EHIND VORSTER'S
INDEPENDENCE FRAUD by RIC WEBSTER & PAT JORDAN
The defeat of Portuguese imperialism in Mozambique and the subsequent collapse of attempts to establish a puppet regime in Angola created a new relationship of forces throughout southern Africa. The victories of the liberation struggles in the former Portuguese colonies, and especially the humiliating rout of the South African forces in Angola, gave new impetus to the mass struggle against racism and imperialism in the region. Imperialism's response has been to recompose its grip in such a way as to grant the appearance of concessions while maintaining real control. This rather delicate recomposition, which must reconcile the conflicting interests of various social forces, has been focussed primarily on Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), where the intransigence of the white racist regime has placed the entire operation in question. But the restructuring of imperialist domination in southern Africa has not been limited to Zimbabwe. The 32
Vorster regime in South Africa, commented the Christian Science Monitor at the end of January, "is increasingly concerned over the lack of progress in finding a solution the Rhodesian crisis. It is therefore determined to push a with its own solution for Namibia. . Vorster's goal to have an interim government installed in Namibia by t middle of this year and to grant complete independence the territory by 1978." The essence of Vorster's solution in Namibia - the vast territory occupied by South Africa in defiance of international law and the will of the population — is to excl the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) the territory's liberation movement, from any role in a n government, interim or otherwise. This aim is quite explicit: In the working papers before the Turnhalle con
erence (1) it is stipulated that "Marxist-Leninist parties hould not be allowed in any Namibian election, "and the outh African regime has designated SWAPO a Marxisteninist organization and has excluded it from the onstitutional talks. the meantime, the work of the conference is proceeding lowly. The constitution that comes out of the conference ust be capable of drawing support away from SWAPO, and ven the "moderate" Namibians with whom Vorster is egotiating have so far declined to accept white demands at the bulk of the territory's land continue to be reserved or whites, that the powers of the multiracial central overnment be strongly limited, and that the projected ethnic councils" serve purely decorative functions. In ddition, Vorster is having trouble selling the Turnhalle ho had spent two weeks in Europe trying to drum up support or Vorster's Namibian project, said, "I found that Turnhalle ad not managed to establish much credibility abroad. " retoria has responded by engaging two American firms to aint up Chief Kapuuo, one of the Turnhalle stooges, as a onafide Namibian leader. The February 1977 issue of frican Development reported: "The first of the two New ork based firms, Psychographic Communications, a public lations firm, has been 'marketing' Kapuvo. On a recent ip to the U.S. Kapuuo met with Cyrus Vance, Henry ord, and the editorial boards of Newsweek and the New ork Times. He was also photographed at a party with film ar Elizabeth Taylor. The other company, a law firm called urns and Jacoby, has represented Kapuo at the Turnhalle Iks and one of its partners has attended the talks and is lieved to have drawn up the constitutional proposal. The rvices of the law fim have been estimated to cost $1,000 day. Spokesmen for both firms have said that Kapuuo mself is not paying either of them any fees, which has ised speculation of BOSS-CIA benefactors. "(BOSS, reau of Special Services, is the South African CIA.) e aim of the South African ruling class in the Turnhalle Iks is to arrange for nominal independence for Namibia ile retaining actual control. Under the Turnhalle oposals there will be no change in the structure of the onomy. Industry will still be owned and run by South rican, British, and American capital, while the Blacks Il continue to provide cheap migratory labor. Second, e ownership of land will not change. Third, the new rliament will be made up of four representatives from each pulation group, but will function by consensus, any group ving veto rights. Thus, the four whites, representing a all fraction of the population, could block any proposal t to their liking. Fourth, Pretoria will retain control of fense, security, foreign affairs, finance, and monetary licies, leaving little for the new "parliament" to discuss. th, South African troops will remain in Namibia. There now 45,000 armed South Africans in the country, stly in the north, where a mile-wide free-fire zone has en cleared along the Angolan border. Among the 45,000 : 12,800 counterinsurgency troops. A small number of ricans, bought off by the Vorster regime and granted les enabling them to claim that they speak for various
