author is a member of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party), sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina. A terrible silence reigns in Chilean territory, the silence of the defeat of the working class. And the revolutionary movement, the working class, and democratic opinion throughout the world, which denounced the ferocity of Pinochet, also know that for some months now the prison population of Argentine has been several times that of Chile. The Videla dictatorship, responsible for thousands and thousands of deaths, imprisonments, and acts of torture, justly provokes hatred and indignation. This sentiment must be kept alive and above all must fuel a redoubled campaign to win the release of the thousands of victims from the prisons and concentration camps. But when it comes time to make an analysis of the overal! situation, of the causes that led to the coup and the proces opened since, when it comes time to formulate a policy by which to respond, it is necessary to lend an ear to all the voices to whom it is forbidden to listen in Argentina itself. We shall thus see that while subjectively there are no great differences between the governments of Pinochet and Videla, the situation of the class struggle in the two countries is distinct, for the Argentine workers movement, although in retreat, has not been defeated. If is important, then, to advance a characterization that enables us to understand the Argentine situation and its dynamic in all its contradictions, as well as a correct revolutionary policy for dealing with that situation. That is the objective of these notes. Roots of the coup The various currents claiming allegiance to the left or to the popular movement, both nationally and internationally, have offered varying explanations of the coup that overthrew Isabel Perón and brought installed Videla as president. The Communist party, for example, which had been predicting a coup for a year and a half before it occurred, attributed it to an imperialist plot to overthrow a government that was said to be a "people's" government, in spite of errors and deviations and even though it contained reactionary wings and ministers like Lopez Rega. From a position of virtually total confrontation with the government, the guerrillaist currents also predicted the coup well in odvance, considering it an inevitable part of an imperialist plan to spread fascism throughout the southern cone. The truth is that Yankee imperialism had maintained a dual, ambiguous attitude toward the coup. As the daily La Nación wrote in an editorial a few days after March 24, 1976, the majority of military commanders were opposed to a coup throughout 1975 and remained dubious up to the last minute. The truth is that the coup was brought about by a very contradictory process and as the result of the relationship of forces between the workers movement and the government and employers after three years of virtually uninterrupted struggles. This relationship of forces shifted various times
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ARGENTINA ONE YEAR AFTER THE COUP by Irene Rodriguez aw is the first part of a study of the situation ear after the military coup. The second in the next issue of INPRECOR. The
ARGENTINA as this process unfolded and was intimately linked to the contradictions and dynamic of the Peronist movement and government. In fact, the ultimate cause of the fall of Perionism must be sought in the tremendous contradiction between its past as a left bourgeois Bonapartist movement of a special type -that is, as a mass nationalist movement, which is why the masses voted it into the government for the third time -and the reactionary Bonapartist role it came to play once in power. "Inasmuch as the chief role in backward contries is not played by national but by foreign capitalism, the national bourgeoisie occupies, in the sense of its social position, a much more minor position than corresponds with the development of industry. Inasmuch as foreign capital does not import workers but proletarianizes the native population, the national proletariat soon begins playing the most important role in the life of the country. In these conditions the national government, to the extent that it tries to show resistance to foreign capital, is compelled to a greater or lesser degree to lean on the proletariat. On the other hand, the governments of those backward countries which consider if inescapable or more profitable for themselves to march shoulder to shoulder with foreign capital destroy the labor organizations and institute a more or less totalitarian regime. Thus, the feebleness of the national bourgeoisie, the absence of traditions of municipal self-government, the pressure of foreign capitalism, and the relatively rapid growth of the proletariat cut the ground from under any kind of stable democratic regime. The governments of backward, i.e. colonial and semicolonial, contries by and large assume a Bonapartist or semi-Bonapartist character; they differ from one another in that some try to orient in a democratic direction, seeking support among workers and peasants, while others install a form close to military-police dictatorship." (Leon Trotsky in Trade Unions in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay.) From nationalism to reactionary Bonapartism It was the masses of workers and people, those who waged the Cordobazos and Rosariazos(1), overturned the military governments