ITALY
OTUNA
PAESE
GIA DETTO
ATTO
ЩО СНЕ 40)
DEVAMOi
HORILE M
ENTER NOIA
MANI
THE DIE
ISNOT
YETCAST
The Italian economic and political situation at the end of 1976 remains precarious. Official and unofficial predictions for the new year are far from enthusiastic for the ruling class. It is sufficient to recall a few facts: the partial economic upturn has already run out of steam; the prospect for 1970 is, to take up the expression of some government documents, zero growth, with additional unemployment of hundreds of thousands of workers; it will be difficult to hold the rate of inflation under 20%. Agnelli, the chief of Fiat, put it this way: "It will be a terrible year." Nevertheless, up to now the Giulio Andreotti government has succeeded in partially controlling the situation and has also managed to pass a series of economic and social measures which strike mainly at the working class and other exploited layers. These measures may be synthesized as follows:
*Complete freezing of the sliding scale for nineteen months in the case of workers making more than 8 million lire a year (about US $8, 900) and 50% freeze for those making less than 6 million (the workers in question will receive treasury bonds that cannot be cashed in for five years).
* Increase in taxes on automobiles and gambling on sports and increase of various fées; introduction of a special tax on autos, travel, etc.
* Increases in many rates (electricity, telephones, railroads) and new increases in the price of gasoline, which will be compensated for only to a ridiculously small extent by government subsidies for people living on fixed incomes.
*Elimination of some holidays, which in principle are supposed to be given back at the time of long vacations (which does not always happen in practice). At the same time, the government has authorized or registered without reaction generalized increased in prices (for example, rather considerable increases in the prices of automobiles). On the whole, these measures have been adopted with the agreement of the workers parties and the trade unions. So far, the latter have organized only very partial and symbolic mobilizations (provincial and regional strikes, national strikes of industrial categories limited to a few hours duration, etc.), the aim being to exert pressure on the government and grant partial satisfaction to the masses' will to struggle. This operation has attained its objective only in part. On the one hand, the government and the employers are pressing ahead in their offensive and are planning more drastic measures, especially in relation to the sliding scale, the functioning of which they want to stagger over time. On the other hand, rather overt tensions have been manifested between the bureaucratic leaderships and the rank and file. On many occasions and in various contexts (factory assemblies, assemblies of trade-union cadres, street demonstrations) significant sectors of workers have strongly criticized the orientation of their organizations. It is symptomatic that both the trade-union
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ITALY leaders and the leaders of the Communist party publicly lamented that many intermediary cadres had not committed themselves to defending the official line and had proven unable to counter the arguments of the "ultraleftists." A number of important events will occur in January, from meetings between the government and the unions to the national assembly of trade-union cadres, which may noticeably influence the evolution of the situation. We are publishing below a summary of a report by Comrade Livio Maitan approved by a majority of the Central Committee of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (GCR - Revolutionary Communist Groups), Italian section of the Fourth International, at its plenum held in December. The text stresses the dangers of a negative evolution if the working class is not able to organize an effective response in the short term to the insidious attacks of the employers and the Andreotti government.
* * * Six months after the June 20 elections an initial balance-sheet must be drawn of the new situation created especially after the formation of the Andreotti government. The days of struggle of the first half of October and the several significant events of subsequent weeks showed that important sectors of the working class were prepared to fight, that there was still a vanguard capable of interpreting this combative spirit and of stimulating broader movements, thus placing the bureaucratic leaderships in difficulty and compelling the government and the employers to act more cautiously, But the PCI (the Communist party) and the PSI (the Socialist party) subordinated the needs of the struggle of the masses to a political orientation symbolized by their support to the Andreotti government and their acceptance of the so-called austerity policy. As for the trade-union leaderships, they absolutely lacked any initiative and avoided any real confrontation, limiting themselves to calling for symbolic and fragmented strikes.
