congress of the Bolivian miners, which was held in May. The situation has undergone important developments since then, in the wake of the repression unleashed by the government against the massive strikes in the mining regions. (See INPRECOR, No.55, July 8, 1976) In a Latin American context characterized by a series of reactionary counterattacks over the past few years, the mobilizations of the Bolivian masses (factory workers, students, and miners) reflect a certain recovery of the workers movement in at least one of the countries that had been hard hit. As of press time, information From Bolivia indicates that the struggle of the miners is not over and that the Banzer regime is far from having by S. FERNANDEZ overcome its crisis. As our party predicted and as we said in our message to the miners congress, the congress met in an atmosphere of general anticipation, the Bolivian masses full of hope, the bourgeoisie and fascist generals preoccupied by hate and fear. For seven days Corocoro was the scene of a social and political event of the greatest importance. More than 700 delegates, observers, and journalists set this small village in the Altiplano rumbling. The attention of both friends and enemies was concentrated there, for the congress was to decide the immediate future of the proletarian struggles. The expectations and hopes of the masses were justified. The very convocation, inifiation, and realization of the congress represented a triumph for the workers. But its deliberations, conclusions, and resolutions also meant a significant step forward for the mining proletariat and consequently an advance of the masses toward the recovery of their organizations and the democratic formation of trade-union leaderships. Most of all, it was the point of departure for a national struggle that begins from the question of wages and moves toward the problem of power. The miners congress of Corocoro and its conclusions constituted an open and vigorous denunciation and rejection of the national and international policy of the fascist generals. Above all, it was the expression of the will of the masses to get rid of the hated antinational and anti-worker dictatorship, valet of imperialism. In addition, the congress was a demonstration both of the tendency among the workers toward a united centralization that the sectarians wanted to prevent, and of their aspiration to change their old conservatized leaders. The congress delegates did not allow themselves to be intimidated by the difficulties of lack of preparation, an inadequate meeting hall, etc. They overcome the insufficiencies of a leadership that was in disarray because if anticipated defeat. Nevertheless, we believe that because of the defects in its preparation and the behavior of some sectors, the congress also had some limitations, especially organizational ones. These will have to be overcome in practice, before the confrontations that are inevitable if the congress resolutions are applied. Preparation of the congress We say that there were defects in the activities preceding the congress and that the results would have been better, more organized, more homogeneous, had it not been for these defects. The congress was called only thirty days in advance. Consequently, there was too little time for organizing and carrying out discussion among the rank and file. Moreover, the leadership of the FSTMB (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia - Trade Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia) did not implement the recommendations of the previous congress, held in Potosi in 1973, that the activities report and the political, economic, social, and organizational discussion documents be circulated well in advance. The outgoing toba. The minor conger me ol leadership did not issue official documents to orient the agenda of the presidium, which released a general list of the themes that would be dealt with. The result was that there was very little discussion among the rank and file, which could have served to centralize opinions, criteria, and proposals. As far as the political aspect of the congress is concerned, nine documents were submitted to the congress, among which only that of the Catavi district had been approved by a democratic vote in a general assembly. The others were drafts of political tendencies or of individual trodeunion leaders. The clearest case was that of Ninavia, a union leader in Huanuni, who, behind the back of the workers, the delegates, and even the leadership of which he is a part, tried to present a thesis drafted by his party, the pro-Chinese Communist party, as representing the mine workers of Huanuni. When this falsification and lack of political honesty was exposed, Ninavia had to admit that the document only had the support
