Many of the discussions that have been developing in recent months in the revolutionary left and in the workers' movement in general are linked more or less directly to the analysis of the objective situation that took form about a year ago and assumed a definite physiognomy with the formation of the Andreotti government. A clear understanding of this phase is indispensable both to clarify the orientations for the immediate future thy to go and to outline a strategy for the longer run. This is what I will try to do as briefly as possible, utilizing, among other things, elements of the analysis formulated by the Fourth International and its Italian section on several occasions in past years.
The International Dimensions
Let us recall first of all the international context in which the new phase of political struggle in Italy is taking place. Over and above compromises or partial agreements between some of the major powers in the opposing camps, or certain defeats and halts of the revolutionary movement, the context remains one of multiplying and sharpening conflicts throughout the world, and one of periodic revolutionary explosions.
The example of the Indian subcontinent is particularly significant. As a result last year first of the brutal Pakistani repression of the Bengali popular masses and later of the Indo- Pakistan war, the national bourgeoisie regained not inconsiderable margins for maneuver, dealing a number of blows to the revolutionary movement. Despite this, in the space of a few months explosive tensions have reappeared and are reemerging almost daily, even while this is being written, both in Pakistan and in Bangladesh. New grave crises, thus, may arise even in the near future in a sector where, I repeat, the national bourgeoisie scored several points in the preceding period.
There is scarcely any need, on the other hand, to note again that the 1276
situation in the Arab East remains explosive notwithstanding the severe defeats the Palestinian revolutionary movement has suffered in the past two years. Regardless of the specific assessment of the action undertaken by the Black September group, the events in Munich have a symbolic significance that goes beyond the Near East.
In the phase of the historical crisis of imperialism, of the overall rise of the revolutionary forces, of an ever closer interconnection among the various theaters of a conflict that is tending to assume the features of a worldwide civil war, in a phase when it is relatively easy to come by deadly weapons of war, the technologically developed societies seem extremely vulnerable even to modest-sized revolutionary organizations. In periods of defeat, such groups can strike blows that, even without serving the aims of a coherent revolutionary strategy, can still provoke tensions, dismay, and confusion in countries remote from the immediate field of battle. To take the case of Western Europe in particular, there are two countries- Ireland and Spain-where explosive situations exist capable of precipitating open conflicts and revolutionary crises which could have incalculable repercussions for the entire continent.
These same great capitalist industrial powers are more than ever shaken by constant conflicts. The international economic machinery as a whole is shot through with burgeoning violent crises. Think of the crisis of the monetary system for which there is not a sign of even an attempt at solution. Think of the consequences of continued capital concentration and the constantly increasing competition among the giants of monopoly capital themselves. Think of the tendency toward an international synchronization of the economic cycle, which has already occurred to a certain extent in the last two years and which threatens to make any upturn more difficult after periodic recessions.
We will not go back over the new phase that opened up in capitalist Western Europe in 1968. Its most advanced manifestations were the French May and the Italian prerevolutionary crisis, but in various ways it embraced a whole series of countries. The 1968 events expressed the profound political and social crisis of so-called neocapitalism. This stage of capitalist development, which emerged following the post-World War II crisis, had given its advocates the illusion of unending economic progress and permanent stability. The point that needs to be stressed here is that the economic situation that took form in 1970-71 has had profound structural causes (alongside more or less normal conjunctural causes). In essence, we have been seeing the successive exhaustion of the principal stimuli that assured the prolonged boom in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Moreover, no new sectors have yet appeared capable of assuring a new phase of prolonged growth.
The capitalists have always had a tendency to shed tears about their problems, to lament about how small their profits were. This fits in with the argument about the necessity of holding down costs and subordinating everything to the demands of economic equilibrium that has been advanced ever since capitalism began when the workers' movement starts to organize and fight for a less inhuman standard of life. But this doesn't mean that "depressions are invented by the bosses" and that the cries of alarm from ministers and official economists are without foundation from a bourgeois point of view. The fact is that one of the basic factors in the crisis of Western capitalism is an actual falling rate of profit. This decline has assumed particular scope in countries like Italy and Great Britain.
The declining rate of profit, as Marx taught, is inherent in the capitalist system. But the problem is that in the present context the Western European -and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. and Japanese-capitalists cannot compensate so easily for this decline. Recessions and the difficulties of assuring strong subsequent upturns prevent them from increasing the overall volume of surplus value. At the same time, the political and social relationship of forces prevents them from increasing the rate of exploitation, which in the last analysis, according to the logic of the system, is the real solution.
