Dy Livio Maran
1. The Argentine bourgeoisie had accepted the prospect of Peronism playing a new, major role within the framework of the GAN [Gran Acuerdo Nacional-Great National Agreement], that is, of a policy providing for substantial control by the military over a newly restored "constitutional" regime and, at the same time, involving a compromise between Peronism and other traditional forces. This scheme, thought up by Lanusse, political the most lucid of the heads of the military dictatorship, involved the isolation, if not the crushing, of the "extreme" points represented both by the armed struggle organizations and by the most combative working-class vanguards that had broken with the Peronist union bureau-
In spite of rigging and distortions, the results of the March 11 elections basically showed that the wave of radicalization had reached an extraordinary scope, not only among the working masses but also among broad layers of the petty bourgeoisie. The GAN operation was literally swept aside, and the Argentine bourgeoisie found itself faced with a very clear choice: either to forcibly thwart the tidal wave by preventing Cámpora from assuming the presidency, or to play its neo-Peronist card. The former option would have inevitably resulted in the hegemony of the most reactionary wing of the military and would very likely have led to the breaking out of a civil war, characterized from the very start by armed resistance. This is why it decided, in spite of the desperate efforts of the ultras, to run the risk of a radical turn and reinstate Peronism in power.
The following question now arises: What are the Argentine bourgeoisie's chances for achieving some successes with the spectacular turn that it has been forced to make?
It goes without saying that the economic conditions in the Argentina of 1973 are in no way analogous to the conditions at the end of the second world war that created a situation favorable to the Peronist experiment. Nor is there any longer any possibility for Argentina to take the path followed by Brazil after the 1964 military coup. In the first place, it will be impossible within the context of a Peronist regime in any way to impose July 2, 1973
on the working class what the gorillas, resorting to the most brutal violence, imposed on the Brazilian workers. Second, it would not be easy to find room in Latin America for two "subimperialisms," and there is every indication that Brazil offers American imperialism other guarantees than Argentina. Thus, a large-scale economic boom lasting for a number of years appears unlikely.
This does not mean that the bourgeoisie has no room at all for maneuver. There is room, and Cámpora and Company will attempt to use it to the utmost. First of all, they will be able to ease the pressure from North American imperialism by appealing to West European capitalism, which is on the lookout for new openings in its increasingly sharp competition with the United States. This also involves the possibility both of new investments, making the achievement of short-term results possible, and of substantially expanding the export of basic products like meat (in this area, the present evolution of the market is favorable to producing countries). At the same time, Argentina can play the card of an alliance with Latin American countries interested in thwarting Brazilian expansionism - countries that have already joined together in the Andean Pact. In this way, Argentine industry could, for a certain period of time and to a certain extent, assure itself of larger foreign outlets. In addition, measures of partial nationalization could bring about a certain rationalization of economic options, in the final analysis strengthening the positions of Argentine capitalism as a whole. North American imperialism itself, while placing its top priority on Brazil, will not be able to systematically sabotage the neo-Peronist experiment, given the danger of its rapidly wearing down, without any available alternative solution within the framework of the system. Finally, the new government will be able to reach agreement with some workers states that are obviously interested in the process of evolution going on in Argentina (Perón's planned trip to China is significant in this regard).
3. Judging from the electoral returns, the Peronists are taking power with a broader social base than they had in 1945-46. It is the attitude of broad layers of the petty bourgeoisie in particular that has changed as they have become increasingly radicalized.
Theoretically, this ought to guarantee Cámpora considerable room for political maneuver and prevent a too rapid erosion of support. But in practice, the difficulties and contradictions are enormous, and they surfaced during his first days in office.
Above all, one must not for a moment lose sight of the very profound evolution of the international context since 1945. In particular, the victory of a socialist revolution in Cuba, and the very existence of an American workers state, continue to draw incomparably sharper lines of division in the class struggle in Latin America.
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On the other hand, the Argentine bourgeoisie has already lived through an experience with Peronism; it knows the limitations from its own point of view, it is aware of the dangers, and it has only opened up the road to power for the Social Justice movement as an extreme solution.
