THE
FIGHT AGAINST
SOARES'S AUSTERITY
*Information on the mobilization and preparation of the workers for struggle is contradictory; it varies from sector to sector. " Thus began the chapter on the situation of the workers movement in the resolution passed by the assembly of Portuguese Communist party codres held December 18, 1976. Exactly what is the situation of the workers movement? What was the impact of the recent struggle of the public service workers? What is the import of the congress of the Intersindical (the trade-union federation) and the crisis of the Socialist party? Rising workers combativity At the end of January, a few weeks after the election of their trode-union leodership, public service employees demonstrated at So Bento. Against the 15% wage increase proposed by the government, some 10,000 workers demanded an across-the-board increase of 2,000 escudos a month. Previously, 60, 000 workers had signed petitions demanding the same thing. But upon arrival at São Bento, the union leadership (dominated by the CP) limited itself to asking for negotiations, without presenting any specific demand, even though this leadership hod been elected on the basis of a platform containing an explicit defense of this objective of struggle.
PORTUGAL ANISTE by GEORGE BUARQUE Because of this policy, the strikes were isolated. The CP has systematically opposed the development of other forms of struggle. This explains why labor contracts have remained suspended for more than a year and why there has still been no overall response from the working class. Nevertheless, the situation is now beginning to change. In 1976, after the formation of the Soares SP government, and following an initial moment of hesitation, some significant sectors of the working class did mobilize: the textile workers, employees in commerce, shoe workers, sectors among the most exploited but also the most disorganized on the trade-union level. Thus the trend toward the generalized dynamic of unification of struggles which had held sway before November 25, 1975, ond even during the final phase of the sixth government, was reversed. This situation weakened the workers movement, intensified its divisions, and enabled the Soares government to move to the offensive. In September 1976 the workers at Lisnave and Setnave shipyards accepted the administration's proposal, which rejected the forty-hour week and across-the-board wage increases of 1,000 escudos a month for all; in fact, it even introduced new divisions in wage categories. One hundred and one agricultural properties that had been seized by peasants in 1975 were evacuated. The right of reserve (the return to landlords of a portion of
land occupied by peasants) began to be applied. On September 9, 1976, Soares issued a call for a battle for production and a social pact: "Hard work and discipline, that is the first precondition for emerging from the tunnel in which we now find ourselves. "And he added: "The government calls upon trade-union officials and all workers in general, as well as the employers, to increase productivity at all costs. This is an urgent national imperative. . . In the interests of the workers, the situation must be clarified. Given the impossibility of immediate layoffs, many enterprises won't create new jobs or accept new projects. " To concretize the "demands" of the Social Democratic leaders, a law on layoffs was adopted in 1976. Some of the grounds on which layoffs are allowed are: "l. illegitimate disobedience of the orders of supervisory officials;.. 5. damaging the property of the enterprise;. . .7. a number of unjustified absences amounting to Five consecutive or ten non-consecutive days a year;. . .12, abnormal reduction of the productivity of the workers." The first phase of trade-union mobilization, coinciding with preparation for the congress of the intersindical, led to the day of struggle of November 27, 1976: Some 30,000 workers turned out to the May 1 Stadium in Lisbon, but they were offered no specific rallying cry. The toughest struggles and strikes dragged on, the employers refusing to negotiate and the government declining to intervene. Nevertheless, the pressure of workers combativity persisted. The construction workers of Modeira, under the leadership of far-left militants, launched a strike that led to a partial victory in two weeks. But the construction workers on the mainland did not budge. The workers of the "margem esquerda" collective production unit surrounded a plot of property slated to be returned to a British landlord and held their position for quite some time. But there was no solidarity movement. In two textile factories, Maconde (in Braga) and M. Lopes Henrique (in Lisbon) there were protracted strikes with factory occupations against the layoff of two union delegates.
