union of the Leff'
Before examining exactly what the political bloc constituted by the Union de la Gauche consists of, it is worthwhile to specify the aims - which are different — of each of these two partners.
As for the PCF, in a sense, its objective represents the culmination of a policy initiated at the end of the war by the entry of Communist leaders into the bourgeois governments. At the time, the PCF leadership already revealed a Bernsteinian conception of advancing toward socialism by parliamentary paths, of a broadening of bourgeois democracy that was supposed to lead gradually to a socialist society. But after 1947 this was generally just a propaganda theme without any concrete basis, since the PS in this period did not have the slightest inclination to look for allies to its left. That is no longer the case today (further on we will see why), so the PF leadership, while and continuing to distrust Mitterrand, is convinced that now it is only a question of time before its people get into the government. To see this you just have to listen to and watch Marchais. He has already taken the necessary lessons so that he can talk, behave, and dress in a manner suitable for a minister of the solidly bourgeois republic. His slogan at the recent PCF congress was "an open hand to all Frenchmen," except of course the far left, to whom this graduate of Thorez's old strong-arm squads showed his fist.
In the case of the PS, things are more complex. After taking control of this party shortly after the war, the Guy Mollet leadership for a long time followed a policy oriented toward the center. In the electoral arena, the PS lost ground constantly, and 1968 Guy Mollet found himself totally discredited. After Defferre's lamentable failure in the May 1969 presidential elections (barely 5 percent of the vote), the PS had to find a path to salvation. A new PS was in formation, uniting the old SFIO and various groupings, including Mitterrand's. After various tedious episodes, Mitterand was elevated to the leadership by a combination of the right wing of the old SFIO (Defferre and company) and a "left wing" formed around young technocrats.
Mitterrand pledged to rebuild a strong PS capable of dealing with the PCF on equal terms. In order to February 12, 1973
achieve this, he broke completely with Guy Mollet's orientation of looking for allies on the right or at most playing a balancing game between rightist alliances and temporary agreements with the PCF. The new PS leader understood that after May 1968, the party could only make a comeback by turning to the left. So he broke with the Radical party, which had been almost literally bought by J.J. Servan-Schreiber, and sought an accord with the PCF on a basis that in practice was virtually identical with the program proposed by the latter.
On the trade-union level, the PS's old official relationships with Force Ouvrière [Labor Force, the anti-Communist trade union] were cut to a minimum to pave the way for quite close contacts with the CFDT [Confédération Française et Démocrate du Travail - French Democratic Confederation of Labor, the old Catholic unions turned left. It needs to be noted in order to understand Mitterrand's present orientation clearly, that his course fits in with a personal ambition of winning the presidency of the republic in 1976 at the end of Pompidou's term with the votes of the left (Socialists and Communists) and the center. But in order to engage in such an operation, he needs first to strengthen the PS and assure a success in the upcoming elections. Only the future can say whether or not Mitterrand will be able to pull off a tightrope act. But in the meantime as a result of his agreement with the PCF we are seeing a certain reinvigoration of the PS. The party is recruiting primarily new members who favor joint action with the PCF, and this will not fail to have consequences in the future whose effect cannot be foreseen at the moment.
A New Popular Front?
The common program of the Union de la Gauche is a moderate program of bourgeois reforms. It contains some very limited nationalizations, promises to certain disadvantaged categories of workers, a retirement age of sixty, etc. It does not propose abolishing the Gaullist constitution but only making some amendments. In content, there is no important difference between the Union de la Gauche program and that of the Popular Front, even though the recent version is more extensive than the one in 1936.
But between the Popular Front and the Union de la Gauche there are some very important differences on two essential points:
1. The Popular Front had as its sole objective "barring the road to fascism."
2. Along with the PCF and the PS, it included the Radical party, which at that time was the main party of the French bourgeoisie. The decline of this party had already set in but it still had the open support of an important wing of French capitalism, which in particular favored its participation in the Popular Front. This was both for reasons of international policy (that is, reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union as a counterweight to German imperialism, then on the ascendant under Hitler) as well as of economic policy (getting the French economy moving again at the end of the depression years by Keynesian-type measures).
The Union de la Gauche differs from the Popular Front on two points.
1. While recognizing that the common program does not contain any specifically socialist measures, the leaders of the PS as well as the PCF claim that this program, which is supposed to be realized within five years, will promote democracy and thus pave the way for socialism in the relatively short run.
