Thailand was turned. In fact, it is improbable that the latest coup will resemble the
MILITARY COUP: 3 MEASURE y PAUL PETITJEAN earlier palace revolutions that have occurred since the fall of the absolute monarchy in 1932, for a few years ago the country entered the era of modern class struggles. And while it will take some time for the basic class regroupments to be completed, the establishment of a new dictatorship represents moré than a mere change in the mode of government. It is a civil war Bankruptcy of the "civilian" regime The right had succeeded in making some gains over the past two years, partially isolating the left student movement in public opinion, murdering many radical "''=..: nearly eliminating the legal left from the politica sc=-= during the last elections through a dangerous "strateg: of tension" and the organization of a white terror. See INPRECOR, Nos. 38, November 20, 1975, and 50, April 23, 1976.) But the predominant feature of the Thai situation was nevertheless a deep social and political instability and a growing class polarization. The mass movement could not be lastingly strangled, despite the blows it had received. The failure of the post-October 1973 "civilian" governments was first of all a social failure. They proved incapable of carrying out the indispensable reforms or of attacking established interests, in spite of a few attempts, particularly under the Kukrit Pramoj government. Consequently, "the gap between rich and poor widened ceaselessly even though the economic situation had improved visibly after the slump of 1975.... "or the first time more than a million unemployed were officially registered.... The increase in rice production barely managed to keep pace with the rising population and resulted almost exclusively from the increase in the area of land under cultivation. Productivity remains among the lowest in the region. " (Patrice de Beer, Le Monde, November 13, 1976.) Incapable under these conditions of putting an end to the social struggles that had been endemic since October 1973, the governments of Kukrit and Seni Pramoj lost the confidence of investors, both foreign and domestic. The former directly control a third of industrial capital and half of banking capital. Imperialism clearly manifested its discontent by organizing an investment boycott. Japan, which holds first place among foreign investors in Thailand, lent priority to Hong Kong and Singapore. In 1975 the United States canceled sixtyseven investment projects in Thailand. As for national capital, it began to "flee" at growing speed to Hong Kong (where Thailand became the third largest foreign investor!), Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore. (See figures of M. Barang in Le Monde Diplomatique, September 1976.) One of the major objectives of the military junta now in power is thus to reestablish investor confidence. Although the trade-union movement has not been formally declared illegal, strikes are now forbidden and a purge of the unions has begun. Politically as well, the governments of Kukrit and Seni Pramoj were not up to the tasks of defending imperialist interests in the region. The United States was prepared to withdraw the bulk of its troops stationed in Thailand during the Indochina war. But Washington wanted to maintain control of the essential part of its military infrastructure. It was only under the constraint and pressure of popular student demonstrations in Bangkok -and because of the hostility of the left wing of the Thai Democratic party — that Washington finally agreed to restore its bases to the Thai kingdom. (See INPRECOR, No. 50, April 29, 1976, and A.C. Culbeaux in Le Monde Diplomatique, October 1976.) But U.S. imperialism nonetheless did not remain passive. The October 10 Bangkok Post recognized the role this
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THAILAND question played in the fall in April 1976 of the previous prime minister, Kukrit Pramoj: "The tide of public favour was turning toward the Social Action party, but just before the April general election its stock with the conservatives and the military fell as the result of M. R. Kukrit's ouster of various American military installations and technicians from Thailand. " Since the coup, the new prime minister, Thanin Kraivichien, has issued an appeal to the United States to construct arms and ammunition factories in the kingdom. The former under-secretary of state responsible for negotiations with the United States (and for the improvement of diplomatic relations with Hanoi), Anand Panyarachun, has been removed and he is now under investigation. The minister of foreign affairs is none other than the ambassador to Washington, Udapit Pachariyangkun! Finally, Takli airbase has already been officially reopened to use by the U.S. army. The military junta hastened to assert its pro-West orientation and its combat opposition to the revolutionary Indochinese regimes. Outcome of the "strategy of tension" The dilemma the ruling class had been facing for three years - maintenance of a semi-civilian regime that would allow the mass movement to mature or organization of a new coup that would risk throwing liberal layers into the arms of the Thai Communist party -has thus been decisively resolved. The policy of confrontation has been chosen by the military hierarchy, the king and his entourage, and the conservative parties, all of which were deeply involved in the preparation of the coup. October 6 was the outcome of a "strategy of tension" whose first elements were sketched out two years ago. A series of organizations were established or strengthened in order to whip the population into shape: the Border Police Patrol (BPP), the Nawapon (linked to the people were probably thus organized to defend "the king, the nation, and religion" against the "communist threat. " These were the troops that were thrown against the campus of Thammassat University at dawn on October 6. Through acts of systematic armed provocation, the military right partially paralyzed the student and workers movement and drove many militants out of the villages in which they had been established. (See INPRECOR, Nos. 38, November 20, 1975, and 50,