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BOLIVIA of three of his party comrades who were in the union leodership of this district. On the economic question, especially that of wages, twenty-six drafts were presented, expressing different positions on the percentage wage increase to demand, the effects of the currency devaluation, and the criteria by which to calculate the basic wage. During this preparatory stage, a positive tendency emerged as regards the number of delegates, which reflected the desire of the rank and file to intervene more extensively. Up to the Potosi congress of 1973, there was one delegate per 300 workers. That congress decided that the representation would be changed to one delegate for every 200 workers at the next congress. The congress call incorporated this proportion, but the rank and file, beginning in the Catavi-Siglo XX district, decided on greater representation: one delegate per 100 workers. And if was on this basis that the delegates were elected to the Corocoro congress. The credentials committee recognized this modification, which was also approved by the plenary assembly. The political discussion Let us repeat that there was very little political discussion among the rank and file. Apart From Catavi-Siglo XX, there was an attempt at discussion in Huanuni, which was frustrated by the maneuvers and tricks of Ninavia, who was trying to smuggle in the thesis of the pro-Chinese party. In Catavi the discussion led to homogenizing ideas in line with the revolutionary traditions of the miners. The product of this was the political thesis proposed to the congress. In Siglo XX the discussion was unable to arrive at a unified position; this district sent four theses to the congress, corresponding to the political tendencies that exist in the district. The political commission of the congress received nine political document to analyze and discuss, each claiming to express the thinking and orientation of the miners. Undoubtedly, these documents corresponded to the positions of the various parties of the Bolivian left, but: they were presented in the name of unions or leaders, following the old custom of the Bolivian workers movement. Nonetheless, the discussion hod the merit of lifting the veil that had shrouded the real attitudes of these parfies. This was a positive step forward, which enables the masses to learn the real physiognomy of the political groups. At the same time, it confirmed the right of the tendencies that exist among the miners to speak in their own name. It also represented a setback for the dictatorship, which had tried to wipe the workers and revolutionary parties off the map with its decrees and measures of November 9, 1974. The result was that the parties Banzer tried to bury are nonetheless very much alive among the masses and are struggling ogainst the regime. 40
The political polemic, which gave rise to violent and heated exchanges between the advocates of Soviet revisionism and Chinese revisionism, centered around the character of the revolution in Bolivia and the backward countries, the role of the various classes, and the type of government for which the workers are struggling. This debate took shape around two classical positions:
1. The position of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninists, embodied by the Trotskyists, which supported the thesis of the permanent revolution applied to the backward countries. This position denies that the bourgeoisie has any revolutionary qualities in the epoch of imperialism, defines Bolivia as a backward and dependent capitalist country, recognizes the working class as the revolutionary class in this epoch, sees the peasantry as an ally of the proletariat but under proletarian leadership, and thus defines the character of the Bolivian revolution as socialist. The working class in power, acting as the leader of the oppressed nation, will carry out the socialist tasks at the same time as it resolves the unresolved democratic tasks. The documents that have been approved by the miners, from the Pulacayo thesis and program to the political thesis of the Siglo XX congress (1973), later adopted as the thesis of the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana -Bolivian Trade Union Federation), fall within this line, proclaiming the independence of the working class from the bourgeoisie, its allies, and its governments, and posing the struggle for socialism, for a government of the working class supported by and allied to the peasantry.
2. The other position was that of the neo-Mensheviks and neo-Stalinish of the two Communist parties. Although the pro-Moscow: and pro-Chinese elements engaged in heated debates, each capitalizing on the evil deeds of the other — the pro-Moscow CP denouncing the Chinese pro-reactionary intervention in Angola and their close friendship with Pinochet, the pro-Chinese accusing the pro-Soviets of having restored capitalism and of being "social-imperialists" - these two groups are actually brothers, sons of the same mother, neo-Menshevik Stalinism. The thesis of the pro-Moscow elements, drafted with "moderation, " claimed that we are now in the epoch of "anti-imperialist revolutions and national liberation." They claim that the democratic anti-imperialist struggle takes priority, and for this all must be united; the struggle for socialism will come later. The thesis of the Siglo XX congress, odopted as the thesis of the COB, affirmed the contrary: The struggle for socialism is for now. There is no vigor in the document of the pro-Moscow CP; one has the impression that those who wrote it are ashamed of the assertions such as those we have cited, which represent an attempt to revise the revolutionary trajectory of the miners. The document of the pro-Chinese, on the other hand, does not disguise their positions, and for this very rea-