All the struggles and disputes that have developed in this period in various West European countries turn precisely on the question of how to get out of this impasse, how to find a way to increase the rate of exploitation, how to co-opt the workers into a project of restabilizing the economy. All this ultimately depends on the relationship of forces. So far the bourgeoisie has not succeeded in reestablishing the pre-1968 relationship and in subjecting the working class to a restored discipline.
In a phase characterized in general by great structural crises such as opened up in 1968, there is inevitably a succession of ups and downs in the workers' struggles, and in anticapitalist mobilizations. France obviously could not long remain at the level of May 1968, and May was in fact followed by a revival of the government's strength and the retreat of petty-bourgeois strata. The crisis in Italy was exceptionally prolonged, lasting for about four years, but then in its turn the Italian bourgeoisie began to open up its counteroffensive.
However, the ebb in neither France nor in Italy has brought on a real restoration of bourgeois power, a restabilization that would more or less immediately have repercussions on the general situation in Western Europe. Neither France nor Italy has returned to the conditions prevailing before 1968. No new equilibrium has been restored that could assure a new phase of economic ascent and relative social stability. The present period continues to be marked by a high degree of conflict, by the instability of the political solutions being tried, by profound unrest among broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie, by a persistent militancy on the part of the working class, by the existence of substantial vanguards on the watch against the restorationist designs of the ruling classes and the capitulationist strategy of the reformist leaderships.
I should add immediately that we cannot assume that even a phase of this type will last indefinitely. The capitalism of Western Europe cannot accept conditions such as those it has had to put up with in recent years as "normal." The system cannot survive a constant decline in the rate November 20, 1972
of profit, a continual wearing down of profits. Decisive confrontations between the fundamental classes are inevitable sooner or later.
Let us leave aside the question of the tempo and rhythm of the development of these clashes, even though in itself it is an important one. The essential thing to understand is that the bourgeoisie cannot restore stable equilibria and assure a new broad economic revival without first inflicting a major defeat on the working class. In none of the large countries of capitalist Europe has such a victory been achieved by the ruling class and this does not seem possible in the immediate or near future. In certain countries, in fact, the workers' movement has not yet revealed its full potential, has not yet had its French May or its Italian-style vigorous and prolonged ascent. 1
An Interlude and the Possible Outcomes
The observation that the bourgeoisie has not succeeded in resolving the contradictions of Italian society may seem only too obvious. The fact is that it has not succeeded either in finding partial solutions to the most acute immediate problems. It is continuing to live from day to day and to get by with miserable palliatives, evasions, and stalling — by dipping into the reserves accumulated in the past, which are by now becoming dangerously depleted.
The problem of education, a timely one at the start of the new year, is a good example of this reality. There has not even been a start at solving the problems at the root of the crisis in this sphere, problems that helped to bring about the explosion of the military dictatorship, a which was born out of a portentous defeat of the workers and peasants' movement and succeeded in imposing a drastic reduction in the standard of living of the proletarian masses deprived of any instrument for defending themselves economically or politically.
student movement and progressively produced a situation of paralysis. The bourgeois press itself does not hesitate to recognize this explicitly.
But to come back to the economy for a moment, have any minimally effective measures been launched to overcome or mitigate the most crying distortions, to break out of the most suffocating bottlenecks, to establish the preconditions for a revival of some strength? The answer is implied. I need only mention the socalled chemicals plan. I need only point to the lack of substance of the various planning projects that are constantly coming to nothing and being revised without any practical effect.
The analysis stressing the chronic instability of the Italian situation, despite the insidious counterattack that has thrown the working class as a whole on the defensive, is based on these structural factors. The precarious position of the Andreotti government, the narrowness of his parliamentary majority, the endless internal disputes in the coalition parties - these are the most visible manifestations of this instability - are only the reflection of a more fundamental crisis that has by no means been surmounted. Let mẹ repeat: Despite the initiatives it has taken on the political level and its efforts to reconsolidate its own ranks, the bourgeoisie has not overcome its own crisis of leadership. The bourgeois groups themselves remain profoundly divided even on the economic solutions to be adopted for starting up a new cycle. The episode of the clash between the major chemical combines is symptomatic in this regard.