"population groups, " have accepted the presence of these troops. Pastor Cornelius Ndjoba, for example, "Chief Minister" of Ovamboland, has said, "My people welcome the presence of the defense forces. " Other African delegates at Turnhalle have made similar remarks. South African big business has backed the Turnhalle conference in a big way, setting up a "South West Africa Foundation" to garner international support for the proposed "multinational provisional government. " Among those companies supporting this publicity operation are De Beers, Rio Tinto Zinc, and Newmont Mining, all of which have substantial investments in Namibia. Links have also been forged with West German foundations, and many German residents in Namibia are involved in the project: Kurt Dalmann, editor of the German-language Allgemeine Zeitung, is a key member of the foundation's planning committee. The foundation plans to organize tours of Britain, West Germany, and other European countries by Vorster's stooges from the Turnhalle conference. Alongside the political operation of the Turnhalle talks, the South African government is stepping up its military involvement in Namibia, alloting increasing portions of the ever growing "defense" budget to Namibian operations and building up troop concentrations on the Namibian-Angolan border. Nevertheless, SWAPO has continued to make gains, both military and political. In mid-January the Financial Times reported that it appeared that "a new SWAPO base has been opened, provided with large quantities of arms, including surface-to-air missiles and armoured cars. " One of the most notable SWAPO gains in the political field has been the decision of the Reheboth Volkspartie, a party of the Reheboths(2) which has always opposed South African policy in Namibia, to disband and join SWAPO. This was followed by similar announcements by the traditional leaders of four Nama(3) groups and the dissolution of the Namibia African People's Organization, a new party whose main support is among the Damaras, the second-largest African community in Namibia. According to the February issue of African Development, "SWAPO and SWANU(4) leaders have recently held secret discussions aimed af establishing a 'black nationalist front. '" All these developments mean that SWAPO's claim to be the national organiarmy camps® Zambia Oshikango Angola Auacana Oshakati** Dam •Ondor • Sodoliet: •Groatfontein NAMIBIA
Atlantic SOUTH WEST AFRICA
Ocean
•Waivis WINDHOEK Bay ESW 33
----- photo credits and running heads -----
Botswana
NAMIBIA zation of Namibia is becoming increasingly unchallengable. SWAPO has denounced the Turnhalle talks, both inside and outside Namibia, as a "monumental exercise of Boer bad faith" and has laid down a number of preconditions for participating in any such negotiations. These are: 1) that the South African army and police withdraw from Namibia; 2) that the security clampdown be lifted; 3) that South Africa accept Namibia's right to independence and national sovereignty; 4) that Namibia's national territorial integrity be recognized; 5) that all political prisoners, including those being held on Robben Island, be released; 6) that all exiles be allowed to return; 7) that free elections be held under United Nations supervision; 8) that the order outlawing SWAPO be lifted. The stakes Why should imperialism be so concerned with this area of 520, 000 square miles (824, 000 square kilometers) of highlands and desert, the home of less than a million people? Historically, the early twentieth century conflict between British and German imperialism over control of South West Africa was roofed in competition over trade routes, the farmlands of the central highlands, and Cecil Rhodes's dream of an African zone of British control extending from Egypt to the Cape. But the stakes today are much greater. Namibia is now the world's largest producer of gem diamonds and also has large deposits of lithium, vanadium, lead, cadmium, and zinc. In addition, new uranium mines, on which Britain is dependent, have been opened. South West Africa was created by imperialist fiat at the Berlin conference of 1884. Its borders are among the straightest in the world - and for good reason. They were drawn with pen and ruler by representatives of British and German imperialism who were parceling out control of southern Africa. South West Africa was given to then expanding German colonialism. There were, however, some exceptions to the ruler-straight boundaries of Namibia. Walvis Bay, of strategic importance as the only safe anchorage on the west coast of southern Africa (and today the only sea outlet for Namibian exports) was annexed by the British Cape colony in 1878. A second exception was the Caprivi Strip, a forty-mile-wide (sixty-five kilometers) band which stretches 300 miles (500 kilometers), eastward, giving Namibia borders with Botswana, Zambia, and Rhodesia. Defeat in the first world war cost German imperialism possession of South West Africa, which was placed under League of Nations mandate but ruled by South Africa in the