strike in the history of Sri Lanka took place from the third week in December to January 17, 1977. This outbreak of social struggle came in the wake of drastic increases in the cost of living (the prices of basic foodstuffs were doubled) and university struggles which occurred in November (see INPRECOR, No. 64, December 9, 1976). Thus, the government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike must now deal with a series of mobilizations of national scope, after the explusion from the cabinet of the Lanka Sama Samaja party (Celyon Equal Society party) in September 1975. The prime minister decided to respond to the demands of the workers by resorting to force, just as she had done earlier in the case of the students. On December 24 a group of about 150 railway employees in Ratmalana staged a sit-down strike. Their initial demand was that the year-end loan be 500 rupees instead of the 200 rupees proposed by the government. As the struggle continued, new demands were raised, notably relating to wage increases (minimum wage of 250 rupees, automatic increase of 2.50 rupees for each point of increase in the cost of living index, etc.). Initially, the big unions were opposed to the strike. But when the workers massively followed the minority that had taken the initiative, the unions changed their position. The strike of the railway employees was solid. No train could move and in some areas the tracks were even taken up. The government took a hard line. It rejected any negotiation until the strikers had gone back to work. But shortly after, the workers of the port of Colombo joined the strike, advancing demands identical to those of the railway workers. Some Some 000 of the port's 7,000 workers participated in the strike. The outbreak of the strikes and their subsequent extension were largely spontaneous phenomena. In the port, as later in the postal system, trade-union leaders of the CP who tried to oppose the strike movement were attacked by the workers. In several cases, partial agreements reached between the union leaderships and the government were rejected by the strikers.
WAVE EPS LANKA Then, belatedly, the LSSP decided to give full support to the strike and to use its influence in the General Clerical Servants Union (GCSU) and the Lanka Dumriya Sevaka Sangamaya (LDSS, the railway workers union) to extend the struggle. A trade-union front was finally formed, which called for a strike for January 6. Once again, the strike was solid, with about 80% of the workers concerned participating. All the unions except those dominated by the Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP, the ruling party), which are led by Alavi Noulena, supported the struggle. The Ceylon Mercantile Union (CMU) and other unions of the Trade Union Coordinating Committee (TUCC) demanded that the goverment negotiate and criticized the regime's responsibility for the rise of inflation. In their declaration, these unions explained that the year-end loan was only a temporary solution and that each worker had to be paid a decent wage. On January 4 the government brandished both a carrot and a stick. On the one hand, it declared that in addition to the 200 rupees promised it could also come up with another 300 rupees from the banks. But at the same time it declared government services as "essential services, " which meant that striking workers in this sector would be subject to arrest under the Essential Services Order. The strikers and trade-union militants were thus threatened not only with layoffs but also with prison and confiscation of their property. In addition, many workers were arrested on charges of inciting to strike. Nevertheless, the strike mobilized at least 400,000 workers; transport, communications, and port services were paralyzed. The government responded by sending troops and naval forces to assure distribution of goods and gasoline and to break the strike. In foce of these measures the TUCC met once again, denounced the measures, and called for stepping up action in defense of the strikers. The Ceylon Mercantile Union proposed preparation of a general strike. But this preparation had not been achieved when the railway strike finally ended on January 17, after a government ultimatum. The movement thus ended in failure, although there was no serious defeat. This failure is explained in good part by the trode-union and political division of the workers movement. And the responsiblity of the CP and the LSSP here is great. The Communist party continues to sit in the government. Caught between its government participation and the danger of losing control of its rank and file in the trade unions, if tried to escape from the dilemma by calling for negotiations. But the government drove the CP to the wall by taking a tough attitude. The CP minister then ceased to attend cabinet sessions, which did not prevent Bandaranaike From asserting that all decisions had been taken unanimously. Consequently, a crisis which may tum our to be significant is developing among the ranks of the CP and the unions it leads. The explusion of the LSSP from the government in September 1975 has unblocked the situation in the sectors of government employees this party controls. For the first time in five years, significant struggles for union demands have broken out in this sector. But the LSSP has tried to exploit these social movements in a narrowly partisan way, using them to recompose a political opposition front including the CP, and inrating many contacts even with the United National party (UNP), the conservative bourgeois party. The LSSP thus helped the govemment to denounce the strike as a maneuver by the oppostion, although the demands of the workers were essentially economic. This sectarian attitude of the LSSP also explains the failure of the strike to extend to some sectors, such as the bus drivers, as well as the failure of the call issued by the Ceylon Federation of Labor. In fact, a bloc was formed among the LSSP, the CP, and the UNP, as well as the trode-unions they control. This common front between reformists and bourgeois elements did everything to exclude the CMU and the unions grouped around the TUCC, which were nonetheless the most active militants in supporting the strikers. This rejection of the indispensable unity of the trade-union movement, which is the work of the LSSP and the CP, considerably limited the possibilities of extending the strike. Nonetheless, the failure of the strike probably does not herald a massive repression against the workers. The sympathy the population manifested for the government employees in struggle and the imminent elections will probably prevent Bandaranaike from hitting as hard as she would like. But the failure of the strike does mean that a hard blow has been dealt the hegemony of the LSSP over significant sectors of the union movement among government employees. The LSSP will be compelled to give an account of the manner in which it led the struggle, while the loss of its cabinet posts, which had previously provided it with a base for patronage, has already placed a question mark over its position in this sector. The latest strikes, even though defeated, may represent an important moment in the ongoing recomposition of the workers movement and offer new possibilities for the development of a base for the radical left.
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THE TRADE