currents in the so-called intellectual opposition in Poland today actually represent seems fundamental for any analysis of the situation in this country. Until now - and this will persist until a new order is established - the intellectual opposition conducting the struggle against the anti-working-class repression unleashed by the regime in the wake of the events of June 25, 1976, has appeared from the outside to be a solid and compact bloc. But examination of a few documents - some anonymous, others whose authors are known - shows that this is not really the case. The ideological and tactical positions which are arising attest to differences of view that would lead to distinct regroupments if conditions of open political struggle existed. At the present stage of development and on the basis of the documents of which we are aware, it is obviously impossible to draw up a definitive political map of the Polish opposition. Right now we can only sketch its general contours and must follow its future vicissitudes closely and integrate them into the analysis.
23
POLAND Rebirth of the intellectual opposition In answering the question, Whither the opposition? it would undoubtedly be enlightening to first take a look at where this opposition comes from. The intellectual opposition forcefully manifested itself for the first time in 1955-56. It then appeared as allied to both the working class and the "liberal" wing of the bureaucracy, which it supported against the hardline Stalinist wing. The great majority of the dissident intellectuals claimed to be Marxists. At the time, a degree of freedom of expression never before seen in Poland - and never seen again since then - enabled them to present the most varied ideas, not only in the press, but also from the podiums of many discussion clubs, the best known of which was the Torduna Circle Club in Warsaw. Relations with the working class were reflected essentially in the organization of meetings of workers and intellectuals, in aid extended to workers who wanted to set up discussion clubs in the factories, and, on the theoretical level, in adherence to the idea of workers democracy, which the workers themselves had placed on the agenda by establishing their first councils in 1956. This period of rapprochement between the intellectuals and the workers lasted no longer than the gains of "de-Stalinization, " which were gradually eliminated by the Gomulka bureaucracy. After the bureaucracy's clever policy had succeeded in liquidating the real contacts, a gap opened and in 1968, when Gomulka decided to halt the irritating dissent in university circles, the working class remained indifferent to the protest movement of the intellectual opposition. The events of March 1968 nevertheless marked a decisive turn in the evolution of the movement of intellectuals. On the one hand, these events saw the definitive break of the intellectual oppositionists with the regime they had supported twelve years earlier. On the other hand, they resulted in the collapse of the hopes that had been placed in the so-called revisionist line, which could have been called "revisionism from within"; this line consisted of relying on the liberal wing of the party to change the system. The 1968 crisis also explains, although it does not at all justify, the silence of the intellectuals during the workers revolt in the Baltic ports in the winter of 1970-71. Decimated by forced emigrations and trials, weakened and suspicious, the intellectual opposition did not immediately understand — or did not want to understand - the decisive role of the workers movement in the struggle against political and social oppression by the bureaucracy. The importance of this role was proven, however, by the outcome of the 1970-71 crisis, which triggered the fall of the Gomulka regime, as well as by the effectiveness of the many local strikes which took place during the years 1970-76, which forced the new authorities to bend to the workers. Although, as is stressed by K. Pomian in his preface to the collection of documents of the Workers Defense Committee(2), latent guilt feelings were one of the reasons for the rapid reaction of the intellectual oppositionists in 1976, another and no less important factor was the consciousness of the political role played by the working class in Polish society. 24
The general context in which the intellectual opposition began to speak out again was created by the aggravation of the economic situation in 1975, characterized by a colossal foreign debt among other things. The Gierek team, far from commanding confidence comparable to Gomulka's in 1956, was compelled to make substantial concessions in order to assure social peace. These included the granting of some economic benefits and greater managerial independence to the technocrats, a cautious liberalization to win the favor of the intellectuals, and above all a significant increase in real wages, while the freeze on the prices of basic commodities was maintained under the pressure from the workers. During the winter of 1975, after the crisis had already broken out, the Polish government decided to submit proposals for constitutional amendments to the Diet. The amendments included articles on the leading role of the Polish United Workers party (the Communist party), the indissoluble alliance with the USSR, and the inseparable character of the rights and duties of the citizen. A public discussion, organized at the last minute in order to create the illusion of popular "consultation, " provided an opportunity for some of the intellectuals to openly oppose the draft constitution. They skillfully utilized the so-called discussion, and various bodies of the party, government, and parliament received letthat a broad protest action was possible and would not necessarily be followed by harsh repression. The authorities even went so far as to make some concessions. Thus, even before the events of June 25, 1976, the "constitutional affair" enabled the intellectual opposition to organize, make itself known, and become conscious of its own strength. This partially explains its immediate reaction to the strikes and demonstrations of June 25. The slogans of the students in 1968 - No bread without freedom - and the workers in 1970 - No freedom without bread - were finally able to be joined. When the authorities launched a wave of antiworker repression just after the June 25 events, prominent intellectuals responded with letters and petitions addressed particularly to intellectuals and the left in the West. In September 1976 the Workers Defense Committee was established in Warsaw, whose aim was to extend financial and legal aid to the workers who had been imprisoned or laid off, as well as to their families. (3) Concurrently, the KOR sought to break the state monopoly on news, regularly publishing communiques on its activities and on specific cases of repression, as well as a broader "information bulletin." Although the members of the committee deliberately stated that their action was purely humanitarian in character, the KOR actually became a genuine pole of regroupment for the intellectual opposition, mobilizing hundreds and even thousands of people in various activities, such as collecting money or distributing the bulletin. The existence of a public group that was able to express itself and act without the regime being able to silence it effectively contributed to encouraging manifestations of opposition in various social milieus: Many documents have been drafted recently by individuals or groups containing different proposals for changes
relating both to certain aspects of the functioning of the bureaucratic system and to the political and social structures themselves.
