Uprising (part 2)
by Pat Jordan Below is the second and concluding installment of an article analyzing the situation in South Africa one year after the black uprising in Soweto, outside Johannesburg. The first installment was published in the last issue of INPRECOR (No. 10 new series, 7 July 1977.) The new apartheid policies did not provide a neat solution to the South African governmer 's problems. Because of the growing needs of manufacturing industry, the period that was supposed to see the exclusion of blacks from the white areas actually experienced the massive and permanent settlement of black labor in the urban areas. The 1950 figure of one million African workers in mining, manufacturing, electricity, construction, commerce, etc. had almost doubled by 1970 and certainly exceeded 2 million in 1973. About 40% of the total economically active African population are now employed in these sectors. Despite the removal, on various pretexts, of nearly two million Africans from white areas to bantustans(1) during the period 19601970, in the latter year less than 47% of the African population actually lived in the "homelands." (2) More than 4.5 million Africans now live in city areas, compared with a total white population of just over four million. 14
But even these figures distort the real situation. A high proportion of those living in the "homelands" are the wives, children, and dependants of those living in the urban centers. Moreover, many of those listed as residents of the "homelands" are actually migrant workers who ear their livelihood by occasional work in the farms or mines. Urban blacks overwhelmingly reject the bantustan concept. A survey of Soweto residents published in 1974 revealed that no less than two-thirds of those asked refused to regard bantustans as their "real" homes. As bad as conditions in the townships are, life in the bantustans is much worse. The average annual income in the four largest bantustans was $97, according to the February 3, 1973, issue of the Johannesburg Star. Most of the jobs in the bantustans are taken by women who have little or no prospect of leaving the reserves and have no alternative to these extremely low-paying jobs. The largest employer of labor in the bantustans, Kool Look Wigs at Babelgi, pays a basic wage of $4.60(3) a week and an average of $6.90; the poverty line for this area is $20.70 a week. (Rand Daily Mail, June 20, 1975. Effects of the recession The worsening of the economic situation has intensified the structural problems of South African capitalism. The boom ran out of steam in the early 1970s. By 1975 the real annual
rate of growth had fallen to 2.5%. Industrial activity fell sharply in 1976, a trend which continued into 1977. The London journal National Institute Economic Review (NIER) of May 1977 reported: "Manufacturing production (in South Africa) in the first quarter of 1977... fell at an annual rate of 6%. " Moreover, "The weakness of domestic demand in South Africa is likely to be aggravated by the sharp rises in indirect taxes announced in early March and by the deflationary budget." The current recession in South Africa is part of the world recession but it was somewhat delayed owing to the high price of gold. Once this declined the recession developed rapidly. South Africa normally has a high balance of payments deficit on its merchandise trade, which traditionally has been covered by the export of gold. In 1973, 1974, and 1975, the current account deficit on merchandise amounted to $1, 185 million, $2, 985 million and $3, 646 million respectively. Net gold output more than covered this in 1973 at $2,034 million, just about covered it in 1975 at $2,938 million, but fell well short in 1975 at $2,925 million. Another aspect of South Africa's economic difficulties is the drying up of foreign investment. As an Economist Intelligence Unit (ElU) survey of July 1976 noted: "South Africa is vitally dependent on the continued inflow of foreign capital for its balance of payments. In the first three quarters of 1975 South Africa had a deficit on current account of $1,432 million. This is equal to 46% of merchandise exports. " A clear indication of the problems South Africa is facing in this field came early in 1976, when the South African government failed to raise a loan of $28.8 million on the European money market. That this was due to unease about the political situation in South Africa is demonstrated by the fact that Norway raised a similar amount at the same time despite offering a lower rate of interest. And this was prior to the Soweto uprising. But political instability is not the only factor reducing foreign investment: according to the U.S. newsletter Business International, returns on direct U.S. investment in South Africa have dropped from a high point of 18.4% in 1973 to 8,7% in 1975. Business International attributed the lower returns to the recession in South Africa and higher interest rates. Inflation, at 14% in 1974 and 11% in the year ending July 1976, has been fueled by very high government spending. In the financial year before Soweto capital spending by the public sector grew by 38% and total government expenditure by 33% (Johannesburg Star, August 28, 1976.) These figures are explained by high levels of investment in the state and parastate projects and by a huge increase in "defense" spending. In 1975 the defense budget rose 50% and this was followed by another 42% increase in 1976. This trend has continued in 1977: defense spending is to rise by 21% to $1, 900 million and public sector borrowing is to rise to $2, 300 million, some 7% of the GDP. (Economist, April 9, 1977.) The effect of the economic crisis on the conditions of black workers is severe. Unemployment among black workers is estimated at 2 million (official figures don't exist; this figure is based upon a survey carried out by the University of