BERLINGUER 18
The social vanguards obviously could not substitute themselves for the bureaucratic leaderships on a national scale and it was difficult for them to avoid the twin reefs of sectarian outbursts and opportunist adaptation. As for the far left organizations, which are in full crisis, they were not even in condition to play the role they had played in previous important battles. The results are clear. The working class, although better organized and more mature politically, was increasingly driven onto the defensive; there were some reactions of uncertainty and disarray; the class sometimes responded without conviction and somewhat caustically to the calls for strikes and trade-union demonstrations. The persistent attack on employment and the new intensification of inflation have begun to have deep effects on the spiritual state of the workers, impelling them to seek solutions apart from struggle. The ideology, shared by the PCI, that says that it is necessary to work more and not be "absent" so often has not gone without echo among some layers of workers, even if only as a defensive reflex against the danger of unemployment. At the same time, in order to counteract the consequences of inflation, workers are seeking to increase their wages by accepting overtime work, intensification of the work pace, working two jobs, etc. For the moment, it is difficult to judge the real scope of these phenomena. But it is certain that they exist, that they are intensifying and that they have a negative political significance. A stalemate situation The most politicized layers of the working class are suffering the difficulties of the situation even more painfully. The members and sympathizers of the PCI, who were partially disappointed on June 20 because their party did not overtake the Christian Democracy, are now torn by conflicting sentiments. On the one hand, they hope that the increased weight of the PCI will produce tangible results, while they also note that the government, whose survival is guaranteed by the PCI, is openly striking at the exploited classes, without even holding up the chimera of more reasurring middle- or long-term prospects. On the other hand, they want to accept the discipline of the party and the trade unions, while at the same time they increasingly feel that the line they are supposed to apply does not correspond to the needs or sentiments of the broad masses. Increasingly, they feel a sentiment of frustration. The most conscious social vanguards feel that they are caught in a vise. If they do not take initiatives now, the leaderships of the trade unions and the traditional parties will press further with their acceptance of the austerity policy; if they move, they risk isolation or falling into the cul-de-sac of adventurism, given the extreme difficulty of drawing up and concretizing a credible alternative line. Such a situation cannot drag on indefinitely without the indicated process provoking a qualitative leap, without retreat upon retreat finally resulting in a de-
LIQUOR feat for the working class and a significant lowering of the standard of living of the masses and a serious erosion of the conquests of the past decade, without the potential and capacity of moblization of the masses being cut down, at least for a certain time. Up to now the Italian ruling class has drawn undoubted benefits from its acceptance of a greater integration of the PCI into state institutions and the PCI's partial participation in the parliamentary majority. The ruling class could profit from this even more if it succeeds in accentuating the tendencies that have taken shape in past months, eventually provoking an erosion of the mass movement and, in the final analysis, also weakening the negotiating strength of the PCI. In the context of the overall political crisis and the crisis of bourgeois leadership, which began to take on extremely acute forms as of 1975, the ruling class could not hope for any more than that. It can rely, not without reason, on making the working class bear the costs of the economic crisis, which it had been unable to do during the period from the crisis of autumn 1974 to summer 1976. It can safeguard the possibility of making different political choices, even within the parliamentary context that emerged from June 20, and of opting for different variants of the "democratic counterrevolution" also based on a weakening of its adversaries-allies (a government without the PCI but with special collaboration with the Socialists, a government including the PCI under conditions of relative stabilization, etc.). Let us avoid any possible misunderstanding. The ruling class has not structurally overcome the crisis at any level (political, economic, social), nor will it be able to do so in the near future. In the final analysis, the situation of relative neutralization of the counterposed social forces persists; the differentiations and divisions within the two fundamental social forces, and primarily within the bourgeoisie, have not disappeared. Some sectors and layers of the ruling class continue to be hit, to varying extents and with varying dynamics, by the economic crisis, the difficulty of overcoming the recession, the upswing of inflationary tendencies. Hence, they view the prospect of an even greater inflation which could become uncontrollable in a totally different light. Even within the ruling class - and more so among the middle classes — certain sectors will pay the price of the crisis (or have already paid it in part), while others will be hit less seriously or will even be able to profit from it in absolute or relative terms. As for the reformist bureaucracies, they were able to rejoice in the fact that June 20 reduced the strength of their left opponents; they may now believe that after all "it was not so difficult to ride the tiger's back." They are counting on the fact that in the end the facts of "reality" will assert themselves in everybody's eyes and will determine a state of mind of resignation among the working class. But they cannot help noting that if the government succeeded in imposing its entire program, the strength and prestige of the unions and the traditional parties would be eroded. The mechanism of the crisis, which has already weakened the power of the unions, could accentuate the negative effects. In addition, the trade-union leaderships, which are subject to varying pressures depending on the forces they represent, the levels they occupy within the structure of the unions, and the particular tactical projects they advocate, are experiencing increasingly bitter differentiations and divisions. This could lead to breaks with the united practice that has marked the past decade. The counterposed social fronts thus remain undermined by a series of contradictions. The bourgeoisie and its major political party are conscious that the results achieved so tar are precarious, that it will be difficult to maintain the unstable equilibrium of the present governmental formula for very long and will also be difficult to assemble all the conditions needed to actually overcome the crisis and achieve a relative stabilization. The workers movement retains its strength intact; it has increased its weight in parliament and at the institutional level in general. But it has increasingly been thrown onto the defensive. It has even begun to lose ground for the first time in many years. If the situation such as it now exists, in autumn 1976, persists, the structural instability will also persist and the ruling class will continue to face enormous problems. Neverthe less, it will be able to draw considerable advantages from the combination of the effects provoked by the mechanisms of the economic crisis of the system and by the relative political neutralization of its adversaries.
