One Year
After the Soweto Uprising by Pat Jordan J weto(1) uprising, which sparked off the biggest ever une 16, 1977, marked the first anniversary of the Somass movement against the racist South African regime. The movement of revolt rapidly spread throughout the coun try, drawing in while layers of the oppressed, the most noteworthy of which were the urban workers and the so-called coloured(2) people of Cape Province. Thus, a struggle which began ostensibly around the issue of the compulsory teaching of the Afrikaans language grew rapidly into a tumultuous social revolt, an upsurge which shook the very foundations of the richest and most powerful state in Africa. The South African authorities succeeded in checking the initial explosion - but only by drowning it in blood. Upwards of one thousand people shot dead in the streets, thousands injured or driven into exile, and thousands of others arrested - it required that level of violence (far exceeding anything else in South African history) merely to contain the situation. The regime paid a high price for the imposition of relative calm: tens of millions of dollars' worth of damage to property, a devastating blow to the picture of stability the regime had assiduously tried to paint, and a huge increase in spending on "defense" and the maintenance of "law and order." Despite all this, the regime failed to defeat, still less annihilate, the resistance. In this respect the situation is very different from that after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. (3) The latter marked the end of a period of struggle and the total discrediting of the tactic of passive resistance. Soweto, on the other hand, registered both the explosion of discontent and frustration which had been mounting throughout a whole period of struggle (struggles which had had some modest successes, moreover) and the recomposition of the resistance movement and the emergence of a new generation of freedom fighters. Moreover, far from being smashed, the body which initiated the original protest action, the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC), is now, to quote The Economist's South African correspondent, ... the only black group with any authority over the township's million people. " This assessment was confirmed by the resignation of the puppet Soweto Urban Bantu Council under pressure from the students. As the Christian Science Monitor of June 27, 1977, noted: ••.a matter for deep concern (by the South African authorities) is the fact that militant younger blacks, including the type of students who sparked the original 1976 disorders, appear to have gained the upper hand in some of the black south africa communities." An indication of the temper, with its strengths and weaknesses, of the young leaders of the SSRC is given by the text of a leaflet issued by that body for last year's mid-September general strike in Soweto and Alexandra, another township near Johannesburg: "Parents, you should rejoice for having given birth to this type of child, a child who prefers to fight it out with the oppressor rather than to be submerged in drunkeness, frustration and thuggery. A child who prefers to lie from a bullet rather than to swallow a poisonous education which relegates him and his parents to a position of perpetual subordination. Aren't you proud of the soldiers of liberation you have given birth to? If you are proud, support them. Do not go to work on Monday. Parents-Workers, heed our call, and stay away from work. We, the Black society, have nothing to lose from operation Azikhwelwa but our chains. Let our oppressors tremble. • .. Our slogan is away with Vorster. Down with oppression. Power to the People." The revolutionary anger of these words expresses the alienation, militancy, determination to fight back, and heroism of the new generation of freedom fighters in South Africa. The leaflet also illustrates the key role being played by youth and students. A fresh new generation which had not experienced the defeats of the post-Sharpeville period was issuing a call to action. And this call - from youth as young as 8 and 9 years old in some cases - was heeded. Half a million Johannesburg workers went on strike on September 15, along with an estimated 100,000 Cape Town strikers,. It was the biggest political strike in the history of South Africa. But the leaflet also reveals the extreme political inexperience of the Soweto youth leaders. As exiled members of the SSRC have explained, in South Africa they knew practically nothing of socialism, Marxism, or the labor movement; even the history of the struggle in their own country was largely a blank book to them. Such innocence is hardly surprising; it has been the conscious policy of the Vorster regime to prevent any "dangerous ideas" from infecting black youth. However, such a level of inexperience can be very dangerous and there is no lack of forces in South Africa seeking to manipulate the unsuspecting; we will examine this factor later in this article. Background to the June 16 events To understand the events set off by the June 16, 1976, demonstration in Soweto we have to view them in their in-
29
