Britain's strategy in Ireland. Although Britain has charted a flexible course in the past and revised its policy on numerous occosions, if has nonetheless remained within a strategic framework created during the early sixties. As the crisis of British Imperialism deepers and the contradictions inherent in the northern situation itself ripen, this fromework is rapidly becoming a straitjacket. Increasingly, Britain is compelled to adopt a qualifatively different type of perspective. Britain's changing role in Ireland Britain's historic interest in Ireland was to enforce an artificial division of labor and manipulate the terms of trode between both countries. Political strategy was governed by a desire to transform Ireland into a source of cheap food and labor for industrial Britain. But the prolonged decline of British imperialism has slowly modified this. These changes were rooted in Britain's difficul ties, particularly since the last world war. A low level of investment and growth coupled with increased competition on the international market and a shrinking share of world exparts has caused repeated crises in Britain's balance of payments. Any attempt to find an immediate solution to this problem by restricting home demand mat with the stiff resistance of a well organized and self-confident British working class. Moreover, in the long term, a restriction of home demand could only add to the stagnation of Industry, making the balance of payments situation worse. The only alterative open was to stimulate overseas investments as a source of profits. The mid-fifties -n an important period for adjusting relations in Ireland -- saw a significant change in this respect with a steody annual increase in the Figure for long-term private investment abroad. An important part of this overseas investment found its way into Ireland, where it began to take over and dominate the new industrial base which had been developed under native control during the protectionist period. In the South of Ireland only 20 percent of industrial capital in the sixties was raised locally and of the remainder over 40 percent come from Britain. In the North too there was a significant influx of capital and even 24 by the end of the flfties only about 30 percent of capital invested in heavy industry remained in local hands. Proctically all the rest was owned by Britain. This development demanded a more sophisticated political framework to deal with the changing relatiors between Britain and Ireland and between North and South. Instead of fostering artificial divisions it became necessary to maximize unity and integration. If was recognized that such on abrupt change could not be introduced overnight. The profound social and political contradictions that had matured over centuries would take time to mellow. In the flush of growth and expansion this did not represent an insurmountable problem. A long-term strategy of rationalizing Ireland's political structures and drawing the whole country more tightly within Britain's orbit was projected. Crisis of British imperialism: the Irish strategy The renewed crisis of British capitalism starting in 1969 hos dealt this perspective a severe blow. When Britain's balance of payments showed a surplus in 1969 it seemed that Britain was beginning to cope with the problems clogging it since the war. But the nature of the surplus indicated that this was not the case. It originated mainly in the fall of import prices and rise of export prices, os a result of devaluation. In other words, it did not reflect a strengthening of the economy but rather o weakening of it. The change in Britain's prospects has had inevitable repercussions on its strategy in Ireland. As late as 1968, when the line it was pursuing became entangled by a genuine democratic upsurge among Catholic workers, Britain's response remained within the limits of the strategy of the earlier half of the decade. During the first phase of the struggle, from October 1968 to August 1971, the aim of the Labour party and the Tories was simply to restore the status quo so that the long march towards a gradual federal solution could be resumed: But the contradictions in the North of Ireland sharpened so quickly that it was necessary to speed up the introduction of the federal solution in a gambling effort to forestall o premature confrontation. Thus, in the second phase of the struggle the Assembly(2) and the power-sharing executive were hastily established and the Sunningdale Agreement was drawn up as a first step in the direction of the federal solution. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this short-term initiative
was still viewed in the context of continued and expanding opportunities for British capitalism. Now that even this procondition can no longer be relied upon, the federal strategy has been made redundant. A whole new framework for gefting the Irish situation under control once more is obviously needed. Britain hos been reluctant to face this fact. Certainty about the depth of the economic and political problems focing it at home had first to be confirmed before bridges could be burned But now that the bleak prospects for Britain are established without doubt the necessary odjustments are being made.