But in the final analysis, it is the attitude of the masses that will be decisive. And the new Peronist upsurge has been spurred on among adult generations of workers by the deterioration of the living conditions and rights of the working class following the downfall of Perón. Among layers of the youth, Peronism appeared, a little mythically, to be a radical, anti-imperialist solution with an anticapitalist thrust. Neither are prepared to be satisfied by demagogic statements or measures that are more theatrical than real, to put up with the consequences of an economic situation that constantly eats up their buying power, or to pay the costs of national "concord." From the very start, they will be much more critical than were the workers who brought Perón to power about thirty years ago.
At that time, the trade-union organizations were the main instrument that guaranteed Perón's hegemony over the masses. They in fact represented a historic conquest by the Argentine proletariat, which used them to improve its standard of living and make important gains. The present situation is radically different. The Peronist unions remain powerful, but they have become transformed into highly bureaucratized machines - even using goons against opponents-and they are largely discredited because of their opportunism and their repeated capitulations. During the past few years this has produced numerous crises, break-offs on different levels, and even genuine splits, with the creation of radicalized tendencies and plant unions or local organizations adhering to an antibureaucratic class orientation.
As for the Peronist youth movement, it has gained in influence among the radicalized petty bourgeoisie, as well as among young workers. It is largely inspired by an anti-imperialist outlook, and it is linked to the Peronist armed struggle organizations. The experience of the May days showed the extent to which this sector, despite repressive measures like the dismissal of Galimberti, is creating difficulties for the new president.
Finally, during the past few years, a large vanguard has arisen in the working class that has broken free from Peronism, or has never been under its influence. This is a vanguard that has developed in the most dynamie industrial sectors, particularly in Córdoba, epicenter of the class struggle. It has moved more and more openly into conflict with the traditional union bureaucracy, has rejected suggestions of the Perón myth, has matured under the impact of the Cuban revolution and the revolutionary struggle in other Latin American countries, has been influenced by the vicissitudes of the international Communist movement, especially of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Chinese events of 1966-69. The existence of this vanguard — the scope of which could not be deduced from the results of the March 11 election (on this occasion, it took various positions, ranging from tactical support to Peronist candidates like López in Córdoba or voting for the PST [Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores — Socialist Workers party], to abstention or casting blank ballots) - is henceforth an extremely important factor, which represents the essential line of demarcation from the first Peronist experience. Although this vanguard is not yet in a position to play a decisive role or to put forward a short-term alternative, its impact in the struggles that are going on must in no way be underestimated. After all, it is this vanguard that has been the motor force in the Cordobazos and similar mobilizations, and in the battles in the leading factories. From its ranks emerged the militants who became part of the armed struggle organizations that have unquestionably contributed to deepening the political crisis in the country, stimulating the struggle against the military dictatorship, and bringing about the defeat of Lanusse and the operation for saving the GAN.
4. The new regime must face up to enormous problems. It has to define its economic plans and begin to put them into practice rather quickly, get at least large sectors of the organized working class to go along with these plans, and make concessions in the area of wages in order to guarantee compensation for the constant eropurchasin pa pomentary apparatus that ha sion of the purchasing power of the workers. It must put back on its feet a parliamentary apparatus that has suffered a prolonged vacation; reorganize the military, which has been weakened at the top by the defeat of the dietatorship; and consolidate the police apparatus, which has also been shaken by crises. It must give the Social Justice political movement more efficient and homogeneous structures and reestablish the authority of the central union apparatuses. The events prior to and following the elections have already indicated some of the difficulties and contradictions that carrying out these tasks involves for Cámpora and the Social Justice leadership.
In the course of the past few weeks, the crisis of the system has gotten worse, and there exists a power deficiency that is extremely dangerous for the ruling classes. Through the multipurpose ideology of Peronism, the bourgeoisie has succeeded in temporarily diverting the dynamism of the mass movement. But precisely to the extent that the masses regard the election of Cámpora as a victory, they feel a greater confidence in their forces and will tend, in a more favorable context than existed in the past, to bring their full weight to bear. They are not prepared to hand over a blank check to the new team in power, nor to wait too long for concrete results.
Analogous tendencies can be seen in other social layers. All those who supported the Peronist movement and contributed to the defeat of the military feel that the moment has come for them to impose their own demands, if necessary through combative mobilizations. In particular, struggles could develop on an increasingly broad scale in the universities and in the secondary schools.