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ITALY In other words, a dangerous situation of retreat could take shape. Crisis of the far left ) Another element at work is the deep crisis that has hit the major components of the far left. This crisis was inevitable, for after experiencing a remarkable. growth, the far left revealed its incapacity to appear and act as an alternative, first in the workers struggles unleashed in the context of an economic crisis that required comprehensive responses and then in the political confrontation that led to June 20. Moreover, beyond its electoral forms, this confrontation posed the problem of a new political leadership. In the context of the difficulties experienced by the workers movement as a whole, all the contradictions and deficiencies of the various formations not only emerged more openly but exploded dramatically. The bitter discussions of the past two or three months have consequently concerned not aspects of political line or tactical choices but the strategic foundations, and even the very reason for being, of the far left. The disarray, demoralization, and loss of militants are the product of these factors. Precisely at the peak of an overall crisis of capitalism, especially sharp in Europe, and of growing conflicts in the bureaucratized workers states, the far left is proving itself less and less capable of offering a response to the problems posed by the phase of transition. The Chinese crisis, by progressively eliminating all illusions, is depriving the far left of what it had presented with assurance as its basic point of reference. On the level of political strategy, the defeat of June 20 has left much ruin. On the level of struggles and the movement, the influxes of oxygen of the October days were not sufficient to make the intrinsic inconsistency drop from sight and, in a certain sense, they further highlighted the real relationship of forces and the far left's inability to exploit the serious difficulties the bureaucracies are meeting in their relations with the masses. In addition, to the extent that struggles and mobilizations took place, the far left had to deal with new explosions of spontanéism, the roots of which are not difficult to grasp and which in any case can lead only to an impasse. A battle for clarification would be necessary and urgent in orderto prevent potentialities from being rapidly lost and from being exhausted in the short term. But because of the overall complex deriving from consciousness of their bankruptcy as an alternative in the eyes of the masses, the resurgence of spontanéist features which all the far-left groups had experienced in 1968-69, and the centrist inclination to adapt to the pressures to which they are subject, the three major far-left formations renounced any consistent battle, perhaps hoping to be able to carry out recovery operations later through methods that are, in the final analysis, paternalistic. The neo-spontanéism was manifested during the October days in limited workers sectors in the wake of crying contrasts between the will to struggle on the part of 20 significant sectors of the working class and the deliberate passivity of the bureaucracies, which prshed the hypocritical ideology of austerity. Since the battle against the crisis can be won only through a mobilization around overall objectives, and since even the less politicized workers are conscious of this, this type of neo-spontanéism inevitably was and is of short duration. It threatens to generate crises of demoralization among cadres who have been committed to struggle for many years. The movements of the "young proletariat" - at least judging from experience up to now - ought also to be considered part of the neo-spontanéist tendency. (1) Here the field of operation is broader and it is possible that such movements may for some time represent elements of conflict potentially capable of impeding the projects of "peaceful" relative stabilization. The return to a 1968-type outlook is rather transparent, both in the mode of organization of mobilization and in the inspiration, which is marked by utopianism and ultimatism. The fact that the greater comprehension of strategy and political tactics acquired after 1968 should now be blurred among the protagonists of these new struggles incontestably represents a regression. Especially since the movements of the "young proletariat" - regard less of the ages of those who participate - arise in the vacuum or partial vacuum left by the decline of the student movement. At bottom, it is the consciousness of being the offspring of a partial defeat that is at the origin of a certain bitterness and pessimism which shines through the "new rhetoric. " What is more, behind phenomena like the explosions at Parco Lambro or a recent assembly at the University of Milan one may perceive phenomena of disintegration. (2) This neo-spontanéism has found its most striking and aggressive expression among tendencies in the women's movement that lie in the sphere of influence of far-left or radical groups. The analogies with the initial student movements of 1968 are incontestable: the indiscriminate emphasis on "novelty"; the counterposition of the movement, presented as immediately "real, " to everything else; the denunciation of political organizations, even far-left ones, as opponents of the movement and useless holdovers from a time gone by; the ultimatist utopianism in program (we want everything right away), a prefiguration of communist society, etc. Here we will not go into all the problems of the women's liberation movement in general, but will limit ourselves to some considerations of the specific features of the neo-spontanéist currents. First of all, the women's movement as it is now developing is experiencing its own 1968, with all that was extremely positive about 1968. Thus, what is involved is not a nostalgic look back at the past, a sort of return to origins. Second, the spontanéism of certain sectors of the women's movement and the tendency toward autonomization have deep objective roots and may persist much longer than other, similar phenomena, either in their present forms or in similar ones (provided the political context permits). The workers movement
