independent!
mozambique, angola:
lisbon tries to hold on sary for American imperialism in coming months and years.
According to the last opinion polls (which were taken before his public admission that he had been lying about Watergate for more than two years), Nixon had the support of only slightly more than one-fifth of the population. Further, the other four-fifths of the people were not just neutral. Nixon hod become a detested figure: The continuation of such a regime would have exacerbated all the problems of the ruling eless. The coming intersification of the attack on the standard of living of the working closs, if it had been administered by Nixon, would have vastly accelerated the resistance of the class. In foreign policy, Nixon would have been unable to use the usual chauvinist patriotic arguments to garner suppart for his policies, for the simple reason that the majority of the population had become convinced that everything Nixon said was a bold-faced lie: In the Nixon administration, the U.5, ruling class had a regime that could not function. The hope is that the change in personalities will enable a new regime to implement precisely the policies that the old regime would have had great difficulty in carrying out. But the popular mood that was in large part responsible for the state of Nixon's prestige has not disappeared with Nixon. Nor will it. The radicalization of the 1960s, focused around the movement against the Indochine war and the movement for Black liberation, was based not only on the moral outrage of certain sectors of the population at various ills. It was also a reflection of material reality. The war in Indoching and the AFRICA The "process of decolonization" was incontestably accelerated by the change in the Lisbon government in July. (See INPRECOR, No. 5-6.) The initial plan worked out by Foreign Minister Mario Soares, which we described as utopian, is hanging fire. Lisbon wanted to start fresh by proclaiming the Imminent independence of Guinea-Bissau and the opening of a period of transition in the Cape Verde Islands, Angola, and Mozambique. This new initiative is not at all the result of o sudden moral effusion on the part of the men in power in Lisbon. It was a toctical turn imposed by the situation in the colonies and the internal situation in the metropolis itself, where the restart of economic functioning after the summer vacations promises to be difficult. Everybody has greeted the furn with applause: the imperialist governments that have been cheerfully arming the colonial troops for years, the African governments that are stepping up their intrigues, and the ever-present "observers" whose analyses are summed up in photographic film. The plan of the Portuguese goverment is clear. It is based on a number of factors: -- Except for Guinea, the liberation movements have nowhere imposed their control over the greater part of the colonial territories. - The present situation is deteriorating rapidly ond the strengthening of the hard-line camp among the colons may very soon bury any hope of a neocolonial solution. Under these conditions, Lisbon is preparing a general proposal oppression of the Blacks were adversely affecting the lives of broad sections of the population. The radicalization that began in the 1960s significantly altered the consciousness of wide layers of the American population about their government. Brood sections of the antiwar movement were not simply objecting to a particular policy of the government, but were openly and consciously siding with the enemies of the American government, the Vietnamese revolutionaries. Brood sections of the Black liberation movement were not merely domanding the alteration of this or that particular policy of the government, but were conscicusly condemning the entire structure of American capitalism. These revolutionary feelings, while they have been restricted to a relatively small minority of the population, have had a generalized effect throughout the country The major weakness of the radicalization of the 1960s was that it failed to penetrate the mosses of the American working class to any significant degree. Today, however, the material Interests of the working class are being threatened and attacked by the international capitalist economic crisis and its effects in the United States. The next wave of rodicalization will surely find it roots in that reality. The "era of good feeling" that the ruling class is attempting to construct around the administration of Gerald Ford will not be able to counteract that material reality any more than patrictism was able to save Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon.
