[The following is a report on the discussions of the February 1973 French legislative elections that took place at the recent convention of the Ligue Communiste. It appeared in the December 16, 1972, issue of the Ligue's weekly, Rouge, from which it has been translated by Intercontinental Press.
[In France, elections occur in two "rounds." On the first, only candidates with an absolute majority are elected. On the second, held a week later, a plurality suffices.]
There were three positions at the convention regarding the Ligue's tactical approach to the 1973 elections: The "Bolshevik-Leninist Proletarianization" tendency advocated abstention on both the first and second rounds. A minority of the outgoing Central Committee proposed withdrawing on the second round in favor of only candidates of the CP. The majority was for voting for candidates of the Union of the Left on the second round.
Each of these positions stems from a different assessment of the present political conjuncture and of the Union of the Left.
Abstain on Both Rounds?
For the comrades of the "B-L-P Tendency " (Tendency 1), the post-May '68 period is characterized by a strain in the links between the working class and its traditional organizations. The brake the CP has put on struggles is causing the workers to increasingly distrust the political solutions advanced by that party.
"In these conditions," these comrades say, "the 1973 elections do not appear to the workers to be able to accomplish much. And this results in a relative lack of interest in the agreement between the SP and the CP, which seems all the less worthy of credibility in light of the fact that the workers remember how the left exploded in May '68." Consequently, this agreement and the scenario it has come up January 15, 1973
with for the elections are incapable of setting off any dynamics whatsoever. The wait-and-see attitude and the disarray that it arouses within the working class will be reflected in an increase in abstentions. By calling for abstention on both rounds, revolutionary Marxists will therefore be responding to the spontaneous sentiments of the workers' vanguard. Furthermore, the Ligue Communiste has better things to do today than to devote all its forces to the electoral arena. It will take part in the battle through the regular activity of its cells, without attempting to systematically put up candidates.
Not Just Any Election
Many spoke against this position at the convention. They felt that the members of the tendency were making a serious error in analysis. The election in winter 1973 is not, in fact, just any election. It will be the first legislative election since the general strike of May-June '68 and since General de Gaulle left office.
It is taking place in the context of a marked erosion of the government, of crisis within the majority's coalition, of a rise in the combativity of the workers, and of increasing discontent among the masses. The very signing of the joint program produces the appearance of a credible alternative solution. While a broad workers' vanguard tens of thousands strong is, indeed, skeptical about the strategy of the Union of the Left; while it doubts- correctly - that a victory of the Union of the Left will open up the road to socialism; and while, as a result, it is particularly receptive to the criticisms revolutionary Marxists make of the joint program, the fact nonetheless remains that the bulk of the class that has been brought up on electoral illusions will remain true to that perspective and that the workers' vanguard itself, whatever reservations it may have, sees in a victory of the Union of the Left the only concrete way of flushing the UDR
[Union pour la Défense de la République - Union for the Defense of the Republic] mafia out of power and thereby unclogging the situation.
For all these reasons, while it is true that the Union of the Left has not filled the workers with enthusiasm, it is absurd to maintain that it has met with "relative disinterest" on their part and that it has no credibility. To say that the '73 elections "do not appear to the workers to be able to accomplish much" is to completely misunderstand reality.
Stakes of the Greatest Importance
On the contrary, because of the political conjuncture in which they are occurring, the "73 elections involve stakes, and a battle, of the greatest importance. The favorable evolution in the relationship of class forces that has been characteristic of the post- May '68 period could now be reflected in the electoral arena in a sizable defeat of the majority and a victory for the left opposition. This change in the relationship of electoral forces in a country where the working class has been brought up on electoralism will in turn affect the evolution of the relationship of forces between the classes: A victory for the Union of the Left will be seen by the workers as a defeat for the bourgeoisie and a victory for the workers' movement. It will serve as a stimulus to workers' combativity, intensifying the contradiction today between combative workers and the reformist apparatuses, thereby increasing the opportunities for bypassing the latter. A victory (unlikely, but not out of the question either) of the Union of the Left would in time set off a major political crisis capable of leading to a generalized explosion of struggles and to a test of strength between the mass movement and the bourgeois state apparatus.
