A FRAGILE VICTORY
EANES... by A. UDRY & C. MICHALOUX The Portuguese presidential elections ended in the victory of Chief of Staff Ramalho Eanes. The man who proclaimed at his last meeting in Lisbon, *It is necessary that everyone go to work, even those who sit around in coffee houses or pour gasoline in the streets dreaming of revolutions that have nothing to do with ours, for ours must be rekindled with work" received 61,54 percent of the vote. The coalition of parties that supported him had won 74.91 percent of the vote in the legislative elections of April 1976. A semi-presidential regime has now been set up. Its strength and stability will have to be gauged in coming months. One of the themes that dominated the campaign of Eanes - the candidate of the PPD, CDS, and SP* - was the "struggle against the economic crisis, " which is another way of saying the attack on the gains made by the workers since April 1974 and March 1975. Eanes, the commander of the military November 25, put himself forward as the leader of a social November 25, a November 25 that would enable the bourgeoisie to restore profits and boost the accumulation of capital. The decline in production in economic sectors that play a pace-setting role in Portuguese capitalism has been very great since the middle of the 1960s. The figures for 1975 have just appeared (in June 1976). They provide a picture of a situation that further deteriorated during the first half of 1976. For example, the sector of "civil construction, " hard hit by the crisis of tourism and the fall of infrastructural industrial investment, declined 12 percent in 1975 compared with 1974. Production in basic metals fell 18.,5 percent; the decline was 12.7 percent in mechanics and transport material and 21,2 percent in the "various transformation" industries. The effects of the international recession, economic sabotage, and the fall in investments were violently Felt in these sectors. Production in the textile and clothing industry fell 17.3 percent in 1975 compared with the preceding year. The depression here is accounted for by the international recession and the protectionist measures taken in other European countries (especially the quota system in Britain). On the other hand, the sectors that do not have an "export vocation" (the term already used by the Caetano government) are expanding. The food, drink, and to*PPD: Partido Popular Democrático — Popular Democratic party; CDS: Centro Democrático Social - Social Democratic Center; SP: Socialist party.
portugal bacco industries, for instance, are growing significantly. This is explained by the increase in the number of employees since April 24, 1974. In addition, the democratic rights won since that date have had a positive effect on the paper, typesetting, and publishing industries! Concurrently, agricultural production, grain production among other things, has increased strongly, not only because of climate conditions, but also because the area of land under cultivation was heavily expanded in the framework of the agrarian reform and the land occupations (since March 1975). In a certain sense, we are now seeing a block on the tendencies of the accumulation of capital that have prevailed over the past decade, a product both of the new relationship of social forces in the factories and of wage increases. In the general context of the decline of investment, there is a shift of investment toward industries linked to the domestic market. This retroversion is clearly revealed in the following two figures: In 1975 investment in sectors linked to domestic consumption reached about 50 percent of totall investment (17.4% For food, 7.3% for paper, 16.4% for drinks, 9.2% for textiles, etc.). In 1971 these branches accounted for only 16 percent of total investment during the year. The metals industry, on the other In 1973, accounted for only 0.2 percent in 1975! Hence, when Minister of Finance Salgado Zenha (a member of the SP) proclaims the necessity of "making the nationalized sector profitable" (60 percent of gross fixed capital formation depends on the nationalized industries or those industries in which the state intervenes), he is only emphasizing the bourgeoisie's desire to strike at the gains of the toiling mosses in order to prime investment in the direction if had been turned for a decade by capitalist development plans. Soares himself has affirmed: "This (expansion) requires the security and 'dynamization' of the private sector and the reorganization of the public sector in order to make it prof¡table and efficient. " (Oppão, June 17-23, 1976.) The prime target of the attack of the employers and the bourgeois state, or, to put it another way, the first concern of the economic plan of the future Soares government, is none other than wages, If the Portuguese capitalists and mulfinational corporations are to end their investment strike and if the nationalized sector is to be "made profitable, " then wage costs must be cut to the bone. This is the only way to fulfill the condition necessary for priming the sector "devoted to export, " the sector around which Portuguese capitalism has re-
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PORTUGAL organized itself for some time now. The Portuguese bourgeoisie understands that it must act quickly if it wants to take some odvantage of the international capitalist uptick. Throughout the election campaign the bourgeoisie's impatience was striking. The offensive will be directed essentially against the worker with the lowest wages (among others, the texfile workers and those in the assembly industry) and against the strongly organized and militant workers of the Lisbon industrial belt (those who make more than 5,000 escudos a month). The table explains why. If indicates the changes that have occurred in the division of wage categories of male and female workers over the age of 20.