Cape Town) out of a total working population (all races) of about 9 million. A year ago unemployment was reported to be rising at the rate of 22,000 per month (Financial Mail, •July 16, 1976) and this figure will increase if the rate of growth remains at present levels. Inflation tends to hit the black population harder because price increases in basic foodstuffs are greater than the average; in 1975, for instance, they amounted to 30%. In May 1976, the poverty line in Soweto was estimated at 75% above what it had been in November 1970. (Financial Mail July 30, 1976.) The South African government has appealed for "wage restraint" to solve the country's economic difficulties and, to show that it means business, has imposed a freeze on wages and salaries in the public sector. There is no doubt that the South African employers will resist to the utmost any attempt to achieve basic increases in the wages of the black workers. Repression and resistance The apartheid policies of the South African. regime were imposed through the systematic destruction of all organized resistance. With the introduction of the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, an offensive was launched to stamp out all opposition. Massive force was used against the resistance to the imposition of Bantu authorities in the countryside. In the Pondoland, thousands were arrested and whole regions underwent military seige. Armed resistance in Skhukhuniland and Zululand was similarly crushed. Draconian measures were taken to break workers' resistance. By 1956 some 150 trade union leaders were behind bars. All black political activity was repressed. After the outlawing of the South African Communist Party (SACP), the banning of the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Organisation, etc. soon followed. Such actions as bus boycotts, demonstrations against the pass laws, and similar protests were ruthlessly put down. The Sharpeville massacre of March 1960 and the fizzling out of the strike movement in its aftermath led to the collapse of the urban resistance movement. After Sharpeville the SACP and ANC turned towards a desperate policy of sabotage. The other main resistance organization, the PAC, which had split from the ANC in April 1969 and had called the mass campaign of resistance to the pass laws that culminated in the Sharpeville demonstration, also made a turn toward terrorism. By 1963 both these organizations had been largely crushed within South Africa. Most of their internal leaders were arrested and put on trial. Another current, the Trotskyist-influenced Non-European Unity Movement(4) (usually known as the Unity Movement) had played an important role in the Pondoland events. It too, however, was largely destroyed within South Africa in a series of attacks by the regime, the most notorious of which was the Maritzburg Trial (June 1971 - April 1972). Once it was confident that the main forces of resistance had been smashed, the regime proceeded with slightly more flexibility in its attempts to build some kind of credible basis for "separate development. " In 1961 Urban Bantu Councils were established in townships, with a proportion of
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elected representatives from various ethnic groupings. Similar bodies, the Bantu assemblies, were established in the ""homelands"; between 30% and 44% of their members were elected (the rest being chiefs or state appointees). The machinery of the Bantu Education Act of 1953 introduced special schools, teachers, and curricula for blacks. Quite correctly, revolutionaries in South Africa strongly opposed the imposition of Bantu Education, characterizing it as a vicious attack on the rights of the black people, as education for slavery. But these innovations did mean a very slight relaxation in the suppression of black organization and political activity, making it possible for some elementary organizational forms to emerge. Rise of the black consciousness movement The black consciousness movement first surfaced at the beginning of 1969. In that year black students from the multiracial and white-led student organizations - the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and the University Christian Movement - established the South African Students Organization (SASO). The following year SASO withdrew recognition of NUSAS as a national union, declaring that "the emancipation of the black peoples in this country depends on the role the black people themselves are prepared to