Germany will now take its place on the already long list of unstable Western governments that are capable only of managing current affairs rather than governing in the real sense of the term. This in turn could cast shadows over the possibility of German imperialism's taking od-
GERMAN ELECTIONS: by WERNER HÜLSBERG vantage of the economic and political positions it now holds to serve as pillar of capitalist Europe.
October 3 marked the end of one of the most deceitful and substance lacking election campaigns in the history of the Federal Republic. The three parties represented in the Bundestag did not advance contradictory concrete proposals in any sphere. They limited themselves to a
"war of slogans" empty of real content. The CDU-CSU raised the watchword "Choose between freedom and socialism, " while the SPD trumpeted "Perfect the German model." No party clearly indicated the political orientation it was going to pursue.
The elections were not accompanied by any mobilization of the workers in the trade unions or factories. The leadership of the SPD even sought to prevent such mobilizations by all the means at its command, under the pretext of not fueling the reactionary demagogy of the
CDU-SU. Unlike the elections of 1972, the 1976 elecfions had no class character whatever. They degenerated into a chase after the "individual voter." The inevitable result was a loss of votes for the Social Democracy.
The passive attitude of the working class during the election campaign may be explained by the repercussions of the economic crisis and the behavior of the Social
Democracy in the course of this crisis. The SPD has again taken up its historic role as "physician at the sick-
WEST GERMANY bed of capitalism, "to the applause of the national and international bourgeoisie. By virtue of its use of the trade-union bureaucracy it has been able to hait the new rise of workers struggles which had been under way since 1969. Through an economic policy in the avowed interests of the employers, the Social Democracy has demobilized and demoralized the working class, os well as the youth influenced by the SPD. Only the reactionary excesses of the CDU-SU campaign enabled the SPD to get the bull of its voters to the polls. But the capitulations of the Social Democratic leaders preventer the SPD from fully recapturing the votes won in 1972, especially among the youth and the recently proletarionized layers. In this sense, the result of the 1976 elections is a faithful reflection of the ebb in activity of the working class and the absence of any class response to the capitalist crisis, features which have characterized the political situation in West Germany since 1974, The reforms the SPD promised during the 1972 elections have not at all been implemented. The few legislative measures the SPD-FDP coalition passed during the term of the Bundestag were totally watered down by the concessions made to the CDU-CSU. It is barely recalled today that the Social Democracy had waged the 1972 campaign under the slogan "Let us dare to be more democratic!" For from keeping this promise, the Helmut Schmidt cabinet suppressed a series of democratic gairs won by the workers movement and the youth radicalization of the 1960s. This cabinet enacted legislative measures on repression that would permit a future reactionary government to attack the entire workers movement in the event of a significant change in the relationship of forces. Some examples:
* The decree against employing "enemies of the Constitution" in the public services (known as the Berufsverbot) has created the legal basis for inquiries by the political police into the activities of hundreds of thousands of people and has also engendered a heavy atmosphere of intimidation in the country•
*The new Paragraph 88 of the penal code creates the legal basis for banning all socialist literature and Marxist propaganda.
*The limitations on the rights of defendants in political trials have undermined the possibilities of "fair trials" even from the bourgeois democratic standpoint.