Percentage of workers in three wage categories
(in escudos per month) January 1974 January 1975 less than 3, 300 escudos 48.2 1.7 3, 300-5, 000 escudos 33.1 38.1 5,000-12, 000 escudos 17.4 56.5 Overall, real wages have increased 25 percent for the low-wage categories since April 1974. Asimple comparison between this figure and the devaluation rate of 30 percent predicted and announced by various sources close to the Ministry of Finance indicates the scope and intensity of the attack on the incomes of the toiling masses. This devaluation - which should also foster some imperialist investment - will trigger significant price increases in, for instance, basic foodstuffs (grain, meat, cod, cooking oil), which form a very large and not easily reducible share of imported food products. Such imports are growing (from 9,5 percent of total imports in 1960 to 15.7 parcent in 1974) because of the increase in the number of workers and their purchasing power. The devaluation will thus stimulate inflationary pressure, which has already pushed the consumer price index above 16 percent (April 1976 compared with April 1975 in Lisbon), especially since consumer goods manufacturers will begin to add the interest they must pay on the credits they were granted a year ago onto their prices. And at the same time, the Soares government asks for a more or less rigid freeze on prices! Concurrently, in applying the plan of "capitalist recuperation" the Social Democratic government will not only impose limits on wages in the public sector (hospitals, teaching, civil service, etc.), but will also seck to reduce the number of jobs in this sector, which had strongly increased since the "carnation revolution." In oddition, the government will press for a restructuring of the nationalized enterprises, closing down many "crippled companies," and will thus increase unemployment, which already stands of 10 percent of the work force, according to the estimate of the Ministry of Labor. The unemployment figure was 3 percent in 1974; it rose to 5.3 percent in 1975. Today it has become a central problem, felt very widely. The rise of unemploy4 ment is a result of the decline of investment (in 1975 only 11,807 new jobs were created, compared with 37,377 in 1973), the return home of Portuguese immigrant workers in other countries, the slowdown of new emigration, the demobilization of the army, and the return of the colons. The creation of a large industrial reserve army is clearly seen as means of favoring the capitalist offensive. For instance, Almedo Santos (of the Socialist party) declared: "Everybody must create wealth. If you are laid off today, you will find new work tomorrow someplace whera wealth is being created." So accept it. Finally, the bourgeoisie is seeking to modify the relationship of forces in the factories, for it is as a result of this relationship of forces that the workers, for example, refuse to accept the consequences of the "normal functioning of market laws," namely layoffs. Soares has raised the colors: "If is important to convince the workers that they must work and that it is indispersoble to establish some labor discipline, through appeals to the consciousness of the workers and also through setting down certain rules of coercion. ... It must be explained to the workers, as Maurice Thorez did in 1947, that it is necessary and revolutionary to be able to end a strike at certain times." (Oppão, June 17-23, 1976.) The further the election campaign advanced, the more these various themes — all facets of what is called "cap¡talist recuperation" in Portugal - acquired a predominant place in the speeches of Eanes and his supporters. Thus, among broad layers of the workers who have been engaged in struggle for two years now, the already existing deep sentiment of defiance in face of the inability of the provisional governments to resolve even the smallest problems was topped off by an increasingly marked desire to defeat this offensive, personified by Eanes, and to express this in the vote. Especially since practical comprehension among the toiling masses of the depth of the crisis enabled them to catch a glimpse of the sharpness of the attack of capital and its state, inde pendent of the promises of "dialogue" and "social pact" made by Soares. This largely accounts for the votes that went to Otel and for the drift away from the Communist party. Eanes & the legislative elections The legislative elections to the Assembly of the Republic (April 25, 1976) were less a confirmation of November 25 than an assertion of the strength of the working class, Resistance to the attacks of the employers has been expressed continuously since March 1976, that is, since the gas and electricity strike in Porto. Of course, this workers response has been manifested in less sponfaneous and more limited forms than was the case during autumn 1975. Nevertheless, on more than one occasion demands linked to workers control have been at the center of mobilizations, when a factory is closed, when a reconversion plan is launched, or when an employer returns. In addition, wage struggles, albeit fragmented, are developing in various factories and industrial branches.