1976.) More than forty peasant leaders and personalities of the left were eliminated by killers in a period of one year. The major leaders of the student movement were sometimes attacked by the far right at the very doorstep of their central headquarters in Bangkok. Protected by the police, the fascistic forces enjoyed complete impunity and every leftist demonstration had to deal with murderous attacks. The cadres of the mass organizations, who stood in the forefront of 18 political life, were subjected to permanent and exhausting terrorist pressure. An intense and very violent intoxication campaign was organized by the controlled mass media over a period of months, especially the radio station of the armored forces. In spite of all this, the student and workers movements retained their will and capacity to act when favorable opportunities arose, for example during the campaign against the presence of American troops last spring. These movements continued to represent a potentially active force threatening the regime. Quite conscious of the difficult situation in which they found themselves, the cadres of the mass movement carefully avoided anything that could have served as a pretext for provocation and repression. But the test of strength could not be postponed indefinitely. The provocation policy of the right culminated with the successive return to Thailand of two former dictators, Prapass and Thanom Kittikachorn. The former returned from exile in August. The urban left responded by organizing a big demonstration (20,000 strong), which was attacked and suffered four dead and more than sixty wounded. Under the pressure of this mobilization and of divisions within his own government, Seni Pramoj, who was then prime minister, was forced to order Prapass out. But in September it was Thanom's turn to come back to the country, with his head shaved and his body draped in the yellow robes of a Buddhist monk. Once again the Seni government was conspicuous for its inability to make any firm decisions whatsoever. A political hesitation waltz began. The prime minister resigned, only to be succeeded by himself; he then reconstituted a government further left than the preceding one. Simultaneously, an enormous provocation was mounted against the student movement, whose leaders were accused of treason against the king for having allegedly burned the king's son in effigy. This accusation was especially absurd in that the Thai left had always carefully refrained from attacking the person of the king. But delirium was spreading among the population of the
capital, faithful to the two centuries' old monarchy and tired of incessant violence. The trap was ready to be sprung. (See the reports published in the French Trotskyist daily, Rouge, September 27-October 13). In fact, it was allegedly to avenge the affront to the son of King Bumipol and his family that thousands of Village Scouts and Red Gaurs attacked Thammassat University. It was a pogrom, with students hanged, burned alive, mutilated, and slaughtered during a fascist riot orchestrated by the police. One member of the SWAT 60, the corps of Thai sharpshooters trained by the Americans, was discovered among the assailants. Bangkok did not move when the massacre of the students was reported. The coup succeeded. Nevertheless, the army and the ruling parties continue to be torn by internal divisions. In fact, October 6 represented several coups rolled into one. The unexpected death several months ago of General Kris Sivara had seemed to have removed the only man capable of temporarily assuring the unity of the higher officer corps and various political forces behind the perspective of a "constitutional" coup. As it has turned out, the police, after doing their dirty job, have been excluded from power (the police have only one representative in the junta and the chief of police was quickly removed for corruption). The Conservative party Chart Thai has also had its influence sharply reduced. General Chalard, who is linked to this party, had already been retired. As for the well known General Vithoon, an enemy of Prapass and former commander of the Thai mercenaries in Laos and of the anticommunist "333 command, " he has been sent to Tokyo to work with Thai students residing in Japan. Many people seem to have been waiting for an opportunity to alter the internal balance of the forces in power, among them Kukrit Pramoj himself. Reorganization of the resistance Internal divisions thus constitute the first weakness of the junta. But they are not the only weakness. This time the king himself moved directly into the political arena to support the prospect of the coup. He is now trying to place his own men in power. In playing this dangerous game he risks losing the position that enabled him to play a crucial role as arbiter on several occasions in the past. The junta is trying to provide itself with a "civilian" cover, the government named by Thanin Klaivichien. But it has had to acknowledge that there is no chance of restoring democracy before 1988! Thailand cannot become a Chile without running great risks. But after rising to power thanks to a massacre, the junta has driven any liberal opposition underground and must now extend the repression to ever broadening circles. Which induced a junta spokesman to tell Newsweek that if U.S. President Gerald Ford were Thai, he would risk arrest for leftism! The legal workers movement has bent under the weight of military pressure. It was the Thai Labor Council (TLC) which, along with the National Student Center of Thailand, had waged the struggle against the return of General Thanom. The TLC, which is a loose grouping of 165 trade unions, had called a general protest strike for October 6. Today its reputedly "radical" members, such as its president, Arom Pongpangarn, have been arrested. The representatives of the right wing of the trade-uni on movement, such as Thanong Laovanich, have acceded to new responsibilities. As for the president of the TLC, in the name of "realism" he has agreed to deal with the junta and to exchange the maintenance of legality for the trade unions for explicit support to the military's policy as far as maintaining order and work rules is concerned.
Nevertheless, the resistance is slowly reorganizing.