play. " Explaining their approach, the leaders of SASO said: "Being black in South Africa means being part of a group that is discriminated against politically and socially, either by law or tradition — it also means an identification as a unit in the struggle towards the réalisation of black aspirations. " The formation of SASO at the black university campuses was soon followed by the creation of the South African Students Movement (SASM) in the high school colleges. As Tsietsi Mashinini explained in his Red Weekly interview (October 14, 1976), the Soweto Student Representativa Council developed directly from SASM. SASO was one of the organizations that took part in founding the Black People's Convention (BPC) in a series of conferences held in 1971. In 1972, SASO took the initiative in establishing the Black Workers Project, which had "the task of approaching existing trade unions" and "establishing new trade unions wherever necessary." The black consciousness movement's conception of trade unionism was explained in Black Review 1972: "The classical western elements of trade unionism have had to be modified to accommodate the fact that black workers' interests extend beyond the factory ... to the ghetto, .. the crowded trains and buses, ... the absence of amenities, ... influx control laws, ... lack of proper (education) ... exposure to 'technical arrests'..." The black consciousness movement received some accommodation from the South African authorities in its early days. The Nationalist Party ideologues saw it as fitting in with their separate development project. But by the end of 1971 the South African government had realized that SASO and its allied groups actually constituted a resistance movement. SASO was banned on some campuses. Then followed the ban of SASO leaders as well as those of the BPC and the BAWU. 16
The bans were intended to cripple the black consciousness movement. The Nationalist Party regime pursued its offensive. In February 1974 Abraham Tiro, a SASO leader and at that time president of SASM, was killed by a parcel bomb despatched by agents of the South African police. Later in 1974, following the pro-Frelimo rallies (5) staged by SASO and the BPC, more of those organizations' leaders were arrested and charged with treason. Following these rallies many SASO and BPC leaders were arrested; after long legal wrangles, some of them were found guilty of treason. During the Angolan civil war and the South African intervention, the black consciousness movement openly identified with the MPLA. Thus, two vital components fused to form the basis for the mass radicalization of layers of youth around the black consciousness movement: First, a social base in the existence of a permanently urbanized black population having no identification with the "homelands" and largely free of the ethnic divisions the regime has been trying to sow; second, the stimulus of a successful struggle against white colonialism reaching the borders of South Africa itself. The Soweto demonstration on June 16, 1976, was the dramatic culmination of a protest campaign which had been For further reading on South Africa: *"Southem Africa in Crisis" Red Weekly pamphlet ($.70 post paid) is an analysis of the process of permanent revolution in the whole region, including Zimbabwe and Namibia. Much of the argumentation in the present article rests upon the theoretical research and factual material assembled in this pamphlet.
Southern
Africa
in Crisis
30p RED pamphlet "Southern Africa in Crisis" from Red Books, 328/9 Upper St., on
in progress for some months. There had always been resistance to "Bantu Education, " but the enforcement of instruction in Afrikaans, the hated language of the oppressor, was a new development. Begun in South Transvaal in 1975, it was unsuccessfully opposed by parents and teachers. Early in 1976 the school students began to take up the struggle. Several schools went on strike in April. More than 2,000 school students were on strike by the end of May. Police who attempted to intervene were chased off by the students and in one case had their police car set afire. By mid-June the atmosphere was tense and schools had notices up warning the police to keep away. The story of the June 16 demonstration is well known, but a few key facts should be noted. First, the behavior of the police indicated that someone high in authority had decided to "teach the demonstrators a lesson. " The shooting into the crowd was quite unprovoked and it was only after the news spread of the killing of Hector Peterson (6) that the students charged the police, set up barricades, etc. Second, the violence of the oppressed was not blind: the targets of black anger were the police, and individuals, buildings, and facilities associated with oppression. On the other hand, none of the forty schools built by the charity fund, TEACH, * "Africa in Struggle, " a revolutionary Marxist journal for black Africa ($1.50 for three issues), has initiated a debate on the South African revolution in its current issue, number five. This will be continued in subsequent numbers, with a special concentration on the politics and program of the resistance movements in South Africa.