of Ongania and Levingston, and opened a prerevolutionary stage in the country, who prepared the way for the rise to power of the third Peronist government. Terror at the tumultuous rise of the masses which was shaking the country and the necessity of diverting and liquidating this upsurge lent increasing strength among the military and the bourgeoisie to the wing of the army that wanted to reach an electoral agreement with Peronism. The immense majority of the masses of workers and people who voted for Peronism in the elections of 1973 believed they were voting for a government of the movement they had known, a movement which loomed large in their memories after many years of military governments and restrictions. They were voting for the mass nationalist movement which had made great concessions to the workers movement, basing itself on this movement to resist imperialism. But times had changed. There had been a very important change in the political and economic structure of the country. With the 1955 coup, the capitulation to imperialism initiated in 1954 by the Peronist
4 government itself was transformed into an open doo which imperialism penetrated and dominated the es structure and bound the country in military and dig commitments, transforming it into a semicolony. (2 no longer possible, as it had been during the decor to mediate among all the bourgeois sectors without agreement with imperialist capital and the imperic ments, primarily North American, which dominated country and were intimately linked to significant no bourgeois sectors. In addition, the years of the had ended. The privileged economic position the c enjoyed during and immediately after the secon which made the Peronist concessions to the masses t no longer existed. This sifuation had forced Peron abandon its relatively anti-imperialist policy and t the reigns of the country not in order to defend the movement and base itself on it but instead to divert feat it, to save the capitalist system as a whole fro threat of new Cordobazos. The economic situation permitted doing this through concessions. And most the bourgeois nationalist consciousness of the work movement deprived it of the strength and leadership would have been necessary to deepen the mobiliza could have pushed the government and Peronism fur the left. Thus, a rightward evolution held sway, to reactionary Bonapartism. Internal contradictions of Peronism In following the evolution of Peronism from populis reactionary Bonapartism, account must be taken of decisive tendencies and factors of the objective pro Indeed, the world situation, the transformation of country into a semicolony after 1955, and the agg of the economic crisis were the powerful objective which increasingly drove Peronism to the right, in the populist history and inclinations of its leadersh as is logical, this objective process did not elimina transform this history and these aspirations immedia but rather combined with them. Peronism had succ returning to power, an objective for which it had for eighteen years, because the Argentine bourgeo longer hod any other instrument with which to mair class rule. But the very situation that had forced i enemies, the military and the other bourgeois par capitulate, also placed very narrow limits on Pero Peronist leaders were aware that fulfilling their of of propping up the capitalist system within these rs would rebound against them, and they struggled a could to avoid or postpone this process. In a word, Peronism was increasingly to play the role required of it by the world situation and the of the country, but it would do so while resisting, to fully apply the policy that would have brought bankruptcy as a movement. This resistance of Pero attempt to preserve its mass base, while it could decisively modify the rightward evolution, did le Peronist government and movement populist feat though constantly weakened, persisted to the end
e is no other way to explain the very important role trade-union organizations and their bureaucratic leadera played in the movement, and even in the government. inzo Miguel, head of the metalworkers union and most erful trade-union leader in the country, was an integral ber of the Isabel-Lopez Rega camarilla right up to the - Isabel and López Rega tried to limit the power and venice of the burdaucracy, but at the same time they ded the bureaucracy urgently. In tum, the bureaucracy, le increasingly giving ground in face of the offensive of employers, demanded certain concessions. To the end goverment, reflecting both this pressure and, in a orted form, the pressure of the rank-and-file workers, shed completely applying the plan laid down by the mational Monetary Fund. the populist origin of Peronism and its need to maintain tradition to some extent in order to prevent the liquidaof the movement were also expressed in other ways. It * not be forgotten that even though relations became easingly tense, the Montonero guerrillas continued to an important part of the Peronist movement until the ch of Perón. Negotiation with the guerrilla wing of the ement continued even long after. other side of this policy was the ultrareactionary, atic populism reflected by López Rega and to a certain ent by Isabel herself. They gave expression to the many belan sectors which rose with Peronism, occupying the cial posts or creating them where they did not. : Peronist government prepares its own defeat the fair weather years of 1973-74 drew to