*The militarization of the police and the transformation of the Bundesgrenzschutz (the federal border police) into a civil war army under the pretext of combatting terrorism has led to the accentuated use of repression against the workers movement. During the recent strike in the printing and publishing industry (which was, moreover, an "official" strike) the police intervened against strike picket with an intensity not seen in Germany in decades. Since the beginning of 1976 the SPD had systematically sought to organize an electoral campaign centered on the personality of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, an attempt to follow the model of the "Adenauer victories" won by the CDU in the 1950. This meant a campaign
20 arbe SPD Modi SPD Deut directed exclusively toward the middle classes. Helmut Schmidt himself expressed this rather cynically during a reception, when he told an industrialist: "1 know that the SPD does nof interest you, but you do want me to remain chancellor." The SPD used formulas like "We must continue the policy of Helmut Schmidt, which has increased German prestige in the world, " "effectively defended democracy, "and "brought about the economic upturn. " The SPD's identity of views with the bourgeois FDP was stressed systematically. In order to make sure that this sort of campaign could be carried out, the left of the SPD was condemned to silence during the Mannheim party congress. The Young Socialists (Jusos) committed themselves to waging an electoral campaign "For Helmut Schmidt. It was only at the last minute, on the eve of October 3, that a slight turn was made. In fact, as it turned out, even the members of the SPD, not to mention the broad masses of workers, were scarcely enthusiastic about election meetings centered on the "technical problems" of "transport and urban planning. " When a meeting of Social Democratic campaign volunteers was convoked in the SPD stronghold of southern Hesse (which includes the city of Frankfort), a total of eleven people showed up out of the 600 activists who had been invited. The initial SPD campaign meetings in the heavily industrialized Ruhr had been crushing failures. It was then that Schmidt agreed to launch a polemic ogainst the CDUCSU; the front lines of this offensive were occupied by party chairman Willy Brandt, Minister of Labor and former militant trade unionist Arendt, and Minister of Education Rode, who is the leader of the "groups of wage workers within the SPD. " Two weeks before the vote, they sought to recreate a bit of the 1972 atmosphere, raising the slogan "Vote for peace." The failure of this election campaign and the responsibility that devolves on Helmut Schmidt, chancellor and party vice president, will most probably be at the center of internal discussion in the SPD. During the past few weeks the leadership of the party has "reestablished control" over the chancellor. Schmidt will lose a few feathers in his cap during the internal discussion in the Social Democracy.
The CDU-CSU toughens its structures The CDU-SU had been created at the time of the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany not on the basis of a clearly delimited political program but as an assembly of various bourgeois forces united only by their desire to govern. It was only after the CDU-CSU was thrown into the opposition in 1969 that the process of building a better structured party began, especially on the part of the CSU, the Bavarian affiliate of the CDU. The fact that the CDU-CSU had been deprived of the fringe benefits of political power provoked a series of internal crises beginning in 1969: the replacement of former chancellor Kurt Kiesinger by Ranier Barzel, followed by the replacement of Barzel by Helmut Kohl, this year's candidate for chancellor; the controversy around the possible extersion of the Bavarian CSU, which is clearly further right than the CDU, throughout West Germany as a separate party; the threats of a breakup of the CDU-SU Bundestag fraction, and so on. Because of these internal differences, the CDUCSU was nearly paralyzed on the federal level until the middle of 1975. The nomination of Helmut Kohl as candidate for chancellor was contested up through the spring of 1976. In the end, Franz-Josef Strauss, leoder of the CSU, is said to have approved this candidacy with the phrase! "It's all the same to me who is chancellor under my direction. " Moreover, in its official declaration approving Kohl's candidacy, the CSU confirmed that it continued to consider Strauss, its own president, as the best condidate for the post.
Helmut Ko mann, cann. CDU borin und the The major goal the CDU-CSU sought to attain through the 1976 election campaign was to avoid a breakup of the Union into pro- and anti-Strauss groups. Obtaining the absolute majority of the vote was the only way to consolidate the bloc of the two factions in a lasting manner. The fact that the CDU-SU narrowly failed to attain this goal enabled the outbreak of the controvery to be postponed three days.