ZAIRE never fear we're here! IMPERIALIST ZIMBABWE Interview with NO! TO South African NEW MANOEUVRES Revolutionary in struggle "Africa in Struggle" from Box 24, 182 Upper St., London N.1, had to close as a result of damage. The solidarity demonstrations that followed the Soweto massacres involved a range of social and racial groups: black workers on the streets of Johannesburg, Indian students at Durban Westville University, white students at Witwatersrand University, and African students at the University of Zululand, near Durban. In many cases, these demonstrations were followed by the destruction of buildings associated with oppression. The arrests that followed this wave of solidarity demonstrations sparked another protest movement: mass actions demanding the release of detainees. The unprovoked attacks on the second and third waves of protests resulted in a renewed round of demonstrations and more destruction of apartheid property. It was in this context that the first general strike was called. Again, it is useful to quote Mashinini from his Red Weekly interview: "After June 16th we realised that there were too many killings so we tried to get a method whereby we could hit at the system and reduce the casualties. As we did not have any guns our only weapon was to cripple the economy which lies in black hands. So the idea was to stop workers going to work... " Early in the morning of August 23 pickets stood outside the Soweto stations and bus terminals. The trains and buses were practically empty and by mid-morning it was clear that the general strike had received overwhelming support. The second general strike in mid-September marked the highpoint of the protests. However, each of the following months saw some new outbreak of struggle and corresponding counterattacks by the regime. In October there were protest demonstrations, burning, etc., against the murder of student prisoners. In November there were mass demonstrations in Cape Town and the neighboring township of Guguletu for black majority rule, which led to three days of struggle between black demonstrators and the police. In December Soweto students organized a boycott of all business and celebrations for the Christmas weekend to commemorate those who had fallen since June. Fighting erupted again in Guguletu on Christmas day and spread to the nearby townships of Langa and Nyanga. In February 1977 there were student demonstrations in several centers demanding an end to examinations, amnesty for prisoners, and the abolition of Bantu Education. In March there were more protests against the death of prisoners in custody. In April protest marches were organized against the government-imposed rent increases on black housing. Again govemment buildings and vehicles were attacked and beerhalls destroyed(7). The government announced a postponement of the increases "for re-consideration". May and June of this year saw rising tension in South Africa as the first anniversary of Soweto approached. The SSRC mounted its campaign for the resignation of the Urban Bantu Council in Soweto and one by one the councillors resigned. The African Teachers union has since announced that it will support the demand for the abolition of Urban Bantu Councils and the immediate resignation of all urban Bantu councillors. When the Soweto students announced that they were calling a two-day strike on June 16 and 17 to commemorate the thousands of dead and injured of the past year, the author-
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SOUTH AFRICA ities responded in their usual manner. On June 10, SSRC president Dan Sechaba Montsitsi (who replaced Khotso Seal tholo when the latter was forced into exile) and some twenty-five other student leaders were arrested. On June 15 roadblocks were set up at all exits from Soweto. A vicious campaign of threats and intimidation against anyone responding to the strike call began. Most black schools in South Africa were closed on June 16, 1977. Despite the inrate was reported. Demonstrations occurred throughout the country on these two days. Some of the more general aspects of the Soweto and postSoweto demonstrations are worth noting. First, the oppressed black people went into action in a unified way. Students, workers, and intellectuals stood shoulder to shoulder in the street battles. All organizations seem to have been involved in the struggle, for the arrest lists included people from SASO, SASM, BPC, ANC, PAC, and other groups. In addition, the "Coloured" people moved into the fight. The general strikes indicated a deepening of consciousness among big sections of the black proletariat. But certain weaknesses were also revealed:
*the strike movement in the Natal did not attain the level of 1973.
*the African workers in the countryside were drawn into the struggle only to a limited extent.