son it appears grotesque, completely foreign to the maturity of mineworkers. They repeat old ideas formulated in the language of forty years ago. They are marked by the aberration of characterizing Bolivia as a "feudal country" with "feudal relations of production." From this apostasy naturally flows the additional absolute apostasy of the revolution by stages, the bloc of four classes, class collaboration, and so on. Since the country is feudal, according to them, it follows that the bourgeois revolution must be made. The socialist revolution is not on the agenda. The major revolutionary class is the peasantry and not the proletariat. This is the thinking of the Chinese. On this basis they ally themselves with the rightists in Angola, Pinochet, and some walking corpses of the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria - Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) . Thus, with this arrogance the pro-Chinese nucleus tried to counterpose its wor-out thesis to the whole revolutionary socialist trodition of the Bolivian miners. The discussion in the political commission was violent. It ended in the defeat of the pro-Chinese. Once they had lost in the commission, they appealed to the plenary assembly, where they suffered an even greater defeat. Virtually unanimously, the delegates quickly ratified the theses of the previous congresses, including the struggle for socialism, and asked the political commission to draft a platform to unify the struggles of the Bolivian masses, which was later approved. The plenary assembly thus corrected the error the political commission had made by spending all its time discussing this problem. The pro-Chinese, who had been trying to sterilize the discussion in the assembly, emerged disappointed. The functioning of the political commission was undoubtedly a negative element, for instead of discussing and resolving the present problems in order to strengthen the workers movement, preparing it for the coming struggles, it wasted time on a question that had already been settled years ago: whether Bolivia has a feudal or capitalist structure.
The Corocoro congress's ratification of the struggle for socialism must be assimilated, understood, and carried forward with full clarity and force. It should be noted that after the congress the pro-Chinese delegates who had participated in the political commission repeated their political dishonesty, introducing an "explanation" of the congress declaration containing phrases about a front of classes, which is contrary to the thinking of the miners. They have resorted to these methods in order to justify themselves before their own party and to try to cover up their political defeat. The economic commission received twenty-six drafts. The discussion here was calmer, and agreement was quickly reached to support the steps that have already been taken. A demand has been presented to the government to raise the minimum wage to 80 pesos; the government was given thirty days to respond positively, otherwise there will be a general strike. It was also decided to form a rank-and-file commission to work with the federation in this conflict. The report of the economic commission was approved, along with nineteen complementary points on related subjects. There was not much discussion in the commission on social affairs; documents were approved on questions of the living conditions of the miners, social benefits, and questions of education. Election of a new leadership Before and during the congress the leadership of the FSTMB acted in a disorganized manner, for it felt defeat coming. This became obvious during the discussion on the activities report of the general secretary and when the congress proceeded to the election of a new leadership. The report of Victor Lopez was vigorously criticized. It was approved in a manner so confused that it appeared more like rejection. The resolution said: "1. To approve the activities report of the general secretary of the FSTMB, with the following observations: It is incomplete and ignores the political and social elements that confront the Bolivian people in their struggle for liberty and the democratic rights of the people." In the discussion the FSTMB was accused of passivity and of lending only weak support to the struggles at the Manaco shoe factory and the universities (see INPRECOR, No.50, April 19, 1976); it was stressed that the rank-and-fille miners had gone into struggle first, dragging the leadership along. Along with criticizing this report, the congress resolution also condemned as traitors those who accept government posts in the "labor coordinating bodies, " saying that this disqualified them from occupying posts in the trade-union leadership. The tendency to repudiate the old leadership because of its capitulating conduct toward the dictatorship was expressed forcefully in the election. Nearly 75 percent of this leadership was turned out of office. They