a close, the ravation of the economic situation was generating unrest I discontent in bourgeois circles, especially the agrarian rgeoisie. The behavior of the Isabel-López Rega camarilla, ich refused to discuss a solution with the other bourgeois rents while the situation steadily worsened, was another ortant element aggravating the crisis. Nevertheless, se who in 1974 began holding up a coup as an immediate pective met with oppostion from the bourgeoisie and the cers, who were doing a brisk business and spent month ir month engaged in complicated maneuvers to separate i from Lopez Rega or at least to establish a negotiating g within Peronism(3), dropping the thorny question of aggravation of the economic crisis to second position. ke the small minorities which had actually favored a ip for some time, the Argentine bourgeoisie demonstrated e it hod not lived the past twenty years for nothing. For thing, the memories of the formidable semi-insurrections had shaken the country and of the decomposition and is of the armed forces after seven years of military governremained fresh in the minds of the military commanders leaders of the employers. But they had another decisive ton to be cautious. So long as the situation was getting ne, the Peronist goverment, even against its own mes, was imposing plans for mounting superexploitation, ting use of the immense capital of confidence it still commanded among the masses. The rate of surplus value was rising ceaselessly. What other bourgeois force would have been capable of imposing brutal superexploitation without resorting to the sort of generalized repression that would have run the risk of triggering new Cordobazos? On the other hand, the most astute bourgeois strategists saw an additional advantage in the continuation of the Peronist government: By implementing the reactionary plan required by the bourgeois system, Peronism would increasingly lose its prestige among the masses; it would lose its support and would thus open the road to being liquidated most painlessly. This was precisely the consequence of the grave contradiction of the Peronist regime, a contradiction the most clever bourgeois leaders wanted to exploit. The Peronist regime had come to power tolerated by the bourgeoisie and riding the wave of the powerful rise of the masses who hoped that this regime would defend their interests in accordance with its tradition. It would have liked to remain faithful to this tradition, but the world situation and the situation of the country did not allow this. As the Peronist government moved to the right it lost the support of the masses and became increasingly incapable of guaranteeing the super-exploitation of the working class without provoking reactions. It thus ceased to be useful to the bourgeoisie and at the same time lost its strength and very reason for being. It thus prepared its own defeat. Three years of struggle It cannot be denied that the victory of the Peronist government made the mass movement less explosive, temporarily diverting it toward economic struggles and thus diluting the prerevolutionary phase into a stable, non-revolutionary one. It is also clear that the broad consensus of the employers(4), the reunification of the armed forces, and the fact that the political and trade-union leadership of the workers movement exerted its full strength and prestige in curbing the movement, demanding that it accept poverty and repressing its vanguard, gave the bourgeoisie the offensive. But those who uphold the caricature of a coup whose triumph was supposedly assured a year and a haif in advance not only deny the class struggle and the possibility and ability of the mass movement to destroy any plan of the employers in general, but also falsify real history, the history of the concrete class struggles and confrontations that occurred during this period. It must be recalled that scarcely a month went by during these three years without struggles by the workers movement. Strikes and factory occupations, slowdowns and strikes by unions in entire cities lasting for weeks and months (such as the strikes of the metalworkers of Villa Constitución and the sugar workers of Tucumán), and even national strikes like that of the teachers, were part of daily life. In this context, two decisive events must be cited: On two occasions (June 1975 and February-March 1976) the generalization and intensity of the struggle of the workers movement, especially in the industrial heartland of the country, greater Buenos Aires, in combination with division
5
ARGENTINA and internal clashes among the employers, either provoked a prerevolutionary crisis (in the first case) or were on the point of provoking one (in the second case). In June 1975 an extraordinary workers mobilization paralyzed the factories; the streets of the capital and greater Buenos Aires were filled with demonstrators marching in what is called the "rodrigazo" (5), an important part of the history of class struggle in the country. A historic event thus occurred: The first general strike against a Peronist government. This strike brought down López Rega and Minister of Economics Rodrigo, won a significant wage increase (ranging from 40-80% for unionized workers), and raised the possibility of deepening the mobilization toward the overthrow of the government as a whole. For a combination of reasons, this did not happen. The bureaucracy, which wanted the fall of López Rega and the minister of economics