*the Indian masses, apart from some layers of students, did not throw in their lot with the African and "Coloured"
*migrant workers did not join the struggle in most cases. Second, despite the escalation of demands as the struggle developed, its programmatic base was very weak. This is dangerous because of the various elements seeking to incorporate sections of the black consciousness movement into reformist projects. In this context it is important to consider the program adopted by the BPC at a meeting in Mafeking on May 30-31, 1976. Entitled "Black Communalism, " it embodies a program of democratic, social democratic, and utopian demands. Among the more important of these are state ownership of the land, transport, and major corporations and financial institutions, the establishment of cooperative production in agriculture, municipal ownership of village stores and municipal organization of small-scale commerce. The demands on trade unions and wages envisage a key role being played by the "department controlling labor." The program very clearly illustrates the heterogeneous character of the black consciousness movement, as well as its confused thinking. Third, although in its initial stages the movement was mainly spontaneous, the picture changed as the struggle developed. The SSRC took on the task of organizing and calling actions. In Cape Town in August yet another element of organized resistance had surfaced: there was a division of labor between the demonstrators and those who attacked buildings. As the organ of the ANC (African Nationalist) (8) noted: "The street 18 marches, the Soweto three day strike of August, the anonymous strike leaflets and the method of their delivery, the entry of the 'colored' students into the struggle, left fingerprints whose owners were identifiable: the moving spirit behind these events was clearly the black consciousness movement". The recomposition of white politics The most dramatic expression of the impact of the post-Soweto political crisis on white politics is the final disappearance of the second bourgeois party of South Africa, the so-called United Party (UP). The latter party governed South Africa for twenty-nine years and has acted as the main parliamentary opposition to the Nationalist Party regime since 1948, A section of the party split off in 1959 to form the Progressive Party. Since this split, the UP has suffered a series of walkouts, some to the Nationalist Party, some to the Progressive Party (which became the Progressive Reform Party (PRP) in 1975 after a merger. with the Reform Party), Fusion negotiations between the PRP and UP broke down, and the final blow to the latter was given by its disastrous showing in the 1977 municipal elections. The final winding up was done at the Johannesburg ice rink in late June 1977. The field is now open for the PRP to emerge as the only credible white opposition. (9) The PRP's main support comes from a section of English-speaking capital that includes the most advanced sections of South African capitalism. Less dependent on the migrant labor system, in need of a stable work force, having very important links with the black neocolonialist regimes, and being more closely integrated into the international capitalist system than Afrikaaner capital, these elements would welcome some modification of the apartheid system. The links between the PRP and this section of capital are personified in Harry Oppenheimer Read of Anglo-American, the huge conglomerate which is estimated to co-t--! Ano/ of the investments traded on the Johannesburg st.
range. Of the five parliamentary seats won by the Progressive Party in the 1974 general election, three were held by people having sénior positions in Anglo-American, This tight connection determines the extreme limitations of white parliamentary opposition to Vorster. Despite the verbal criticisms that Oppenheimer may make of apartheid, Anglo-American has made its millions out of the ruthless exploitation of black labor: Striking evidence of this came in May this year: An investigation into conditions at Anglo-American's Welkom mine declared that the "black workers there live in an atmosphere of fear, cruelty and white supremacy". The report quoted one African miner as saying: "Working in the mines is an agonising, painful experience ... Your work is in an extremely dangerous place ... Death is so real you keep on praying and unking god each time you come out alive." Anglo-American has no hesitation in using the resources of the state to protect its profits: In September 1973 a major strike took place at its Western Deep Levels mine, reputed to be the richest in the world. The management called in the police the day the strike started. Eleven miners were shot dead and the miners went back to work next day.
----- photo credits and running heads -----
resisters.
