1. For four years Italy has experienced a very deep social and political crisis which, during 1969 and early 1970, precipitated a prerevolutionary situation. In the final analysis, this crisis resulted from a new eruption of the fundamental contradictions of capitalist society. Its specific form and its prolongation stem from the nearly complete failure of the program of reformist rationalization that was the cornerstone of the center-left, the most advanced political expression of the "neocapitalist tendencies that asserted themselves during the latter part of the 1950s.
In other words, even at the height of the boom, the regime proved itself incapable both of eliminating reactionary vestiges that arose from the very formation of the national state, and of resolving the problems raised by the postwar transformations- urbanization, education, administration of justice, functioning of the administrative apparatus, disintegration of the traditional family, etc.
More exactly, on the economic level, the contradiction between the requirements of an economy with increasingly rigid interconnections, which therefore demands greater and greater harmonization, and a growing chaos that engenders further dislocations reached explosive proportions.
On the political level, the erosion of the parliamentary institutions, their humbug role, their divorce from the needs of large masses, their inefficacy even from a technical viewpoint became more and more clear and evident.
On the sociocultural level, the contradiction between the rise in the mean level of education (and the consequent accentuated demands for active participation and "self-management") and the reality of growing authoritarianism and manipulation became sharper.
The program of integrating the working class into the so-called consumer soa particular failure owing to ciety was capitalism's inability either to satisfy ef fectively those needs (especially social) that stimulated the economic growth itself, or to respond to the most elementary necessities of wide layers of the proletariat, always condemned to extremely hard conditions of life.
Consciousness of the exploitative nature of the system, far from declining, was powerfully stimulated by the dramatic intensification of physical and psychological stresses resulting from new techniques and the new forms of organizing work in the factories.
There is no need here to stress the new element represented by the student movement, which played a role beyond comparison with that played by the student nuclei in the past. In Italy also, this movement was the product both of intervening changes in technology-and in the organization of production -and
• of the eruption of "marginal" contradictions. In this way, the movement played a detonator role, simultaneously expressing the disintegration of bourgeois ideology and stimulating ideological debate within the working class, where the students appear as a supporting force. Finally, the crisis and radicalization of significant sectors of the petty bourgeoisie has been expressed via the student movement.
This crisis of the petty bourgeoisie deserves to be stressed; in fact, it is an important element in the more general social crisis. On the one hand the traditional petty bourgeoisie has undergone a process of disintegration and has been partially declassed. On the other, that part of the petty bourgeoisie most closely tied to production, or most active in services and administration, was impelled to take advantage of the situation in the country and put forth its own demands through strong mobilizations and even by very tough methods.
With the collapse of traditional values, intellectual layers have also radicalized, reflecting the turbulent aspirations, vacillations, and disarray of the middle classes, and serving in the final analysis as a sounding board for the ideology of the "leftist" groups. The crisis of wide circles of Catholics also expresses the turmoil in the petty bourgeoisie much more than the changes in substance among the working-class layers.
2. The upsurge, marked by a very large mobilization of all layers of the working class, as well as wide layers of the petty bourgeoisie, reached its peak during the second half of 1969, when imposing struggles of basic sectors of the working class impelled, among other things, the birth of councils of delegates, organs of workers' democracy in the best revolutionary tradition, and forced the trade unions to reckon with constant pressure from below and to accept into their structures the massive entry of cadres from the new generation.
The gains of these struggles should in no way be minimized. But precisely the depth and power of the movement demanded its passing into the general political arena. Failing this, partial struggles risked becoming quickly emptied of all real content. In the absence of an effective revolutionary pole of attraction, it was easy for the bureaucrats to fill that vacuum with their own reformist program.
They were able to view this program as realizable to the degree that the ruling class was not in principle opposed to granting reforms. The provincial, regional, and national strikes of 1970 and early 1971 were seen as instruments in this strategy of putting pressure on the ruling class. But the contradiction lay in the very act of proposing a reformist perspective during a prerevolutionary situation in which the real issue was the struggle for power.
Furthermore, the center-left, which did not carry out the reforms as preventive measures, became increasingly paralyzed and divided and proved itself incapable of acting with the slightest effectiveness even after the outbreak of the crisis. Apart from a few minor concessions, the reform policy remained a scrap of paper.