Protestants block Belfast streef during reactionary Loyalist strike in North of Ireland. The White Paper turn If the collapse of the Assembly and the power-sharing execufive and the disappearance of Sunningdale indicates a change in Britain's attitude toward Ireland, then the July 4 White Paper indicates the direction of that change. If represents a decisive retreat from the federal strategy to a highly repres sive solution in the present crisis. In the new White Paper the so-called Irish Dimension is completely emasculated. From meaning that the Orange ruling class would have to subordinate its political autonomy to the dictates of the entire Irish ruling class in accordance with the requirements of British imperialism (as outlined in the Green Paper of October 1972 where the term "Irish Dimersion" was first coined) it has been reduced to the plane of geography -to the fact that the Free State and the six counties have "a common land frontier"! The political significance of the "trish Dimension" is thereby rendered meaningless. As the Irish Times (July 5) notes in its front page coverage of the White Paper: "The "Irish Dimersion" is reduced to a shadow. ... Acceptability (of any British solution in the North) to Dublin, previously a feature of British policy, is excised from the new policy." Power-sharing, the other main pillar of Britain's strategy, is also emptied of all content. Previously the Green Paper had admitted that the Catholic population had become a permanent minority in the North and that alone created a number of social and political anomolies. The first White Paper (March 1973) projected a definite system of power-sharing between the chosen political representatives of the minority and the representatives of Unionism as the only way of democratizing Northern political relations -- a necessary pre-condition for the federal solution. A measure of how much Britain's confidence has been shaken in the latest turn of events is illustrated by the second White Paper where the rationale of power-sharing is seen simply as
U DA the need for political stability. Accordingly, the insistence that "there must be some form (!) of power-sharing" Is more a poignant cry of despair than a political conviction. There is in fact only one form of power-sharing that might have co-opted the anti-imperialist minority. That has been tried and overthrown by the Loyalists. The only other possible form of power-sharing is that advocated by the Loyalists themselves -- the inclusion of Castle Catholics and Token Teighs(3) in on Oronge-controlled cabinet. This appears to be the "some form" of power-sharing that the new White Paper has opted for, The British bourgeoisie is retreating to an acceptance of the old Stormont-type(4) regime with a few trimmings and trappings to save face. Relying on the Loyalists Once the above has been understood it is easy to comprehend the provisions of the White Paper vis-å-vis the setting up of interim political machinery. This machinery. is not a fly wheel operating a transmission belt to a further installment of the federal solution, rather it operates a transmission belt back to the pre-1968 situation. To extricate itself from the terrible mess it is in Britain needs a breathing space. The establishment of a Constitutional Convention to discuss possible solutions to the Northern problem is designed specially to provide this. Can anyone seriously imagine that almost five years of intense struggle can suddenly
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IRELAND be followed by a whole period of mere chatter? That further discussion can produce some remedy that has not already been thought of and discarded? No, Britain is not so naive, nor is any solution expected. Britain is simply waiting for an opportune moment to implement the new strategy already outlined in the White Paper. If Britain Is to implement this strategy, then it must rely on a molecular process to which it supplies the energy but which it is not directly part of. In other words, Britain cannot afford a decisive blow against the minority of this moment. Such a mave would unite the entire community, oust the SDLP (Social Democrafic and Labour party) (5) and send tremors of revolt across the border into the South, Instead Britain is deending on the changing relationship of forces between the Catholic and Prolestant communities, Within the framework of its previous approach Britain tried to keep the Layalists(6) in check while dealing with the minority itself. Now it is releasing the damper and permitting a balance of forces more Favorable to the Loyalists to emerge. Thus the Irish Times (July 5) observed correctly that: "Although a veto is retained for Westminster the White Paper leaves little doubt of the desire of the British Government to withdraw (in a political sense) from the scene leaving the Northern Ireland representatives to arrange matters to the best of their own ability. "And when the White Paper says that "Some time is required for polifical groupings to emerge and develop, to engage in discussion with other parties and interests and to clarify but not foreclose their positions, " what if really mears is that the developing trends since the Westminster election must reach maturity before a new