But the defensive capacity of the working class has also been asserted in the realm of unionization, which was also reflected in the electoral domain.
The workers commissions have sometimes lost strength, but in the main they are tending to become organs to which the workers delegate many responsibilities; their capacity to mobilize all the workers was, and often remains, limited, apart from some general assemblies.
This is clearly an expression of the change in the period in comparison with the months before November 1975.
Nevertheless, the essential feature of the legislative elections was the affirmation of a working-class majority in the Assembly of the Republic, which placed the question of an SP-CP government based on this majority on the agenda, especially given the attack of capital and the need for workers unity.
Thus, after April 25, 1976, the bourgeoisie was compelled to recognize that neither the PPD not the CDS had emerged as an incontested leadership in the bourgeois camp, that the ability of the CDS to mobilize petty-bourgeois sectors (and to stabilize the relationship of forces in the North in its favor) had not been extended to an ability to stimulate the offensive of the petty-bourgeoisie and the "returnees" (from Angola), as had been the case in March-April.
Moreover, the PPD's attempts to trigger a government crisis immediately after the elections had failed, as did the offensive of the PPD, CDS, and the right wing of the SP against the constitution. What gave rise to the greatest concern among the bourgeoisie was precisely the inability to implement any real measures freezing wages. Zenha was reduced to remarking: it is necessary
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
CDS-PPD
Aveiro
57.6
12.4
Beja
Broga
53.7
61.5
2
Bragança
42.5
Catelo Br.
39.2
Coimbra
3
17.1
Evora
26.1
Faro
Guarda
57.7
Leiria
50.6
29.8
Lisbon
Portalegre
24.0
42.6
Porto
33.4
Santarem
12.8
Setbal
Viana d.C.
56.2
Villa R.
57.3
63.4
Viseu
*F.L. = for left to wait for a "real government." Of course, the bourgeoisie has reconstructed its state apparatus and strengthened its repressive forces, although they remain very fragile and quantitatively limited, both in military and police terms. Nevertheless, the blows dealt to the bourgeois class by the toiling masses over many months still leave their imprint on the subjective plane, and the relationship of social forces is such that the crisis of political leodership of the bourgeoisie remains largely open. In this context, and on the basis of the pact between the parties and the Council of the Revolution - a pact supported, not to say worked ouf, by the SP and the CP - the bourgeoisie realized the urgent necessity of unifying its will and forces and of using all its weight to guarantee the emergence of a semi-presidential regime (the constitution includes a provision for granting the president full powers in cases of crisis. The Social Democracy - repeating with strange similitude the experience of the Weimar Republic - did not fail to support this operation with both hands. Temporarily, Eanes achieved a consensus in the bourgeois ranks, which nevertheless does not mean that there has beer substantial progress in homogenizing the bourgeois class. Thanks to the support of the major Portuguese workers party, the Socialist party of Mario Soares, the bourgeois class moved toward the objective of placing Eanes in the presidency through a sort of plebiscite. Palma Carlos had harbored this dream for Spínola on two occasions in 1974. In both cases, it turned into a nightmare. The bourgeois plan is clear: attack the working class by utilizing the SP (a "dialogue" with the SP, whose trade-union influence is rising, was conducted during the past few months, in order to freeze wages); eliminate as far
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (percentage of votes received)
Eanes Azevedo Pato Carvalho 74.4 15.9 2.7 7.0 34.6 6.9 25.6 32.8 70.2 19.0 2.7 8.0 82.5 11.4 2.6 3.3 76.2 8.6 3.8 11.3 71.9 14.1 4,3 9.6 36.0 9.5 19.6 34.8 52.9 14.7 7.6 24.7 82,9 10.5 2.4 4.2 76.6 9.8 4.3 9.1 53.5 12.2 10.3 23.9 56.1 12.8 14.4 16.6 60.4 22.8 5.1 11.6 59.6 13.1 8.1 20.0 29.9 9.6 18.7 41,8 74.6 14.7 3.7 6.9 81.6 11.3 3.0 4.1 81.2 13.1 1.9 3.9 5