His, however, fit melet to position.
the general features that characterize this opposition. Contrary to the period 1955-56, the ideological debate today is unfolding in underground conditions; the documents are mimeographed and circulate under cover. Those which have appeared and have reached us in the West thus do not necessarily reflect all the positions that have been taken within the opposition. The fact that not all the positions of the opposition have been expressed may also be explained by the observation that for the moment some of the oppositionists prefer to maintain maximum unity around demands which are agreed to by all, such as freedom of expression. Another problem, also linked to underground conditions, is the lack of synchronization of the discussion: the documents in question constitute occasional contributions on various subjects rather than each picking up where the others leave off. Finally, their heterogeneity is related to the fact that they were written during different periods - before or after the events of June 1976 - and that they are sometimes addressed to specific interlocutors. The styles and choices of themes in lic opinion abroad. The rest of this article should be read while keeping all these factors in mind, as well as the limitations mentioned at the beginning. Programs of the intellectual opposition An initial series of documents dates from the period of the "constitutional debate" during the winter of 1975: 1. The letter of the 59. This constituted the first and most important protest document against the new draft Polish constitution. The letter, written in the form of amendments to the proposed draft, was signed by fifty-nine very well known intellectuals and sent to the president of the Polish Republic. This document succeeded in triggering a very broad public discussion, since a large number of Poles (several thousand, some say) rallied to this document or to similar ones which were published later. 2. The letter of the 7. This document was written during the same period. It was signed by seven well-known students and intellectuals and addressed to the seventh plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers party. Its aim was not to amend the draft constitution but to propose more general changes in the organization of society. The following documents were produced after the June 1976 events. 3. The Independentist Alliance Program. (PPN). This program was published by a group of immigrants closely linked to the magazine Kultura, which is published in Paris by rather rightist emigre circles. The authors of this document, who are anonymous, also claim to have connections with opposition circles in Poland itself. The document expresses a rightist ideological view; moreover, contrary to the claims of its authors, it does not appear that the opinions it puts forward have broad support in Poland today. 4. The Program of the 44, a project of constitutional reforms. This text, whose forty-four authors preferred to maintain anonymity, was written in Poland in the summer of 1976, immediately after the June events. It is the only opposition document that does not merely assert basic principles but also attempts to advance concrete proposals (although they are sometimes awkward) on the methods of functioning of a state which is supposed to be socialist and democratic. A second series of documents was produced by three of the leaders of the intellectual opposition, Modzelewski and Kuron (who co-authored the Open Letter to the PUWP published in 1964) and Michnik (one of the leaders of the student revolt of 1968). Each of the three has separately published texts dealing with the problems that face the Polish opposition and examining the relationship between the opposition and the regime: 1. Kuron's article "Reflections on the Action Program. " This article was written in autumn 1976 and distributed secretly in Poland. It contains an analysis of the present situation; its last section is devoted to concrete proposals for action by the opposition. In the preface to his article Kuron writes that he considers his article a contribution to the basic political discussion that must be held in Poland today. 2. Michnik's article, "A Strategy for the Polish Opposition." This article consists of the text of a speech Michnik delivered during the colloquium "Poland Hungary 1956, " which was held in Paris in autumn 1976. The article sums up the history of the intellectual opposition since 1956 and expresses the author's opinion on its future tasks. 3. The Modzelewski letter. This is in the form of a letter to Gierek written in November 1976. Contrary to the other texts, in which the regime is addressed in a purely rhetorical manner, here it appears that Modzelewski really hopes to be heard by a section of the bureaucracy. He addresses himself to the "common sense" of the workers and the regime and tries to convince both sides to come to a realistic compromise in order to avoid a generalized and uncontrollable explosion. Where is the left? In describing a political movement in an advanced capitalist country one normally begins by locating that movement in the political spectrum, between right and left, reformist and revolutionary, and so on. But it is practically impossible to classify the various currents of the Polish opposition by analyzing their documents according to western criteria. The use or lack of "Marxist" language obviously cannot be a decisive criterion. in judging a document from eastern Europe.