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But it was only in December 1976 that the struggles once again began to have an impact on the political situation. The postal workers strike of December 15, 1976, heralded some important mobilizations, particularly those of the teachers and public service employees. These struggles must be located in a socioeconomic context which is increasingly marked by crisis. The secretary of state for the economic plan has odmitter that the rate of unemployment is 14%. But the real figure must be on the order of 29% (700, 000 workers), which represents an increase of 30% since December 1975. According to government figures, real wages declined 17.5% last year; according to the figures of the trade unions and the workers parties, the decline was 25%. But at the same time, the government is having great difficulty launching an offensive against the toiling masses in order to create the conditions for a bourgeois anti-crisis policy. The resistance of the workers movement to anti-union legislation threatens to turn into mass mobilizations. Meetings of trade-union leaders, delegates, and members of workers commissions held in Lisbon on November 6, 1976, and in Porto on January 9, 1977, reflected a growing radicalization: nearly 10% of the delegates declared themselves for preparation of a national strike for collective bargaining contracts, a proposal made by union militants supporting the positions of the Liga Comunista internaciona lista (LCI - Internationalist Communist League). After an initial offensive, the duration of which was prolonged by the results of the elections, the government is now confronted with greater combativity and a permanent crisis which places it in opposition to the rank-and-file workers of its own party, the SP. This is accompanied by a deepening of political opposition from the bourgeois parties and pressures from the military hierarchy. Soares will now stake everything on his next move: a deeper attack on the trade-union movement and the agrarian reform. This attack will be concretized in legislation challenging some of the decisive gains of the toilers: workers control, the workers commissions, and the collective production units (in agriculture).
Economic and political crisis worsens
The municipal electiors of December 12, 1976, confirmed the combativity potential of the working class,
Although they did not qualitatively alter the political situation, these elections did highlight the depth of the crisis of bourgeois leadership. In spite of the limits of the comparison, it should be noted that the PPD
(Partido Popular Democrático — Popular Democratic party, largest bourgeois party in Portugal) lost 275,000 votes compared with its performance in the legislative elections of spring 1976 (and 475, 000 votes compared with the 1975 elections to the Constituent Assembly) .
The CDS (Centro Democrático Social - Social Demo-
cratic Center, the "rightist" bourgeois party) lost 171,000 votes (which represents 20% of its total vote in the legisiative elections). For its part, the Socialist party lost 500,000 votes (750, 000 compared with the Constituent Assembly elections). Like the PPD and CDS, the SP lost ground everywhere (except in Beja). On the other hand, the Communist party got twice as many votes as is candidate, Octávio Pato, did in the presidential elections last year, although in absolute figures it did not attain the record result of the legislative elections. The GDUP (Dynamization Groups of Popular Unity, the far-left grouping established around the candidacy of Otelo Carvalho in the presidential elections) did not succeed in amassing the sum of votes received by the MES (Movimento Esquerda Socialista - Left Socialist Movement) and the UDP (União Democrático Popular - People's Democratic Union) in the April 1976 legislative elections. Obviously, it was the bourgeois parties that suffered most from the increase in the rate of abstention (35% as against 20% during the legislative elections). This has prevented them from launching the offensive that PPD leader S& Corneiro declared inevitable after the elections. In fact, before the municipal elections Sá Carneiro told the congress of his party: "Faced with an ineffective government and an Assembly of the Republic in which there is no stable majority, the president will surely be called upon to play an increasingly active role in the framework of the Functions aftributed to him by the Constitution." The PPD was shifting its orientation, now aiming at a government the backbone of which would be made up of a bloc between the PPD and the SP. Further, a preference was indicated for a military government under the direct control of President Ramalho Eanes. The CDS also developed the same orientation.
