THE PQ
VICTORY-
CAUSES AND EFFECTS
The elections of November 15 in Quebec, won by the Porti Quebécois (PQ - Quebec party) mark an important turn in the political situation. The results of the elections were as follows: The PQ, led by Rene Lévesque, received 41% of the votes cast (30% in the elections of 1973) and won 69 of the 110 seats in the assembly (6 in 1973), The Parti Libéral du Quebec (PLQ - Liberal party of Quebec) of Robert Bourassa won 33% of the vote (55% in 1973) and will hold 28 seats in the assembly (102 in 1973). The Union Nationale (National Union) received 19% of the vote (5% in 1973) and won 11 seats (0 in 1973; the Union Nationale had gained one seat during by-elections in 1975). The reactionary Ralliement Crédiste got 5% of the vote (10% in 1973) and will hold 2 seats (the same as 1973). We are publishing below an analysis of the causes and effects of the PQ's election victory written just after the elections by the Groupe Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Marxist Group), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International: in Quebec. * ÷ * * * * 1. A new political period opens with the end of the Liberal regime and the introduction of a PQ government. The fall of the Bourossa government is not the fall of just any bourgeois government. For the first time in the history of the Canadian Federation, the fall of an existing goverment has been accompanied by the accession to power of a party that calls for the secession of Quebec. This new situation opens both a period of political and social instability in Quebec and a political crisis on a pan-Canadian scale. 2. While the period now ending was marked above all by the rise of the PQ in a context of ascending workers struggles, the present period is characterized fundamentally by the new role of the PQ as a government party. A number of points follow from this:
a) An exacerbation of the crisis of Canadion federalism, which thus enters the most critical phase of its history.
b) The necessity for the imperialist bourgeoisie to restructure a new political alternative to the PQ and to block Quebec's accession to independence by all possible means.
c) The development of the internal contradictions of the PQ under the twofold pressure of the demands of the
QUEBEC masses and the barely concealed hostility manifested toward the PQ by virtually all the bourgeoisie, most especially the Canadian bourgeoisie. This means that on the one hand the PQ will henceforth be squeezed between imperialism and the Quebecois working class and on the other hand it will tend to further internalize the controdiction between those who will be increasingly inclined to negotiate a "special status" under the pressure of imperialism and those who support Independence unconditionally. d) Progressively as the above elements unfold, there will be the opening of a real political space on the left of the PQ, which will go well beyond the narrow terrain to which the various far-left grouplets are presently confined. The PQ victory 3. Of the various hypotheses as to the outcome of the recent Québécois elections, the prospect of a PQ government was considered the least likely. Even the leadership of the PQ had not planned on forming the next government in Quebec. The most likely probabilTty was considered a minority Liberal government. But the results could not be clearer, above all in terms of parliamentary representation: a leap forward of more than 60 seats for the PQ, a loss of more than 70 seats for the PLQ. 4. There is no doubt that the present electoral system based on the British porliamentary model, that is, the unicameral system with single-round elections, tends to distort the representation of parties in the National Assembly. The elections of 1973 provide the most Flagrant example of this: the PQ, with 30% of the vote, got only 6 seats, while the PLQ, with 55% of the vote, got 102 seats. Nevertheless, the present elections provide an addifional example, in the opposite direction and in a less spectacular (although real) manner, of the inadequacies of the present electoral system. This time the PO, which won 41% of the vote, finds itself commanding a large majority in the National Assembly, while the PLQ is under-represented, What permitted this reversal of the 1973 situation was primarily the PQ's development of a national base, which allowed it to contend seriously with the PLQ in the provincial cities and even in the rural areas, thus attenuating the inequities of the electoral system, which tends to overrepresent the rural regions compared to the big urban
QUEBEC centers. The second factor is the new rise of the Union Nationale and the division of the federalist vote. 5. Nevertheless, apart from the problems of proportionality between votes cast and parliamentary representation, the PQ's victory is an overwhelming one on several levels, not only in terms of the number of deputies. First, with its 10% leap forward in the number of votes the PQ becomes the largest political party in Quebec. Second, it won the absolute majority of the Frenchspeaking vote. Third, and this is even more important, the quality of the PQ's vote is superior to that of the other bourgeois parties. It holds a majority in nearly all the urban centers. In the regions of heavy industrial concentration dominated by imperialism the Québécois industrial proletariat is one of the pillars of the electoral base of the PQ. Among the youth and student layers of the population, within the organized workers movement, and now within the Quebécois working class as a whole the PQ holds nearly undivided domination. Its influence now extends into the provincial areas, even the regions that are not much industralized (Gaspésie, Iles de la Madeleine, etc.). Finally, the PQ has broadened its social bose, rallying to its banner a whole layer