but not of the rest of the government, which it considered its own, exerted all its strength to curb the movement. For their part, the masses either did not understand the necessity of converting the moblization into a political strike to bring down the entire government or else did not dare to do so against the orders of their leaders. The vanguard, which did understand this, remained alone. At the beginning of 1976 a wave of strikes lasting some two weeks shook the industrial belt around the capital. The strikes were directed against the Mondelli plan, named after the economics minister who was trying once again to clamp on the tourniquet of superexploitation and surrender to imperialism. (6) A wing of the trade-union bureaucracy which had clashed with Isabel, headed by Calabro, metalworkers leader and governor of the province of Buenos Aires, called for twenty-four and forty-eight hour strikes. Then the leadership of the metalworkers union and other, less important sectors announced in various delegates' assemblies that they were preparing to call a general strike. For one week, while significant though minority sectors of the class were supporting the strikes and demonstrations, and while the Calabroista leaders were vacillating and the great masses of workers were in sympathy with the struggle and were waiting for action, the putschists were also lying in wait. The Calabroists, who were widely known and led an important part of the workers movement, were able to become the leadership the masses followed in the general strike. The class-struggle coordinating bodies that had arisen during the mobilization, especially in greater Buenos Aires, grouped together a numerically large vanguard and could have played an important role in this process, but they lacked the strength and prestige to constitute an alternative leadership in themselves. Finally, the Calabroists, who negotiated with a wing of the putschists, retreated; the mobilization receded and lost the possibility of becoming generalized. The road was finally open to the putschists. There was no leadership or force sufficient to detonate a generalized mobilization of the entire working class. Thus, Peronism, while preparing its own defeat, rendered the capitalist system one last great service: the division, disillusionment, and lack of confidence it provoked among the masses in turn deprived the masses of the only leadership they had known.
In the end these two tumultuous processes of mass mobilizo were incapable of defeating the offensive of the governme and the putschists, because they were unable rapidly enou to overcome the historic deficits of backward political consciousness and lack of a mass revolutionary leadership Nevertheless, such a process had begun with the growing repudiation of Peronism and the emergence of the nucleus of a leadership of struggle in which sectors of the trade-union bureaucracy and the coordinating bodies came together. The leadership for the general strike that was posed as a possibility during those days, when the Calabroist bureau cracy held the majority, was far from constituting a revolutionary leadership. Nevertheless, it could have bee a powerful weapon with which to continue the struggle an curb the putschists. Stimulating this process would have co tributed significantly, even against their own wishes, to the possibility of building a genuine revolutionary leadership to replace the Calabroists. This, however, did not happen. But, on the basis of the events that did occur, to deny that it was possible for such a leadership to arise, to deny that it was possible to deepen the struggle and defeat the coup, is bourgeois determinism of the worst ord It is a method of analysis that denies the class struggle and turns reality into a caricature in which the victory of one class over another can be determined with absolute assuran several years in advance, independent of the course of struggle. Moreover, since analyses are intimately linked to politics it is here that the petty-bourgeois social roots of a method that runs contrary to the working class leads. It is no accident that the prediction of an inevitable and constant Imminent coup a year and a half in advance served the Communist party to justify its capitulation to the Peronist government, with the usual argument: "This would only amount to playing into the hands of the putschists. " For th guerrillaist currents, the permanent prospect of a coup was partly an expression of their own desires, since they regarc a coup as very helpful in aiding the development of revolu tionary consciousness; they regarded this prospect as a goo occasion to put pressure on the best worker activists to dra them out of the factories and separate them from the worke movement in order to integrate them into the military apparatus. It is thus no accident that the CP, the ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo - Revolutionary Army of the People), and the Montoneros all coincided in practice. While they curbed the struggle against Mondelli, they centered all their activity on propaganda against the alleg inevitable coup, thus collaborating in weakening the only process that could have defeated the putshchists: the devel ment of the mobilization that had begun against the econor plan. The other aspect of this policy was their outright desertion of the posts of struggle, the abandonment of the factories months before the coup in order to avoid "fascist repression."