Under these conditions, the movement could not help but flatten out and lose its force as a generalized movement. Nevertheless, conflicts kept on, often in explosive forms. Despite their fragmentation, the students were periodically pushed into new mobilizations; the working class was conscious of its power and, thanks to the relationship of forces in the factories, would not stand for being robbed, directly or indirectly, of its 1969 conquests and often opened new offensives, especially in the area of organization of work in the plants.
The economic crisis, with its threat of massive unemployment, likewise has not yet broken the workers' combativity, which continues to counteract the employers' maneuvers and all their efforts at reestablishing "order" in the factories. Thus, four years after the onslaught of the system is still far the great wave, from having achieved a stabilization, and social and political forces are moving toward new major confrontations.
3. For the bourgeoisie, the most pressing problem is to overcome its crisis of leadership. The center-left has been paralyzed for a long time, and the coming elections represent an attempt to establish a new equilibrium and to arrive at a new governmental formula.
Through the election of a new president of the republic (in which fascist votes played a part) and through a series of political moves toward creating a oneparty government, a majority has taken shape that aims at imposing a center or center-right formula that excludes the Socialists (providing the latter do not capitulate completely, which in the present context seems unlikely).
The direction of such an operation is executive restad toward stiffening the repression, reinforcing the executive, and abandoning all reformist cover. The grave economic difficulties - in the framework of the international crisis-increasingly press in this direction to the degree that the bourgeoisie needs to reestablish order in the factories so as to increase the rate of exploitation and be in position to draw up its medium-term plans.
The big propaganda campaign of the Christian Democratic majority, the liberals, the Social Democrats, and the re publicans is aimed precisely at assuring a new relationship of forces on the parliamentary level. The attacks on the "opposite extremes" have the same goal. Those who push this line hope to drive the frightened petty bourgeoisie into the center-democratic fold.
The decisive bourgeois sectors still re 650
ject the perspective of a fascist or fascistlike regime or a military coup d'etat. Nevertheless, during the past year the fascists' activities have attained considerable dimensions, a more systematic character, and unprecedented aggressiveness. Undoubtedly the fascists enjoy the support of certain groups of capitalists and landholders, and function to a considerable extent with the complicity of the state apparatus.
In some cases (Reggio Calabria, l'Aquila) the fascists have even succeeded in turning the wave of popular discontent to their own advantage. Their game may be to find a more propitious political field in the immediate future, waiting for the accentuation of the rightist radicalization of the petty- and middle-bourgeois layers and for a further economic deterioration, resulting in a large increase in unemployment.
The existence of a fascist or fascist-like force involves the danger of unleashing centrifugal, adventuristic, rightist tendencies. Such tendencies, especially if the May 7 elections result in an impasse, may increase tensions and move toward a coup d'etat attempt. In the present context, which will not change radically in the short run, such an attempt could precipitate civil war. This is not, I repeat, the most likely variant, but it should not be completely excluded.
At bottom, the bureaucrats want more than ever to present the PCI as a constitutional force, defending parliamentary democracy, fighting disorder, and aspiring to play a role on the governmental level itself. Thus, at a time when growing layers criticize the regime that emerged at the end of the second world war, the PCI appears as a consistent partisan of the status quo; and when a majority of the bourgeoisie wants to stop collaborating even with the Socialists, the PCI proposes its candidacy as a partner in a parliamentary and governmental alliance of Communists, Socialists, and Catholics. (Concretely, this means collaboration with the bourgeoisie, or with certain decisive sectors of it.) Once again the PCI, which decades ago ceased to be a revolutionary party, is unable to put its projected reformist program into practice.
The trade unions in turn face grave difficulties. At the end of 1969 they tried to relieve the political parties by taking over responsibility for launching the battle for reforms. They counted on their ability to mobilize masses that no party-not even the PCI-could reach. But the intrinsic contradictions of the reformist project turned against them, too. Nothing substantial was accomplished, and the economic crisis even threw them onto the defensive.
One of the consequences of the failure of the fight for reforms- and of the various pressures flowing from the confrontation of political forces-is that trade union solidarity is losing ground, and the possibility of organizational union on the confederation level appears increasingly remote.
Despite all this, the reformist organizations retain their influence on the vast majority of the masses and are not likely to suffer a serious setback in the coming elections. If faced with a direct fascist threat, they might energetically react in self-defense. But fundamentally, they have no real perspective. They mark time; they appear as an essentially static element. This is a factor in the situation whose implications should not be minimized.