of local notables (or a good part of them at least) who are now won to the PQ project. Thus, independent of the fact that the PQ vote represents a minority in Quebécois soclety as a whole, the PQ is a much more solid political reality. It enjoys the support of the most dynamic, most progressive, and best organized elements of Québécois society. The PQ is the dominant political factor in Quebec, It is also the major element of political disequilibrium on a panCanodian scale, both in its government role and in the very nature of its project. The crisis of the Federal Liberal Government 6. Two years after the victory of the Candian Liberal party in the federal elections of 1974, we are now witnessing an erosion of the electoral base and credibility of the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. This is attested to by the rise of the Conservative partyr the loss of personal popularity of the prime minister himself, the disintegration of what had constituted the historic backbone of the Trudeau government, the marginalization of the provincial Liberal parties in a whole series of provinces, etc. 7. The basic causes of this are of two orders, First, the failure of the bilingualism policy of the Trudeau government and the government's increasing inability to appear as the sole guarantor of Canadian unity. The Trudeau government today is being squeezed between the rise of anti-Québécois chauvinism on the one hand and the coming to power of a bourgeois nationalist party in Québec on the other. Trudeau's solution to the national question (bilingualism, French-speaking personnel in Ottawa, etc.) is an ob ous failure for everyone. The second factor is the economic situation, which has not been significantly improved by the so-called anti-inflationary measures that have been taken, 16
Unemployment remains high (7%) and the Canadian economy is facing a coming economic recession. In addition, the wage-cut measures and the budget cuts have engendered strong social discontent. 8. Thus, while the Liberal party still represents the interests of the Canadian big bourgeoisie, it is increasingly cut off from its mass social base, the urban petty bourgeoisie, which no longer follows the Liberal party's policy. Although the major beneficiary of this decline of the Liberal party has been the Conservative party, the latter is not yet a coherent alternative. It is in fact undermined by the existing contradictions between its leadership - which seeks to present itself to the big bourgeoisie as a credible alternative to the Trudeau govemment and therefore refuses to challenge some of the basic orientations of the Liberal cabinet - and its reactionary and chauvinist base, which rejects the policy of bilingualism and refuses any concession to Quebec. A Conservative government would be a disaster for "Canadian unity" if this government were to prove incapable of acquiring a mass base in Quebec and of offering a coherent solution to the national question. Up to now the leadership of the Conservative party has proven incapable of attaining these objectives. A prisoner of its chauvinist base, the Conservative party is incapable of sketching out any alternative. The failure of the Trudeau solution thus leaves the Canadian bourgeoisie with no clear policy toward Quebec in a situation in which Quebec is now governed by "separatists." 9. The present dynamic thus points toward an accentuation of binational polarization, an exacerbation of the tensions between Quebec and the rest of Canada - and this in a situation in which the economic margins of the Canadian bourgeoisie are rather narrow and the bourgeoisie commands no coherent political solution. The stage of the referendum 10. The dominant sectors of the Canadian bourgeoisie derive their strength and their ability to participate in international imperialist exploitation from their historic control of the great monopolies linked to the Canadian state: the banks, the financial institutions, transport and communications, etc. Historically, for the petty and middle-sized Canadian bourgeoisie maintenance of the pan-Canadian national market has been the only way to resist the competition of American capitalists. All sectors of the Canadian bourgeoisie thus have a vital interest in keeping Quebec within the Canadian federation. If not, all the regional centrifugal tendencies that exist within the pan-Canadian state would intensify considerably. The political stability of the Canadian state would be destroyed. Economically, the Canadian bourgeoisie would be directly affected by the project of a Quebécois state capitalism actively supporting the development of small and middle-sized Québécois industry. The political, economic, and social costs of a possible secession of Québec make it completely unacceptable
to the Canadian bourgeoisie. Beyond the panicky reactions just after the PQ victory, it must be understood that the bourgeoisie's entire tactic during an initial period will be determined by the following objective: the reconquest of a federalist majority during the referendum and the next provincial elections." Ottawa must thus avoid a generalized economic and political destabilization in Quebec, which would throw the Quebécois masses behind the PQ and would compromise a massive "No" vote in the referendum. As long as this crucial test has not yet occurred, the Canadian bourgeoisie must continue to rely on its parliamentary mechanisms for fear of stimulating extra-parliamentary mass movements in Québec that would be difficult to control. 11. By all evidence, a federalist victory in the referendum is not at all a sure thing. A PQ in power commands a whole gamut of means and measures by which to increase the breadth of support to independence. In addition, even the rejection of independence through a referendum would not be sufficient in itself.