The CDU-SU had gone into the election campaign under a great handicap. If scarcely had any political line to counterpose to that of the Schmidt cabinet. This is clearly apparent when one considers that of the 515 laws passed by the previous Bundestag, 480 were adopted unanimously! Nor is the West German bourgeoisie in need of any alternative orientation. But since the opposition could not purely and simply recognize the bourgeois "technical" competence of the Helmut Schmidt cabinet, and since it could not attack the SPD "from the left" either (notably by waging a campaign against unemployment and inflation, as some of the Catholic demagogues in the CDU-SU sought to do), there was no alternative but to rely on bourgeois resentment of the Social Democracy, which has generally been overcome. Thus was born the slogan "Choose between freedom and socialism." The CDU-SU nonetheless obtained a tactical advantage for the bourgeoisie: the political center of gravity of the election campaign was once again shifted to the right. Since the Social Democracy was not prepared to appeal to the interests of the workers in any way whatsoever (no more in its election campaign than in its government activity during the past four years), the SPD was clearly thrown onto the defensive, The result was that any mobilization of the Social Democratic workers was avoided, even during the campaign itself. As for the bourgeoisie as a class, in its great majority if refrained from taking any open political position in favor of any of the parties, first of all because the bourgeoisie's excessively pro-CDU-SU behavior had had negative consequences in 1972 and second because the policy of the Schmidt cabinet had in fact given the bourgeoisie every reason for satisfaction. This was clearly expressed in the press of big capital. To openly approve of a Social Democratic chancellor would no doubt have been contrary to tradition. But care was taken not to visibly support the opposition (only the press owned by the Springer trust broke ranks on this point). The daily newspaper that most clearly represents the big bourgeoisie, the Frankfurter Aligemeine Zeitung, summed up the view of the employers in its September 27 issue: "Each of the two camps possesses valid arguments. Each hos competent talent. A democrat can vote for either of them." Voter participation saves the coalition Before the opening of the legislative election campaign the SPD had suffered partially catastrophic setbacks in a number of regional elections. In Hamburg its vote dropped 10 percent and it lost its absolute majority. In Lower Saxony and Hesse it had lost its position as the strongest party. In Bavaria it had declined 6 to 7 percent. In North Rhine-Westphalia (that is, in the Ruhr) it had lost 5 percent.
21
WEST GERMANY What was decisive in all these setbacks was the decline in voter turnout among the traditionally Social Democratic electorate. For example, in the elections in Baden-Wurtfemberg the number of workers who did not bother to vote was estimated at 300,000! The survival of the government coalition thus depended in large part on the possibility of getting layers of Social Democratic voters to show up at the polls, especially in the troditional Social Democratic strongholds, and this in spite of an "electoral struggle" waged not on the basis of workers mobilizations but instead on defense of the "practical achievements" of the Schmidt cabinet. Nevertheless, the SPD scored an incontestable success in turning out the vote. Voter participation was unusually high, 91 percent. (In 1972 the percentage was only slightly higher, 91.2.) What are the reasons for this?
Sid zialismi It was above all a response to the reactionary campaign of the CDU-SU, which was marked not only by anti-socialist demagogy, but also (especially in the Ruhr) by attacks on the trade unions under the pretext of denouncing the ties between the trade-union bureaucracy and the Social Democrats. It was this reactionary campaign of the CDU-SU more than the efforts of the SPD itself which succeeded in mobilizing the Social Democratic voters. The conscious workers, who had abstained from voting during the regional elections as a protest against the policy of the SPD but who, in view of the general demobilization of the working class and the absence of any alternative leadership, were unable to break proctically and politically with the SPD and the trode-union bureaucracy during a period of economic crisis, went to the polls this time, not to express approval of Helmut Schmidt's policy, which favors the employers, but rather to say "no" to the reactionary CDU-SU. The hundreds of thousands of workers who had caused the defeat of the Social Democracy by abstaining in the regional elections this time inflicted a narrow defeat on the CDU-CSU by coming out to vote. In so doing they were not at all manifesting new illusions in the SPD. They 22 simply demonstrated that they were sensitive to the argument of the "lesser evil, "given a level of class consciousness that is still quite low. Nevertheless, the SPD did lose about 3.3 percent, which means that all the gains of 1972 were lost. On the whole, the SPD is back to its 1969 level. These losses occurred above all in the cities with a less working-class social composition and among the new middle layers. The CDU-CSU was able to win these layers back, layers the Social Democracy hod won over for the first time in 1972. Social Democratic government policy also had negative effects on the youth vote. The hopes