decisive change can be introduced. Building the backlash In this light the White Paper's ambiguity on security is ominous. The SDLP was bitterly disappointed by the absence of a gesture towards creating a security force acceptable to the minority. More important is the snowballing demand among loyalist polificians for a 20, 000-30, 000-strong Protestant Home Guard. Although the British government has been opproached officially by the Loyalists on this matter, although the demand has been coupled with renewed threats of civil war from John Laird(7) and Bill Craig(8), the British government remains silent. This cannot be because the government considers the subject too trivial to deal with. The raising of the demand on the Orange 12th of July(9) commemorations by Taylor(10) was not frivolous holiday speechifying. The demand perculated through from the grassroots of loyalism. It originated in the Ulster Special Constabulary Association, a paramilitary group formed by ex-B-specials which has several thousand members and is represented on the Ulster Workers Council. (11) This organization in itself could easily constitute the backbone of either an official or unofficial loyalist militia. It has been reported that the USCA in fact intends fo emerge at the end of August as an unarmed force to recruit on a wide scale before arming. Added to this is the growing dissatisfaction with the role of the Ulster Defense Regiment(12) and the Royal Ulster Constabulary(13) both among loyalists in general and members of the security forces themselves. Numerous reports of para-military loyalist groups taking over units of the UDR and carrying ouf sectarian operations have appeared in the press. Dissatisfac26 tion with the RUC is also increasing. Proportionately the RUC has borne the brunt of the war against "terrorism. Figures released last month by the RUC show that since 1968 more than half the force has been injured in riots and street battles. By contrast its success against the Provos(14) has been minimal -last year over a thousand bombs were planted despite the unprecedented security precautions. Even the success of the security forces shows how hopeless their tosk is. The capturing of 282 rocket launchers and morters, 1,598 Firearms, 187,399 rounds of ammunition, and 3,400 pounds of explosives reveals only the massive size of the iceberg that lies submerged and out of the grasp of the security forces. In face of this meager performance and the cost to the morale and prestige of the UDR and RUC, the Loyalists' demand for a more aggressive force is bound to meet with a wide response in the Protestant community. Britain's apparent oblivion to the tendency towards loyalist militarism is not without explanation. This tendency is exactly what Britain want to see enhanced, without for the time being soiling its own hands. It will have at once outflanke the Ulster Defence Association(15) and found an alternative and more rellable battering ram ogainst the Catholic minority. What perspective? To date no important section of the revolutionary movement has been able to understand the dynamic and direction of the national struggle, After the establishment of the Assembly, the Officials (16) predicted a return to normality. The far left groups with the exception of the RMG (Revolutionary Marxist Group, Irish section of the Fourth International) and the PD (People's Democracy, a centrist formation at present supporting the military struggle of the Provos) simply condemned the Assembly and power-sharine os an empty gesture but ignored their implication for the future course of the struggle. The Provos forecast that the Assembly would fall, but as a direct result of their own campaign. Following the fall of the Assembly and the overthrow of Sunningdale all these organizations and groups are once more indulging themselves in facile predictions based on assumed dogma: Some see the development of an autonomous working class movement among the Protestant which will inevitably embrace socialism. Others see the withdrawal of Britain and a deal between the Republicans and Loyalists being reached. And, of course, for the far left groups, blinded by their own dogma and self-importance, nothing has changed - "the struggle goes on." All of these assessments miss the mark by a wide margin. Will there be an autonomous Protestant working class movement and will it embrace socialism? Those who answer this question in the affirmative are relying on the current divisions within the Loyalist camp to produce something. But they have thoroughly misunderstood the nature of these divisions. It is true that there is friction between the plebian elements of the UWC and the middle class representatives on the United Ulster Unionist Council. But this friction has not been created by any move on the part of the UVC towards socialism or even populism. What has happened is that the UW strike brought the bourgeois leaders of Loyalism to the pinnacle of power after five years of fragmentation and frustration. Now that they are on top, the Wests, Craigs, and Paisleys are seizing the opportunity to sweep away all the intermediary forces of plebian (working class and petty bourgeois) origin in an effort to bring the movement firmly under their own control.