25
POLAND It must not be forgotten that "Marxist" language is in fact the language of the bureaucrats; hence the lack of enthusiasm the majority of oppositionists exhibit for its use. These are not purely stylistic problems; the perversion of Marxism by the bureaucrats goes well beyond simple differences in language. The years of efforts by Stalin, Brezhney, Bierut, Gomulka, Gierek, and all their aides to explain that their regimes represent socialism and that their ideology is Marxism have contributed extensively to creating the disgust a significant portion of the population of the countries of eastern Europe feels for anything that even looks like Marxism. (4) The situation is particularly difficult in regard to Poland. Michnik is not wrong when in his article he explains that after the experience of the failure of the reforms of 1956, after the unhappy end of the attempt to change the system from within, the prestige of Marxist thought, which was closely associated with these attempts, has been strongly shaken. What, then, are the criteria that may be used in distinguishing the progressive forces within the opposition? If a Polish oppositionist is asked who represents the right in Poland today, the invariable response will be, "They are the right," "they" meaning the bureaucrats. This is not a new notion. In a famous article by L. Kolakowski (a philosopher and one of the leaders of the Polish October of 1956) entitled "The Ideological Meaning of the Notion of Leff" (published in the February 24, 1957, issue of Prostu), the author defined the right as the force which aspires to preserve the existing situation: "The right is the expression of the inertia of historical reality. ... The distinctive sign of the right is opportunism toward the existing world." But the division between the conservative forces and those which want change is in itself not sufficient to define the the left. In characterizing the left in his 1957 article Kolakowski was compelled to add a series of further criteria, the major ones of which were: 1) struggle for the right of free speech and freedom of expression; 2) struggle for secularization, for separation of church and state, struggle against racism and obscurantism; 3) struggle to abolish social privileges; 4) conviction that a change in social relations is possible and that it is worthwhile to struggle for this objective. Kolakowski's choice of criteria in defining the left was heavily influenced by the political situation in 1957 and the reality of the struggle between the liberal wing (the left) and conservative Stalinist wing (the right) within the party. To adapt the definition of the left to Polish reality today we would propose to add several supplementary criteria which aid in more precisely characterizing the various currents of the opposition: 5) attitude toward nationalization of the means of production; 6) evaluation of the role of the working class in the antibureaucratic struggle, attitude toward trade-union rights and workers councils; 7) the problem of Polish nationalism and the existence of an internationalist attitude. 26
If each of the texts mentioned above represented a coherent position, their classification as rightist or leftist according to our criteria would be relatively simple. Unfortunately, the reality is much more complex; opinions that could be considered leftist often coexist in the same text with attitudes that could be defined as rightist. For example, in the program of the 44, which calls for democratic socialism, the role of the Catholic church is glorified, as is that of the traditional family; they go so far as to propose abolition of the law legalizing abortion. In Kuron's document the author recognizes the importance of direct democracy (and implicitly of workers councils), but on the other hand he goes so far as to deny the capitalist character of the western countries. Ideological confusion, consciously sown by the bureaucracy, is surely not unrelated to the lack of political discussion within the opposition. In addition, it is important not to forget that there are differences in the importance of the various criteria: the attitude toward the working class or toward the reprivatization of the means of production - key questions of Polish reality today - are obviously more decisive than the attitude toward secularization. Let us examine these various criteria more closely. The left, nationalizations, and the working class *The problem of the nationalization (or the reprivatization) of the means of production. The only document which clearly calls for reprivatization is the document of the PPN. The program of the 44, on the other hand, is the only one which explicitly opposes to this. According to one possible interpretation of the letter of the 59, the phrase which says, "There is no freedom of labor if the state is the sole employer, may represent an aspiration for a certain reprivatization (probably the ambiguity of the sentence was a deliberate attempt to permit people holding very different views to sign the document.) (5) *The importance of the working class. After the strikes of 1970-71 and after June 1976 it is difficult to neglect the importance of the working class. All the documents, including that of the PPN, explicitly support the formation of free and independent trade unions and the right to strike. This aspiration, which falls within the framework of the struggle for democratic rights, is probably common to all oppositionists. (Modzelewski, who also supports it, does not go so far as to demand real independent trade unions, but only because he believes that this demand is premature.) Workers councils are mentioned explicitly in the letter of the 7 (in the context of a return to the 1956 situation) and in the program of the 44 (in which an effort is made to find a model that combines councils at the rank-and-file level and a central power elected by universal suffrage). In his text Kuron speaks of a system of direct democracy which re-
sponds to the aspirations of people during their hours of labor.