in the Social Democracy which had been awakened at the beginning of the 1970s have been disappointed. In 1968 only 7 percent of the youth questioned by the weekly Stern responded that they were not Interested in politics; in 1976 this percentage rose to nearly 35. This poll is significant, although the reference to the year 1968 (a highpoint of the youth rodicalization in West Germany) requires a bit of caution. For the first time, the CDU-SU was able to make a "breakthrough" in this milieu. If won 45 percent of the votes of youth casting ballots for the first time, against 44 percent for. the SPD, which had won more than 50 percent of these votes in 1972. In general, the SPD lost 1.1 million votes to the CDUCSU and gained only 130,000 votes from the Social Christians, But the CDU-CSU gains were not uniform throughout the country. The CDU-SU gained more in the South than in the North, more in its own troditional strongholds than in those of the Social Democracy. It was only in Munich (where the SPD lost four of its five direct mandates) and in Frankfort (where the Social Democrats lost more than 5 percent and one direct mandate) that there were significant shifts in SPD strongholds. Other cities with a voter structure in which white-collar workers and functionaries tend to predominate, such as Hamburg, Hanover, Düsseldorf, and Stuttgart, remained in the hands of the Social Democrats despite the fact that the CDU-CSU had already made substantial gains there in 1972. As for the more clearly working-class strongholds, such as those in the Ruhr, Social Democratic losses were less than the nafional average, oscillating between 2 and 2.8 percent, while voter turnout reached 95 percent. The reasons why the CDU-SU was able to obtain better results in southern Germany than in northern Germany are more difficult to determine. In this regard one must mention the fact that the CSU has created solid organizational structures in Bavaria and the CDU has done so in Wurttemberg and Hesse, and this probably played a role. (The CDU-SU now has 1 million members, about the same as the SPD.) The CDU-SU also took advantage of the public conflicts within the Social Democratic bureaucracy in Munich and Frankfort. They probably regained a more than proportional number of Catholic voters because of the open commitment of the Catholic hierarchy against the government in the discussion around abortion.
Campaign of the revolutionary Marxists
IWEG MIT ALLE BERUESVERBOTEN WEG MIT 5880 AUFHEEUNG DES ENRELSEVERBOTS GEGEN E. MANDE @GIM The Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (GIM - Internafional Marxist Group), German section of the Fourth International, participated in the legislative elections for the first time. Unlike the Maoist sects, the GIM did not try to pass itself off as an organization already capable of resolving all the problems of the working class and of "leading the popular masses." It presented only three regional lists (in Hamburg, North RhineWestphalia, and Boden-Württemberg) as well as twelve individual candidates in electoral districts, Getting on the ballot required gathering 10,000 signatures in support of these candidates before the end of September. Given the present political atmosphere in West Germany, the GIM's ability to amass these signatures may itself be considered a modest success. The atmosphere of political intimidation that now reigns in this country was revealed during the signature campaign. Many students and public service employees refused to sign or did so with the greatest reluctance in spite of their political sympathy, openly mentioning their fear of the repressive measures that have been passed by the Schmidt cabinet. Expulsion proceedings have already been initiated within the Social Democracy against members who dared to sign the petitions of the far-left groups. Our election propaganda was centered on the need to work out a class struggle alternative both to the proemployer policy of the Schmidt cabinet and to the wagefreeze policy of the trade-union bureaucracy. This was concretized in the demand for a "bonus" wage increase in autumn 1976, for a sliding scale of wages, and for the institution of o thirty-five-hour workweek with no reduction in pay. Contrary to the other left organizations, we fully integrated the struggle for the emancipation of women into our campaign (in some cities we were able to hold common meetings with the organizations of the women's liberation movement), as well as the struggle for complete equality of rights for immigrant workers (representatives of organizations of immigrant workers spoke at our meetings) and the international class struggle (a representative of the LCR/ETA-VI, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain, spoke at many of the meetings of the GIM). The struggle against state repression was also one of the centers of our election campaign. The obstacles to electoral activity by the German left are indicative of the repressive atmosphere that reigns in West Germany today. On several occasions the radio and television censored or suppressed the broadcasts that the KBW, KPD, and GIM hod been authorized to prepare as part of their election campaigns. For example, West German television refused to broadcast a twoand-a-half minute film made by the GIM consisting of a statement by Ernest Mandel, a leading victim of the "Berufsverbot" decreed by the SPD-FP coalition. In the film, Mandel affirmed that the repressive measures now in force would permit a future reactionary