The bourgeoisie needs an overwhelming rejection. The PQ'scoming to power will stimulate a whole series of struggles which the Canadian bourgeoisie will not be in position to effectively contain through the intermediary of a PQ government, Whatever Lévesque's reassuring promises that everything is to occur in an orderly manner, no sector of the bourgeoisie has confidence in his ability to indefinitely contain a dangerous political and social dynamic. The election of the PQ is a major political defeat for the Canadian bourgeoisie, and it is around the referendum that the counteroffensive will be concentrated. First the re*The leadership of the PQ has promised to hold a referendum in Quebec, putting the question of Québécois independence to a vote. No definite date for the referendum has been set yet. - INPRECOR composition of a Quebécois political alternative to the PQ. Second a policy of economic pressure accompanied by political toughening. 12. The creation of a Québécois political alternative to the PQ is now posed. The collapse of the PLO (loss of 21% of its vote, defeat of Bourassa and of about a dozen ministers, among them some of the strongmen of the party) now requires the reconstruction and reorientation of the Parti Liberal. It would be suicidal for the Canodian bourgeoisie to allow the PQ to dominate the Québécois political scene and to allow a confrontation to develop along the lines of the Federal government versus the Quebécois government. Such a policy would further accentuate the dynamic of binational polarization. 13. The causes of the defeat of the PLQ are rather evident. An unfavorable economic situation, the avalanche of scandals that have sullied the Liberals, the PLQ's image as a corrupt party, linguistic legislation that has alienated a substantial portion of the English-speaking vote, its inability to impose a solution in face of persisting social struggles. All this contributed to dissolving not only the artificial majority the PLQ had acquired in 1973 but also the traditional historic vote of this party, which generally exceeded 40%. The present collapse leaves the PLQ in full disarray, politically and psychologically crushed. The attempt to refloat the sinking team around Bourassa by adding a few well know federal figures has been a resounding failure. The major task of the bourgeoisie at the present time is to recompose an instrument that can appear as a credible alterative to the PQ in order to campaign for federalism during the referendum and to take power ouf of the hands of the PQ. 14. The Union Nationale (UN) cannot be such an instrument. A good part of the UN vote was a reactionary protest vote against the corruption and incompetence of the Bourassa government. In no way can if be considered a stable vote. This party remains a third party that can possibly serve as a prop for a federalist alternative to the PQ, but scarcely more than that. A representative of the petty and middle bourgeoisie, the UN has only slight links with monopoly capital. Its potential utility can nonetheless be very real in the future, as a component of a coalition government, for example. Finally, the few gains achieved by the UN in English-speaking and immigrant milieus are ephemeral and express only the rage of these layers against a specific problem, that of Law 22. (This is the law designating French as the official longuage of Québec. - INPRECOR). 15. The major instrument of the bourgeoisie remains the PLQ. This party conserves its links with the Canadian Liberal party, major organ of the Canodian Imperialist bourgeoisie. It is the only provincial party that maintains links with a federal party having a pan-Canadian base. It remains the second largest party in terms of votes. The reconstruction of this party is therefore o logical choice for the Canadian bourgeoisie.