interests of British imperialism. In 1946 the mandate was transformed into a United Nations "trusteeship, " which was revoked by the United Nations in 1966 after years of conflict with South Africa. In spite of the UN decision, however, Namibia, as South West Africa was renamed in 1966, remains under South African domination. In fact, during the 19605 and 1970s, it has been increasingly infegrated into South Africa both economically and politically. Structure of the Namibian economy The Namibian economy is dominated by production of primary products, structured around the sectors of mining, 34 fishing; and farming. It retains all the classical features of a colonial system: domination of the economy and raw materials exports by a few imperialist countries; repatric of huge imperialist superprofits; subsistence existence fo mass of the indigenous toiling population; relatively larg reserve amy of labor driving down wage rates; use of in revenue to cover the infrastructural costs of imperialism. The most important industry in the country is mineral extraction. British, Canadian, French, German, Japane and U.S. capital own shares of the Namibian mining industry, which, as of 1972, accounted for 60% of gross national product, 60% of exports, and 50% of governme revenue. The profits the multinationals reap in Namibia may be illustrated by the case of the Tsumeb South West Africa Co. Ltd. and Consolidated Diamond Mines, whic taken together, raked in $91 million profit from their Namibian operations in 1972. Of this total, $9.8 millio went to U.S. nationals, $1.3 million to Britons, and $3 million to South Africans. Tsumeb is a U.S.-controlled corporation in which South West Africa Co. Ltd., a British firm, has an important minority stake. As of 1970 one of its mines, in the town of Tsumeb, was valued at $70 million worth of investment. The Tsumeb mine had b German owned, but came under the charge of the Custo of Enemy Property after the second world war. In 1945 a consortium of American, British, and South African capi bought the mine for El million during the redistribution capital after the collapse of German fascism. The second most important sector of the economy, fishing and fish processing, accounts for about 25% of the GNP Pilchards and anchovies are the two biggest cotches. The proceeds go to South African firms, which are allocated catches on a quota basis. The fish are then packaged unc "produce of South Africa" labels and exported to Europe and North America. The third sector, farming, is based primarily on producti of meat hides and Karakul Persian sheep pelts, which are sold by the Hudson Bay Company in London and provide white farmers in Namibia with lucrative incomes. A tota of 3.4 million pelts were sold between September 1972 a September 1973; they retailed abroad for E6.50 each. The Namibian economy has not undergone the sort of neo colonial development of manufacturing production which has occurred in some African countries (although there he been limited growth in construction, processing of perish goods, and assembling of imported South African semifinished products). The subsistence wages paid to African and the high unemployment levels prevent the developme of a domestic market for consumer goods. The economy thus remains dominated by foreign capital concentrated i extractive or primary industries. The laws imposed by the South African regime and the taxes on foreign capital encourage repatriation of large amounts of profit. Undist uted profits are taxed at the rate of 20%, but all outlay capital expenditure is deductible; the mining industry pa an income tax ranging from 224% to 30%. In 1974 the la were modified to allow foreign capital greater control ov
investments. Previously, 50% local participation (that is, South African participation) was required and a premium of 10% of investment had to be paid to the government in Pretoria. The participation figure was reduced to 25% in 1974, which stimulated both foreign investment and repotriation of profits. Thus, although there has been no increase whatever in the living standards of Black Africans, the economy's growth rate has been rapid, as is shown by the following comparative annual growth rates for the years 1960-69: South Africa: 3.8% Tanzania: 1.6% Kenya: 1.5% Uganda: 1.7% Angola: 1.4% Rhodesia: 0.4% Zambia: 5.4% Botswana: 1.0% (Source: Finance and Development, January-March 1972.) The figure for South Africa includes Namibia, but in the pamphlet "The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia" Roger Murray cites 11% as the growth rate for Namibia during this decade. This would not be inconsistent with the 3.8% figure for Namibia and South Africa combined, for the gross domestic product of Namibia is only 4% that of South Africa. South Africa and Namibia
The South African government had long refused to recognize the United Nations trusteeship over Namibia. In 1969
Namibia was formally designated the fifth province of
South Africa under the South West Africa Affairs Act.
