[The following article was published in the June 20-27 issue of Avanzada Socialista, weekly newspaper of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST - Socialist Workers party). The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
Many compañeros might be surprised that we are casting a pall over their joy at the return of Perón by recalling the way he fell from office eighteen years ago.
But the fact is that the two periods are identical in two ways: not only as far as the dates are concerned [Perón's downfall began in June 1955; he returned on June 20, 1973], but also with regard to the statements and appeals for harmony, peacefulness, and negotiation with the "opposition" parties of the oligarchy and imperialism.
On June 16, 1955, the Peronist movement began to lose control of the government, and it was removed three months later. The speeches of Perón at the time are very similar to those that Cámpora is making today, or to the statement of the Movimiento Nacional Justicialista [Justicialist National Movement, the Peronist movement] against the occupations. Then as now, the Peronists wanted to negotiate with the oligarchy and imperialism, and in order to do this, they tried to put a brake on the struggle of the workers. Eighteen years ago this policy led to the fall of Perón and, subsequently, to the fierce revenge of the bosses and imperialism against the workers and the country. Now this same policy could lead to a similar disaster, although the Cámpora government does not realize it.
June 16
Since 1952 the Argentine economy had been in a process of serious deterioration. The period of the "fat kine" [time of plenty] had ended with the end of the world war, and with it our country's privileged situation as a producer of food products. It could then be seen that the six years of Peronist rule had not revolutionized the country but had only improved the situation of the workers thanks to favorable circumstances brought on by the war.
In 1952 the bosses began their campaign to take back part of what they had given up during the preceding years. In order to accomplish this, they began to pressure the government, as well as conspire against it.
Perón partially gave in to this pressure, as can be seen in the fact that real wages decreased by more than 20 percent between 1948 and 1954.
On the other hand, North American imperialism launched an assault on the country. Here, too, the government began to give in. In 1950, Cereijo traveled to the United States and, after drawn-out negotiations, obtained a loan of almost $100 million.
In exchange, a law was signed on foreign investments that allowed North American firms — none of which were nationalized under Peronist rule-to take out of Argentina up to 5 percent of their recorded capital annually; negotiations also began on granting Standard Oil drilling rights in Santa Cruz.
But imperialism wanted much more than these concessions. And so it is that while it was negotiating with Perón, as well as with the bosses, it was also laying the groundwork for the military coup.
The great ally of the bosses and imperialism was the church. The priests, with their support from the middle class - which was bitter over the economic situation and traditionally opposed Perón because of the dictatorial nature of his government — organized street demonstrations and declared political war. The army, navy, and air force began to seethe with ferment about a possible coup.
It was in these circumstances that a sector of the navy rose up on June 16, 1955, and took over Ezeiza [airport], the Naval Machine School, and the naval yards. Some of the insurgent troops posted themselves in front of the government house. At noon, three Glenn Martin and Catalina airplanes flew over the Plaza de Mayo and bombed it. One bomb fell right on the government house. Another exploded on a trolley bus full of passengers; it turned onto its side, dumping its load of wounded and dead onto the pavement.
There were repeated air attacks. The last one came at 6:00 p.m., but the rebels, who did not win the support of the other branches of the armed forces, were repressed. Thirty-eight airplanes left for Uruguay; on board one of them was one of the civilian chiefs of the whole motley crew, the Radical Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz.
In spite of the fact that the coup was defeated militarily, it was a complete triumph politically. The government came out of it weakened, while the number of its opponents had grown: All the opposing forces needed to do was better coordinate their social, political, and military forces. The navy attempt failed because it reflected exclusively those interests favoring a coup who were the most pro-Yankee, and they attempted to go it alone.
Perón's response to the coup completely disarmed the workers and prevented any possibility of the workers defending themselves. In place of appealing to them and their organization to struggle-even though they were the only national sector that was prepared to lay it on the line for Perón —he made his famous "pacification" speech. In the name of this concept, he permitted the forces of reaction to commit the worst outrages.
In fact, on June 16 itself, Perón spoke in order to praise the army and to say that, thanks to it, the situation had been saved: "All the generals of the republic, the commanding officers, officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers have demonstrated that they can brilliantly carry out their duty...."
Who were these generals? Aramburu, Lagos, Videla Balaguer, Uranga, Bengoa, to name a few. Precisely the same ones who three months later overthrew him.
Perón called for faith in the executioners. And not only this, but he called for people to remain calm, not to get organized, not to defend themselves. Following Perón spoke Di Pietro, assistant secretary of the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo —General Confederation of Labor], who said the following: ". . . the CGT strongly urges all the workers . . . to keep the necessary calm, and to do this in the venerated memory of Eva Perón. . . . I want to render our emotion-filled homage to the glorious Argentine army, which, by merging with the people, has defended it like a great man protecting a child...."
And just so that there can be no doubt that the workers, rather than organize for struggle, had to passively place their faith in the military, the "saviors of the homeland," Di Pietro then read the following resolution: "The CGT has prepared a general stoppage of all activity tomorrow as a sign of grief. This strike, compañeros, must be quietly observed in our own homes. . . ."
A sector of the Peronist movement itself, together with worker and revolutionary militants, ignored this pacification order. They went out into the streets to demonstrate, and this resulted in churches being set on fire.
Then Perón accused the "Communists." (Now the reference is to "Trotskyists," but the purpose is the same.) On June 19 [1955], Perón, while speaking to the staff of the union bureaucracy in the CGT, made accusations against the "Communists," called for "more and better work," and again praised the army. A few days later, he offered all the parties radio time and newspaper space to state their positions and to begin a dialogue aimed at reaching an agreement with them.
Three Months Later, the Fall
Thanks to the paralysis of the workers, who were held back by the union bureaucracy on orders from Perón, the anti-Perón forces continued to grow stronger and stronger. The plotting was done openly, and the only response of the Peronist movement was to increasingly praise the army that was to overthrow it.
From that point on, the collapse was very simple. Perón, in spite of the backing of the working class, fell from power in a pitiful fashion.
At the end of August, Perón made his last "peace offer" - his resignation in return for negotiations. The opposition ignored it: It wanted to completely destroy him. A few days later it happened.
For a few days, beginning September 16, sectors of the military in the interior rebelled. They were relatively small forces, but the government was paralyzed. The last measure it took was to decree a curfew; that is, it placed a ban on the workers themselves taking to the streets to struggle and defend themselves. Perón wanted to work everything out between the top political and military cliques. From that point on, no settlement was possible. And thus began the new, "liberated" era.