This perspective of a gradual, parliamentary, electoralist development of bourgeois democracy culminating in a socialist society is, as we know, false and deceitful and is setting the stage for the worst kind of disillusionments. But is not without interest to note that these parties can only hope to obtain an electoral victory by offering the perspective of socialism in a relatively short period. This testifies to the ferment in the masses and to the possible implications, if not of a victory, at least of a major electoral success by the Union de la Gauche.
2. In contrast to the Popular Front, the Union de la Gauche does not have the support of any appreciable wing of French capitalism whatsoever, not even among those elements today that have no confidence in Gaullism or Pompidou. To those who raise the objection that Radical office-holders have associated themselves with the Union de la Gauche, it is easy to answer that these figures represent neither a political or a social force. They are individuals who were elected with the help of Communist and Socialist votes, parasites, mendicants, who have no hope of getting reelected if they follow the orientation of the Radical party, that is, seeking to recreate a "third force." The Union de la Gauche therefore is an alliance of reformist parties solely and not an alliance between the reformists and any bourgeois party. From this standpoint the Union de la Gauche is not a new Popular Front.
The attitude of the capitalist forces toward the Union de la Gauche is one of quite understandable hostility. We must, of course, discount what comes simply from electioneering. In view of the law in force, the results of the elections can depend on a shift to the right or left of half a million to a million voters. So the politicians are not going to turn up their noses at any "argument" that might influence a few thousand votes one way or the other. But the most astute bourgeois are telling Mitterrand: "Your party is numerically weak by comparison with the PCF, and times have changed since the Popular Front, when the Communists were a minority that could be controlled. We know that the Communist party is a reformist party, but its reformism is not our kind but the Kremlin's. Furthermore, under pressure as it is from the revolutionary movements, we don't know whether the PCF is able now to maintain its control over broad mobilizations as it still was in May 1968. Your Union de la Gauche operation is too risky."
Mitterrand's reply to this is that he is going to prove that he can change the relationship of forces between the PS and the PCF. And he can say, too, that de Gaulle himself was not afraid of appointing Communist ministers and that they did not carry out a "Prague coup" because France, unlike Czechoslovakia, does not lie in the Soviet sphere of influence.
What is understood but not said in this dialogue is that de Gaulle acted the way he did when he was facing several thousand armed partisans, most of them under the control of the PCF, and that he needed a Thorez in his cabinet in order to disarm them by invoking the need for "one police force, one army, and one state." In a similar situation a Pompidou would act like de Gaulle. But times have changed. We have seen, in Italy for example, that the bourgeoisie is not 144 144
prepared to bring the Communist party into the government unless forced to by a situation more than perilous for the survival of its system.
The Perspectives
The trend is now running strongly in favor of the left; the signs of this are increasing. But for those who can remember, it is apparent that we are not seeing a revival of anything like the kind of enthusiasm aroused by the Popular Front in 1935-36. The experience of those years, compounded by that of the immediate postwar period (Communist participation in the government) and of the Republican Front in 1956 (in which the PCF voted for "special powers" for the Algerian war), have left a mark on people's memories, have inspired reservations. Many parliamentary illusions have disappeared, and not only in the minds of those who have already opted for revolutionary solutions. But in the absence of an alternative leadership that can inspire confidence, the masses will vote for the Union de la Gauche and will do so in enormous numbers.
If the Union de la Gauche gets a majority, we will quickly find ourselves confronted with a major political crisis resulting from a conflict between the president of the republic and the new Assembly, since the constitution provides that the government appointed by the president must receive a vote of confidence from the Assembly. And Pompidou will not appoint a government that can get this. Such a conflict would almost immediately be taken outside the framework of the institutions of the Fifth Republic.
In my opinion, it is much more likely that the elections will result, on the one hand, in a considerable success for the Union de la Gauche (it would not be surprising if it more than doubled its seats in parliament) and, on the other hand, in serious changes within the majority. The UDR may lose a substantial amount of ground to its allies. In this case, there will not be an immediate constitutional conflict, since Pompidou will be able to shift the axis of his leadership within the majority. But the parliament will be unwieldy; and, above all, hesitations, uncertainties, and a certain paralysis of the government will ensue. People remember that by giving de Gaulle only a very small majority the 1967 legislative elections brought on just such consequences, and thus speeded up the ripening of the May 1968 crisis.