But the municipal elections provoked some disarray in these circles. Sá Carneiro upped the ante, stepping up his attacks on the government and his calls for military Intervention. The CDS, on the other hand, moderated the tone of its criticisms. The basic difference between Sá Carneiro and Freitas do Amaral of the CDS lies not in the definition of the objective. Both agree that only General Eanes can resolve the situation, either by exerting pressure on the govemment or by changing it. But the CDS better understands the character of the relationship of social forces. After its big meeting in Rio Maior in October 1976, which was directed primarily against Social Democratic Minister of Agriculture Lapes Cardoso, the Confederation of Portuguese Farmers (CAP) has hardly been heard from. The Confederation of Portuguese Industry (CIP) maintains a certain level of activity but is not capable of taking initiatives having a broad audience. Thus, neither the bourgeois parties nor their organizations (CAP and CIP) are in position to polarize clearly majority sectors of the "middle classes" around them, Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to underestimate the process of recomposition of the state apparatus or the degree of initiative this confers upon the bourgeoisie. The November conference of the Bank of Portugal and the German Marshall Fund demonstrated that imperialism now has a more concerted tactic of economic blackmail. The military hierarchy is now much more solidified around Eanes. The latest changes in the Council of the Revolution testify to this. The far right sectors (Pires Veloso and Morais E. Silva, "councillors of the revolution" linked to the terrorist network) are now very much pushed to the sidelines. But while a direct military intervention, demanded by the entire bourgeoisie, is not possible given the present situation of the class struggle, the danger nevertheless exists. At the same time, the continued existence of the Mario Soares government demonstrates to what extent the gravity of the political crisis, in view of the relationship of class forces, still requires the maintenance of a government of class collaboration, a goverment whose fragility is nonetheless highlighted by the depth of the social and economic crisis. The economic crisis In spite of some signs of a positive turn in the economic situation (diminution of fiduciary circulation, total banking deposits have attained the historic record of 400 million escudos; some sectors-such as construction - which exert strong multiplying effects experienced an upturn during the summer and the beginning of autumn), the indices of the increase of industrial production in December fell well short of government targef.. Some sectors are already beginning to exhibit the limits of a short-term inflationary recovery: construction has already slowed down and this trend will deepen. Production in the food sector, the only branch to undergo an expansion during 1974 and 1975 (in October 1976 its production was 14% higher than in
PORTUGAL October 1975) is now declining spectacularly. The only branch now registering growth is equipment goods. For the first five months of 1976 total growth in the transformation industries was 4%; in September growth reached 6% compared with the same period of the preceding year. The growth in the equipment goods sector cannot conceal the modesty of the results achieved compared with the overall economic objectives set by the government and by "Plan 77": a 5% Increase in gross domestic product, with a 10% average annual growth rate of industrial production and a 15-18% yearly increase in investment. These are, in fact, extremely low targets, inferior to the actual development that occurred during the period 1972-73. Hence, the creation of 50,000 new jobs and the reanimation of the export sectors did not take place. On the contrary, the retum to their former owners of "intervened" and "se If-managed" enterprises, the imposition of a "battle for production" in the nationalized enterprises, the extension of the workweek, and the laws on layoffs will stimulate increasing unemployment and inflation and will generate social tension. In substance, the government is limiting itself to again taking up the economic project of the Catano regime. Moreover, Walter Rosa, minister of industry up until a few weeks ago, was one of the authors of these plans when he was a functionary in governments before the April 1974 coup. This economic option (for example, concentration of 30% of industrial investments in a single complex of Sines) resolves none of the problems. What good is all this, the capitalists ask, if the private sector still lacks the requested guarantees, if there is no radical reconversion of the productive system, if the restitution to their former owners of enterprises under "se If-management" is held up. Neither the Formal promise of Mario Soares to impose a forty-eight-hour week in the productive sector and a forty-hour week in services, nor the 2, 500 men of the NATO brigade stationed 100 kilometers from Lisbon will be able to permit resolution of this problem. The depth of the economic crisis, the resistance of the workers, and the political and social crisis mean that only a generalized confrontation will be able to qualitatively transform the present period of the class struggle. For the bourgeoisie, this would require the ability to destroy the gains of the period prior to November 25, 1975, in particular the freedom of action of the trade unions and the workers parties. No intermediary solution will be able in the medium term to escape the contradiction between this objective and the reality of the present relationship of social forces. Recomposition of the workers movement The presidential elections, the formation of the Soares government, and the initial struggles ogainst the austerity plan opened a new period dominated by the recomposition of the organized workers movement. Clearly, the most spectacular element here is the crisis of the SP and the formation of a left wing within it. But the crisis is not limited to this. The weakness of the SP government lies in the persistance of workers combativity and the fragility of the SP's organized base in the workers movement and the trade unions. The SP now has 600 factory sections, less than 90 of which are in the Lisbon industrial belt. The "open letter" - a trade-union grouping linked to the SP - won the adherence of 69 unions, but its September 1976 meeting, the most representative one, was attended by only 50 delegations. Finally, the permanent gap between the SP's electoral influence among the workers and its