5. The 1968-71 wave of struggles gave rise to numerous groups and organizations that laid claim to being of the revolutionary left. The power of this left is shown by its leading role in the student struggles, by its real, even if largely minority, presence in the workers' struggles -especially in 1969 and 1970—by its ability to organize very large mass demonstrations, by the extent its literature has circulated, and by the influence of its ideology. All this implies an important change in the relationship of forces with the bureaucrats.
Nevertheless, up to now the far left has been unable to exploit the objective possibilities, to stabilize fully even the forces it commands, and a fortiori to present itself as a real alternative. This is because of the preponderance of sectarian, spontaneist, and adventurist tendencies, which often mix themselves into a single organization, and at times put downright centrist ideas on a par with the others.
On the whole, Maoism retains a generally very considerable influence, even though it was affected by the international events of 1971. Spontaneism now finds few avowed adherents, but it has left its mark both on the student movement (especially in the high schools) and on groups with vacillating and sometimes contradictory orientations.
Thus, while the groups officially claiming adherence to orthodox Maoism have a very limited audience, and the spontaneist movements have lost their steam, the most well known groups represent a combination of disparate orientations, ideas, and methods.
In the case of Lotta Continua- whose influence remains very great-this is reflected in a rather deep internal differentiation, an adventurist current strongly tainted with spontaneism opposing a more "moderate" current with populist tendencies.
Potere Operaio for its part, while still linking itself to Maoism on the international level, has opted for an adventurist course based on a false analysis of the situation and inspired by ideas analogous to those of the U.S. Weathermen. (The influence of Potere Operaio is much more limited than that of Lotta Continua.)
Avanguardia Operaia up to now has not had a real national base: (It is absent, for example, in a city like Turin.) But its strength in Milan, the epicenter of political struggle in Italy today, assures it a role that should not be underestimated. What is involved, at bottom, is an eclectic formation that has tried to combine Maoism with vestiges of Trotskyist theory and practice and with some tendencies belonging to the ultraleft tradition (characterization of the USSR, attitude toward the trade unions, electoral abstentionism, etc.).
Finally, in Il Manifesto — which in terms of ideological and general influence is now the strongest formation, having such an instrument as a daily paper with a circulation of 30,000 to 40,000 — we have a typical centrist organization, with all that this implies in a situation where substantial forces have escaped from the control of the traditional bureaucracies, and ultraleftist tendencies of all kinds continually arise. Thus for a whole period, the leading nucleus wanted to establish close collaboration with the ultraleft groups and the spontaneist tendencies, while at the same time linking itself to Maoism on the international level. Now its efforts lean toward reinforcing its own organization, which it hopes will soon win hegemony in the revolutionary left-all the while maintaining eclectic conceptions and orientations. The May 7 elections will give some indications of such an endeavor's chances of success.
6. The active intervention of Trotskyism as an organized political force in the Italian situation was very seriously hampered by the extremely grave crisis the organization suffered in the second half of 1968 and the beginning of 1969. During crucial months the organization was paralyzed, and later it was enormously restricted, not only in relation to the big mass movements, but also within the vanguard.
At the beginning of 1969 the Italian Trotskyists had to confront the twofold task of projecting a new strategy for building the revolutionary party and at the same time reconstructing their own organization.
It was necessary to start from the new facts of the situation. That meant, above all, understanding that the bureaucrats of the traditional parties and trade unions retained their grip on the majority of the working class, a fact that many leftists disputed. But, (1) the ties between the masses and the bureaucrats had deteriorated considerably and serious conflicts were not out of the question; and (2) sizeable forces, including proletarian elements, were working outside the apparatus in opposition to reformist notions.
From this it was necessary to conclude that any continuation of entryism would be a catastrophic error, that it was necessary to follow a completely indepenz61 g dent orientation, that it was necessary to intervene directly on the level of social forces (the student movement, the most militant layers of workers, etc.). Obviously, we could entertain no illusions of playing a leading role in the short term on this level. But we had to understand that this "mass" activity, no matter how modest and inevitably sector-oriented, was a prerequisite for building links with vanguard workers' nuclei and militants, as well as for training the movement's cadres to the tasks of the new stage.
The second point of the Italian section's analysis was that there would be a stage during which the revolutionary left would extend its influence, but without radically altering the relationship of forces in its tavor. At the same time, the multiplicity of far-left organizations and groups, with the constant variation in their influence and respective roles, would continue to be a characteristic trait of the period (our own weakness being one of the factors preventing a relatively rapid sorting-out process).