or is it accidental that those of us who saw the prospect of a up as the result of the relationship of class forces that ould finally be established and not as an inevitable event termined beforehand, strived to the very end to develop e ongoing mobilization which, having been initiated jainst the economic plan, was turning against the governent as a whole. If this mobilization had succeeded in inging down the government, it would have opened the sibility of defeating the putschists and shifting the fensive to the mass movement. We counterposed the only al and concrete antiputschist policy to the purely verbal atements against the coup. ituation opened by the coup fter March 24, 1976, the dictatorship stamped out the few emocratic rights that had remained under Peronism and multaneously intensified the offensive toward superxploitation of the working class. The parliament and all le national, provincial, and municipal authorities were bolished, political parties were suspended, and the left as outlawed, with the exception of the CP; the CGT (the ade-union federation) and the trade unions were banned nd the right to strike was suspended, while the brutality F the repression of the vanguard was intensified. Inflation ontinued, although its dizzying rate did decline, and wages ere held virtually frozen. orture was used systematically and in a generalized manner gainst trade-union activists and militants suspected of being ctive in the left; at the same time, brutal massacres were tensified in response to the actions of the guerrillas. Conurently, the banning of the CGT and the largest trade nions did not affect all unions; the government began egotiations with the smallest unions, and a publicly cognized though unofficial leadership was established, lected by all the unions, including the ones that were anned. Similarly, the sinister suspension of the right to rike and of trade-union activity was combined with granting actory delegates and trade-union leaders authorization to onduct activity which would have to be viewed as individual initiatives" or "administration of social works." lany officials of the army were compelled to go further in is direction, recognizing in practice the functioning of e Committees of Struggle that hod been formed at the actory level in the heat of the last struggles for wage inreases, with which they were forced to negotiate(7). Toand the end of the year, the trade-union leadership blicly released a statement criticizing the economic olicy of the government. In face of this situation, the overnment announced that it would extend the bans, a easure which, though not concretized, did compel the ureaucracy to retreat and thus, it cannot be denied, irther hardened the government's policy. Another indication F this possible hardening was a new labor code which, as continuation of the attack on the light and power workers, as aimed at liquidating all the gains of the government mployees, which has already provoked reaction from the ectrical workers. contradictory situation also exists within the reactionary fensive in the domain of democratic rights. The Communist arty, for example, remains legal, although its activities have been suspended along with those of the other parties; this means that only internal activities can be carried out. On several occasions President Videla has declared that his government would work for "a return to democracy, "(8) and the minister of planning has announced a plan for discussions with various forces, including the political parties. Nevertheless, all the plans for "openings" that are being bandied about by the most liberal sectors of the government and the armed forces call for a minimum of five years! rule by the present govemment. As for the political prisoners, although about 1,000 have been released, this represents a tiny percentage of the hostages held in prison. All these factors express an important contradiction. Subjectively - that is, in regard to intentions and objectives - the government is essentially counterrevolutionary. In practice it has vasily intensified the reactionary offensive against democratic rights and the living standards of the masses. Moreover, it is possibile that many months and more may pass before the workers movement is able to force important changes in the siutation, which may even worsen a little given the government's need to continue the massive superexploitation and its surrender to imperialism. Nevertheless, in spite of its intentions and the ultrareactionary measures it has already been able to impose, the government has been unable to apply a directly counterrevolutionary policy, and for the moment the stage cannot be defined as such. The situation is one of transition and only the course of the class struggle during coming months will enable the stage to be defined, along with the regime and the government. Jorge Rafael Videla
7