Another factor of instability is represented by the fluidity and divisions of the petty bourgeoisie. A part of this social stratum has undoubtedly evolved toward the right, furnishing recruits for the electoral battalions of the so-called National Right, or supporting in the May 7 elections the Christian Democrats, who presented a conservative scowl this time instead of the old reformist smile. Another section of the petty bourgeoisie is wavering; it hesitates to take a definite line and is prone to abrupt shifts in various directions. Other sectors, tinally, have not backed away from the radicalization they experienced in the crucial years of the ascent. A partial but significant example of this tendency is the recent mobilization of thousands of teachers, who in some cases conducted militant demonstrations. This mobilization was rooted, essentially, in the persistent structural crisis of education, but it was helped along and stimulated by contingents of young teachers who proved themselves first in the student movement of 1968-69.
The conclusion that flows from our analysis is that while the prerevolutionary crisis of 1969-70 has been surmounted, while the great upsurge has exhausted its full potential and the working class as a whole has been forced onto the defensive, we are still a long way from a real conservative restoration and even from a solution to the political and social instability. In other words, the present phase must be defined as an interlude-whose duration it would be futile to try to predict with any exactness - an interlude between the great struggles of 1968-71 and a decisive class confrontation that can either take the form of a new impetuous upsurge or culminate in a far-reaching defeat for the proletariat.
Which one of these two variants will win out is by no means predetermined. The game is still open. And in the situation of instability and conflict that persists the workers have objectively an opportunity to win successes and to undertake counterattacks. At the same time, the vanguard has an opportunity to play a role in the interest of the movement as a whole and to make gains in strengthening its own positions and extending its own influence in the advanced sectors . of the class.
We reject, therefore, two divergent but equally erroneous interpretations of the present situation. The first incorrect view is put forward by those who deny or try to minimize the changes that have been appearing for more than a year and in particular in the last six months, thereby justifying a blind forward acceleration and adventuristic actions. The second error is made by those who think that we are already in a phase of restabilization destined to last for many years and who thus suggest a strategy of withdrawing and cutting back.
The Dangers of the Present Situation
Since we have made our basic evaluation clear, we can point out all the negative sides and the pitfalls of the present situation without fear of being misunderstood.
In the first place, the decisive groups in the ruling class have made a clear choice, on which they have already achieved wide agreement. The centerleft policy has been definitely abandoned, still more clearly as regards the content than the possible governmental formulas. This is the fundamental meaning of the two Andreotti governments, the first before and the second after the special elections. The Socialists have been kicked out the front door and they can get back in through the back door-or the servants' entrance-only on the condition that they accept the humiliation of renouncing the reformist projects of the early 1960s and agree to live in sin with the liberals. It is evident that such a turn involves a new governmental lineup, with all the implications this can have for the various camps.
In the second place, given the relationship of forces in the country and their reflection in the parliament, this new coalition has only limited independence. This means that if the Andreotti government or any similar government that might be formed wants to survive, it will have to reach de facto compromises with the National Right. According to normal legislative practice -which is an important factor in a system of parliamentary democracy - such deals are absolutely necessary unless a government resigns itself to being periodically outvoted or paralyzed to a large extent in the committees.
As everyone realizes, these are not so much predictions about the future as descriptions of what has already happened (and on the important occasion, moreover, of electing the president of the republic). The result will be a constant and strong drift to the right by the ruling coalition, a concrete tribute paid to the National Right, consisting in the first instance of toleration for goon squad attacks and other provocative actions. That substantial sectors of the state apparatus will try to take advantage of this opening to carry out more naked repression is in the logic of things.
The economic trends of this phase, especially the continuation and heightening of the inflationary process, moreover, can favor a conservative evolution on the part of broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie. It is the workers who pay the heavy price of a recession and an inflationary spiral, and an upturn after a recession is inevitably achieved at their expense. However, strata of the petty bourgeoisie can also be hit. In fact, because of their lower level of organization and their fragmentation, they often are in danger of suffering the consequences of recession and inflation before the working class (or better organized and more militant strata of the working class).
