[The following interview with the Peruvian revolutionist Hugo Blanco, currently living in exile in Chile, was obtained by Alejandro Tarquin. It was published in the April 15-30 issue of the Venezualan magazine Summa. Sections appearing in parentheses are observations by the interviewer.
[The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]
(The [March 1973] Chilean elections have one exceptional observer -- Hugo Blanco, the legendary Peruvian peasant leader, who is living in Santiago after being expelled from his own country, from Mexico, and from Argentina. We knew that he was here, and searched him out until we found the small flat where he lives.
(We spoke with him for several hours, both in his home and while walking through the streets of this capital. A virtual legend for the peasants of his homeland of Cuzco, Hugo Blanco bears no resemblance whatever to the political leaders we are used to in Venezuela. Neither pedantic nor imperious. Calm and resolute like his country's Indians. In the restaurant of the UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] building, several people approach us. They would like to talk with Hugo, learn about his experience, and perhaps hear the reasons why the Velasco Alvarado government will not let him reside in Peru.)
Question. Is it true that every Cuzco peasant keeps one bed ready in case "Brother" Hugo Blanco should need it?
Answer. Yes.
(The peasant struggles in Concepción made their mark on the history of Latin America during the first few years of the last decade. Still today Hugo Blanco remains the general secretary of the Federación de Campesinos de la Convención y Lares [Peasants Federation of La Convención and Lares]. Belaúnde intended to kill him with the Tacna trial, but spared his life thanks to a campaign of international solidarity.
(He spent eight years in Frontón Prison. Freed by General Velasco in 1970, he was forbidden to leave Lima. Months later the army expelled him from the country more or less secretly when he supported a teachers' strike. Then he was transferred from Mexico to Buenos Aires, where he was shut up in a jail for three months. And then from Argentina to Chile.)
Q. Will you be allowed to remain in Santiago very long?
A. For the moment they are letting me stay here for a few more months.
Q. The press in all Latin American countries has been devoting a great deal of attention to Velasco's illness these days. Rumors are going around. . .
A. There are too many unknown factors for us to be able to say anything definite about the matter. There was talk of an attempt on his life, but we don't believe it. Whatever the case, the illness of Velasco Alvarado can have important political consequences. The Peruvian right wing is interested in imposing Mercado Jarrin as head of the military junta. Would this happen if Velasco were not to go on governing? As soon as Mercado took over we would see an offensive by the bosses against the workers movement. And this is not a remote possibility, if you take into account the fact that there is no mass upsurge applying pressure in an opposite direction.
Q. Many leftist tendencies in Peru are offering their advice to the government -- the Communist party, [Ismael] Frías [a former Trotskyist], [Héctor] Béjar [former guerrilla leader], and others. The Venezuelan readers of Summa would be interested in knowing what the reasons are behind your opposition to the military junta.
A. It cannot be denied that the measures taken by the government have given the country a certain stability -- measures such as the nationalization of banking, national industry, improved trade with the Soviet Union, and the initial expropriations. The measures themselves deserve our support. But this is a capitalist regime, not a government of the workers. For this reason, the crisis facing Peru will not be overcome. And for this reason, we cannot support a government that does not belong to us. The Communist party does this, but we are already used to seeing the CP capitulate.
The government's economic plans were based on its nationalizations, a greater capitalization of the state sector of the economy, on giving an impetus to the industrial sector through credits and tax benefits, etc. All these plans met with serious setbacks: 1) In reality, strikes also were carried out in the state sector of the economy;
2) Difficulties increased with the refusal to refinance the foreign debt and under the impact of a suspension of credits; 3) In the countryside, production was not adequate, even though it surpassed that of the year before;
4) Climatic factors resulted in a decrease in the production of fish flour.
Last year we had some big struggles, with strikes in the mines and in the factories of the capital. This produced definite rifts between the various sectors of the bourgeoisie, which forced the government to grant concessions to the workers, but also to deal some repressive blows. As a result, the regime began to lose its prestige.
Q. But the right wing is opposed to the military junta.
A. Certainly. The czar was also opposed to Kerensky in 1917. The bourgeoisie is not a monolithic bloc. It suffers from internal contradictions.
It is easy to understand why the most reactionary groups refuse to go along with modernizing the country along capitalist lines, because this strikes at -- although it does not do away with -- their privileges. The most opposition on the right is coming from the APRA [Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana -- People's Revolutionary American Alliance], together with the importer-bourgeoisie. Through their press, they are calling for "institutionalization," that is, for elections. This political solution that they are seeking is reflected in the army and has the support of imperialism.
Q. Allow me to pursue my point a little further. Are you saying that you believe the industrial communities do not represent a progressive step by the regime that benefits the workers?