The lines of orientation for the Italian Trotskyists in the present period were drawn from these premises and analyses sketched out in this document:
A: It is necessary to intervene directly in the social struggles, and to give priority to intervention in the working class.
"This priority," said the resolution of the latest (November 1971) conference of the GCR (Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari- Revolutionary Communist Groups), "flows from the political context of the period, the rise of a new vanguard in this area also, the understanding that precisely in this area the decisive battles for hegemony within the vanguard and against the grip of the bureaucracy will be fought, the consciousness that even modest gains made in such activity will assure the organization of a great attractive power even in the student movement. This choice of priorities presupposes a minimum accumulation of cadres who, most often, are more easily recruited from the student milieu."
B. It is necessary never to forget or blur over the problem of relating to the masses still in the grip of the traditional organizations. Independent mobilizations of the revolutionary left can accelerate the ripening of criticism among those workers. tied to the PCI and the tradeunion apparatus-but only if these mobilizations avoid any trace of simple "leftism" and sectarianism and appear as the initiatives of responsible forces.
A united front policy - both in economic struggles and in mobilizations against re pression and the fascist threat- represents one axis of such an orientation. For even more compelling reasons, it is imperative to fight any tendency to deny the role of the trade unions or to project so-called red mini-unions, and to work for the perspective of building a revolutionary tendency within the unions.
C. It is necessary constantly to foster theoretical and political clarification within the revolutionary left. The fight against all Maoist, spontaneist, and centrist deviations is a primary task for revolutionary Marxists. But this does not exclude, on the contrary, seeking a convergence or unity in action whenever the objective possibility exists.
The experience of the last years shows that whenever such unity is established, the revolutionary left is able to call forth and lead impressive mobilizations that act as a real and immediate factor in the country's political situation and exert an attractive power even on wide layers of members of the traditional organizations. In the final analysis, such united actions help to partially overcome the fragmentation of the far left, which has been such a serious handicap for it. At the same time, these united actions submit the different organizations to a practical test, explode internal contradictions, and facilitate the political ripening of the new generation of militants.
The 1971 conference document made the following points:
I. So far as the struggles of the workers are concerned, the stress must be put on demands most capable of countering the employers' plans for "restoration" in the factories, of creating conditions for large-scale struggle, and of stimulating really political mobilizations.
This involves a campaign taking as its axis transitional slogans linked to the fundamental tenets of Leninism and Trotskyism and formulated according to the specific requirements of the period. (The Italian section has made a special effort at elaborating the needs in this area.) While fighting antiunion deviations, revolutionary Marxists must fight for the creation, or the revitalization, of the proletarian democratic organs that grew out of the 1969 struggles, particularly the delegates' councils.
II. So far as the student movement is concerned, the basic concept remains that the student movement is a mass political movement with its own dynamic and its own aims (obviously within the framework of the total anticapitalist struggle, on the axis of workers' struggles). The Trotskyist intervention must continue to be developed on two levels:
a. Participation, on the basis of the methodology of the transitional program, in the large mobilizations that periodically occur.
b. Political presence as a Trotskyist organization (nuclei of members and sympathizers) that at each moment appears with its whole program and its own image.
III. So far as action inside the far left is concerned, the struggle for hegemony within the vanguard, which, as I have already underscored, does not exclude joint action with groups in complete opposition to our ideas, likewise does not exclude collaboration on a wider basis with organizations with which some affinities can be noted.
This is the case with Il Manifesto on the one hand, and Avanguardia Operaia on the other.
Up to now the practical application of such orientations has run into major dif ficulties. The first difficulty lies in the fact that the struggle for hegemony in the vanguard and the struggle to ignite the contradictions within the bureaucratic organizations coincide only in a general, long-term sense.
The second difficulty stems from the extreme sectarianism current in the far left. On the one hand this makes it hard to apply effectively the united-front line, and on the other hand often prevents a coming together even of groups having points in common with revolutionary Marxism. (For example, Il Manifesto and Avanguardia Operaia frequently take off in different directions and conduct virulent polemics against each other.)
The third difficulty is linked to the nature of the student milieu, which still represents by far the principal component of the far left. This milieu is a hotbed of more or less camouflaged spontaneism, adventurism, and extreme sectarianism.