This is why what is at stake in these elections takes on exceptional importance for all those who take part in them. They are going to give rise to some very serious quarrels. They have already totally polarized French political life during the first few weeks of the year. Within the working class, the question that is posed is nothing less than that of a socialist society and the strategy for taking power. Revolutionary Marxists must equip themselves with every means possible for them to become active participants, with full rights, in this battle. Running candidates everywhere the Ligue is located will allow us to take advantage of all the platforms made available by bourgeois institutions (the regional radio and press, ete.) in order to gain a hearing from the workers.
Experience has shown that no serious political campaign is possible during an electoral period without directly participating in the competition. Not to run candidates would be to go unnoticed. Such are the rules of a game that we do not control. There are elections in which a relatively low profile is possible and justified (cf. the '71 municipal elections). But given the importance of the coming elections, we must make our presence felt this time in a big way.
Vote Only for the CP?
The resolution of Tendency 1 was rejected 262 to 12. But a new debate immediately developed within this antiabstentionist majority itself over what tactic to adopt on the second round.
Certain comrades, agreeing with the minority of the outgoing Central Committee, advocated refusing to vote for the candidates of the SP and the leftwing Radicals on the second round, and thus of withdrawing in favor of only the CP.
These comrades denounced the political orientation of the SP at length: With a worsening of the crisis of the regime in the offing, what it [the SP] is attempting to do is put together a standby political solution for the big bourgeoisie that incorporates the working class through its most representative organizations, particularly the CP and the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail - General Confederation of Labor]. The institutions of the Fifth Republic and the semipresidential character of the regime more than counterbalance the inferior ability of the SP to reach an audience and to organize. What F[rançois] Mit terrand has his eye on is the presidential elections of 1976, for which the '73 legislative elections are only a springboard. For the first secretary of the Socialist party, it is a question of installing himself in 1973 as the undisputed leader of a united left. Which implies not only establishing 20
himself as its most prominent figure, but also of creating a favorable relationship of forces with the CP within the Union of the Left, in the absence of which the bourgeoisie will never agree to go along with this solution. Following this, there will be plenty of time leading up to the presidential elections to make a big move toward the center-right in order to consolidate the relationship of forces and win the confidence of the ruling classes once and for all. As head of the SP, Mitterrand is thus attempting to bring together the voices of the working class for a bourgeois-technocratic standby solution of the Wilson-Brandt type.
Revolutionary Marxists must in no way give any approval to such an operation. The vote they call for must make it possible for the workers to register their mistrust of the Union of the Left, a bourgeois standby solution to which a genuine class vote ought to be counterposed. By calling for a withdrawal of candidates in favor of the CP alone, the Ligue Communiste is urging the workers to reject any compromise with the bourgeois parties. Through such a vote, Communist voters are telling their leadership: "Break with the left-wing Radicals and the Socialist party! Break with the bourgeoisie! Apply your program! Struggle for power on a class basis!" A withdrawal in favor of the Union of the Left as a whole, on the other hand, would mean giving approval to the Mitterrand operation, would deprive us of the political means for denouncing it, and would force us to call for a vote for bourgeois candidates like Defferre, Faure, and many others. In short, it would be opportunist and would reflect the pressure of the Union of the Left on the organization.
A General Reformist Alternative be convention was not convince v this line of argument. Manv whi spoke noted the imprecise and incoherent elements in it. First of all, it is not serious to characterize the Union of the Left by Mitterrand's plan alone. It is this plan that the minority comrades are denouncing.
But it is neither the only, nor the main, plan. What is today at stake in the Union of the Left is contradictory plans (those of the CP and the SP). They are confronting each other in a relationship of forces that is not clear. What François Mitterrand is hoping for is one thing; the political and social reality of post-May '68 France is another. The Union of the Left cannot be analyzed as though the SP and Mitterrand had established their hegemony over it once and for all when, in fact, by signing the joint program and by publicly repudiating the centrist alliance, they were forced to accept the CP's terms.
