| The following article was published in the November 1 issue of Avanzada Socialista, the weekly paper of the Argentine PST (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores - Socialist Workers party). The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
At the end of October 1972, Colonel Banzer's government devalued the Bolivian currency by 66.66 percent, which in effect was a disastrous blow to the workers' standard of living. That is, it was as if the imperialist and Bolivian capitalists had reached into the workers' pockets and taken 66 centavos out of every peso they had.
However, the workers movement, which had been waging some partial struggles since the August 1971 coup d'etat that overthrew Juan José Torres, was able to respond to the situation:
"Today thousands of workers from various sectors of the labor force launched a mobilization to resist the government's economic measures, calling indefinite stoppages in their respective workplaces. La Paz's main factories were at a standstill. ... Workers from the SAID textile factory, employing approximately a thousand white- and blue-collar workers, jammed the main thoroughfare of this city, which leads to the International Airport and connects up Bolivia's most important highways. Hundreds of workers gathered in downtown La Paz to begin a protest march." (Clarin, October 31, 1972.)
The struggle spread. In Cochabamba, "... in the central part of the 1426
country, factory workers declared their solidarity with their companeros in La Paz. The strike could affect some 5,000 workers during a twenty-fourhour period. Unofficial reports indicated that in some areas prisoners were released [by the mobilized workers]." ( La Nación, October 31, 1972.)
The most important immediate results of this uprising were a 20 percent raise won by the workers from the government and the return to the union membership of the headquarters of the La Paz Miners Federation - the strongest union in the Central Obrera Boliviana [COB-Bolivian Workers Federation]. The headquarters had been closed down after Torres fell.
The October explosion was preceded by a few limited struggles by the teachers and journalists unions, among others. Also, from his first days in office, there was friction between Banzer and various capitalist sectors.
Following the revolt in La Paz and in other cities, infighting among the various sectors of Bolivia's capitalists grew more and more intense. In one instance, Colonel Selich (Che Guevara's murderer), who was Banzer's right-hand man in the coup against Torres, was first recalled as ambassador to Paraguay and subsequently killed-accused of conspiring against the government.
Immediately following the La Paz actions, the Comité de Defensa de los Trabajadores [Workers Defense Committee] was formed, which was made up of rank-and-file factory delegates tested in the struggle. At the same time, the left forces began to win trade-union elections from the slates that the government backed in its attempt to get a brake on the struggles by putting manding that the COB be legalized. Popular ferment rose to a new peak during October this year in protests against the miserable raise of 6,000 pesos a month [US$60] decreed by the government, an increase that seemed like a mockery in the face of galloping inflation.
At the beginning of this year, the Bolivian authorities proclaimed that the military would remain in the government for another five to ten years.
However, early last June the PSDB [Partido Social Demócrata Boliviano - Bolivian Social Democratic party], one of the parties composing theruling coalition, came out with a position that calling free elections was the "only solution to the problems confronting the country." That is, in the face of the popular mobilizations, this was the only answer the imperialists and the bosses could come up with.
Confronted with this and other pressures, Banzer chose to retreat from the position he held at the start of this year. He pledged to call elections for mid-1974. At the same time, he sought to fuse the two coalition parties making up the government- the Falange Socialista Boliviana [Bolivian Socialist Phalanx] and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario [Revolutionary Nationalist Movement] into a single party to back his candidacy.
On the other hand, a group of young military officers came out with a document in which they declared that they were "ready to break with the decrepit structures of the country in order to avoid increasing Bolivia's dependence on foreign capital." (Clarin, July 15, 1973.) At the same time, they threatened to take action against any putchist sector of the armed forces that might attempt to prevent the elections from being held.
However, the date for the elections has yet to be set. In the first place, some sections of the MR have called on their leaders to withdraw the party vown
BANZER: Great National Accord?
from the discredited ruling coalition, leaving the Banzer candidacy balanced precariously on one leg. Moreover, when a minister said recently on his own authority that elections would be held on June 2, 1974, and promised a broad amnesty for all political prisoners, including leftwingers, Banzer was quick to deny his assertions.
So, while the bank workers have been spearheading popular struggles recently, showing their solidarity with an imprisoned trade-union leader by calling a massive strike, Banzer and the capitalist parties have been issuing long statements trying to cover up the infighting that prevents them from uniting to confront the militant Bolivian workers.
The situation in Bolivia leads us to draw some conclusions:
In October 1972, a year after the defeat represented by the August 1971 coup, the Bolivian workers showed that they were making a clear recovery.
Since 1972, workers combativity has continued to grow, while the crisis has been deepening and disunity reigns in the army, the government, and the capitalist parties.
The workers focused their struggle on restoring their traditional organiza- December 10, 1973
tions, such as the Miners Federation and the COB, while at the same they took advantage of all legal and semilegal openings, such as trade-union elections, that facilitated the work of activists in reunifying the ranks of the labor movement.
Contrary to the expectations of some, guerrilla warfare has played no role in the revival of the mass movement in Bolivia. What is more, there hasn't even been a sign of guerrilla activity since the 1971 coup d'etat, either in the countryside or the city.
Despite pronouncements that they would stay in power for a decade, Banzer and his cronies were unable to accomplish their planned installation of a solid Brazilian-style dictatorship.
Contrary to the expectations of others, under the pressure of growing workers struggles, friction has increased between different Bolivian capitalist groups, and also between them and imperialism, prompting some sectors to demand elections.
A minister issued a statement, which was only half denied by Banzer, saying that all tendencies would be allowed to participate in the elections, "since this will also be a good way to find out just how many communists there are in Bolivia." (Cronista Comercial, October 19, 1973.) This led to general speculation that the Bolivian governmentwas investigating the possibility of opening up talks with "all the leftist and ultraleft forces" - as the Buenos Aires daily Clarin put it in its October 9 issue - with a view to negotiating the conditions of their participation in the elections.
The Banzer dictatorship seems to find itself in a situation similar to the first stage of the Ovando regime. We hope that the Bolivian worker and student activists have drawn the lessons of Torres's fall and that they will take up the task of building the instrument that they needed to win in 1971 -the revolutionary party.