Over the past year, the approach of the elections has made Pompidou vacillate in the face of the mass upsurge and the rise of the trend in favor of the Union de la Gauche. He had hoped to be able to carry out an effective maneuver in March 1972 by means of a referendum on the European Common Market. The PCF and the PS disagreed on this issue. The referendum was a failure. In an attempt to reverse the trend he replaced Premier Chaban-Delmas, whose reputation was besmirched by scandals, with Messmer, a retired Foreign Legion Lieutenant and former colonial governor. Messmer, one of de Gaulle's cronies, was to carry the general's banner to victory in the elections. With the unfavorable wind continuing to blow, a new turn has been made less than two months before the elections. In his speeches kicking off the campaign, Messmer is making promises that plagiarize the social program of the Union de la Gauche and even go further.
The outlook, then, is for a major success by the left and for a parliament without a working majority. Of course, this Assembly was not set up to play any role in the Fifth Republic. But, lacking a clear majority, it can block the functioning of the Bonapartist state machine. We can also, and above all, look forward to seeing a new thrust of the class struggle. It would be hazardous to predict the tempos and the breadth of this, but we can certainly count on the class struggle widening, becoming more acute, and rising toward higher levels. This is why the coming legislative elections will only give a static glimpse of the political relationships existing in the country -taking into account the distortions inherent in the parliamentary system under capitalism — but at the same time, by the context in which they take place and by their results, they will give a new impetus, a prod to the masses. And as a result they will open up new possibilities for the revolutionary Marxist vanguard.
Let me add a few words about the positions taken by the labor organizations and by the revolutionary movements. The CGT is giving total and unconditional backing to the Union de la Gauche and the common program. After many oscillations, the CFDT has come out for a victory of the Union de la Gauche but does not align itself fully with the common program. Force Ouvrière has cited its "nonpolitical character" as a justification for taking no position, since it cannot endorse the alliance of the PS with the PCF when it itself has systematically rejected any unity in action with the CGT.
I have already said that the Maoists, spontanéists, and the like are expressing indifference to the elections; they will probably advocate abstention. The PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié- United Socialist party), which has just lost members on its left and right and which has "purged" its ultralefts, has made criticisms of the common program paralleling those of the CFDT, criticisms that do not condemn the reformism of the program but seek to amend it. The party is running candidates in many districts. Rocard of the PSU wants the PS not to put up any candidates against them but the PCF is not going along with that. We still do not know the upshot of this horse-trading.
For several months the OCI-AIS
For several months the OCI-AJS [Organisation Communiste Internationaliste-Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme - Internationalist Communist Organization-Alliance of Youthfor Socialism, the followers of Pierre Lambert] participated in discussions with the Ligue Communiste [Communist League, the French section of the Fourth
International] and Lutte Ouvrière on dividing up the electoral districts so that in each constituency there would be only one candidate denouncing the Union de la Gauche's "parliamentary roads" to socialism and proposing the revolutionary road instead. (Each of the three organizations intended to put up seventy-five candidates.) Then, when an agreement seemed to have been reached, the OCI-AJS broke off the negotiations and announced that it would run only twenty candidates and that on the first round it would call for a vote for the candidates of the "recognized workers' organizations" (i.e., the PCF and the PS) and "in no case for the candidates of the Ligue Communiste or Lutte Ouvrière, who are crypto-Stalinistcandidates pushed by the bourgeoisie"!
It is unlikely that participating in such long-drawn-out negotiations was February 12, 1973
only a maneuver. For the time being we do not know the reasons for this about-face or why the Lambertists reduced their candidates from a hundred (which would have assured them television and radio time) to twenty, thereby depriving their campaign of all national impact. In any case, this kind of behavior has once again made it look as if they were trying to be just a group pressuring the big organizations and fighting the other revolutionary formations by the lowest means.
The Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvrière will each put up candidates in many constituencies. Thus, therevolutionary road to socialism will be defended in about half the electoral districts. In particular, almost all the working-class districts will be touched directly by the candidates of these two organizations.*
In the first round, the Ligue Communiste is calling for voting only for the revolutionary candidates and for abstaining where they are not on the
* Lutte Ouvriere declares itself in favor ballot. In the second round, it will continue to denounce the program of the Union de la Gauche and its purported roads to socialism. But in order to enable the workers to learn by their own experience and not to put any obstacle in the way of this, the Ligue Communiste will call on its supporters, in accordance with the old tactic already set forth by Lenin in his Left-Wing Communism, to eliminate the candidates of the bourgeoisie by voting for the candidates - but not for the program - of the Union de la Gauche. In this way we will have counterposed our entire program to that of the bourgeoisie and of the Union de la Gauche and done the most that we can to promote a result that will open up a vast perspective for the development of the class struggle.
of the revolutionary road to socialism, but unfortunately the immediate program that it has worked out for this campaign has nothing transitional about it. but is made up of immediate demands, a fact which renders it reformist in content.