To take, for example, the waves of price rises and the crisis in distribution, we can predict as a likely variant that before even a precarious new equilibrium is found, there will be a new advance in the process of concentration in this sphere, with a concomitant reduction in the ranks of the small shopkeepers. Even today the small retail merchants feel caught in a vise, having on the one hand to face the greed of the wholesalers and on the other the reaction of the consumers, who respond by taking out their anger on the ones they have daily contact with and by reducing the volume of their purchases. Such sectors of the petty bourgeoisie-as well as others who feel that they are paying the price for the long-drawnout conflicts between the fundamental classes and who sometimes really are harmed by the prolonged instabilitycan become ripe for fascist and semifascist demagogy and constitute a mass base for reactionary operations.
The mobilizations of recent months, the high level of participation in strikes in the first phases of the battles over new union contracts, the militancy of broad strata, and the ferment of criticism present in many major factories have so far given positive indications of the mood and combat-readiness of the working class. It would be wrong, however, to fail to appreciate the negative consequences of the fact that all this is taking place in a context that has undergone the changes we have pointed to. Concretely, this means that there is a real danger of the more advanced strata of the working class finding themselves relatively isolated, and that the working class as a whole will not be able to count on the mobilizations of other forces converging with its struggles and thus will not be able to rely on the potential solidarity and sympathy of broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie.
The turn imposed by the big bourgeoisie and the new climate it is trying to establish have already begun to put pressure on the intermediate social strata, which in turn are putting pressure on strata of the working population and the proletariat itself. One manifestation — or reflection - of this tendency has been first the capitulationist retreat of the ACLI [Associazione Cristiana dei Lavoratori Italiani - Italian Christian Workers Association] and second the crisis that has seized the CISL [Confederazione Italiana
Sindicati Liberi - Italian Confederation of Free Trade Unions]. And this tendency can spread out like an oil spot to other sections of the trade-union movement and left parties (for example, parts of the Socialist party).
situation can become more se-
The rious, if unemployment assumes more substantial scope than it has so far. The presence of a massive reserve army of labor would come to weigh negatively on the workers' capacity for mobilization. The workers could be thrown on the defensive and find their striking force gravely reduced. Even a partial demobilization of the mass movement would obviously be an extremely favorable factor for the conservative offensive and the desperation of the unemployed masses could even open a breach for rightist demagogy in the ranks of the proletariat itself.
The Fight to Be Waged in the Months Ahead
We repeat what we have said before: Despite the changes for the worse that have occurred, nothing is decided; the working class has still to fight the decisive battles-and it can win them. It is vital that revolutionists play their role in these struggles.
We should say right away that the dangers inherent in the present situation must not lead us into making any concessions to the strategy of the reformists or keeping quiet about the responsibility they bear. We say this because there have already been by no means insignificant signs of op- November 20, 1972
portunistic retreat, if not capitulation (although touted as "realistic choices") in the face of reformism. The simple truth is that the traditional trade-union and political organizations, which to a large extent retain a dominant influence among the masses, have failed to exploit the potential of the prerevolutionary crisis and the great upsurge, into which they were dragged against their will and in contradiction with their previous political plans. The truth is that it is precisely the basic inconsistency of the traditional leaderships that enabled the Christian Democrats to regroup their forces, to reconsolidate, and resume the attack, and which allowed the extreme right to find an opening and to develop an aggressiveness that is unprecedented in the postwar period. Precisely because of the strength they continue to hold-and which they boast of at every opportunity — the reformists bear heavier blame than ever.
Even if we granted (which we do not) that they could change their spots, there are no signs of the reformists repenting. Their analysis itself is flawed at the root. They cannot fail to see the negative trends and dangers which ultimately threaten them too. But instead of viewing the Italian situation as the result of fundamental tendencies that operate in society in a given context-because of the iron logic of class and under the stimulus of the irrepressible demands of the system - they deplore, to repeat Berlinguer's words, "the break among the three great Italian popular currents and their rejection of dialogue" (l'Unità, October 2).
Instead of waging a systematic campaign to explain to the masses the crucial importance of the union bargaining battles for the overall political trend, the reformists lament that these struggles do not have an "active character" and regard them as the prerogative of the workers' representatives, the leaders of the union federations. On the other hand, the Communist party has continued to lead imposing demonstrations during the electoral campaign and for the celebration of the anniversary of l'Unità. It should explain, however, why the enormous energies devoted to these demonstrations have not also-and above all-been exerted on the occasion of general strikes and the most important workers' demonstrations or in campaigns with a specific political purpose, such as the one for the release of Valpreda.
