GISCARD & CHIRAC FALLOUT by PIERRE FRANK
FRANCE
Chirac deputy Bonapartes who occupied this post or desired to do so, since politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. But there was no real Bonaparte available; circumstances like the war and the resistance are required to raise the possibility of creating such a personality. Even De Gaulle - who had succeeded in playing this role for years, winning votes of confidence in referenda with the character of plebescites, obscuring lines of class division, and taking as many as a million votes away From the Communist party - sow his pedestal shaken by May 1968 and hod to step down. His successors (first Pompidou and now Giscard) have had to deal with a rise of the masses, and they have not had the use of the weapon of referenda (Pompidou, who tried one referendum, wound up with a 60 percent abstention rate). In 1974 Giscard was elected with just under 5l percent of the vote. The economic difficulties have not at all broadened his base since then; just the opposite. What is more, since his election Giscard has been unable to get the three parliamentary formations that back his government to march in step. In any event, all three know that the majority will suffer losses in the next elections, and they are squabbling among themselves for the best positions. The differences within this majority, both in parliament and in the government, have broken out almost daily. They worsened and engendered growing tension between Giscard and Chirac after the 22 defeat suffered in the cantonal elections last March. (See INPRECOR, No.49, April 15, 1976.) These elecfions were the prelude to the municipal elections of spring 1977, which are themselves the prelude to the legislative elections of 1978. In fact, the electoral campaign is practically open already and the problem facing these gentlemen is this: How to avoid defeat? Two projects There is nothing secondary about this problem. It is more than a matter of a change in the parliamentary majority, but relates to the problem posed by the prospect of an election that could lead to the entry of members of the French Communist party (PCF) into a government led by Socialist party leader François Mitterrand, It is the French expression of the problem that concerned Ford and Kissinger, Helmut Schmidt, James Callaghan, and Giscard himself during their meeting in Puerto Rico a few months ago, namely the accession of Communist party members to posts in the ministries of governments in West Europe. The leaders of the big capitalist powers know very well that the European Communist parties do not seek to overthrow the capitalist system. But they are afraid both of the class dynamic that could be touched off by the illusions the workers have in the presence of Communist ministers and of the possible inability of these ministers to retain control over this dynamic. How is this problem posed in France in practice? It is now certain that the Union de la Gauche (Union of the Left, the bloc dominated by the SP and CP) will not break up before the elections of 1978. This may happen later if the Union de la Gauche does not win those elections. Winning a majority in the elections depends on the shift to the left or right of about 400, 000-500, 000 votes out of a total of about 28 million; that is, it depends on about 2 percent of the voters. This small number of fluctuating votes lies essentially in what is called the "new middle classes" whose support all the bourgeois parties and mass workers parties, the SP and CP, are now trying to win. There was no disagreement between Giscard and Chiroc on some of the means by which to pick up votes, for example pandering to fear by denouncing delinquency, fostering racism and xenophobia, using the police extensively under the pretext of guaranteeing the "security" of old people, and so on. They also generally agreed to fry to win over some votes through subsidies, grants, and bonuses to certain categories (peasants, the aged, etc.). The disagreement lay elsewhere. Giscard's project is to enact some "reforms" of small scope that correspond to the "modern" spirit of the layers he is trying to attract, for he believes these reforms will be sufficient to win over to his side voters who are now attracted to the Union de la Gauche but who nevertheless fear the unknown represented by the entry of Communish into a government. It is true that these "reforms, or rather mini-reforms, are displeasing to a large part of the voters who support the current majority, but Giscard believes that these voters will have no alternative but to vote for him anyway against the "Communist danger.
Chirac had a different analysis. These "reforms, " he thought, far from enabling the majority to erode support for the left, would only fuel the desire for new reforms; they would not win over votes from the left but would even result in losses due to abstentions on the part of the right. To wait for 1978 would be to head for certain defeat. Thus, in an aggressive mood, he proposed to sweep aside the wait-and-see attitude of the Union de la Gauche, rapidly gather the majority together, and proceed to early elections this autumn, when the recent attentuation of the recession would still be felt and before the situation deteriorates once again and the effects of the austerity measures needed to combat inFlation and make up the trode deficit make themselves felt. Giscard's point of view prevailed and Chirac left, convinced that the Union de la Gauche was going to win, he wanted to bear no responsibility for this. To those who may ask which of the two was correct from the capitalist standpoint, one must respond that it is not a question of a good or bad solution in this domain; the problem for the bourgeoisie is rather to choose the lesser evil. For the immediate future, Giscard has picked up some slim advantages at the expense of the UDR and Chirac, who cannot attack him openly without further worsening the situation of the majority. It is more probable that Chirac, while expressing his political positions in some circumstances, will wait for Giscard's failure, which he considers inevitable. The new government has not yet mode its program known in detail, It has indicated that the first objective is the struggle against inflation. The question of the "security" referred to above has been designated as the second priority. It has "forgotten" to mention unemployment, which is now approaching the figure of 1,200,000. Since the cantonal elections, the leaderships of the PCF, SP, and the frode-union federations have believed, like Chirac, that time is on their side, that nothing should be done to disturb the shifting part of the electorate which they seem to have won over for the time being. They regarded the Giscard-Chirac conflict with
Barre an indifferent air: the policies of the two are the same, each doomed to failure, etc. At the same time, in order to harden up a part of these shifting voters, Mitterrand made some subtle overtures to Giscard, declaring that there would be no obstacle to Giscard's remaining presi dent if the Union de la Gauche wins the legislative elections in 1978. This provoked some rumblings from the PCF ("Giscard will have to submit or resign"), which amounted to just what Mitterrand was saying. In oddition, with the same intention, they sought to win over a section of the Gaullists who have grievances against Giscard because of his foreign policy, which is no longer that of the "European Europe" of De Gaulle, but that of a Europe closely associated to the Atlantic alliance and the United States. To do this the PCF proposed the "Union of the People of France" and was openly supported by a section of the SP leadership. It appears to us doubtful that this policy will lead many Gaullists to vote for the PCF, or even for the SP, but it certainly does add to the confusion these parties are sowing within the working class. We will never know whether Chirae's plan for early elections under the conditions in which he wanted them to be held would have succeeded. For now, however, the government shake-up has turned the situation around; there is wavering in the UDR and trouble among the majority voters. The austerity measures will also contribute to creating discontent in the period immediately ahead, especially among the new middle classes, It follows that the leaderships of the workers movement would have an interest now in demanding early elections. They may be asked: Why do you wait until 1978 when success is within your grasp? You easily have the means to force Giscard's hand: Have about twenty Socialist and Communist parliament members in carefully chosen districts around the country resign and you will provoke by-elections in which you will win with increased majorities and Giscard will not be able to turn a deaf ear. It is probable that the leaders of the SP and PCF will refuse to resort to such factics, because they fear any excessive political agitation before the official election campaign. Limited demonstrations around economic demands are sufficient for them, so long as they are not oriented toward a struggle for power. The foot-dragging attitude of the leoderships of the workers movement is one thing. But the economic difficulties are growing, and austerity will hit at all those who live by their labor. The new government will be led to intensify repression against the laboring masses in order to apply its program. Struggles are inevitable, in fact some are already taking shape on the horizon. Their breadth and political level are not yet discernable, but it is probable that the situation will not be at all restful for the government. It is not out of the question that when the municipal elections take place in the spring, the bourgeoisie may experience a crisis graver than that which divided Giscard and Chirac, a crisis that would not remain confined to government circles. September 1, 1976
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