ARGENTINA The key to the situation lies in the ebb of the workers movement opened by the coup. Confused and leaderless, the majority of the working class did not want the coup, but nor were they prepared to risk everything to leap to the defense of a government which they not only had ceased to consider their own but had even wound up confronting as an enemy. Seeing no alternative, they backed down. At the same time, the fundamental reason why the government has not succeeded in imposing the counterrevolution lies in its fear of the power and combative tradition of the workers, as evidenced by the beginning of their effective resistance as of the month of September 1976. There are other factors, however, which also fuel this contradiction. On the one hand, there is the economic background. Tradifionally, the country's basic products (meat and grain) have fit in well with the necessities of the European, and not the Yankee, market. This interlinking has served to partially counteract the predominance of North American imperialism and, in combination with the current "leftist statements" of European governments imposed by the mass movement, has played a certain role in undercutting the prestige of the most rigidly counterrevolutionary groups among significant sectors of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the contraction if not closure of the European markets for Argentine products provoked by the worsening of the chronic crisis of the world economy has given rise to a rather new phenomenon: The Soviet Union has become the country's primary customer. The direct consequence of this fact, plus the prospect of significant trade with China, is a relative softness of the present government toward the Argentine CP; it also has a more general moderating influence. The other aspect of the economic structure that acts as a brake on the tendencies toward fascism is internal. The country has a relatively advanced industrial production which is aimed essentially at the domestic market. It is ouf of defense of this domestic market that significant sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie oppose policies aimed at an accelerated decline of the wages of the masses and prefer an agreement with the mass workers movement negotiated through its bureaucratic leaderships. These tendencies are nonetheless combined with others that point in the opposite direction. The insoluble crisis of the Argentine economy, which puts strong pressure on the national bourgeoisie to hand the country over to the monopolies, coincides with the end of the "Brazilian miracle." In constantly yielding to the demands of the IMF the Videla dictatorship guarantees increasingly extraordinary profits to the monopolies, and international banks respond by granting the country new loans. Thanks to these loans and to the improvement of the trade balance, Argentina is one of the three Latin American countries which had large balance of payments surpluses for 1976. The combination of these factors may provoke a new offensive by imperialism. This would imply the serious danger of a new attack on the living standards of the masses as well as an increase in repression to impose it. 8
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the fundamental key to the Argentine process must be sought in the realm o past experiences, the current situation, and the prospects for the class struggle, as well as the class struggle on a world scale. The decisive element in this process is represented by the numerical weight, combativity, and extraordinary trade-union consciousness and organization of the working class. Its backward political consciousness, particularly its confidence in Peronism, plus the lack of a mass revolutionary leadership, have enabled the bourgeoisie to divert struggles and save the capitalist system, but they have not sufficed to permit a historic defeat to be inflicted on the workers movement, or even a defeat for a very prolonged period. The numerically large middle class - concentrated especially in the cities, impoverished, in growing process of proletarianization, and exploited by the imperialist domination of the country — has been moving to the left since the end of the 1950s, a process which has been accentuated since 1967-68. For its part, the Argentine bourgeoisie, relatively strong and with links to imperialism lives from crisis to crisis and has been unable to halt the chronic deterioration of the country during the past thirty years. (9) The bourgeoisie is harassed on the one side by stifling imperialist domination and on the other by the powerful resistance of the workers movement. To this must be added the clear consciousness of the Argentine employer of the strength of the workers movement, as well as their fear of its mobilizations and the prospect of these mobilizations turning into genuine insurrections, sharpened by decades of experience but especially by the situation opene in the country since 1969. Internationally, two contradictory tendencies are operative On the one hand, the mobilization of the European masses to exert diplomatic pressure on their governments acts to brake the counterrevolution. On the other hand, the pressur of the big monopolies impels the putschists to the right. The North American Democratic government also combines both tendencies. In responding to world pressure and pressure within its own country, its pronounces itself in favor of democratic rights while also demanding freedom in the economic domain, that is, plans guaranteeing the penetration of