Under this act, all major legal and political functions in
Namibia were transferred to Pretoria. The South African ruling class has two major interests in Namibia. The first is economic, especially in view of the abundance of raw materials and cheap labor; the second is strategic, a result of Namibia's geographical position between South Africa and Angola. The Vorster regime views Namibia as part of a buffer zone made up of Rhodesia and the bantustans of
South Africa, protecting the northern flank of the apartheid regime. South African interest in the Namibian economy is substantial: 50% of Namibian exports go to South Africa, while 80% of its imports come from South Africa (mainly fuel, food and some manufactured goods). The economic importance of Namibia for firms such as the Anglo-American corporation Openheimer, which controls De Beers and
Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa, the companies which dominate production of gem diamonds in this country, is quite evident. These interests are especially profitable, as the figures for after-tax profits in 1971-73
Profits in millions of pounds sterling
1971 1972 1973
De Beers 71.6 114.3 166.5
CDM of SWA 22.5 42.6 64.4
In the past few years, however, uranium extraction has become a crucial aspect of South African interest in Namibia, for both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The French government has recently sold various nuclear power stations to Vorster. Extraction of the uranium of Namibia is a joint project of the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, which have constructed an open cast mine at Rossing. The IDC, a government body, has invested an estimated £75-100 million in the Rossing project. Finally, Namibia represents a pool of cheap Black labor for South Africa. According to Jo Morris in "The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia, "the minimum wage paid by the Tsumeb corporation to Black workers is £13.30 a month, while the starting salary for whites in the personnel department is £390 a month. The average monthly wage for Black workers of CDM, known to be one of the highest payers, is £24-28. White apprentices receive three times that figure. The bantustan policy The 1975-76 turn by the Vorster regime toward a policy of détente with Black African regimes and the bantustanization of South Africa has been mirrored in Namibia. South African manufacturing industry would like to expand its markets in the Black neocolonial states, but it requires maintenance of a cheap labor pool within its own borders. An expansion of the domestic market would require increased consumption by the Black majority and an end to subsistence wage levels. But this option has been consistently rejected by the South African ruling class. The policy of bantustanization, of which the fraudulent independence of the Transkei (see INPRECOR, No.63, November 23, 1976) is the first example, is a continuation of the racist apartheid policy. In 1964 the Odendaal commission on Namibia made a report to the South African government, proposing the establishment of ten bantustans to accommodate the "twelve ethnic groups" living in South West Africa. These bantustans, not surprisingly, were to be located on the worst areas of land, lacking agricultural possibilities or any access to minerals.
The report also stressed the necessity of establishing closer ties between the mineral producing regions of Namibia and
South Africa. Mass displacement of the Black population would be required to implement the proposed bantustan policy.
Almost 150,000 people (nearly one-fourth of the African population) would have to be shifted. (For example, only
6% of the Damaras presently live in the area that has been designated for them.)
Overall, the white 12% of the population will hold 61% of all land, including, of course, all the fertile land of more than 4,000 feet elevation. Ovamboland, along the northern border with Angola, is projected to have a population of 292,000 (about 40% of the total population)
but will be alloted only 7% of the land area. And half of this land is unsuitable for cattle grazing, while other tracts, which suffer from overcultivation, will become dustbowls. If all these factors are taken into account, the average white person will be alloted 146 times as much land as the average Ovambo.
