[The following article is scheduled for publication in a French translation in the Paris monthly Le Monde Diplomatique.]
A strike wave has gripped Pakistan. Despite the fact that martial law is still in operation, all the military regulations prohibiting strikes are being ignored daily by hundreds of thousands of workers all over the country. The workers are openly defying the police and, thanks to their militant tactics, are compelling capitalists to agree to their wage demands. This fact in itself gives us an indication of the extent to which social and economic crisis has developed in (West) Pakistan since the defeat of the Pakistan army and the emergence of Bangladesh.
Although the defeat of the Pakistan army in Bangladesh by the Indian army was political more than military - in the sense that the Pakistan army, guaranteed safety by the Indira Gandhi regime, chose to surrender without a fight-its effects in West Pakistan were traumatic. Overnightthe results of indoctrination in army propaganda disappeared, and mass demonstrations in the cities demanded Yahya Khan's overthrow.
Clearly a new military coup d'état would not have been appreciated by the masses in Pakistan, and the ruling class, in collusion with the army, opted for a continuation of military rule, but in civilian clothing.
Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, one of the politicians responsible for the invasion of East Bengal and the leader of the People's party, was appointed president and chief martial-law administrator. He placed his predecessor under arrest, released Sheik Mujibur Rahman, and made demagogic speeches throughout the country promising an end to oppression. In reality, however, he is attempting an extremely difficult task for any bourgeois leader in Pakistan today, namely, the task of stabilizing the existing social order 274
and preserving the capitalist mode of production in Pakistan.
This is not to imply that there exists a political force in West Pakistan strong enough to overthrow the existing state, but merely to stress that the crisis cannot be solved within the existing framework and that the bourgeoisie will be compelled to search for a new political formula - impossible to confine within the present geospan
BHUTTO: Army's civilian-face finds Mao's blessing useful left cover.
graphical limits of the "moth-eaten and truncated" state of Pakistan.
The People's party, which Bhutto leads, emerged as the largest single party in West Pakistan after the illfated elections of December 1970, but its strength was confined to two of West Pakistan's four provinces: Punjab (the largest and most important) and Sind.
The party's social base in the two provinces reflects its hybrid nature somewhat accurately. In the Punjab it represents the petty bourgeoisie and all its layers, though now that Bhutto is president, many monopolists and landlords will flock behind his banner. In Sind (Bhutto's home province, where he is one of the largest landlords!) the base of the party, excepting marginally for the industrial center of Karachi, rests on feudal landlords who decided to back one of their own in the last election and whose loyalty is no doubt being handsomely rewarded at the moment.
Thus while Bhutto is in power at the moment owing to the fact that the army would rather have a civilian face while it recovers from the blow inflicted on its prestige, what gives him a certain amount of autonomy is the fact that he does command some support, a factor which is convenient for the army as well in the present circumstances.
However, what Bhutto is attempting politically is more ambitious. He is trying to incorporate the extreme left under his umbrella by claiming that he has the blessing of the Chinese government. Thus a leading "Maoist" in the People's party, Mairaj Mohammed Khan, is one of the special presidential advisers and part of the martial law administration. Also, a renowned Urdu poet, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, known for his pro-Moscow sympathies, as his Lenin Peace Prize testifies, is a cultural adviser to the government- a poet at the court of Emperor Bhutto.
Given the past record of the left and its extreme opportunism and chauvinism, there is every possibility that Bhutto will win its support. This will not mean very much to the new regime, but it will remove a potential alternative from the political scene and give the regime a left cover.
The main political issue today is the question of ending martial law and convening the National Assembly. These two demands have been put forward by the National Awami party, which emerged as the strongest political force in the remaining two provinces, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The National Awami party is led by the nationalist politician Wali Khan, and though it has been infiltrated by the pro-Moscow "Communists," their influence is negligible; in any case, they tail-end the party leadership and carry out its dictates.
What Wali Khan would like is a coalition government at the Center and governments in NWFP and Baluchistan dominated by his party. However, Mr. Bhutto is not so anxious to share political power at the present moment, and demonstrations by thousands of armed supporters of
Wali Khan in Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP, have left him unmoved.
In a certain sense, the political maneuverings which are taking place on Pakistan's political stage have an air of unreality about them. It seems that few bourgeois politicians have really understood what the events of the last year signify. They seem to think that it is possible for them to go on in the same old way in completely changed circumstances.
The power of landlordism in the countryside can be seen from the fact that 1.25% of the total number of landholders in Pakistan control 31.2% of the total area under private control, whereas 64.4% of the landholders (i. e., poor peasants) own among them 15.25% of the whole. The increase of landless laborers, coupled with growing unemployment (some of it a direct result of the loss of Eastern Bengal), makes the crisis more intense would otherwise have been. than it Hence the debates between the National Awami party and the People's party have a somewhat hollow ring as far as the masses are concerned.
We are therefore likely to see a continued rise of the mass movement, and the inability of a capitalist government to grant the demands of this movement will make the political situation even more unstable than it has been in the past. Bhutto's inability to deal with this movement is bound to bring the army back into the picture.
The new commander in chief of the army, General Gul Hassan, is not only more sophisticated than his two predecessors, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, but is known to harbor ambitions regarding the presidency, and it is unlikely that Bhutto will succeed in keeping him at arm's length for too long. Given Gul Hassan's marked distaste for the "left," which was exhibited when he was director of the Joint Services Intelligence some years back, his military dictatorship is likely to be much harsher. Even if one ignores his subjective inclinations, the social and economic situation in Pakistan will not tolerate an "easy" regime if the social structure has to be preserved.
The disintegration of the state of Pakistan has, of course, created two crucial weak links within the subcontinent. Both West Pakistan and Bangladesh, as they exist today, have shattered the stability of South Asia; March 13, 1972
given the fact that in Asia as a whole, South Asia is of prime strategic and political, significance for U.S. imperialism, from now on the latter's main aim will be to preserve the power of the bourgeoisie in the entire subcontinent.
Already the indications are that Bhutto, Mujibur Rahman, and Indira Gandhi are planning a "summit" meeting to discuss common problems, and the existence of the latter is understood by all.
If the Nixon-Mao talks result in an Asian Yalta and the Chinese agree to divide Asia into "spheres of influence"- and all the signs indicate that they are prepared to do so- then South
Asia will come under the American "sphere of influence," and a meeting of the three bourgeois leaders ke for good measure) will discuss one key problem: not the mythical threat of "Communist aggression" but the more real threat posed by the rise of the mass movement in different parts of the subcontinent.
A threat to one will be regarded as a threat to all, and some type of common defense agreement will undoubtedly be reached. In the short term, this is the only way for imperialism to preserve the fragile status quo in South Asia.