imperialist capital. Since September 1976 these tendencies have been concretized in the beginning of a reactivation of the workers movement and in a turn by broad sectors of the middle classes toward increasing opposition to the government. The strikes and job actions in the automobile industry and the prolonged conflict of the electricity workers, who paralyzed the factories of the capital and greater Buenos Aires on several occasions, were the axes of a broader molecular process. The attitude of the workers during this conflict, along with the attitude of the government, the bourgeoisie, and the middle class, is important in understanding the present situation of the class struggle. The conflict was triggered by the policy of the government, which was attempting to wipe out some old gains of the union, apparently spurred on by its right wing, which demanded the ouster of virtually the entire leadership of the Buenos
ires trade union, by far the largest in the country. Either cause of pressure from the right wing or because of a misalculation by the government as a whole, a grave tactical ror was committed which united the bureaucracy with the furiated ranks of a traditionally privileged union. An tensive series of measures of resistance was then initiated, cluding strikes or slowdowns that were so extreme as to nount to the same thing. This situation, combined with e spread of acts of sabotage, quickly provoked power cuts large sectors of the capital and greater Buenos Aires. ithin the government, the workers resistance provoked an fensive by the "negotiations" wing, which opposed pression and began secret negotiations with the bureauacy. The government broadcast constant communiqués on le radio and television stations reporting that the army was king over the tasks of control and repression and announcg that first the "instigators of the strike" and then the rikers themselves would be most severely punished. Conary to the communiqués, the troops barred the public from e factories and buildings, but did not carry out repression. ne workers responded cleverly, acting as though they were ing to work when entering the buildings and then going on rike and barring the doors. The population, including broad ctors of the middle class, sympathized with the workers i spite of the power cuts. The communiqués got tougher, ut the electrical workers and employees held out against le goverment. The vacillations and lack of concrete easures of severe repression were more closely noted than e communiqués and threats. The rank-and-file workers ere prepared to confront the repression. After two weeks resistance, the employers began to sound the alarm. • Nación, traditional voice of the agrarian and ranching purgeoisie, which had been backing all the government's easures against the workers, testified to this, charactering the strike as the most serious setback suffered by the overnment since March 24, 1976, and calling on the overnment to make an accommodation with the bureaucracy. ne negotiations, although not yet concluded, may result in e government backing down on some points, including the lease of many people arrested since the struggle began. astrated that it is possible to resist the dictatorship. The face of a working class that began to resist and had the pport of a sympathetic middle class. levertheless, none of this has liquidated the offensive of e goverment, which has now announced that its target is year will be the rationalization of the public adminisration, which it was unable to carry out in 1976. The ffensive against wages continues, a new code restricting overment employees has been decreed, and there have been reats to ban additional unions, which would appear to ave been confirmed by the Ministry of Economics. It is not ossible to predict exactly to what extent the government ill be able to maintain and intensify the offensive of ploitation the national employers are demanding nor ove all whether the support of imperialism will continue. is likewise impossible to foresee exactly to what extent e workers and people's resistance will compel the governent to retreat. The electrical workers, for example, began resistance, forcing an end to collaboration, and demonstrated by the thousands before the union. But while these events appear to indicate that the reactivation will continue, the depth and pace it will acquire in coming months cannot be predicted. For all these reasons, the final characterization of the government, the period, and the regime still remains open. If the workers and people's resistance grows rapidly, if it succeedes in curbing the government offensive, the black months of 1976 will remain an ultrareactionary period but will not have inaugurated a stage of counterrevolution, nor would the government be characterized as counterrevolutionary, in spite of its subjective desires. If, on the other hand, the government continues its offensive, even if there are isolated struggles and contradictions, if the workers movement is incapable of reversing or at least curbing this situation for a prolonged period, then these events will mean that the period initiated on March 24 must be characterized as a new, counterrevolutionary period. NOTES: 1. Cordoba and Rosario are the two most important cities and industrial centers in the country next to Buenos Aires. In late 1969 they were the scenes of the famous semi-insurrections which have since become popularly known by the names Cordobazo and Rosariazo. 