35
NAMIBIA Along with the bantustans, all the repressive laws in effect in South Africa, from the pass laws to the Suppression of Communism Act, have been applied to Namibia. The movement of Blacks into white areas or police zones is restricted by the pass laws, and in order to remain in such an area a Black person has to have a permit authorizing him or her to look for work. Just as in South Africa, the aim of this body of laws is to provide industry and farms with cheap, migratory black labor-power. Virtually no employment is available in the black "homelands"; the result is massive joblessness and an immense reserve army of labor desperate for employment under any terms. Unemployment in Ovamboland, for example, runs as high as 70%. The only way to find a job is to become a migrant laborer and leave the "homeland" for periods of six to twelve months. Some 43,000 of the 60,000 Ovambo workers are migrants. The figure breaks down as follows: Mining 12,800 Farming 10,900 & commerce Government 14,000 (all in Windhoek, the capital) Fishing 3,000 Domestics 2,700 Prior to the Angolan civil war 40% of this migratory work force came from Angola, 53% from the Ovambo territories of Namibia, and 7% from the Kavango areas of northeast Namibia. The South African stake in Namibia is thus great. Not only for the economic reasons that have been outlined here, but for political and strategic reasons as well. The South African ruling class is determined to establish a buffer zone along the northern border of South Africa in order to stem the tide of the upsurge of the African masses that defeated Portuguese colonialism and has now spread into Zimbabwe and even South Africa itself. This project is backed by British and American imperialism, which want to preserve their crucial economic interests in South Africa even if this means removing the lan Smith government in Rhodesia and replacing it with a black neocolonial regime. The rise of the struggle of the masses in Namibia, and particularly the growth of SWAPO, threatens this project. Vorster is responding on two levels: military repression of the Africans in struggle and attempts to negotiate fraudulent independence for Namibia, patterned after the operation conducted in the Transkei.
According to an inferview given by SWAPO President Sam
Nujoma to Liberation Support News (No. 11/12), SWAPO originated from the Ovamboland People's Organization
(OPO), which had been created in Windhoek in 1959. In
1960 the OPO changed its name to the South West African
People's Organization, because "the name (OPO) did not characterize the national aspirations of the Namibian people as a whole." From its inception SWAPO has had to face continuous repression. It therefore decided, in 1966, to launch an armed struggle. Many SWAPO militants are exiled or in prison. In June 1967, for example, thirty-seven Namibians were brought to trial in a major attack on SWAPO. Of the thirty-seven, twenty were given life imprisonment and one died under torture. Five more SWAPO members were given life imprisonment at another trial held in 1969. At least thirty-eight others were sent to Robben Island. Since 1969 SWAPO has recognized two important points: first, that a base in the working class is needed if the struggle is to achieve victory. Thus, according to its new political program, efforts are being made to establish branches "in the industrial areas of Windhoek, Otjiwarongo, Tsumeb, Walvis Bay, and Oranjemund. " (Nambia News, September 1976.) Second, that countering South African repression required the establishment of the PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia). The new program states: "Armed struggle is now the main form in which politics is being expressed. " While the SWAPO constitution and program contain many correct points, such as the need to "combat all reactionary tendencies of individualism, tribalism, racism, sexism and regionalism, " (point 4 of the constitution), there are many points which remain ambiguous or are ignored entirely. The program manifests illusions in the United Nations, for example, calling for UN supervision of elections. Similar illusions are entertained in the Organization of African Unity. The constitution (point 10) calls for "close cooperation with all peace-loving states towards world peace and security. " Point (a) under SWAPO's "present tasks" calls for a "popular, democratic, people's government, " the class composition of which is left unclear. If is evident, then, that despite talk of socialism by SWAPO leaders, and notwithstanding the organization's heroic struggle against the South African regime, SWAPO is, in essence, a radical nationalist organization. (For a more detailed examination and criticism of SWAPO's program and constitution, see Africa in Struggle, No. 4, available from 97 Caledonian Road, London N1, Britain.)
Despite the criticisms revolutionary Marxists make of
SWAP's program, its tenacious struggle for self-determination for Namibia must be recognized and saluted. In that struggle SWAPO receives the unconditional support of the Fourth International.
Notes:
1. This conference, the aims of which are described further on, is named after the former German drill hall in which it is being held.
2. One of the ethnic groupings represented at the conference.
3. Another of the ethnic groups, one of the largest after the
4. South West African Union. Before the rise of SWAPO it Ovambos.
represented the Namibian liberation movement at such conferences as the Tricontinental. It fell into decline largely because it never developed beyond its origins among the Herero, one of the ethnic groupings.