organizational capocity leaves the SP leadership excessively narrow maneuvering room for the application of its policy. In light of this, the rapid emergence of a left wing within the SP is understandable, It began to meet and organize during and after the party's second national congress in November 1976. The heterogeneity of this left wing is the product of the very factors that account for its development. Distinct political experiences separate the most radicalized codres frontally opposed to the Social Democratic policy (Aires Rodrigue, Carme linda Pereira, the Lisbon teachers union), those sectors that were previously most tightly integrated into the political apparatus of the Social Democracy. (Lopes Cardoso for example), and the trode-union militants (those who opposed the orientation of the CP bureaucracy and those who have had experiences in unity in action, such as K. Barreto, probably future secretary general of the Intersindical). The public appearance of this left wing (2) began between the November 1976 congress and January 1977, with the challenging of the essential axes of the policy of the government. At the second congress in November 1976 the "left dissidents" obtained 210 votes against 610 for the majority (that is 25% of the vote). At the special SP congress in January 1977 they won 117 votes against 394 for the majority (21%). They express the existing workers combativity within the SP and now represent the majority of factory militants and members of the Socialist Meeting one week before the January special congress, militants suspended from the SP and those supporting them were unable to reach agreement with various personalities such as Lopes Cardoso. On the eve of the congress, 80 Young Socialists (the opposition had obtained 147 votes against 152 in the SP youth congress) hod also prepared a response to accusations of "Trotskyism. " (3) The representation of this left wing in Porto despite the repression was indicative of the continuity of this current and of its close links to the party rank and file. But the left wing's difficulties in the trade-union movement, the impasse of the "open letter" group, and the division over whether or not to participate in the congress of the Intersindical, combined with the policy of obstructing struggles being applied by the Stalinist bureaucracy, make a policy of unity of action of the working class around central demands difficult in the immediate period ahead. Such unity would require a rapprochement between the trade-union currents linked to the SP and CP, among other things.
The lack of this unity weakers the battle this left wing wants to wage against partial aspects of the austerity plan. The concrete forms of development of this recomposition of the workers movement are also linked to the policy of the CP in the mass movement. Because of the structure of its base and the centralization of its fraction, the CP now possesses broad maneuvering room in trade-union struggles and leads the majority sector of the organized workers movement. With about 2,500 factory cells, the CP has managed, after the festival of its newspaper Avante and its eighth congress, to reorganize its intervention and regain a grip on its working class rank and file. As a function of the evolution of the SP and the government and the crisis of the GDUP, the CP has blocked preparation of struggle and has extended its orientation— negotiatel-to the whole union movement. Under the cover of a violent criticism of the government (4), the Cunhal leadership is in fact camouflaging a capitulation to the military hierarchy. The leadership is thus led to say: "Given the difficulties resulting from the blindness of some of the SP leoders, the eighth congress of the CP has proposed a second democratic altemative (the first being an understanding between the CP and the SP), namely the formation of a government presided over by a personality not in any party, whether a civilian or an officer, with the participation of members of the parties, independents, and officers and with the support of at least the SP and the CP. "(5) What long march has led to this position? Cunhal himself explained the conditions under which the CP has been influenced by objective reality and the struggle of the masses. (6) Pato had also clarified the obiectives of his party during the presidential elections, when he refused to criticize the candidacy of Eanes: open up the possibility of negotiating a recomposition of the government, if necessary even accepting collaboration with the PPD.(7) This perspective came into de facto contradiction with the mobilizations of the masses: the struggles of the teachers and public service workers were unable to develop because of the explicit outlook and initiatives of the CP, although the possibility of a national strike was real. But at the some time it was proven that the peaceful application of this orientation presupposed a great stability of the working class, a decline in its combativity potential. It wos because these conditions do not exist that the Intersindical congress had to hastily revise Its action program. The Final resolution incorporated some formulations pointing out the necessity of an active mobilization. Nevertheless, the crisis of the far left as expressed in the crisis of the GDUP enables the CP to allow some changes in the formulation of demands without immediately being compelled to actually mobilize. The crisis of the "far left" is expressed in the rapid decline of its initiative capacity, the difficulty in integrating broad sectors that had actively supported the Otelo campaign, the re-entry of many of these workers and youth into the sphere of influence of the majority parties (especially the CP), and the internal crisis caused by the sectarian clashes between the bloc of the MES, PRP, and MSU on the one hand and the UDP and PCP-R on the other hand. (8) The congress of the GDUP was postponed several times. In or'er to avoid an immediate split, a parity leadership was established. This did not prevent the PRP from following in the footsteps of the FSP (Popular Socialist Front) and leaving the GDUP. The MSU then Followed suit. In addition, the militants of the MES are now deeply demoralized. The existence of a very large PCP-R majority creates a very unstable situation politically. Thus, the "movement of popular unity" oscillates between extreme sectarianism toward the workers parties, proclaiming that revisionism is a paper tiger, " and tailendism in the unions as soon as the real relationship of forces began to become clear and the CP launched its campaign against the "open letter. " The pressures that are now building within the MES point precisely toward a greater odaptation to Stalinist policy. Inasmuch as this evolution runs parallel to the adaptation of the PCPR in trade unions, a break between these currents may be postponed. But it seems increasingly inevitable that the development of the class struggle will further accentuate the crisis of the GDUP. In the situation that has been outlined here, it is obvious that the bureaucratic apparatuses do not control the working class with total hegemony. The proliferation of experiences of struggle, the development of the anti-bureaucratic trade-union current, and the audience received by the unifying demands and proposals advanced by the far left indicate that a long process