2. We are referring here to the treaties of Rio de Janeiro of 1942 and 1947, the integration into the Organization of American States in 1948, and the bilateral pacts with the United States signed beginning in 1950-51. Argentina ratified the Rio pact in 1947 under the Perón government, which provoked a scandal but stood nevertheless. All the pacts were ratified after the "gorilla" revolution of 1955. 3. There was permanent pressure on Isabel to resign or take a long leave of absence and leave the government in the hands of Luder, president of the Senate and a member of the negotiating wing of Peronism who had good relations with Radicals and the officers. He succeeded in his objective for a brief period. During her leave, Isabel was billeted in a military base where Lopez Rega had great difficulties visiting her. In the end, at the party congress held a few days before the coup, the last attempt to push the negotiating wing (then led by Robledo) into the Peronist leadership failed. 4. It was the Great National Accord which, under the Lanusse government, united the officers, Peronists, Radicals, and the other bourgeois parties behind the military government's call for elections and promise to surrender the government to the majority, which meant Peronism. The parties were in turn grouped into a front, the Hora del Pueblo (Hour of the People), which presented a common program. 5. The term refers to Celestino Rodrigo, confidant of López Rega and the minister of the economy responsible for the first attempt to drastically reduce the living standards of the masses. Both Rodrigo and López Rega were brought down by tumultuous workers mobilizations. 6. After the fall of Rodrigo, the government tried a new attack through Calfiero. The latter, who came from the first stage of Peronism and had good relations with the trade-union bureau-
ARGENTINA cracy, applied an inflationary policy with deprived the workers of the gains they had made in June, but he still maintained negotiations with the bureaucracy. As the economic situation worsened, the lack of investment and the deficits in the trade balance and balance of payments required a policy of super-exploitation and a more drastic reduction of the budget deficit. Mondelli, a man linked to international financial centers, was named minister of the economy to carry out this policy. 7. "The 4,000 comrades of Peugeot are now represented by a Commission of Struggle which was formed recently; it includes some members of the old internal commission as well as comrades of other currents. It is a widely recognized struggle commission, as is shown by the following events. After its formation, the Commission of Struggle asked to meet with the employer to present its platform of demands. When the employer refused to meet with the commission, it called an assembly to discuss how to respond. This assembly was deliberating when army troops arrived and arrested six workers. When they heard the news, all the personnel in the sections of the arrested workers gathered together, preventing the prisoners from being taken away surreptitiously. By singing the national anthem several times, they temporarily paralyzed the operation, while the officer in charge gave the military salute. In the meantime, many comrades talked to the soldiers, asking them to lay down their arms. "Shortly after, the situation was still frozen, a helicopter arrived carrying a high official. Descending to speak before the thousands of assembled workers, he symbolically took o his pistol as a sign of dialogue. They asked that the prison be released immediately. The official then met with the Commission of Struggle, which outlined the causes of the conflict. The officer, after assuring the workers that there would be no reprisals from the authorities, promised to intercede with the company. The workers set a deadline of several days. " From the clandestine bulletin of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party), December 1976. 8. The following is from a UPI dispatch on his latest speech "President Jorge Videla said that the military government h leads, in power for less than ten months, would present a political plan before the opposition forces compel it to do But in a magazine interview published today General Vide reported that it is still to early to set time limits on the military government. Our political history during past dec demonstrates that those governments of the armed forces whi do not make a clear proposal to the country in time wind up being forced to do so by the alternatives raised by oppositio groups and have had to surrender power to their adversaries the president said." 9. It is important to note that for decades Argentina was on of the centers of world trade (among the five or ten major countries) and was by far the most important country of Lati America, enormously ahead of Brazil and Mexico (accounti for about 50% of total South American economic development, including Brazil).