by C. GABRIEL for the liberation movements opening a period of transition in order to break the hard-line danger and settle the question of the colons and at the some time maintain a Portuguese presence in the apparatus of production. Thus, Lisbon is holding to its proposal for a referendum in the Cape Verde Islands and is planning on coalition governments in Angola and Mozambique. As for Mozambique, let's listen to Commander Seabra, who was sent from Lisbon to LorenzoMarquès: "For an agreement to be reached with FRELIMO, It would be necessary for this movement to accept a presence of Portuguese troops in Mozambique in order to prevent the formation of a reactionary right-wing force. Of course, we hope that there will be some members of FRELIMO among the odministrators who will soon be named, but we insist on the fact that FRELIMO must understand the necessity of our remaining in Mozambique in order to guarantee peace there." (August 7) A similar opinion was expressed by Parcidio Costa, the vice-governor for economic affairs in Mazambique, who observed on August 9 that FRELIMO's participation in a coalition government with the whites was necessary in order to "test its attitude and assure leadership for the future state.* For Angolo, this is the plan: -- cease-fire; - provisional coalition goverment including the MPLA, the ANLF (and possibly UNITA), organizations of the colons, and representatives of ethnic groups"; - after two years (1) elections to a constituent assembly,
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AFRICA which will draw up a constitution and define the new state's relations with Portugal; - then, dissolution of this assembly, new elections, and a new government. Can anyone believe for a minute in the stability of such a house of cards? Just when Angola is little by little reentering a civil war, Lisbon proposes a two-year transition! While clashes between Africans and whites are breaking out in Mozambique and while Luis Cabral has just declared that the PAIG and the state of Guinea will henceforth become instruments for the struggle "for the liberation of the Cape Verde Islands"! The future of the new Portuguese plan is thus scarcely likely to be any brighter than that of the first plan. Even if FRELIMO accepts the principle of coalition government, and even if the MPLA and the ANLF sit together in Lucanda, these situations will not lost very long in face of the growing mobilization of the African masses, the "radicalization" of the white colons, the economic crisis in Mozambique, and the policy of South Africa. The Lisbon government is continuing little by little to lose control of the situation in southern Africa. A generalized crisis is no longer a matter of conjecture, and the bourgeois press is beginning to hark back to the Congo crisis of 1961. To be sure, as in the Congo, the political situation does not allow for the stabilization of African governments. As in the Congo, the enormous resources, the question of the colons, and the maintenance of colonial troops can facilitate secessions and regional conflict. But the Congo had not been the scene of twelve years of armed struggle. The Congo was not embedded in a politico-economic context such as now prevails in souther Africa, where the interpenetration of Imperialist interests will continue to spin a web that will generalize the crisis. An explosion would result in the confrontation of millions of Africans against Rhodesian, South African, and Portuguese armed bands. The continental, and even international, crisis that would break out then would determine the terms of the modification of the relationship of forces on the continent and the rhythms of the emergence of the African revolutionary vanguard. Such a situation would call for the mobilization of the whole international revolutionary movement. We must prepare for this. In the immediate serse, the ball is in the camp of the liberation movements. Three elements will determine the character of the coming period: the crisis of the MPLA, the question of the colons, and the question of "African unity. " The MPLA Four main factors determine the crisis of the MPLA: the polittion of the movement, especially of the external apparatus, and a tendency toward "villagism"; the intrigues of the neocolonial govemments; and the question of the ANLF. There are three declared tendencies in the MPLA: the Neto tendency, which presents a balance-sheet on the outgoing leadership accusing it of "presidentialism"; the Open Revolution tendency (Mario de Andrade), which is supported by Brazzaville (capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo); and the Chipenda tendency, which has protectors within the Zambian government. The congress of the MPLA, which opened in Lusaka, Zambia, on August 8, reflech the depth of the crisis. While the Chipenda tendency has a concrete reality in sense that it "con20 trols" some liberated zones, the Andrade tendency symbolizes the bureaucratic way the congress was prepared through a call to elements that had stood outside the liberation movement for many years. But that is not the main thing. The most disturbing thing is the growing loss of political independence in relation to the neocolonial governments. A few weeks ago a protocol agreement was reached in Lusaka among the three tendencies. But this accord was cosigned by Lopez, the prime minister of the Congo-Brazzaville, and the Zambian minister of Foreign affairs. On July 26 a meeting was held in Bukuvu (in Zalte) of the presidents of the Congo, Zambie, Zalre, and Tanzania, as well as representatives of the MPLA and the ANLF. At this conference on agreement was reached between the two movements to take a common tactical line in the negotiations with the Portuguese goverment. Only imbeciles could greet the meetings of Lusaka and Bukuvu! In such a context, the "unity" of the MPLA means the strengthening of the neocolonial holy alliance. The strengthening of the Congolese and Zambian factions in the MPLA and the strengthening of Mobutuist diplomacy through the ANLF can only be event that will have extremely serious consequences for the direction of development of the struggle for the liberation of Angola. The Portuguese government, moreover, is not kidding itself. Not so long ago Mario Soares refused to negotiate with the ANLF for fear of reinforcing the American intervention; but he now has agreed to negotiate with the ANLF in the framework of a coalition government. A bird in the hand Holden, head of the ANLF and Mobutu's man, has just roceived a second contingent of Chinese instructors; he controls
a real border army prepared to intervene should Kinshasa's wishes not be respected. On August 9, the first "congress" of Angolan students linked to the ANLF was held in Zalte, and on August 7 the Union of Workers of Zaire and the Afro-American Center of Labor organized on international trade-union week in which, of course, "trade-union delegates of Angola" -- from the ANLF -- participated.