government to ban all Marxist propaganda as Hitler did, as well as all trade-union activity against the capitalist mode of production. According to the authorities, this statement amounted to an "insult to the constitutional organs and to the Federal Republic." The GIM obtained nearly 6,000 votes, which corresponded to our predictions. We consider it positive that in the electoral districts in which we presented individual candidates we nearly always obtained twice the number of votes as did the regional lists of the GIM. (For an explanation of the regional lists and individual candidacies and for a summary of the results, see tables.) This was not true for the other far-left formations, who nevertheless have a broader periphery than we do. This means that we succeeded in obtaining votes for our individual condidates from some Social Democratic workers and trade unionists who continued to accord their more important "list vote" to the SPD since they do not see the GIM as a credible alternative on the national political level.
Strates
WEST GERMANY WTERRICHT SA USFALL *ÜBERVOLLE KLASSEN ENNOCH EINSTELLONGSSTOP -KURZARBEIT. FÜR 4000 LEHRER IN NRW The prospects The CDU-CSU will not easily absorb its "defeat in victory." It demanded the post of chancellor on the basis of the fact that it had become the largest political party. But this was only a grandstand stunt. The employers' press clearly advised the CDU-CSU to "stay in the wings. " "It is difficult for the Union to remain excluded from the exercise of power for another four years, but it cannot avoid this fate, *commented the October 5 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Helmut Kohl is counting on overturning the present alliances before the and of the Bundestag's term, and this requires that the CDU take a tolerant aftitude toward the FDP during coming months. But Franz- Josef Strauss has openly threatened to provoke a break between the CSU and the CDU if this tactic is applied. The CDUCSU must now walk a tightrope between these two counterposed tactics. If it does not manage to conciliate its two wings, the SPD-FP government coalition seems assured of four years' rule. The government coalition's freedom of action is nonetheless very narrow as a result of the elections. The unresolved questions are still present. The compromises that will mark the attempts to solve these problems will not be of a nature as to generate new illusions in the Schmidt cabinet or to ward off discussion in the trode unions and the SPD, The bourgeoisie thus fears that the two "men of action" of the coalition may once again be subjected to the influence of their rank and file, from which they seemed to have cut loose during the election campaign. The bourgeoisie is uneasy about the fact that the SPD rank and file is "to the left" of Schmidt and the FDP rank and file is "more left" than FDP chairman and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. There 24 is fear that the activities of the parties may exert pressure on the government. Willy Brandt has demanded "clear programmatic affirmations" from the SPD in order to respond to the loss of Social Democratic votes, Even if this leads only to a moderate upturn for the Young Socialists, this is not something that will broaden the coalition's freedom of action. The Social Democratic leadership will try to exploit this situation in an attempt to hold the coalition together, reacting very flexibly to the discussions that will unfold. The leadership will try to limit the discussion in the party to platonic exchanges, invoking the narrowness of the Schmidt cabinet's majority in the Bundestag in order to warn the rank and file against anything that could threaten the survival of the coalition. Given the problems that must be solved and the need to avoid any attack by the bourgeoisie that could provoke an overturn of the alliance with the FDP, Schmidt will be compelled to accentuate his rightist course. The argument of the narrowness of the Bundestag majority will be used offensively by the Social Democratic leadership against the working closs. In order to mabilize the trade-union bureaucracy to support this orientation, the leadership of the SPD has decided to invite trade-union presidents to the party meeting that will draw a balance-sheet of the elections, which is an unusual step for the Social Democrats, The SPD is facing a dilemma. If it wants to remain in the goverment it will more than ever have to govern against the working class. This implies the risk of losing support among the workers. With the aid of the trodeunion bureaucracy it will try to continue the orientation that Helmut Schmidt has imposed during the economic crisis. There is no other choice. But sooner or later this orientation will lead to differentations or even breaks within the unions in relation to the policy of "moderation" of demands, either in the wake of mobilizations in the factories or in the wake of the emergence of differences within the Social Democratic party itself. In the long run, "social peace" will not be able to be maintained on the basis of such an orientation. The wage negotiations of winter 1976-77 will indicate just how long the working class will continue to bend its knee before this policy. October 7, 1976
Each voter casts two ballots in the West German legislative elections. The first vote goes to an individual candidate in each electoral district, the second vote goes to a regional party list. The table below indicates the total list vote obtained by each party.