QUEBEC 16, This reconstruction requires the construction of a new party leadership and thus the elimination of Bourassa and his replacement by a new chief with the greatest possible federal links. At a second level, in order to reconquer a stable base in the English-speaking community the PLQ will have to completely repudiate Law 22. The reconstructed party will be much more directly an instrument of the Canadian Liberal party than was the case under Bourassa. 17. But the most crucial aspect of the federalist reconquest of Québec Iles outside the Québécois National Assembly. If relates to economic policy and the attitude of the federal government to the PQ government. These three axes - reconstruction of the PLQ, measures of economic pressure, and the federal government's oggressive policy toward the PQ government -constitute an indissoluble whole. Each of these elements Is necessary to the effectiveness of the others. They constitute the three pillars of the policy which the Canadian bou geoisie will have to implement in order to deal with the new situation. 18. The Canadian bourgeoisie as a whole has so far reacted rather calmly to the PQ's accession to power. It is reassuring the population through the referendum proposals of the PQ. There must be no illusion about such behavior. The election of the PQ is a major political defeat for the Canadian bourgeoisie. The present assurances are aimed only at calming certain spirits (marginal sectors of the bourgeoisie, Francophobic bourgeois politicians, massive chauvinist reactions on the part of the Canadian petty bourgeoisie), which would threaten to disastrously precipitate the situation. The Canadian bourgeoisie is seeking to create a climate that would enable it to control the terms of the confrontation. It will thus undertake a long-term campaign in order to make sure that the confrontation around the referendum takes place under the most favorable possible conditions. Thus, economic pressure on the Lévesque government will be rather discreet so as not to take on the appearance of shameless blackmail; such pressure will have to avoid provoking a reaction opposite to the one hoped for but nevertheless must be sufficiently strong to keep the government on the straight and narrow. Blackmail may be especially effective if it takes the form of blocking funds for the PQ's social reform projects. At the same time, pressure will be exerted to make the PQ goverment "bring the trade Unions to reason" under penalty of facing a shortage of investments in the province. Everything will be done to lead the PQ to discredit itself. Simultaneously, the contributions of the federal government to economic development in Quebec will continue to flow, but there will of course be a constant threat of withdrawing them. 19. This little game will be accompanied by a political toughening. No concession will be mode to Québec on the question of sharing constitutional powers. This is linked to two factors. On the one hand the PQ's referendum project falls within a very clear dynamic: to wage a series of partial battles, while demonstrating
18 that it is a good manager of the Quebécois economy, the intention being to lead to the turntable of the referendum. Any concession from Ottawa can only intersify this dynamic and thus strengthen the PQ. On the other hand, a policy of concessions would further undermine the position of the Trudeau government in English Canada. In the event of a Clark government (Clark is the leader of the Conservative party -INPRECOR), this goverment would also be a prisoner of a wave of anti-Quebécois chauvinism such that it would manifest an even less conciliatory attitude. Trudeau's Initial response to the PQ victory is clear: "The PQ was not elected on the basis of constitutional positions. " He could not have been more clear. 20. Thus, the initial position of the Canadian bourgeoisie will be a policy of wait-and-see and maneuver. There will surely be various attempts to. "buy off" the Lévesque government, to make it abandon the perspective of independence. But even in the context of this tactic the bourgeoisie cannot place confidence in the PQ as it exists today. The bourgeoisie's attitude during the electoral campaign was very clear: "While we have confidence in Lévesque, we are afraid of some of the elements behind him" (in other words, the mass movement which the PQ will be unable to contain effectively). This can lead to only one tactic: to place all bets on the referendum and use its results to push: forward a renovated PLQ. For its part, the American bourgeoisie is relying on the policy of the Canadian bourgeoisie. It will proceed in the same manner in regard to credits to the Quebécois state. It will be led to take some independent initiative only if the Canadian bourgeoisie proves completely Incapable of controlling the dynamic of the situation and of maintaining a minimum of political stability. 21. The economic pressure will thus be combined with various constitutional maneuvers aimed at making the referendum occur at a time and under conditions chosen by Canadian imperialism in order to make sure that the result will be a victory for "No" to independence. Internal contradictions of the PQ 22. The internal contradictions of the PQ will begin to be concretely manifested in the present period on a hitherto unequaled scale. But they will not necessarily develop in a rapid or spectacular manner. During an initial period the new PQ government will proceed cautiously. In addition, the opposition to the referendum policy within the party itself will inevitably be thrust to the sidelines, for it is precisely this option that enabled the PQ to gain power. Lévesque is now the uncontested chief of the party. During an initial stage the "left" will be drowned in the victory of the party as a whole. The necessity of proceeding cautiously, of defining a goverment orientation, will hold the internal tensions at a relatively low level. But such a situation will not last. On the contrary, the incompatibility between the independentist project of the PQ and the fundamental interests of the Canadion imperialist