SOUTH AFRICA ternational, African, and domestic context. We have to • examine the background of the movement which gave rise to the SSRC, and we must contrast the post-Soweto period with the post-Sharpeville one. In one sense, the upsurge in South Africa last year represented the extension of the revolutionary process which had been developing throughout southern Africa; in another sense, it registered the fact that the contradictions of South African society had themselves reached an explosive stage. In turn, these two factors operate within a very different African and world context from that of the early 1960s. The most notable difference affecting southern Africa today is that U.S. imperialism, after its experience of the Vietnam war, finds it much more difficult to act as world imperialist cop. At this point, it is using the weapons of diplomacy, bribes made possible by its huge economic strength, Kissingertype initiatives, and intervention through intermediaries rather than those of open and blatant military aggression. Indeed, the present U.S. administration feels it necessary to use such tactics as the appointment of Andrew Young as United Nations Ambassador. That gentleman's demagogy is designed to serve the world interests of U.S. Imperialism (more specifically, to make Young a "third world folk hero," to use the words of Benjamin Hook, a Black Washington Federal Communications Commissioner). But even the pretense that U.S. imperialism supports the aspirations of the black people of southern Africa can be a factor encouraging confidence in the ultimate success of their struggle. Of course, the operation is primarily designed to create illusions among the black masses which will help to lay the basis for neocolonialist solutions. But these illusions are limited in scope, as is shown by the refusal of black leaders from such organizations as the Black People Convention (BPC) to meet Young during his much publicized trip to South Africa. But most important, the present struggle takes place after the defeat of NATO-backed Portuguese imperialism in Angola and Mozambique. The effects of this defeat were intensified by the subsequent debacle of the U.S./ South African attempt to impose a puppet FLNA/UNITA regime in Angola. U.S. imperialism was compelled to accept the reality of Cuban intervention on the side of the MPLA in the Angolan civil war. After encouraging South Africa to intervene, U.S. imperialism was unable to openly back up its ally and had to observe, without military action, South Africa's humiliating defeat; this led to bitter recriminations from the latter. The lessons of these events were not lost on the black masses of South Africa. In particular, they completely punctured the legend of the military invincibility of the white man. The black masses' anger is now blended with confidence that their white oppressors can be defeated. In face of these events, imperialism has been engaged in a wide-ranging maneuver in an attempt to recompose its rule in southern Africa. Because of its wider interests in Africa, the necessity to avoid giving an opening to the Soviet bureaucracy, the need to defuse the Zimbabwe and Namibian struggles, etc., imperialism needs some flexibility and change in method of rule in Souther Africa. In addition, the most
30 powerful imperialist power, the United States, has important domestic reasons for at least appearing to be in favor of greater rights for blacks in South Africa. The more far-seeing bourgeois elements are aware that a change is necessary not merely as a temporary expedient but in the interests of "saving South Africa for the West". In Zimbabwe and Namibia, imperialism is attempting to ensure a transition to neocolonialist rule, going so far as to say that it favors black majority rule in Zimbabwe "by 1978"; in Namibia it calls for involving the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) in any post-independence government. But these moves, too, are dangerous. * If black majority rule is all right for Zimbabwe, why not for South Africa? And if Vorster can be forced to negotiate with SWAPO guerrillas why can't the South African regime be obliged to deal with liberation movement in South Africa itself? From the standpoint of western imperialism and the South African regime the most dangerous turn of events would be if concessions appear in the eyes of the masses to be the fruit of mass struggle. Hence all the maneuvers, demagogy, and "indiscreet" statements of Young and others. For the West, the essence of the problem is to make it appear that concessions can be won only by peaceful negotiations, by reasoning with and persuading the white minorities to "change their ways." Naturally, it is extremely difficult to argue such a conception in the South African context. It is thus not surprising that there should be so many tactical differences between the various imperialist forces. But more important, the plans of imperialism to restructure its rule come up against the real material interests of capitalist domination of South Africa. Although the Rhodesian whites could be jettisoned in a desperate situation, South Africa is another story. The stakes are extremely high. Imperialism's stake in South Africa The South African Reserve Bank estimated that total foreign investment in South Africa amounted to nearly $11,000 mil lion in 1975. Although figures on investment from individual countries are a state secret, the June 1977 issue of Africa estimated that the United States now has South African investments worth $3,678 million; figures for others countries include: Britain $7, 126 million, West Germany $2,070 million, and France $850 million. According to figures published in 1975, there were more than 600 British companies operating in South Africa, as well as nearly 500 from the United States; 130-odd from West Germany, and some 85 from France. Trade between South Africa and leading western imperialist countries assumes gigantic proportions. According to figures published by the South African Customs and Excise, South
African imports from the United States came to $1, 459 million in 1976. Other figures include: West Germany $1,217 million, Britain $1, 185 million, Japan, nearly $690 million, and France more than $293 million.
ports revealed a similar picture, non-bullion South African
exports to Britain amounting to $1, 146 million (22.2% of
South African exports), Japan $592 million, West Germany
$543.7 million, and the United States also $543.7 million.
South Africa has a unique place in the imperialist system because of its role as the main producer of gold in the capitalist world. Although its production of gold has declined sharply during the 1970s (from 1,000 metric tons in
1970 to 708.1 in 1975), it still accounted for some 75% of the capitalist world's production in the latter year.