It must be stressed that the meaning accorded the term "workers council" is not necessarily the one accorded it in western
Europe. For many Polish oppositionists it would appear that workers councils are not regarded as a form of organization of the state (this model has lost much of its attractive power since the bureaucracy calls its regime "soviet democracy"), but rather as organs of workers self-management on a local scale. The relative importance attributed to the councils varies among the oppositionists. The document of the 44, for example, tries to assimilate workers councils to leaderships of a technocratic type selected according to competence.
For the 44, the role of the councils is limited to purely economic dimensions, closer to workers control.
The problem of the role of intellectuals in the antibureaucratic struggle is linked to that of the role of the workers.
In spite of the recognition of the importance of the working class after June 1976, a strong tendency insists on the decisive role of the intelligentsia (probably because of the lack of organic links between the intelligenstia and the working class). Michnik, for example, recounts the entire ewski stresses the decisive role of experts. The document of the 44 also ceaselessly stresses the importance of "experts, "
"competent people, " in changing the system. The actual practice of the Workers Defense Committee thus seems to have gone somewhat beyond the thought of some of its *The struggle for freedom of expression. All the oppositionists struggle for freedom of expression, which they regard as an indispensable precondition for all further political development. Freedom of association and multi-partyism are also among the common aspirations of oppositionists. (6) The answer to the question, What freedoms can we demand immediately? on the other hand, is linked to tactical considerations, and opinions on this subject vary. For example, the document of the 44 considers it unrealistic to demand the total abolition of censorship. In Modzelewski's view, to demand freedom of association (desirable in his eyes) is not only utopian but even dangerous today, and the framework of the single party should be maintained. The program of the 44 proposes to preserve the present National Unity Front but to transform the "parties" which compose it (which are presently nothing but figureheads) into genuine political parties. In his article, on the other hand, Kuron strives to prove that it is not utopian to achieve the establishment of a real parliamentary system on the western model, and in this framework he calls for the "Finlandization" of Poland. *Polish nationalism. The idea of safeguarding the national culture and patrimony, the struggle for the independence of the Nation with a capital N, is at the center of the concerns of the majority of oppositionists in Poland. (7) The very great sensitivity to the national question undoubtedly originates in the centuries-long struggle for national independence. Poles today, the majority of whom regard their dependence on the USSR as national oppression, believe that their national existence is still in jeopardy. Moreover, the bureaucracy is conscious of the explosive potential of the national question in the Polish context and tries to use nationalist and chauvinist sentiments to its own advantage.
Hence the anti-Semitic campaigns and the very recent anti-
German campaign.