Journalistic considerations aside, the class nature of the Union of the Left must be analyzed. One cannot fail to see that the Union of the Left differs from classic front experiences (Popular Front, the Liberation) in that it does not represent an alliance of classes between the proletariat and a leading section of the big bourgeoisie under the leadership of the latter, but a general reformist alternative on the part of the traditional workers' movement. There is no party in the Union of the Left that really represents big capital, such as the Radical party in 1936 or the MRP [Mouvement Républicain Populaire - Popular Republican Movement] in 1945. The "left-wing Radicals" and the SP are relics and marginal groupings, not parties of the big bourgeoisie. It is the CP, a reformist workers'
party, that has hegemony within the Union of the Left today. The conditions that have been imposed upon it are those of the CP. It is this hegemony of the CP over the alliance as a whole that gives it its class nature, and not the presence of this or that bourgeois politician. 1
The ruling class in its entirety is making no mistake about this. No section of it today supports the Union of the Left. On the contrary, as it is constituted in 1973, the Union of the Left is leading to a class polarization: on one side, the working class (represented by its political and tradeunion organizations, the CGT, the FEN [Fédération de l'Education Nationale - National Education Federation], the CFDT [Confédération Fran- çaise et Démocratique du Travail- French Democratic Confederation of Labor], etc.), polarizing various pettybourgeois layers; on the other side, the various sections of the ruling class, also polarizing various layers of the middle and petty bourgeoisie. This is why the ruling class fears and fights the dynamics involved in the Union of the Left. The latter does not today constitute a "bourgeois standby solution," even though the bourgeoisie may find itself compelled to rally to it in case of a catastrophe, just as it resigned itself to having the CP in the government in 1945. Under these conditions, it is clear that it makes no sense to criticize the Union of the Left in the name of the "Workers' United Front"- that is, with slogans like "Comrades of the CP, apply your program! Break with the bourgeoisie! Break with the SP and the left-wing Radicals!" To do so would be to assume that the CP had betrayed its proletarian program by capitulating to the bourgeois program of the SP, when actually their programs are the same and the signing of such a joint program constitutes a radical break with the traditional policy of the Socialist party.
Position of the Majority
For the majority of the outgoing Central Committee, the Union of the Left thus represents a general reformist solution over which, whether we like it or not, the organized workers' movement as a whole has taken charge. The workers see it as the workers' alternative to the powers that be. As a result, their vote will have a class meaning. For these reasons, an electoral victory for the Union of the Left would, in the present political conjuncture, constitute an important element in deepening the political crisis of the regime and, at the same time, a powerful stimulus to the combativity of the masses. It is in the interest of the workers (as well as of revolutionary Marxists) for the majority coalition (viewed by the masses as belonging to the bourgeois camp) to meet with the biggest possible defeat and for the Union of the Left (viewed by the masses as the workers' camp) to meet with the greatest success.
This is why, on the first round, the Ligue Communiste must carry out an intense campaign of political de- January 15, 1973
nunciation and explanation (emphasizing in particular the reformist dead end of the Union of the Left and why, strengthened by this clarification campaign, it must call for a vote on a national scale2 for the Union of the
2. Which does not exclude the possibility of certain exceptions being made on the basis of proposals on a city level and a decision by the Central Committee.
Left on the second round. For the outcome of these elections will have a definite impact on the relationship of class forces and we are not at all indifferent about whether this relationship evolves to the advantage of the working class or of the bourgeoisie.
This position was finally adopted by 191 votes, with 71 for the Central Committee minority and 12 for the abstentionists.
Notes
1. The Lambertists notwithstanding, the rallying of the left-wing Radicals to the Union of the Left changes nothing in the class nature of the latter; the marginal character of these allies is shown by the fact that they did not even take part in discussions on the joint program that they had to sign!