25
PORTUGAL has begun which could go on for several months. These developments are especially important in that the political crisis now taking shape could lead to a heightened crisis of the mass workers parties, already visible in the SP and possible in the CP. Such a crisis would result from the combativity and initiatives of many of its trade-union codres, The publication in the cadres' bulletin of the CP of a criticism from a "radical left" direction of the behovior of the leadership of the bakers union during the bakers strike confirms this. (0 Militante, January 1977, p.3.) Anti-bureaucratic trade-union struggle at a crossroads After rejecting support to the austerity policy of the sixth government, the "open letter" grouping, linked to the SP, launched the battle for a trade-union congress democratically prepared on the basis of the right of tendencies to exist. Some months later, the "open letter" grouping itself refused to organize as a tendency in the union movement. Since September 1976 revolutionary militants hod been systematically proposing the publication of a fortnightly bulletin of the "open letter" and the formation of "support groups" in the unions. Nevertheless, the "open letter" supporters" delay in deciding whether or not to participate in the Intersindical congress further Intensified the hesitations of Socialist trade unionists. It was only in January, a week before the congress, that the "open letter" called for the organization of support groups: "Workers, have no illusions! The second congress of the Intersindical will result in the continuation of corporatist-fascist practices, which will never correspond to the defense of your interests. Workers, there is still a solution. Like you, many other workers agree with us. Unite, organize in your union. Don't let someone else make decisions in your place without consulting you. Struggle, for nothing is lost: democracy will triumph. " With its ambiguity, this call, signed by twenty-one unions on January 20, 1977 (with the exception of the Lisbon teachers), indicates what this socialist current will have to confront. The anti-bureaucratic struggle will be able to be waged only within the Intersindical and not through a coordinating body of unions outside the Intersindical. The congress was held two weeks ago, aftended by more than 250 unions, 70 of which were not affiliated to the Intersindical. It was an important tribune of discussion on the fight against the austerity policy. The hesitations of the Intersindical secretariat, which tried to conceal its refusal to set specific objectives, permitted about thirty unions to propose documents stressing the necessity for a united national mobilization. By allowing a free discussion during the congress (even if its preparation was not democratic and even though the delegates were not directly elected by the workers), the Intersindical managed to create an image of unity, strengthened by the participation in the leadership of some well-known Socialist trade-union leoders, like K. Barreto. 26
The "open letter" has lost a lot of ground recently. Its defeat was illustrated by the vote in the public service employees union - 44.9% for the CP, 33% for the SP, 6.3% for the GDUP - and by the defeat of the Socialist slates in the elections that have been held in some trade unions since the formation of the government. The greater permeability of the Socialist leadership to the struggle of the masses is due above all to the great weakness of its control over the ranks and not, contrary to what is claimed by some, to its more "progressive" or genuine ly "democratic" character. In the present phase the central tasks remain the struggle against the social pact and the austerity plan, for a national strike for labor contracts, for immediate 2,000 escudos a month wage increases for all, for the fortyhour week, combined with the construction of unions in the factories and the definitive establishment of o federative and democratic structure by industrial branch. In the context of defense of existing gains, especially workers control and the workers commissions, this battle will be decisive for the toiling masses on all counts. "The horizon is red" How is it possible that in spite of 20-25% unemployment and a 25% decline in purchasing power the working class has nonetheless maintained its combativity and the bourgeoisie has been unable to impose it own solution? The present mobilizations of the metal and textile workers provide an initial answer. The first successes of the campaign of the LCI-PRT (PRT: Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores - Revolutionary Workers party) for the national day of struggle to respond to austerity, the radicalization of the Socialist workers, and the development of new experiences of struggle, even among backward sectors of the working class, also show that in essence the conquests of the period of rise of the mass movement have been maintained: free organization in the factories, experiences of workers control, freedom of action of the trade unions. Many rodicalized workers have refused to fall into the trap of the Soares government, which qualifies as socialist measures what are in fact decisions whose function is simply to guarantee a new rise of the rate of profit. Hence, even given the maneuvering room they command in the trade-union movement, the Stalinists cannot limit themselves simply to negotiating and exerting pressure on the government. Even though the government may still be able to impose some partial defeats through anti-union and anti-student legislation and aftacks on the agrarian reform, coming months will see the development in the unions of a battle against the austerity plan. If this leads to combined struggle experiences by various sectors of the working class, then a generalized upsurge could begin to germinate, stimulated by the conditions of deepened political crisis and social tension.