has offered and continues to offer a body of theoretical conceptions, of overall political strategy, and valid or relatively valid instruments of struggle. This has exerted and is exerting a force of attraction on the spontaneous movement of working-class origin and on the spontaneous movement of student origin, although in more heavily mediated forms. The women's movement, on the other hand, has received and is receiving very little from the traditional workers organizations, and even the far-left organizations: very general ideas, no concrete political strategy, no organizational instrument. For all these reasons, one must not place an equal sign between the tendencies expressed by the movement of the "young proletariat" and the feminist tendencies that now seem to be prevailing in some sectors of the movement. But these tendencies may nevertheless provoke a fragmentation of the anticapitalist movement, a weakening of the organized forces of the far left, and even individualistic or countercultural retreats. Some demonstrations, such as the one held November 27 in Rome, are in themselves positive and may undergo further development. (3) But it is negative that just at the time when the question of abortion, which has contributed much to the formation of the women's movement, is on the agenda, there has not yet been any united mass mobilization. For a united front against the Andreotti measures After highlighting all the negative conjunctural tendencies, we repeat nevertheless that the die is not yet cast and the question remains open. It is thus necessary to exploit existing possibilities as quickly as possible. It is vital for the working class to refuse to resign itself to paying the price of the so-called austerity policy, that the Andreotti project fail to proceed without meeting determined opposition, that struggles not be limited to symbolic mobilizations. The politically organized vanguard bears a very great responsibility here. Making such an observation does not amount to vanguardism, but simply recognizes reality as it is. Without a powerful united mobilization of the working class and other exploited layers around it, it will obviously be difficult to prevent the success of the operation that has been launched by the government and the employers. The problem of unity in action, of united front, is now on the agenda. But under what conditions? Is there a minimum of possibility that this is not solely a theoretical In the present circumstances, comprehension of the fact that without a counteroffensive around overall political objectives the situation cannot be turned around must not lead to forgetting that some important defensive battles must be won first. Immediately, the central axis must be the intransigent defense of the sliding scale, which has become the symbolic stakes of the class confrontation. To reject the program of Andreotti and the employers means first of all to repell the attacks on the sliding scale. If one wants to obtain maximum convergence and unity around this objective, the greatest tactical flexibility is necessary. For example, it would be a mistake to advance the overthrow of the Andreotti government as a condition for unity, for that would impede a unitary approach to the masses influenced by the PCI and the PSI. We must say: Let us struggle against the Andreotti measures. It is clear that if these measures do not pass, the almost certain consequence would be the fall of Andreotti (and this through an attack from the left), which would throw the political situation into motion again.
But such an orientation toward unity, let us repeat, would remain only on paper and would be strongly tailendist if the vanguard renounced its own initiative, which today implies a harsh polemic against the bureaucratic leaderships, primarily the trade-union leaderships. In the given context, this initiative is a sine qua non condition for the reactivation of a front of struggle, for the masses' regaining confidence, for the traditional organizations being compelled to alter their line to the slightest extent, at least in practice. For our organization, it is imperative to commit ourselves fully, with all the energy we command, to this battle. The stakes, as we have said, are very great, even for the future of our own organization, much will depend on whether or not we are capable of taking this step. The crisis of the far left also requires that we be present today more than ever in the stormy debates now going on, that we present our theoretical alternatives and strategic proposals. We can have a much greater audience than before. Even from this standpoint, we are at a stage during which many things can be decided. FOOTNOTES: 1. The movements of the "young proletariat" organize youth in the neighborhoods on the basis of circles, etc. During the past several months, the most spectacular demonstrations of these movements have occurred in Milan and the other big cities, especially around the problem of the prices in the movie houses. Hundreds and thousands of youth have demonstrated in the streets, forcing movie houses to reduce their prices for hours. On December 8 thousands of youth organized a demonstration in Milan during the opening of the opera season at La Scala to protest against the conspicuous luxury and the exorbitant prices of tickets. There were violent clashes with the police that lasted hours. 2. Parco Lambro is a park in Milan which has for several years been the scene of a yearly festival for youth coming from all over Italy. Last year incidents were provoked by groups of youth who "expropriated" restaurants and stands. In December the University of Milan was the scene of an assembly of the "young proletariat. " Some groups of participants provoked rather serious damages, which gave rise to all sorts of speculation on the part of the bourgeois and reformist press. 3. A demonstration against violence against women was held in Rome on November 27; 8, 000-9, 000 women participated.
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INDIA Sanjay Gandhi