To us, the reason for this seems clear. The PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano - Italian Communist party] wants to demonstrate its mass influence, which is unquestionably a significant means of pressure- or of discouraging any fascist or neofascist attempts at a Latin American style coup. But it is carefully avoiding mobilizations that would pose a real test of strength between the fundamental classes. Thus, despite its strength, it remains more than ever in a vicious circle, because that is what you get into when you center your struggle on winning reforms in a period in which there is less objective room and less subjective readiness than ever for reformist operations of some minimal scope that would enable the party to take a place in the political circles running the country.
The orientation of revolutionists in this phase must center around participating actively in the contract-renewal struggles that are going on at this writing. They do not represent a "normal" episode in trade-union life, but a new confrontation between the classes whose outcome cannot fail to have profound repercussions on the relationship of forces and all subsequent developments. What the bourgeoisie is after is to force the workers to pay the cost of reviving the economy, to restore "authority" in the plants, and more generally to get the process under way of creating a new political leadership and consolidating the conservative turn.
The interest of the working class is first of all to repel the offensive against the level of employment, to prevent rising prices from bringing about a drop in real wages, to win better wages and conditions, and to put up a determined fight against any attempt at restoring the old relations in the shops. The stakes are thus extremely high, and the confrontation has a clear political portent. Hence the necessity that the working class bring all its strength to bear in converging battles and mobilizations and not expose itself to the risk of fragmentation, inconclusive actions, and scattered struggles.2
If this is our evaluation of the meaning of the battle in progress, it follows that in the months ahead we must strive to bring about a convergence between the struggles of other sectors of the working population and the student movement with those of the major categories of industrial workers. This objective must be pursued by two methods: by promoting mobilizations for specific objectives right now that would, however, have the effect of tying down the enemyincluding the repressive forces— on a vast general front; and by stimulating demonstrations, such as big rallies and marches, of active solidarity on the occasion of large or general strikes. Thousands and tens of thousands of students marching in the streets side by side with workers from the foundries, chemical plants, and building sites would have a clear political importance and constitute a pos- Inca, Importance ana constitute a positive factor for reviving the student movement as such.
The importance of the student struggle must be stressed also in view of its importance for the fight against the new outbreak of fascism, the threat of gangs of extreme-rightist goons and provocateurs, whose have actions multiplied in recent months. It is, in fact, possible that, following up on Almirante's arrogant pronouncements about the fascists' determination to impose order in the schools, the National Right will launch its first se rious offensive in this area, well aware that if it launched a frontal attack on the factories it would risk getting a rather severe lesson. It is essential to deflate the fascist threat, to see that any attacks are decisively repelled, that the attempts of the goon squads to impose a climate of intimidation are crushed in embryo.
Unity in action among the various components of the student movement, including those that identify with the traditional organizations, is a vital necessity that only blind sectarianism or a self-destructive urge could lead us to reject or ignore. At this moment, the policy of the united front of all organizations and groups in the workers' movement remains more valid than ever as a political guideworkers, see the pamphlet Contratti; una Battaglia politica della classe operaia. (Available from Quarta Internazionale, c/o Silvio Paolicchi, viale Bligny 50, Milan, Italy. Price 100 lire, about U. S.$.20. ) 1280
line. The revolutionary left must help to achieve this, beginning by trying to achieve unity of action within its own ranks, since, among other things, this is a precondition for offering itsell as a credible component of a more general united front.
The battle in and around the schools takes on an importance also inasmuch as it is an episode in the struggle for winning sway over the petty bourgeoisie. In fact the student movementalthough not as such petty bourgeois - has been one of the driving forces behind the radicalization of broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. If it were to retreat in the face of fascist violence, this would have extremely negative effects on these same strata, with all the dangers we have already pointed out. Thus, this battle must not be lost.
It they are able to follow these orientations, the revolutionists will be able at once to help in achieving victories of the working class as a whole, to establish much more substantial links with the masses than they have now or have had in past years, and to win over to their strategy and methods the vanguard workers, the natural leaders of the class, who are conscious of the dangers in the present situation and of the fundamental sterility of the policy of the reformist organizations.
Notes
1. While taking into account the obvious differences, the example of Brazil seems an instructive one. In alliance with the imperialists, the Brazilian national bourgeoisie has been able to restore a certain political equilibrium (the dictatorship has lasted now for more than eight years and to achieve an impressive economic revival. But the precondition for this was establishing
2. For the platform of the revolutionary Marxists, centered on an all-inclusive sliding scale of wages under the control of the