The situation in the Spanish state fosters this perspective, although the decisive factors remain the integration of the rodicalization of Socialist militants into this overall movement and the capacity of revolutionaries to carry out a qualitatively superior intervention in the workers movement. We thus distinguish between a partial defeat which accelerates the irreversible offensive of the bourgeoisie and a partial defeat which, like November 25, 1975, opens a period in which struggles will occur on a more organized basis. NOTES: T. "On the social situation. On the congress of the unions. " In O Militante, January 1977, p.5. The cadire assembly includes functionaries, trade-union leaders, and members of the Central Committee. It was held before the Central Committee meeting of December 19 and 20, 1976. 2. Call of the "Second National Congress of Militants of Nuclei and Sections for the Special Congress of the SP" proposed by the Executive of the labor commission. 3. We are speaking of certain Trotskyist currents that have found in the anti-Goncalves struggle of the SP a propitious ground for promulgating their historical theses. Criticism of the labor legislation, educational policy, and the agrarian reform, of the economic policy of the government as well as criticism of the release of PIDE agents (the Salazarist secret police - INPRECOR) and the impunity of the bomb throwers are their fronts of combat. We are now witnessing in Portugal an attempted infiltration of the SP by a current of Trotskyist inspiration, in accordance with a known tactic of the Fourth International, as has occurred in other parties of the Socialist International (such as the Swedish SP, the Labour party, the youth federation of the PSOE)." Extract from the document of Antonio Reis, approved by the national commission of the SP a week before the congress. 4. "The proposed budget and Plan 77 confirm two Fundomental lines in the orientation of the SP government: make the workers bear the burden of all the difficulties of the situation, continue a policy of capitalist recuperation, liquidating the gains of the revolution and intensifying dependence on imperialism. The realization of these projects of the SP goverment challenges the great democratic transformations, facilitates the offensive of the right, and damages the national interests. " From the resolution of the CP Central Committee of December 19-20, 1976. 5. Declaration of the CC, December 19-20, 1976, 6. In an interview published in the November 19, 1976, issue of Expresso Cunhal stated: "The end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975 were marked by capitalist sabotage which determined the need for the agrarian reform, nationalizations, and workers control as indispensable emergency measures. I am convinced that the process would have been much slower, with less turbulence, if the forces representing the economic Interests of big capital had accepted democrocy. This was so clear for us that in our platform of emergency measures passed at the seventh congress (November
1974) we demanded control of private banks and economic activities; but at that time we were not advocating an immediate agrarian reform and nationalizations. But what happened? They continued to divert money and commit sabotage. The immediate nationalization of the banks became indispensable. This sabotage also created the necessity for occupying and cultivating the land." And he concluded: "In Portugal if there was anyone who could have given the capitalists guarantees it would have been the Communists. I repeat that we are for respect for the dynamic of the capitalist sector. This is contained in our theses, in our positions." 7. In November 1976 Pato told Diário de Lisboa: "They (the CDS and the PPD) are in fact committed to General Eanes, and this was always our assumption; that is why we never attacked General Eanes during the election campaign.. • We can say that the president of the republic has maintained a line consistent with what he promised. " He concluded on the question of the government: We are not unaware that there are people in the PPD who really want Portuguese democracy to be consolidated. Civilians and officers who uphold democracy must be in this government because the greater the responsibility of this government, as well as of the Socialists and Communists, the greater will be the confidence it will inspire among the working masses of the country." 8. MES: Left Socialist Movement; PRP: Revolutionary party of the Proletariat; MSU: United Socialist Movement; UDP: Popular Democratic Union; PCP-R: Portuguese Communist party-Reconstructed.
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Le Duan Photo: Bao Cuong The national congress of the