Notes: The DKP (German Communist party) is the "official" Communist party. The NDP
(New Democratic party) is neofascist. The GIM, German section of the Fourth International, presented a list in 3 regions out of 10. The KBW (Communist League of West Germany) presented a list in 8 of the 10 regions. It is the strongest organization of the West
German far left, with some 2,000 members. Initially more flexible in regard to Chinese foreign policy than the KPD (see below), it has clearly "hardened" its line during past months. This has accentuated its internal crisis, Announcing a "rise of the revolutionary mass movement in West Germany, " the KBW tried to make its election campaign a decisive step in its transformation into a party. If thus waged a maximalist campaign based around the slogan "Against imperialism and reaction, for the victory of the world proletarian revolution!" The KPD (Communist party of Germany), which presented lists in 9 of
10 regions, has lost many members and much of its influence during the past several years because of its adaptation to Chinese foreign policy, which has led it to preach defense of the fatherland in West Germany. Its election campaign was mainly directed against "social imperialism" as well as "Honecker, its satrap in the German Democratic Republic, and the German Communist party (DKP), its representative in the Federal Republic of
Comparative list vofes in states in which the GIM presented regional lists
Notes: The GIM achieved the best relative results in Hamburg and the worst in the Ruhr, where the organization still has an insufficient base. The result in Baden-
Wurttemberg is surprising when compared to the vote of the KBW, which enjoys a rather broad base in the region (ir is represented, for example, on the municipal council in Heidelberg). The results obtained by some of the individual candidates of the GIM should also be noted, for example Comrade Michael Latz, who won
0.3 percent of the vote in Tubingen (three times as many as the candidate of the
KBW). The GIM's two individual candidates in Hamburg won twice as many votes
1976
Party
Votes
16,098, 632
42.6
SPD
CDU-CSU
18, 434,402
48.6
2, 995,160
7.9
FDP
118,483
DKP
0.3
122,428
NDP
0.3
GIM
4,767
19,970
KBW
22,801
KPD
Germany."
Total of votes for individual candidates (in 12 districts) :
2,035
Total number of votes for regional lists (in the three regions contested):
GIM
Hamburg
938
North Rhine-Westphalia
1,778
Baden-WUrttemberg
2,051 as the candidates of the KBW.
TABLE I
1972
%
Votes
* Seats
Seats
213
17, 175,169
45.8
230
16,806,020
44.9
225
244
39
3, 129,982
8.4
48
113,891
0.3
---
207,465
0.6
---
TABLE II
Results of the GIM
4,767, of which 875 in districts where individual candidates were presented and 3,892 in districts in which individual candidates were not presented.
KBW
KPD
DKP
942
1,148
9,006
38, 166
3,889
6,175
3,814
2,904
12,510
25
GREEK MILITANTS ACQUITTED The attack of the Caramanlis government on the Greek revolutionary left has been dealt a setback. An Athens court has been compelled to acquit the militants charged with bearing "moral responsibility" for the events of May 25. (See INPRECOR, No.53, June 10, 1976.) The government had begun to carefully prepare the trial immediately after the workers strikes and demonstrations of May 24 and 25. The targets were