bourgeoisie — in a situation in which mass struggles will inevitably be stimulated by the victory of the PQ - will shake the internal cohesion of the party. During the previous period the independentist projects of the PQ in opposition clashed with the federalist project of the PLQ in power. Now that the PQ constitutes the government, the clash between the currents rodically attached to independence and the currents inclined to dilute this project indefinitely will take place within the party itself. Further, the beginning of class polarization which has resulted from the rise of workers and people's struggles will continue. The workers and people's radicalization will also have repercussions within the PQ. 23. Two levels of contradictions will first of all assert themselves within the PQ. Fint that of Independence; second that of the workers and people's rodicalization. Several of the candidates of the "left" campaigned actively for independence, while the leadership of the party played down this theme. The various imperialist pressures, the policy of the federal government, the difficult negotiations between the Lévesque government and the federal government, and the continuing rodicalization of the mosses will make this question the key one in Canadian politics as a whole. On this question an entire wing, in fact the majority wing, of the PQ is prepared to make concessions to imperialism and to attenuate the independentist aspect of its program. But another wing has fought and will fight in the opposite direction. In addition, such a policy will place the PQ in contradiction with a substantial portion of its mass base. In addition, the PQ was elected fundamentally by the working class, While for an initial period the PQ government will be able to offer certain concessions, its long-term orientations will be determined by imperialist pressure (American and Canadian), most particularly as concerns social policy and labor relations. Once again, the tensions between the electoral base of the PQ and its governmental policy will be manifested within the party. But also, and this is infinitely more important, they will be manifested in disillusionment with the party among entire sections of the working class. The workers movement and the far left 24, In the end, a PQ in power becomes a much more fragile obstacle for revolutionary communists. In the historical sense, the erosion of this party will be in proportion to the illusions it has sowed. Commanding only narrow politico-constitutional and socioeconomic maneuvering room and caught between imperialist pressure and pressure from the mass movement, this party will be increasingly reduced to being a clever defender of the status quo. The objective conditions for a break with this party by advanced sectors of the working class will be posed in the coming period.
25. The trade-union bureaucracy is now celebrating its victory. This euphoria is shared by the entire working class. For the workers, what is involved is revenge against the multinationals, their lackey Bourassa, and all the tinpot local reactionaries; the workers see it as a victory against the limitation of the right to strike, the anti-trade-union campaign of the other bourgeois parties, and the blows they have suffered under the Bourassa goverment during past years. For the bureaucracy, what is involved is the election of a government which (at least they hope) will help to avoid struggles as much as possible and will negotiate in a completely, or nearly completely, friendly manner. For the bureaucracy the victory of the PQ will be a pretext for curbing these struggles. We have a friendly government in power, they will say, let's give it a chance. For the working class as a whole, on the other hand (and for several other popular movements), the PQ victory will be a stimulant to struggle. These two contradictory exigencies could lead to a phase of a wait-and-see attitude toward the government on the part of the workers movement. Buf this attitude threatens to be broken by the application of Phase 2 of the Trudeau measures (6% ceiling on wage increases) and the Q's inability to respond, by the contradictory behavior of the PQ during conflicts with the multinationals, etc. The far left was totally marginalized in the course of this election. There is nothing surprising about this. The weakness of its base, of its central political presence, combined with the desire of many militants of the mass movement to "make their vote count" and get rid of Bourassa, as well as the strong pro-PQ wave, contributed to this marginalization. 26. More specifically, the New Democratic party-RMS coalition, presented as the first step toward the creation of a party of the workers, was a lamentable failure as a political operation. This coalition, explicitly formed to seek votes, in fact attracted very few. Politically it completely side-stepped the decisive factor, namely a correct position on the national question. In reducing the problem of the political independence of the working class to the construction of a Social Democratic party (the NDP by implication), the RMS seriously undermined the credibility of its previous work and provided a weapon for the bureaucrats, who would like to marginalize the RMS in the short term. This does not mean that this marginalization will necessarily be decisive. Disillusionment in the PQ may be able to open some room for such a formation (whether the RMS or another grouping of the same type). 27. The possibilities opened for the development of the GMR are becoming considerable. Our strategic orientation, that of a Workers Republic of Québec, falls within the dynamic of the present situation and enables us to take advantage of the potential growing discredit of the PO's project. It also falls within the perspective of an accentuation of the contradictions within the PQ November 20, 1976
10
The Socialist Workers party (SWP) has just concluded the most successful