Given such a situation, there is no other road for the MPLA than to build an anticapitalist tendency opposed to any strategic compromise with the neocolonial regimes and the ANLF. The counterrevolution today holds o number of trump cards and it is essentially counting on the political appetites of the African puppets to build up the most right-wing tendencies in the MPLA. To be sure, such an inttiative on the part of milifants of the MPLA implies a new launching of struggle, a difficult battle in an urban setting, and a total isolation in the context of African diplomacy. But the analysis of the situation clearly proves that such a radicalization of the struggle cannot be put off if the path of neocolonialism is to be really blocked. The colons The question of the white colons (600, 000 of them in Angola, 200,000 in Mozambique) is without doubt a decisive question in the transactions now under way. From a political point of view, this European population is the target of the South African intrigues. Its behavior in the coming period con liquidate Lisbon's tactics, can touch off chaos out of which will come either a rodicalization of the national liberation struggle or a crushing of the Portuguese positiors in favor of the Americons. It will thus be imperative for the liberation movements to formulate o political response -- all the more so in that racial incidents are on the rise in Angola and Mozambique. Are these actions the work of South African agitators, bandits, and uncontrolled elements? This may be the case in certain areas. But these clashes cannot be reduced to the racial level alone and condemned as such. They are the expression of social conflicts more than racial conflicts. The colons cannot be analyzed as a classical social formation. It is not the big Portuguese industrialist but the taxi driver who is carrying on pogroms and murdering dozens of Africans in Luanda. However "poor" or "rich" they may be, the colons occupy a particular place in the social relations of the colonies. To assert that the fight is not against whites but against colonialism is certainly necessary, but it is by no means sufficient. Is it necessary to explain to the African masses that the current stage necessitates a toctical approach? Is is necessary to deny the social character of the vengeance of the slum dwellers against the Portuguese shopkeepers who extend credit at 20 percent interest and who run the black market? Is it necessary to get in the way when the workers kick out the Portuguese employer and take his place? Up till now the response of the liberation movements to these questions has been insufficient, and in trying to be "realistic" in order to block the path of the hard-liners, they are failing to offer the only response that con prepare for the inevitable confrontation: the military training of the urban masses and their mobilization around anticapitalist objectives. To be sure, it is necessary to struggle against tendencies toward genocide, but illusions about the support of the Portuguese army are equally irresponsible. Nevertheless, Oscar Montero, a representative of FRELIMO, told the Paris daily Le Monde: "As for those (of the whites) who are wedded to Portuguese tradition and culture, we will obviously not force them to become Mozambique citizens. They can stay in Mozambique and their lives, their interests, and the fruits of their labor will be guaranteed at the outset and without negotiations, for this flows from our political line: " And on August 6, Commander Dalapa told the press: "If is not only FRELIMO that has won this war, but also the Portuguese officers who have rejected the discredited Lisbon dictatorship." Tactics? Maybe. But when will a strategy be formulated that offers a general response to the present urban strikes and mobilizations? "African unity" The construction of an economy independent of imperialist diktat is undoubtedly a central concern of the liberation movements. In previous orticles we have explained the absence of a strategic response to this question and the economistic and moralizing character of the antidotes that have been put forward to neocolonialism. What would happen to the immense Imperialist interests in Angola and Mozambique under coalition governments? This remains one of the most important questions, for we know that from the economic point of view these countries are already more neocolonies of various imperialist factions than they are colonies of Portugal. In an article published in INPRECOR No. 3 we criticized the liberation movements' lack of precision on the social objectives of the struggle. While we are obviously partisons of an anticapitalist answer to this question, we have no illusions about the possibility of a Guinean, or even Angolan, workers stote. Too many factors make such a perspective a utopia. The level of productive forces, the economic resources, the ethnic questions within the states, and the existence of ethnic groups that stroddle the borders of the puppet states, which are carefully nurtured by the African bourgeoisies -- all this i slies and imposes a regional and internationalist dimension to the construction of on economy freed from the capitalist yoke: The military question -- that is, the capocity to respond to the counterrevolution -- also constitutes an argument in favor of a regional strategy. The struggle for the Cope Verde Islands is thus no longer simply a question of unity of the Portuguesespeaking territories or even of the islands' historic ties with Guinea. In is also a question of breaking the isolation of the future Guineon state and of liquidating an important Imperialist base in the region. At a time when Dakar and Conakry are putting out communiqués demanding on early cooperation agreement with the state of Guinea-Bissau, it is urgent for the PAIGC to define its attitude toward neocolonial Africa. There must be no illusion that there can be an economically independent Guinea-Bissau side by side with a neocolonial Senegal. And likewise, what goes for Guinea-Bissau in relation to neocolonial central Africa goes for Angola and Mozambique in relation to white southern Africa. The cose of Cabinda (an enclave of Angola surrounded by the Congo) is the clearest. If the American imperialists provoke a secession, the revolution will have to be waged throughout the Congolese ethnic area, for the N'Gouabis and the Mobutus are the pawns in a nationalist farce. The Cabinda national question is Washington's thing. There is certainly a Cabindese population that is not identical to the rest of the Angolan population. But a secessionist initiative would lead to a proliferation of micronationalisms that would be favorable to imperialism. The only response is the strengthening and defense of national rights within the framework of an uninterrupted and internationalist development of the revolution. Cabinda will not be saved by dickering with the governments of Brazzaville and Kinshasa. This question concerns the masses of all three countries -Angola, the Congo, and Zaire -- and must be solved through their common mobilization.
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