All the documents we have mentioned here were written before the emergence of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, and this may explain the total absence of reference to struggles in other countries of easter Europe. The USSR is treated as monolithic in all the documents, and no reference is made to the possibility of an opposition within the Soviet Union itself. *The role of the Catholic church. Practically all the documents (with the exception of those addressed to the party, namely the letter of the 7 and the article by Modzelewski) stress the importance of the Catholic church, whether directly (as in the document of the PPN or the program of the 44), or by highlighting the importance of freedom of religious worship (the letter of the 59), or by explaining the decisive role of the Catholic church in the struggle against the regime (Michnik and Kuron). The importance attributed to the church and the fact that the majority of oppositionists strongly desire an alliance with the church hierarchy contrast sharply with the attitude of the oppositionists in 1956. At that time the left opposition grouped around the magazine Po Prostu considered the struggle for secularization, for the separation of church and state, and against anti-Semitism and obscurantism as one of its major tasks. The change of attitude of the oppositionists toward the church probably results from the fact that during the period in which the intellectual opposition was virtually silent (1968-75) the Catholic church was able to appear as the only organized and structured opposition force. The fact that today, unlike 1956, the church hierarchy is in conflict with the regime, the hierarchy supports workers who have been victimized by repression, and church circles have aided the KOR, has contributed to strengthening the links between the church and the intellectual opposition. Several Polish oppositionists today believe that the conflict between the church and the regime will be permanent. Their attitude toward the church is based on this analysis, and it could change if the hierarchy comes closer to the bureaucracy again. (Since 1945 there have been successive periods of rapprochement and divergence in church-state relations.) *Egalitarianism and transformation of social relations. The struggle against the exorbitant privileges of some layers of the population is practically not mentioned in the documents of the oppositionists. (One sentence in the program of the 44 speaks of the necessity for public control over high incomes.) Here again, from this angle the 1976 oppositionists differ from those of 1956, for in that year the struggle against social inequality was one of the major themes of the left op-
POLAND position. The difference is probably due to the lack of organic links between the intellectual opposition and the working class. (These links were much closer in 1956.) The working class is now also expressing aspirations for greater social equality (as revealed in recent polls). All the oppositionists believe that a transformation of social relations is possible, but there are important differences in the assessment of the degree of flexibility of the system. The most "pessimistic" on this subject is probably Modzelewski, who believes only in the possibility of a compromise between the toilers and the regime, a compromise which may be expressed solely by a slight liberalization of the regime which challenges neither the existence of a single party nor the character of Poland's relations with the Soviet Union. The most "optimistic" is Kuron, who thinks it is possible that Poland may gradually achieve the status Finland has today, that is - according to him - great freedom in internal affairs, the possibility of choosing the sort of system desired, but concurrently the acceptance of certain limitations on national sovereignty imposed by the Soviet Union. Between these two poles stand the authors of the program of the 44, who want to maintain the general framework of the regime while introducing a new content, and Michnik, who
Jacek Kuron believes it is possible that the regime may become more flexible although he does not hope that it will go so far as a "Finlandization" of Poland.
As for the means by which to achieve a change in the system, only Kuron puts forward more concrete proposals:
creation of mass movements, such as a movement of workers, peasants, intellectuals, etc., which would challenge the state monopoly in such spheres as association, discussion, and dissemination of news, and would be capable of exerting pressure on the regime. Is reformism realistic in Poland?
The intellectual opposition in Poland (at least those of the oppositionists who have expressed themselves publicly up to now) may be characterized as "reformist from outside" (outside the party that is. They all think that the road to 28 change requires an opposition movement which develops outside the party and wins mass support. This movement would create a favorable relationship of forces which would enable pressure to be put on the regime to bring about negotiations. They all agree in noting that the limits of the changes now possible are determined in Moscow. Moreover, this is most probably the reason why nobody proposes substantial changes in Polish foreign policy. They all think that Soviet tanks are the first element that must be taken into account when speaking of the future of Poland and that because of this, as Kuron has put it, "it's better to stop much too soon than a little too late. " All, or nearly all, no longer believe in the possibility of reforming the regime from within, but on the other hand they do envisage the possibility of relying on "reasonable" forces within the bureaucracy (the technocrats according to Michnik), who would prefer to yield to demands (also reasonable) from a mass opposition movement rather than risk a confrontation. The problem for the opposition is thus to create a relationship of forces that would foster negotiation with the bureaucrats; the problem of the central state power is nowhere This opposition therefore presents itself as reformist. On the other hand, in our view the demands advanced by these same oppositionists go beyond purely reformist limits. Can we envisage the possibility of the bureaucrats' according the Polish workers the right to strike, to create free trade unions, the freedom of expression, and above all the possibility