It will be very difficult for the new regime to crush these movements through repression. It will try to take advantage of all room for maneuver that it has at its disposal through postponements, by mobilizing the union machines in its defense, by moving toward taking certain steps in response to pressure, and by taking a few spectacular measures (possibly with regard to North American imperialism). It will pump new steam into the myth of Perón, who tries to appear as a "father of his country" who stands above the fray. But this will not be enough to surmount the situation of conflict, which will continue and could even get worse.
This means that the Argentine bourgeoisie will not be able to enjoy the relative stabilization that it will need if it is to carry out its plans. In other words, it will not be able "peacefully" and at the expense of the working class to reestablish the margins of accumulation necessary for an economic revival. This is why the installation of the "constitutional" regime and the accession of Cámpora to the presidency will in the last analysis be only an interlude that the bourgeoisie will have to call into question. Need it be recalled, moreover, that although the military has suffered a major defeat, it basically retains its apparatus and could try to take revenge as soon as it feels the situation has become favorable?
The main danger for the working class and the revolutionary movement at the present stage lies in the possibility of the dynamism and combativity of the masses being expressed only in sectorial struggles, without coordination and liable to peter out or result in marginal gains, or of their giving way to spontaneous explosions, risking isolation or repression, or, in any case, resulting in no real gains.
5. The central task of revolutionists in this stage is to gain a mass base, if only in a few epicenters of the class struggle. This goal can be achieved only by winning to the revolutionary organization or to its influence those vanguard cadres who have played a leading role in the struggles since the first Cordobazo (May 1969).
Any success of the revolutionary organization in this area will contribute to strengthening the mass movement as a whole, and therefore to deepening the crisis of the system and to fostering political maturity among broad layers of the workers and of the working people in general, freeing them from the influence the bourgeoisie continues to enjoy over them by means of Peronist ideology. At the same time, an effective integration into the masses will give the revolutionary organization more favorable conditions for meeting inevitable tests of strength and for confronting a possible new stage, during which clandestine activity and armed struggle again have priority, with increased effectiveness.
Applying such an orientation requires clarity on the following points:
I. Gaining mass influence through winning decisive cadres in the workers vanguard presupposes a hard and systematic battle involving the entire body of the positions of revolutionary Marxism, whatever the difficulties that might arise at any given stage. Any possible adaptation to the current level of the masses or broad layers of the masses could, on the surface, resolve the problem of establishing links with the masses. But it would inevitably
"lead to a tail-ending approach devoid of any perspective and revolutionary method.
II. Revolutionists must not for a single instant lose sight of the strict necessity of waging a battle to constantly clarify the nature of the regime that arose out of the March 11 elections, in other words, to demystify Peronism. This involves defining the prerevolutionary character of the period, the nature of the revolutionary process in Argentina, and the strategic objective of a struggle for power. It is not a matter of waging an abstract battle of loyalty to principles or of analytical rigor. It is a question of waging a political battle, the aim of which is to help broad vanguards of the working class and of the exploited masses to make the decisive leap from protest July 2, 1973
and instinctive revolt to class political autonomy and revolutionary consciousness. There must be clarity on this point: If this goal is not attained, there is no real progress in the revolutionary struggle. On the one hand, any mass movement, including the broadest and most vigorous, would sooner or later find itself in an impasse, either by gradually wearing itself out or by succumbing to repression. On the other hand, any action by the political vanguard and the revolutionary organization, independent of its conjunctural impact, would in the last analysis be condemned to isolation, having at best only symbolic value.
III. Revolutionary Marxists must systematically underline the precariousness of the "democratic" interlude and the inevitability of armed confrontations. They must not only demystify all the parliamentary and "mass-ist/spontanéist illusions, but also — more precisely - insist on the need to prepare to respond to the inevitable attacks of the enemy, whatever form they might take. This means that an underground apparatus must be maintained; that under no circumstances must the special apparatus be given up; that even during the stage of a democratic interlude the use of forms of armed struggle to counteract the repressive actions against the mass movements or the revolutionary vanguard must be envisaged.
6. Having made clear their basic orientation and their overall perspectives, revolutionists will not hesitate to get involved in struggles for even the most modest immediate demands. What is important is to seize the potential dynamic of these struggles and to make it understood, through experience, to those who take part in them.