All these obstacles are particularly serious because the Italian section, despite its recuperation, remains very weak; its influence is far more limited than that of the other formations of the revolutionary lett like Il Manifesto, Lotta Continua, and, to a lesser extent, Avanguardia Operaia.
stage is above all to panization act lis
The line of our organization in this in the political campaign around the May 7 elections, which represent a confrontation with potentially big consequences.
For the GCR, the optimal situation would have been a united campaign of the revolutionary left on the basis of the platform outlined in the Central Committee statement of March 19. Since this variant was rejected (owing to extreme sectarianism and political myopia) the GCR consider it to be their duty, and also to be in their interest, to support the Manifesto campaign. Manifesto's participation in the elections will allow the revolutionary left to gauge its strength and test its influence. (For the Senate, which in Italy has the same powers as the House, in the absence of Manifesto candidates the GCR call for a vote for the PCI-PSIUP [PSIUP, Partito Socialista Italiano d' Unita Proletaria - Italian Socialist party of Proletarian Unity] bloc.)
At the same time, the GCR feel that during the elections there must be no letup in workers' struggles, which by their militancy will affect the outcome of the elections. There must also be preparation for the battles of autumn, when collective bargaining for new contracts in important sectors will resume. (About 652
4,000,000 workers are involved.) The workers' commission of the organization is in the process of drafting a line-document on this subject, which will be submitted to a special national meeting planned for the near future.
Moreover, in the words of a Bandiera Rossa editorial, "the revolutionary left should not renounce militant mass demonstrations such as the March 11 action in Milan. To renounce such mobilizations would be to allow the enemy to gain ground, to begin to 'restore order.' Nevertheless, we must add that precisely because of the dangers implicit in the situation, the greatest political vigilance and organizational discipline must be used to avoid any adventurist action in opposition to the goals of the demonstrations or capable of preventing their expansion. •.. At the same time, if the revolutionary left must respond to the abuses and attacks of the bureaucrats, it has every interest in reassimilating as never before the concept of the proletarian united front." The united front policy must be applied especially in organizing militant responses (self-defense of the worker and student movements, mass mobilizations, etc.).
As for anti-imperialist mobilizations, which also must be carried out during the election period, the GCR put the stress on the fight against the Vietnam war, participation in the April 22 campaign, solidarity with the Irish revolutionists, and the struggle of the Spanish workers and students. (Proposals for joint action, especially for April 22, have been made to other organizations, primarily Il Manifesto.)
Immediately after the elections, the organization will make a new analysis of the situation. Tactical adjustments may be called for-for example, if Il Manifesto succeeds in attracting sizeable forces, thus raising the possibility of the birth of a broad centrist organization.
To reiterate: the coming months will be very important for the Italian section. Two variants can be outlined. If the rightist attack can be countered and a new workers' upsurge appears, it would be necessary to exploit all opportunities to participate with the most important and serious forces, as in 1968, but with a much greater dynamism. On the other hand, if the reactionaries gain ground, it would be necessary to take maximum advantage of the time remaining before possibly being obliged to completely restructure the organization and adopt new forms of struggle.
Postscript
One theme of the section's propaganda, which it opposes more and more sharply to all rightist and centrist parties, is unification of the trade unions. Our stand in favor of unification in no way involves acceptance of the orientation of the reformist currents. We are for unity, but we insist that this unity must be effected on the basis of the principles of anticapitalist class struggle-not on the basis of the unions collaborating with the system. At the same time we consider it important to battle for a democratic structure in the union organizations. This means the right of tendencies to exist.
On the possible construction of a youth organization, here is what the 1971 conference said:
"The arguments advanced in the world congress document in favor of the construction of a youth organization certainly retain their validity, and the perspective is that the task will have to be posed in Italy also. The experiences in other countries, where significant results were achieved, merit analysis. Nevertheless, we must not forget that at least in certain cases (Belgium), the launching of a youth organization corresponded to the requirements of a short phase, and the result was the strengthening of the section through a fusion. In any case, the essential criterion must be whether there are some cities with a minimum number of young cadres who can be engaged exclusively, or nearly so, in this work without this involving a serious weakening of the GCR. The balance of available forces suggests a negative reply for the present."
Notes
4. I have already mentioned the contradiction that has paralyzed the reformist current in the Italian workers' movement, of which the Communist party of Italy (PCI) remains by far the most powerful component. The latest PCI congress only confirmed the traditional approach and translated it into electoralist propaganda terms -with a conjuncturally rightist accent.
7. The coming months will be extremely important for the development of the situation in Italy and therefore for the Trotskyist movement.