By virtue of its control over Namibia, South Africa promises to be an extremely important supplier of uranium, the production of which is being rapidly developed. British capitalism will be particularly dependent upon supplies from South
Africa, as was explained by the British delegation to an international conference on uranium in February 1977. The conference, organized by the Ditchley Foundation, heard the British delegation, headed by the deputy under secretary of state for african affairs, complain about the effects of delay in production at the Rossing mine in Namibia.
Britain's problems with the supply of uranium are such that some of its reactors may have to be closed down, the June 24, 1977, Financial Times reported.
South Africa is also of great importance for the western imperialist countries because of its strategic location. Apart from its domination of one of the major entrances to the Indian Ocean, there is also the question of the Cape route. Even after the re-opening of the Suez canal, about half West Europe's oil consumption is shipped via this route. This is due mainly to the increased use of super-tankers, and as the Institute for the Study of Conflict noted in a 1974 report: "...it appears very unlikely, unless the area of the Red Sea acquires a new stability, that there will be any great diversion of tankers. . .from the Cape Route." But of even greater importance for imperialism is the role South Africa plays in black Africa in general. Because it is by far the most industrialized and best armed country south of the Sahara, it acts as the underpinning of the neocolonialist exploitation of black Africa. And the converse is true as well: should the masses overthrow the Vorster regime, the puppet neocolonial regimes of black Africa would be shaken to the core in a relatively short time. Imperialism has immense difficulties in applying its new southern African policy because the South African capitalist system, and especially its high returns on investment, rests on the apartheid system. As Colin Legum noted in an essay published in London in 1975: "The cheap labour system, which is the comerstone of apartheid, enables (foreign investors) ...to earn large profits. . . British business, for example, ears more from direct investment in South Africa than from investment in any other overseas area. Returns on mining investments are in the region of 25-30% and the average annual rate of return on total British investment in South Africa was, between 1965 and 1968, 12%". system represents the codification of policies which have The apartheid their origins in oppressive and racist legislation from the colonial era and even earlier; in this sense it predates the present Nationalist Party regime.
However, it was after the election of the first Nationalist
Party government in 1948 that the various aspects of the policy were forged into a coherent ruling-class strategy and ideology. The South African economy had registered rapid growth during the second world war: its gross domestic product (GDP), at factor cost, increasing from just under
$1,000 million in 1940 to nearly $1, 620 million in 1945.
The period of the second world war also saw the change in the relative weight of the mining and manufacturing sectors of the economy, mining as a proportion of the GDP declining from 23% in 1940 to 14% in 1945, while manufacturing increased from 18% to 20% during the same period. The
Nationalist Party government pursued policies designed to increase the strength of the Afrikaaner sector of capital against that of English-speaking and imperialist-linked capital. One of the consequence of this policy was to greatly aid the manufacturing sector against the mining sector (which was overwhelmingly English-speaking based).
The period of Nationalist Party govemment has also seen a rapid increase in GDP: after almost doubling in the period 1950 to 1960, it registered a growth from $6, 380 million in
1960 to $11,260 million in 1970 (both figures in constant 1963 prices; source: South African Reserve Bank). Within this greatly expanded level of production, the share of manufacturing has increased, rising from 23% in 1950 to 25% in 1955, 26% in 1960, 30% in 1965, and 31% in 1970. The trend has continued during the 1970s but was masked by the escalating price of gold between 1972 and 1974 (which rose from around $70 an ounce at the end of 1972 to its peak of $187 in November 1974) and the recession which began in 1974. This shift to manufacturing greatly increased the demand for cheap African labor and therefore produced new problems of control over the labor force by the state. To respond to this a system was developed by which cheap black labor could be produced and reproduced within the allocated "homelands"; this meant that the wages of the African worker could be kept very low while the state was relieved of the main costs involved in the reproduction of labor. Although the greater part of the skilled jobs needed for this rapid industrialization were filled by white workers (who eam on average five times as much as black workers), when economic pressures forced a change in job allocation policy the racial gap in wage differentials was maintained or even increased. The wage gap between black and white between 1965 and 1970 grew from 5:1 to 6:1 in manufacturing, from 5.5:1 to 6.5:1 in construction, and from 17:1 to 20:1 in gold mining. The main function of the updated apartheid policies was to regulate the supply, control, and reproduction of cheap black labor. In addition, these policies were designed to enable the South African regime to launch a counter offensive against its overseas critics. The essential argument of this aspect of apartheid "theory" is that there exist within the boundaries of South Africa a number of different racial groupings, each with its own claim to territory, its own history, and its own culture. Thus, "homelands" were "granted" to each ethnic group, while the remainder of
31