The proposed Inkatha-PRP alliance The most widely touted reformist or "middle-of-the-road" project in South Africa is that of an alliance between Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement and the PRP.. There is much evidence that the U.S. State Department is doing its bit to push this along. Buthelezi is chief minister of KwaZulu, the designated "homeland" of South Africa's largest ethnic group, the four-million strong "Zulu nation." He was appointed chief minister by the South African government in 1970, after he had dropped his earlier opposition to bantustan policy. Despite his increasing demagogy, Buthelezi's Uncle Tom and opportunist character is well established. It reached its depths of degradation when he personally acted the part of one of his ancestors in the racist British film "Zulu. " KwaZulu itself typifies the system: only half the members of the "Zulu nation" actually live there; before consolidation(10) it comprised 44 separate territorial units plus 144 "black spots" (farms legally acquired by Africans, which can be expropriated with little or no compensation); and 70 of the 125 members of the so-called legislative assembly are appointed by the Vorster government. The comic opera character of the KwaZulu legislative assembly is shown by the fact since the "nation" lacks any army or police force, the guards of honor for ceremonial occasions have to be provided by boy scouts. But Buthelezi has been trying to build himself a reputation as "an opponent of apartheid operating within the system. " He has launched a movement called Inkatha(11), which claims 70,000 members, has a regular news sheet, Nation, and has aspirations to become a national organization. Financial support for Nation is being sought from Nigeria and the United States. The January 24, 1977, issue of the Christian Science Monitor reported that "Andrew Young . . • said he would support a US subsidy for black newspapers opposed to the South African government. " The Nation is the only black-owned newspaper in South Africa. Buthelezi is a much traveled man; in May of this year he met Carter, Andrew Young, and other U.S. officials in the United States. He is reported to be trying to get Organization of African Unity recognition for Inkatha. To this end he paid a visit to Nigeria in October 1976. While on this trip, which was paid for by the Nigerian government, he met Oliver Tambo, president in exile of the ANC. He again met Andrew Young at a reception during the latter's much publicized trip to South Africa in May 1977. The outlook It is clear that there is no immediate prospect of defusing the militancy of the blacks. Events in southern Africa are more likely to fuel that militancy than to reduce it. The failure to arrive at a neocolonialist solution to the Zimbabwe problem is key in this respect. The defeat of Portuguese imperialism in Mozambique had a huge effect on South Africa's blacks. The fall of the white settler regime in Zimbabwe through the action of the masses would have a much bigger one. This is one of the main reasons for all the shuttling from capital to capital by the Anglo-American negotiators. The key element has been the South African regime's failure to crush and demoralize the resistance. We must expect a continuous effort to do this, aided and abetted by various schemes to divide and confuse South Africa's black population. Although there has been less violence and fewer demonstrations this year than last, this is in some measure due to deliberate tactics by the resistance. Its leaders wish to avoid provoking the massacres which have been so demoralizing in the past and which have taken a very heavy toll of cadres. They are aware that because of the difficulties the regime faces they can by subtle well-thought tactics get some leeway and even cause the regime to retreat while maintaining their organizations intact (e.g. the establishing of a people's council to run Soweto). The most likely variant seems to be that of a drawn out struggle in which the South African ruling class will be in a continuous crisis, under constant pressure, and confronted by an active and organized resistance. The prime task remains to use this period to unify the black working class and to develop tactics that aid this class in creating its own organizations and developing its consciousness. To this end, revolutionaries should struggle for the unity of all resistance movements around an action program of united struggle against the Vorster regime and its capitalist backers. July 11, 1977 NOTES: 1. The current term for "homelands" scheduled for "independence." 2. Unattributed population figures are from the South African Institute of Race Relations annual surveys. 3. The current rate of exchange, .87 Rand = US$1, is used in this article. 4. The Unity Movement's policies are explained by I.B. Tabata in "The Awakening of a People" (London 1974) and "The Imperialist Conspiracy in Africa" (Lusaka 1974). 5. The South African regime was particularly infuriated by the invitation from SASO and BPC to Frelimo to address these rallies. The two organizations defied a government ban on the demonstrations. (See "Black Review: 1974-75.") 6. The 13-year-old school pupil who was the first to be killed on the demonstrations. The photograph of his body being carried from the demonstration appeared in much of the world's 7. The government-owned beerhalls are hated by young radicals as symbolizing the regime's deliberate degradation of blacks. ores rousing ical posit been expot elearly defined, but present its political it has a more positive approach to the black consciousness movement than the ANC leadership. 9. There is, however, no immediate perspective of the PRP forming a government. It holds only 12 of the 171 seats in the Pretoria parliament. 10. The process of reducing the number of territorial units involving the enforced deportation of hundreds of thousands of Africans. 11. The traditional name for the pad black women put on their heads to soften the burden of the huge baskets they carry.
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