A. If we had to briefly define the industrial communities, we would say that they are an attempt to get a policy of capitalist development moving by stimulating workers control in the factories as a way of increasing production and preventing strikes.
Q. I believe we have strayed a bit from the initial topic of our conversation. We were talking about the Peruvian left. It would be good if you could say a little more about the situation in which it really finds itself. For, at first glance the Velasco government seems to control the situation in the country -- with the support, in fact, of this left itself.
A. The key to Peru's future lies with the workers movement. Its strength is decisive. Just a while ago, there was an attempt to force the workers to discuss their demands and sign contracts every two years instead of annually. The law was repudiated by strikes and mobilizations that forced the government to suspend the measure until 1975. Here you have an example of a government concession to the right wing that did not succeed thanks to the workers themselves.
The Communist party is the main force on the left. It controls the CGTP [Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú -- General Confederation of Peruvian Workers], the most important union. The other unions -- or, more accurately, union headquarters -- are the APRA-oriented CTP [Confederación de Trabajadores Peruanos -- Peruvian Workers Federation] and the CTRP [Central de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana -- Central Workers Union of the Peruvian Revolution], which was created by the government. But these last two unions have hardly any real strength within the workers movement. And we already said that the CP has unconditionally surrendered to the capitalist government. Just look at the 1971 teachers strike, which this party sabotaged. And that's not the only example.
The revolutionary left is in a state of crisis. The MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria -- Movement of the Revolutionary Left] and the pro-Peking tendencies have broken up into many different groups. The FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario -- Front of the Revolutionary Left], which is our organization, was hit very hard for having led the peasant mobilizations in Cuzco. We just began to get reorganized in 1968, and not without splits; in 1969 we suffered an especially serious one. These tendencies are in opposition to the government.
Q. What is the policy of your party, the FIR, at the moment?
A. I already pointed out that we are supporting the government's progressive measures, but not the government itself. We are calling on the workers to have no faith in it, but rather in their own forces. We are struggling, both inside the CGTP and outside it, against the high prices and unemployment. We are demanding that its leadership put forward a plan for struggle on a national scale. This anticapitalist and antibureaucratic struggle begins with each union conflict and tends to be waged among the ranks -- in view of the incompetence of the union leadership -- and to point in the direction of a government of the workers.
Q. All this does not have much to do with Guevarism. Yet you are known everywhere as a guerrilla and a Guevarist. Could you clarify this?
A. In contrast to the traditional, reformist parties, we uphold the international stance of the Cuban revolution as expressed in Guevarism. In this regard, we recognize Che as our teacher. Another of his tremendously positive sides is that he proposed armed struggle as the only way out for our peoples, thereby breaking with the pacifist molds of Stalinism. And we recognize the heroic efforts of the revolutionary vanguard that came together around this concept and that has shed its blood all across this continent.
Along with these merits, the biggest error of this current, we feel, is the fact that its activities are not linked to the concrete struggles of the masses. This is the reason that all the efforts of the Guevarists have ended in failure. The masses do not learn only through leaflets, manifestos, or heroic actions by a particular group. Basically (Hugo Blanco asked that we emphasize this word -- A. T.), they learn through their own experience, and it is through their concrete struggles that they will understand the need for socialism and will be prepared to lay down their lives for it as the only alternative to all social problems. We do not claim that this occurs spontaneously. What is necessary is a revolutionary party that is integrated into the mass movement and that from that vantage point orients the struggle around such a perspective.
In this sense we have differences with Guevarism, and for this, as well as other, reasons we belong to the Fourth International.
Q. If you were to return to your country tomorrow, what errors made in your previous work would you try to overcome?
A. Our main shortcoming was to have neglected the building of a revolutionary party. We let ourselves get carried away by the dynamics of the struggle itself. This was a syndicalist deviation. Now we are trying to rectify this error by applying the methodology I just described. But the FIR does not consider itself to be the sole proprietor of the revolution. There are many tendencies that, on the basis of their daily experiences, are coming to the same conclusions that we have. And a unified party is necessary for the Peruvian revolution.
Q. Do you believe that you will be returning to Peru soon?
A. The answer to this question lies with the Peruvian workers. I have reports that there is a repatriation committee there that is demanding and struggling not only for my return but also for that of other compañeros. Rolando Breña is also in exile, and suffers from tuberculosis. It appears that Compañero Napuri has been deported. It is a duty to demand the return of all these people to Peru.
(We took our leave of Hugo Blanco. As we were leaving, he observed that nationalism and anti-imperialism are on the rise in our subcontinent. "This is good, but don't forget that the liberation of the workers can only be the work of the workers themselves.")