Many cadres of the urban radical movement have gone underground again or have moved to the guerrilla zones established by the Thai CP long before the coup. The legal mass organizations have been decapitated or even destroyed: the National Student Center of Thailand, the Union for Civil Liberties, the Thai women's liberation movement. Many students were arrested while trying to flee and there are perhaps 10,000 political prisoners in Thailand today. The scope of the repression must not be underestimated. But many others have succeeded in getting to Laos or the zones of the Thai CP. In both cases the estimate of their number varies from several hundred to several thousand. A Western ambassador bitterly told a correspondent of the Washington Post: "The army has succeeded in driving hundreds, even thousands, of Thailand's best minds into the embrace of the Communists. " (Lewis M. Simons, International Herald Tribune, October 19, 1976.) The radio station of the Communist party, the "voice of the Thai people, "has reported these movements. On October 21 it broadcast a solemn declaration of four parliament members who are also leaders of the Socialist party, among them former vice president Kaisaeng Suksai, calling for resistance and affirming the ir will to join the armed struggle. The same is true of student leaders, some of whom had disappeared as long as a year ago, such as Saeksan Praesertkul and Thirayut Boonmee (leaders of the October 1973 events), Saman Ruatwonghtat former president of the student union of Thammassat University), and Chirana Peepricha (one of the major women leaders of the student movement), who declared October 14 over the radio station of the Thai CP: "We have raised our hands to seek justice, but we have received only death and blood.... We have come to this inevitable conclusion: Since the enemy is armed, we must arm ourselves. " (Libération, French daily, November 18, 1976.) In Bangkok itself public opinion seems to be shifting again. Many militants, although they are not acting openly, seem to have remained in the capital to continue action against the dictatorship. An "October 6 Front" has arisen which is clandestinely distributing an appeal dated October 12, which concludes, "dare to struggle dare to win. " The clandestine structure of the opposition may have succeeded in escaping arrest.
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Extens on of ihe armed struggle -nare seem a de differences in the urban opposition =e-how to organize and over what role to assign the CP. But there is unanimity on the necessity of armed action. For its part, the Communist party reaffirms its strategy of armed struggle on a daily basis. On October 7 its radio station declared that "the only road that can lead our people to justice, democratic rights, freedom, and total independence.... is the armed struggle, the extension of people's war, the construction of bases in the rural zones in order to invest the cities
..coordinate (the military fight) with other forms of struggle. " (See Rouge, November 16, 1976.) The central commitee declared on October 9 that "the fight of the rural regions, combined with other forms of struggle in the cities, is the only road that can advance the people forward. " (Rouge, October 14, 1976.) Under the present conditions, the Thai CP may make a qualitative leap above all in terms of the quality of its political organization, its social base outside the zones of traditional influence, and its military strength. The activity of the rural guerrillas seems to have increased already, although they have not yet had time to assimilate their new recruits. Official figures on government losses suggest this: seventeen soldiers killed in an ambush on November 16, more than fifty dead since the beginning of November. Radio Hanoi is emphasizing the scope of military operations, which are said to be sometimes unprecedented. Actions are going on in the provinces of the south, northeast, and the "guerrilla triangle" of Loei-Petchaboon-Pitsanuloke. Government functionaries in the insurrectional zones are concerned about the coming evolution of the situation. For instance, the governor of the province of Nkhon Phanom told Washington Post correspondent Lewis M. Simons, "In five or six months those students who have the nerve to remain in the jungle will be trained combat troops and that's when we'll really have to worry. " (International Herald Tribune, November 8, 1976.) The stakes of this battle are regional. Aid to the Thai CP is furnished primarily by China, Vietnam, Laos, and perhaps Cambodia. Since the coup, Radio Hanoi has been waging a campaign denouncing the dictatorship especially violently since the Vietnamese immigrant community in Thailand has been accused of subversive activity and is gravely threatened. The aid supplied by Vietnam seems to have been on the increase for a year now and Hanoi's political support has never ceased, even last summer, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was launching a diplomatic offensive toward the countries of Southeast Asia. Laos is directly threatened by the events in Thailand. Its supplies (especially oil) still depend on the good will of Bangkok. Neverthe less, on October 14 some 20,000 young people demonstrated in Vientiane to denounce the Thai junta and a small contingent of Thai students went to the embassy to protest the repression. More generally, the balance of forces in Southeast Asia is now at stake in Thailand. 20
On October 17 the United Secretariat of the Fourth International issued an appeal for international solidarity with the Thai resistance. (See INPRECOR, No. 61/62, November 11, 1976.) The gravity of the coup and the evolution of the situation in Thailand are such that it is urgent to act to save the lives of the militants who have been imprisoned and tortured. Some of them may already have been summarily slaughtered. Some solidarity initiatives have already been taken in a few countries. They must be broadened and multiplied. SAVE THE POLITICAL PRISONERS! The exact number of