SOUTH AFRICA the land of South Africa (87%) was designated the territory of the white. The "white territory, " of course, includes all the urban and industrialized areas, the ports, the fertile agricultural land, and the main mining areas. In contrast, the "homelands" are economically unviable, often geographically fragmented (KwaZulu, for instance, is divided into twenty-nine separate units). The soil is exhausted, for a combination of their status as homelands, the migratory labor system, and the continuation of inappropriate traditional agricultural methods has led to overpopulation, soil erosion, and overstocking. A large proportion of the millions of blacks allocated to these "homelands" have never seen the areas they are supposed to be "temporarily absent" from. The blacks in the "white" areas (both rural and urban) are thus treated as foreign immigrant workers with no political and very few legal rights. The only place where blacks are able to exercise their political rights, limited as they are, is in the "homelands. " Here, according to the high priests of apartheid, the blacks will gradually and separately develop under white tutelage, toward "self-government" and eventually "independence". Thus under the flimsy cover of "separate development" and "independence" an attempt has been made to convert the question of the brutal racial oppression of blacks in South Africa into the question of migrant labor. By this means the regime hoped to defend itself against critics from the western capitalist countries. This was the essential foundation of South Africa's ideological counteroffensive and the entire drive toward "détente" with Africa. The détente policy was also related to South Africa's current economic problems. The South African economy has suffered from "stop-go" cycles since the second world war, which have been directly linked to balance of payments difficulties. Furthermore, by the end of the 1960s there was a slowdown in the manufacturing growth rate because production was reaching a ceiling created by the exhaustion of potential import substitution. To achieve a new wave of expansion larger markets were needed, and these could come only from an expansion of exports. The population of South Africa is relatively small compared with that of other industrialized countries, and what is more, the very low standard of living of the black population means that the home market is relatively small.
Sectors of Afrikaaner capitalists, notably Anton Rupert of
Rothmans International, saw the potential of a big increase in trade with black Africa. To this end Rupert established the Bank for the Development of Equatorial and Southern
Africa. But any move toward greater trade with (and greater penetration by South African capitalists) black Africa ran up against the obstacle of South Africa's extremely bad relations with most of the black neocolonialist regimes. It is in this context that one must also view the South African regime's changing policy on the Rhodesia question and its sudden "conversion" to the principle of black majority rule in that country.
32 Directeur de publication: Jean-François Godchau
The expectations raised by this maneuver were high. Sections of the western capitalist press hailed Vorster's "new thinking." There was a warm response from sectors of the neocolonialist world. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, after officially welcoming Vorster's moves, sought to help the process along by imprisoning more than 1,000 Zimbabwean guerillas; it is also clear, although full information is difficult to obtain , that many liberation fighters who opposed détente were murdered in Zambia. Kaunda continued this pro-South African policy by supporting UNITA in the Angolan civil war. The story of the collapse of the détente project is now weilknown. Its deathknell was sounded when South African forces invaded Angola in October 1975 in a vain attempt to install a puppet FLNA/UNITA regime. The failure of the attempt to solve the "Rhodesia problem" - despite the assistance of Kissinger - finally laid détente to rest. If there were any doubts on this score, they were finally dispelled by the bloody repression which followed in Soweto events. However, it would be a mistake to rule out a second attempt to launch such a policy; all the basic problems remain, and certainly Kaunda and even Machel would welcome such an opportunity - providing they were given some face saving formula. Apartheid in its most complete form - the Bantustans - is therefore an attempt to construct a system which corresponds to the present needs of the South African economy and, while not in any way weakening white domination, provides a facade for the maneuvers of detente. Vorster was quite optimistic about the prospects for the latter, since both imperialism and most of the black neocolonial regimes were willing to accommodate South Africa. The stumbling block lay in the fact that the Vorster regime could not grant sutficent concessions because the whole policy flew in the face of the actual social and economic reality of South Africa itself. (To be continued.) T. Soweto is an abbreviation for South West Township. Jokingly called "so-where-to" by its inhabitants, it has a population of well more than a million blacks who provide the labor for nearby Johannesburg. 2. "Coloured" is a legal term used to refer to people of "mixed race" in South Africa. As part of its "divide and rule" strategy, the South African ruling class has attempted to prevent a united struggle by the African and Coloured peoples by granting the latter some very small concessions. This project completely collapsed when the Coloureds came out in support of the Africans after Soweto. 3. The Sharpeville massacre marked the watershed of the ANC-inspired struggles of the 1950s. After a campaign of passive resistance to pass laws (the means by which apartheid is regulated), the regime responded by the slaughter of peaceful African demonstrators (67 killed and 186 wounded). The anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre (March 21) is commemorated each year by the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Imprimerie Rotographie, Montreuil No. de commission paritaire: 59