of forming real workers councils (all of which is demanded in some of the opposition documents), without a profound modification of the character of the system? In a system in which unemployment does not exist and in which the mechanisms of the market no longer exercise constant pressure on the workers, what are the chances of maintaining a system which is detested by the majority of the population once the means of coercion and control from above have disappeared? It seems naive to believe that the Polish bureaucrats will yield to the pressure of the opposition without realizing the dangers inherent in the concessions granted. As nearly all the oppositionists stress, in Poland there is no "more liberal" wing of the bureaucracy that might touch off a process similar to that of the Prague spring. Under these circumstances, "debureaucratization by stages" does not seem to us much more realistic than revolution by stages. It is difficult to believe that the Polish bureaucrats will fail to perceive that they are in the process of losing their power until it is already too late. The Polish oppositionists thus risk running into a reality very different from that of calm and dignified negotiations between representatives of the regime (realistic ones) and the opposition (responsible ones), all gathered around a green tablecloth. In a situation in which the Polish toilers would obtain (or manage to win) the democratic rights demanded by the opposition (freedom of speech, the right to strike, the possibility of self-organization), the regime of the bureaucrats would automatically be challenged. It seems unlikely that in such a situation - the survival of the bureaucrats as a social layer being in danger - these bureaucrats would hesitate to use all available means at their disposal to prevent the debacle. It may be asked, What should be the role of a
responsible opposition under these conditions? Should it adopt an ostrich policy and formulate demands that would lead directly to a confrontation with the bureaucracy without preparing for such a confrontation and without considering the problem of power? The argument most often advanced by Polish oppositionists in responding to these questions is that it is useless to prepare for a change in regime in Poland as long as Soviet tanks are deployed along the border. This problem is unfortunately very real, and after Budapest and Prague it cannot be taken lightly. But should it paralyze all opposition activity in eastern Europe? There is no magic solution, but as some Polish oppositionists have already understood, the only means of dissuading the Kremlin bureaucrats and reducing the danger of an intervention is to convince them that the price of such an intervention would be too high. The preparation of the population, its arming, and the assurance that at least a portion of the national army would not remain neutral in the event of an invasion can convince the Soviet bureaucrats that their intervention could threaten to turn into a long war (as they were convinced in the case of Yugoslavia in 1948). The forging of close links between the opposition in eastern Europe and the western workers movement and the rise of a powerful movement of solidarity in the West, could make the political price the Kremlin would have to pay for an invasion exorbitant. An opposition movement developing simultaneously in several east European countries can make a Soviet intervention extremely difficult. The risk of an intervention in one country triggering an explosive situation in one or several neighboring countries would most probably make the Soviet bureaucracy think twice. Hence the decisive importance of coordination among the opposition movements in the various east European countries. Finally, even the formidable Soviet tanks do not roll by themselves. It is not easy for many of the Polish oppositionists to rethink their positions, strongly tainted by nationalism, and broaden their struggle against the regime of the Kremlin bureaucrats by seeking support among the citizens of the USSR. But is it really unthinkable that some day the Soviet soldier may come to understand that he has nothing to do in Warsaw but much to do in Moscow? May 20, 1977
Notes: 1. Pyjas was found lying dead at the bottom of a stairwell in a Cracow apartment building; his skull had been fractured. He had received many death threats because of his cooperation with the Workers Defense Committee. 2. Published in French by the Comite International Contre la Repression. 3. Some of the activities of the KOR have taken on a more directly political character. For instance, it demands amnesty for all imprisoned workers, the convocation of a parliamentary commission of inquiry to investigate the facts and consequences of the post-June 1976 repression, and, as has been learned recently, the modification of the Labor Code so as to recognize the right to strike. Let us add that a Movement for Defense of Human Rights was also formed in April. Consultations with the workers was one of the major promises Gierek used in 1971 to appease angry workers. But once order was restored, these consultations became a dead letter. During the period 1971-76 the only means the workers had of holding a "dialogue" with the regime was to go on strike. 4. This does not at all mean that there are not people in the east European countries who claim allegiance to genuine Marxism. But they are unfortunately few in number, and it is no accident that several of them have come to Marxism after contact with the western left. 5. In general, it does not seem to us that the thesis of re- privatization of the means of production can find many adherents in Poland today. On the other hand, many people would favor some reprivatization of services, the creation of cooperatives, etc. 6. The demands for democratic rights unite the opposition currents. This is not surprising, for deprivation of political rights is common to all layers of society except the bureaucracy and (a bit like the Third Estate in France before 1789) the winning of political rights is the goal that unites people who often have contradictory interests and opinions in common struggle. 7. Michnik's article is virtually alone among the opposition documents in scarcely mentioning the national problem. This is probably because his article was aimed at western leftist public opinion, which is not very sensitive to nationalist ideas.