Revolutionists will, in particular, have to provide a stimulus to struggles for wage increases, for the rights of the workers in a plant (against layoffs and repression by the bosses), and for elementary demands, not only in the factories, but also in the poor neighborhoods.
Nevertheless, they will have to put the stress on transitional demands, so as to stimulate the anticapitalist dynamic of the struggles. In the context of a prerevolutionary crisis, such demands go beyond the stage of propaganda and become the object of political campaigns and agitation.
Two examples: the struggle against inflation and the struggle for the expropriation of the imperialist companies.
The fight against the erosion of buying power, which has been the catastrophic lot of the Argentine working class for years, must involve a struggle for a sliding scale of wages and periodic readjustments of salaries that are inadequate and slow to catch up. A battle for a sliding scale, which implies control over the selling prices and cost prices by the workers and the popular masses, would have an unquestionable political impact in the present situation.
As regards the struggle against the imperialist industrial groups, revolutionists will oppose any discrimination favoring European capitalists, and at the same time they will demand expropriation without compensation, under workers control.
7. Revolutionary militants will be involved in the battle to renew and restructure the unions by deepening the differentiations that have existed for years, but have thus far produced only partial and uncertain results. They will organize or stimulate antibureaucratic tendencies at
the rank-and-file level with a view toward building a class-struggle movement on a national scale. They will have to avoid any identification with opposition tendencies that themselves originate in the bureaucracy. In a perspective of complete independence from the government and any economic or political organization of the bourgeoisie, they will put forward platforms in which demands felt by broad layers of the masses are the point of departure. It would, nevertheless, be incorrect either to identify the platform of class-struggle tendencies with the strategic or tactical orientation of the revolutionary organization, or to fail to take advantage of all legal possibilities.
In a situation of prerevolutionary crisis such as now exists, it is in the interests of, and possible for, revolutionists to support or give an impetus to the creation of democratic rank-and-file bodies. These bodies arise out of the need of the most combative worker and popular layers to break up the routinist functioning of the traditional apparatuses and to give a more immediate and effective expression to their own aspirations and better impose their will. They are instruments par excellence of revolutionary mobilization and can grow over into embryos of alternative power.
On all levels of their militant intervention, revolutionists will express their position against the Cámpora government with the utmost clarity. They will be able to give critical support to measures striking at imperialist interests, but their overall attitude will be one of intransigent opposition to the new bourgeois government. They will explain that the goal of revolutionists is the setting up of a workers and popular government, that is, a government that expresses the interests of the working class and the other exploited layers and excludes any participation of representatives of the bourgeoisie and of the oligarchie layers.
8. The perspectives of the present stage must not cause the overall conceptions of revolutionary struggle put forward by revolutionists since 1968-69 to be forgotten. The power of the mass movement and the results achieved by the defeat of the military dictatorship justify no illusions whatever of the possibility that the proletariat might acquire power "democratically" and "peacefully" within the framework of a constitutional regime consolidated over the long term. But they also do not justify any adherence - whether explicit or implicit-to an insurrectionalist-spontanéist conception of the struggle for power. Beyond conjunctural vicissitudes, it is an established fact for revolutionists that although this struggle, in Argentina more than in almost any other country of Latin America, will reach its culminating point in the insurrectional mobilization of the urban masses, the armed confrontation will not be limited to this mobilization, but will have to pass through preliminary, multiple, and prolonged phases. At the same time, any illusion to the effect that a limited, or relatively limited, vanguard nucleus can become the revolutionary party and gain hegemony among the masses during the very course of an insurrectional movement itself must be avoided.
In the second place, it does not necessarily flow from the recognition of the depth of the country's structural crisis, the power of the mass upsurge, and the precariousness of the neo-Peronist solution, that the conquest 796
of power can be projected on a short-term basis. Indeed, the following must not be lost sight of: (I) The downfall of the bourgeois regime in Argentina would be a historic catastrophe for imperialism. Hence the justified hypothesis of an intervention —either directly by American imperialism, or indirectly through Brazil or other countries -implying in any case a substantial aid to gorilla tendencies prepared to run the risk of a civil war. (II) In spite of the maturation that has occurred during the last few years, the broad exploited masses have not yet broken free from the grip of bourgeois ideology and of a bourgeois political movement. (III) There exists no revolutionary party with a mass influence, capable, within a relatively short space of time, of leading the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the armed struggle that will be necessary for the overthrow of the system.