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BOLIVIA were replaced by middle-layer cadres and some old mil¡tants of past periods whose conduct has been contradictory but who took advantage of the confusion of the moment. There was a lack of definition and clarity in the political discussion around the election of the new leadership. There were unprincipled compromises, maneuver, and backroom arrangements. The tendency that emerged among the rank and file to change the leodership and replace it with new, combative leaders was unable to be fully brought to bear. The new leadership, which maintains Victor Lopez as acting general secretary and also includes Lechin, Reyes, and Escobar (symbolically, for they are in exile), does not include the old bourgeoisified bureaucrats, but neither is it a leadership adequate to the coming struggles. There is a danger that those who remain and the old leaders who have returned may act as an obstacle to the development of the new, young elements. To eliminate this danger the rank and file will have to exercise constant vigilance while at the same time stimulating the desire to change the leadership, which is developing in the mines. Conclusions and perspectives The Sixteenth Miners Congress of Corocoro was a triumph for the workers and a political defeat for the military dictatorship. The workers ignored all the prohibitive measures and threats of the government. The dictatorship did not dare to attack the congress. In an attempt to confuse and divert public opinion the government assembled its own "coordinating bodies" at another congress, held in Santa Cruz, and also brought its groups of thug "nationalists" together in La Paz. The former decided only to ask for a wage increase of 60 percent and the latter, organized into shock-froop commandos, came to Corocoro but did not dare show their faces. All they did was pay some children to hand out leaflets. The defeat of Banzer and his thugs could not have been more clear. The congress was positive. But its future impact will depend on whether its resolutions are actually applied in any organized way. The workers ratified their socialist line and resolved to struggle for a minimum wage of 80 pesos and for a revolutionary program. These questions involve not only the miners but all the Bolivian masses. The Corocoro congress itself included factory workers, peasants, and university students, who intervened in the discussion and approved the resolutions. Not only because of the needs felt by the broad masses, but also because the masses followed the congress and participated in it. The struggle must be organized nationally, beginning with the miners, to draw the rest of the workers into the same process. The miners must organize this struggle, acting as the vanguard and national leadership. At the same time, they must implement the resolution to make the COB start functioning again, doing this in o mining district by endowing the COB with the necessary infrastructure and guarantees. Finally, they 42 must also promote the united front of all the political tendencies in the workers movement. This was the mandate of the congress, and the new leadership is responsible for carrying it out in practice, in action. It is certain that this leadership is not homogeneous and that the old bureaucratic and conciliatory tricks will be transmitted through some of its members, but the vigilance of the rank and file can neutralize this, stimulating the developing combativity of the young new leaders. The miners congress broke down the dictatorship's measures in proctice, the November 1974 decrees for example. The workers of the entire country must consequently ignore these measures and begin to make their trode-union organizations function fully. But we must also stress the limits and inadequacies of the congress, along with its positive features. Some very important resolutions, such as those dealing with the COB and the united front, were not sufficiently discussed; no practical measures were laid down to implement them. Nor was there any concretization of the forms the struggle will have to take to achieve the advancement of sectors that continue to be held back by the official "coordinating bodies. " It is necessary to become conscious of these limitations in order to go beyond them. Our party was present in the congress through rank-and-file delegates from various districts who presented a document of political analysis and tasks. Our delegafion was larger and its political activity better than at any previous congress. Nevertheless, our progress remains modest. Our party must expand its base in the mines, improve the quality and increase the numbers of its cadres. The development of our party is a historic necessity for resolving the crisis of revolutionary leadership the miners and the masses suffer from. The atomization of the left, which is divided into small groups and parties, is an obstacle to the advance toward the socialist victory. Thus, to strengthen the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Combate) - Revolutionary Workers party (Combate) - Bolivian section of the Fourth International, is to resolve the crisis of the revolution. The will and intentions of the workers have been expressed. The military dictatorship nonetheless refrains From responding, but it is preparing its response. Struggles and confrontations are now shaping up for which we must also prepare. And the way to do this is precisely to implement the decisions of the miners congress, to create bodies to centralize and direct the struggle on a national scale, to create self-defense detachments in order to halt the armed violence the gorillas will unleash. Our consciousness must be armed with the resolutions of the congress and with the weapons with which to implement them in order to defeat the dictatorship of the capitalists and imperialists. Huanuni, May 23, 1976
socia ista
Organo del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores - Año V - N° 182 - 20 de marzo de 1976 - $ 30.arturo gómez
In May 1976 Corrade Arturo Gómez, one of the major leaders of the Partido Socialista de los
Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party, sympathizing organization of the Fourth Internotional in