Those -- among them certain sections of the Provo leadership - who imagine that Britain will withdraw from the North leaving it up to the Republicans and Loyalists to work out some federal compromise display an equal lack of understanding. Can these people seriously imogine that after such o long campaign to maintain its presence Britain is simply going to abandon the enormous assets it has accumulated in the North? Hes British imperialism been increasing its direct share of Northern industrial and commercial capital in the last decade just to hand it over to some federal state that will be dominated by the Provos or any other group of Republicans? Not likely! Will the Loyalist bourgeoisie (or even their working class followers) who have excluded the Catholic population even from employment suddenly agree to shore their spoils? What a hope! Towards a decisive confrontation Finally, does the "struggle" simply "go on" without any significant change? Only the myopic economistic left which can't see past petty reformist issues could believe that it does. While these Fossilized caricatures of social democracy ask themselves questions that have been answered clearly by the course of events (such "profound" questions as "will the Protestant workers unite with their Catholic brothers to fight imperialism") new and decisive questions are being posed. The most Important question in the next period is whether or not the Catholic working class will be able to wage a struggle ogainst the emerging alliance between British imperialism and Loyaliam and the retum to the days of the old Stormont regime. If the answer to this question is a pessimistic one, then the recent White Paper is an epilogue to a series of imperialist maneuvers; if the answer is optimistic then it is only an introduction to a new chapter of struggle. Although the Catholic minority appears demoralized and submissive, there is a process of recomposition at work in the community. In the lost issue of The Plough we tried to evaluate this process. We noted that while the SDLP still maintains political hegemony over the Catholics, the revolutionary anti-imperialist forces were slowly growing. That growth could be estimated only in ters of the electoral support received in the Assembly and Westminster elections and the re-emergence on a touch-and-go basis of street politics. Neither of these could act as sure barometers of the process of revolutionary recomposition that is going on. But that this process does exist and is exerting a real pressure is lately confirmed by the splits that have periodically opened in the ranks of the SDLP since the Loyalist triumph. Moreover, the Devlin wing(17) has apparently got the upper hand inside the party during these controversies. The SDLP as a whole is bending to the pressure of the militoncy within the ghettoes, and this portends a new and more favorable atmosphere for a revolutionary upsurge among the Catholics. If the mood in the Catholic community was one of despair, the SDLP would have softened its attitude towards power-sharing and the "Irish Dimension," Instead it was forced under pain of further weakening its already losening electoral base to project an intransigent and militant image. It is possible to predict that as Britain's new plans become more obvious that there will be mounting opposition from the Catholic minority. Given the critical nature of Britain's economic and political situation and the flowering confidence of Loyalism, no serious attempt to co-opt this resistance will be attempted. The only possible outcome will be a major confrontation taking on the dimersions of civil war..
While it is obvious that the Catholic masses will not abandon their historic aspirations without a fight, a question mark still hangs over the role of the frish revolutionary movement. As a whole it has shown a decided inability to understand the dynomic of the struggle or to give real leadership to the broad layers who have from time to time placed confidence in them. The coming confrontation is the last chance for a long time. Only by uniting our forces and forging real links with the masses can we hope to meet the challenge. Footnotes: 1. The Sunningdale Agreement (Involving power-sharing and a "'Council of Ireland") was established by the British government, the Northern Ireland Executive (composed of the SDLP, Faulkner Unionists, and the Alliance partil and the Southern government2. The Assembly is the governing body of the Six Counties of Northern Ireland set up by Sunningdale. 3. Castle Catholic" is a term for collaborators with British Imperialism, coined when Dublin Castle wos the seat of British power in Ireland. Teigh (or Taig) is a historic term of abuse used against the Catholic minority in the North. 4. Stormont was the seat of government in the North until direct rule was Introduced in March 1972. Its name is firmly identified with Protestant political supremacy. 5. Social Democratic and Labour party originally grew out of the Civil Rights struggle, and represents Catholic bourgeois and petty-bourgeois inherests. 6. Protestants committed to re-establishing the pre-1968 status quo: 7. A right-wing Unionist. 8. An ex-Stormont minister, one of the foremost Loyalist leaders, who set up the Vanguard Unionist party and maintains close links with paramilitary organizations. 9. The 12th of July is a carnival of Protestant supremacy celebroting the victory of William of Orange over James I at the Battle of the Bayne. 10. A right-wing Loyalist politician and an ex-Stormont minister: 11. Coordinating body of the recent Loyalist strike. 12. A special regiment of the British Army, recruited exclusively in Northern Ireland and almost 100 percent Protestant. 13. The police force, almost entirely Protestant. 14. Provisional Irish Republican Army. One of two wings of the IRA, it still engages in armed struggle. 15. Loyalist paramilitary federation of plebian local "defense" associations. 16. Official Irish Republican Army, the other of two wings of the IRA 17. Refers to the populist element in the SDLP which believes that a more militant line is required to hold on to its electoral support. This position is exemplified by Poddy Devlin, a former Civil Rights leader and a member of the IRA in the 1950s.
27
the spring offensive
JAPAN after the elections & Last July 7 elections were held for half the positions in the Upper House of the Japanese parliament. The Upper House is one of the two chambers of the parliament, roughly corresponding to the American Senate. Elections to it are held every three years. Two months earlier, the traditional "spring offensive" of the trade unions had touched off a strike wave whose breadth was remarkable. Generalized struggles are organized every spring, since all trade-union contracts are renewed during that season. In the following interview, taken by Pierre Rousset, Y. Sakal, a member of the Political Bureau of the