If this analysis is correct, the primary task of revolutionists is to gather the forces and win the influence over the decisive layers of the exploited masses that is indispensable for the suceess of their struggle. This goal will be attained through a systematic intervention in economic battles, a generalized political intervention, and principled revolutionary propaganda. It will be attained by organizing and undertaking armed struggle. The priority choice-just as in the case of the priority choice action and illegal action —is obviously linked to an analysis of a given period and a particular conjuncture.
9. A balance sheet of the armed struggle carried out during the past three years does not fall within the framework of this article. We will therefore limit ourselves to a few summary considerations.
In our opinion, the armed struggle initiatives taken between the end of 1970 and the first months of 1971 went in the direction of bringing about a convergence of armed actions and battles by important sectors of the proletariat, and therefore of a synchronization of armed struggle and the specific dynamic of the class struggle. Thus, certain episodes in which the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo - Revolutionary Army of the People] was the protagonist represented the highest stage of the armed struggle in Latin America since the Cuban revolution. Later, however, actions dictated by logistical necessities or aiming at freeing prisoners or punishing the dictatorship's torturers got the upper hand over actions linked to the battles and needs of the masses. In this sense, militarist deviations occurred, which in the final analysis prevented effective political and organizational capital from being gained from the prestige won through the spectacular initiatives and heroic sacrifice of numerous militants.
Nevertheless, the events of the past few weeks have shown that the armed struggle organizations are in no way isolated from the masses. They have been able to join in the big mobilizations, above all for the release of the political prisoners- something that they unquestionably contributed toward winning. In a more general sense, it cannot be denied that the decisive element in defeating the dictatorship was the mobilization of the masses since May 1969. But the battle of the guerrillas contributed to deepening the crisis of the regime, blocking the road to any plan to make a "Brazilian turn," and crushing the GAN operation. At the same time, it played a role as a factor in politically maturing the vanguards.
At the present stage, priority must go to political action among the masses, and any armed struggle initiative must be subordinated to this necessity. This does not involve-as we have already stressed — any perspective of disarming. But it means that the problem of the struggle against repression and against possible attempts at a military coup d'etat must be posed on the level of the masses. In other words, on the one hand, the specialized detachments of the vanguard will be ready to intervene, in liaison with the mass movements, to insure their defense; on the other hand, revolutionists will systematically provide a stimulus to organize workers selfdefense. On the other hand, they will avoid initiatives that, in practice, lead them to concentrate their efforts in a direction opposed to the priority flowing from the political analysis, that look like diversions to the masses, risk precipitating premature tests of strength in which the revolutionists would not enjoy the necessary support, and, in the last analysis, hinder the essential political battle to demystify Peronism.
10. A revolutionary orientation must shed the most complete light on the reformist or national-populist relitical confrontation.
any way to such operations.
gimes and tendencies in the different countries of Latin America. They must be rigorously analyzed and their class content brought out without any sign of concession or tactical hesitation, and without confusing possible support for specific anti-imperialist measures with overall support or with an acceptance of truces in po-
Argentine revolutionists will have to explicitly differentiate themselves from a series of positions taken by the Cuban leaders that are prejudicial to a consistent development of the struggle in Latin America. Solidarity with the Cuban workers state and a correct assessment of the historic thrust of the revolutionary action of its leaders must not lead to any soft-pedaling of criticism of attitudes like the exalting of the Velasco Alvarado regime in Peru, the unconditional support to the reformism of Allende in Chile, and the acceptance of concepts of the Soviet bureaucracy that the Cubans themselves criticized in the past. The Cuban government can legitimately develop political and diplomatic operations that it finds tactically useful, but there can be no question of subordinating the revolutionary struggle in Latin America in
Notes
2. The dramatic events that marked the entry of Cámpora into the Casa Rosada are indicative of the conditions in which Peronism is attempting once again to impose its hegemony. The most representative heads of the military dictatorship had to withdraw from the scene without being able in any way to mask their defeat. The mobilization of the masses and the initiatives taken by the armed organizations, having passed through the test of savage repression, forced the release of all the political prisoners. Allende and Dorticós were acclaimed by the crowds, while Rogers had to keep to the corridors. The edifice built up since Onganía took power in 1966 has completely collapsed.