PORTUGAL as possible the working-class majority that came out of the legislative elections; roll over the CP during an initial period and later cut down the place of the SP as much as possible, for the trode-union militants of this party do not receive the same welcome in the bourgeois ranks os the party notables do. Eanes's electoral program was fundamentally inspired by the ideology of the PPD. This program counterposes co-management to workers control, which the SP formally supports. To the working class it, like the PPD, counterposes the virtues of a petty bourgeoisie that "continues to calmly till the soil while the workers ceaselessly demonstrate." It stresses the function of cooperatives as against demands for nationalizations. It insists on the role of the private sector and on "making the nafionalized sector profitable" and proposes to revise the agrarian reform. The candidate supported by the SP not only embodied all the hopes and current projects of the Portuguese bourgeoisie, but also made himself the spokesman of the PPD! It is this officer, this strong president, that the CP refused to attack openly, after having tried to the last minute to negofiate a place in the next government in exchange for offering Eanes its support, support the CP believed would be sufficient to Induce Eanes to reject the CDS. A limited victory Fundamentally, these elections must thus be analyzed on the basis of the support the SP extended to Canes and the CP's refusal to engage in a determined battle against the chief of staff. This explains in large part both the rate of abstention (only 75.42 percent participation) and the loss of SP votes to Pinheiro Azevedo, who was the first to affack Eanes (saying that "he was against April 25"9, and Orcle. It ales explains the emergence of a broad current behind the candidacy of the former chief of Copcon, who appeared during the campaign as the number one enemy of Eanes and his projects. To neglect this fact, after the legislative elections, is to fail to understand both the relationship between the legislotive and presidential elections and the combined character of the votes that went to Carvalho, The table above gives a summary of the electoral results. First of all, it is clear that a united candidate of the workers movement would have pulverized the candidate of the bourgeoisie. It is in this sense that the militants of the Partido Revolucionario dos Trabalhadores (PRT -Revolutionary Workers party) and the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI — Internationalist Communist
League) had waged their campaign. Second, it is also manifest that the election of Eanes with 61.54 percent of the vote does not represent a deep defeat of the working class. It is more precisely the expression of the lack of a united candidate, the capitulation of the SP, and the character of the CP campaign. Eanes won, but his victory is not solid.
As in the legislative elections, there was a gap between the North and South; nevertheless, there were some grey areas. Although Azevedo undoubtedly drew SP votes in the "provinces, " it is also significant that Otelo and the CP together scored more votes in these areas than the CP and the far left during the legislative elections. The votes for Otelo are the main reason for this (see the combined results in Viana do Castelo, Vila Real, Bragança, Braga, and Viseu), which also reveals the contradictory character of his candidacy. A simple comparison between the oddition of the PPD, CDS, and SP vote in the legislative elections and the vote obtained by Eanes in the presidential elections indicates that the SP was the big loser in the operation. In the North, the former prime minister was able to take advanfage of this. In the South, the shift of the SP vote benefitted Otelo. In the districts of Beja, Evora, Setübal, Lisbon, and Faro the "indiscipline" of the SP voters was massive. Organizationally this was reflected both North and South in the refusal of many sections to support Eanes by participating in common committees with the PPD and CDS (in Chaves, Viano do Castelo, Castelo Branco, Aveiro, Guimares, Vila Nova de Famalicao, etc.). These electoral "breaks" of "party discipline" herald the potential crisis brewing in the ranks of Mario Soares's party. The differentiations within the SP also more or less parallel the North-South division. In the North, in spite of the shifts to Azevedo (and a bit to Carvalho), the support of the SP was a not negligible factor in the virtual plebiscite for Eanes. The fall of the oP The Communist party lost about half its votes compared with the legislative elections. The collapse was spectacular in Lisbon, Beja, Evora, and Setübal. The tradifional strongholds of the party of Alvaro Cunhal and Octávio Pato were turned into fields of lost battles. There are many reasons for this. The CP dug its own grave during the summer and autumn of 1975, when it contributed to building up Otelo's charismatic image. If made him the defender of the agrarian reform. After the CP scornfully cut Gonçalves loose, it pushed Otela. The major was able to take odvantage of this. Second, except for a period of several days, Pato approached Eanes with kid gloves. When O Jornal asserted that the candidate of the CP had declared, "Eanes commands the support of reaction, " the press service of the CP candidate immediately replied, "O Jornal is exaggerating... The CP affirms that the candidacy of Eanes enjoys genuine democratic support, but also relies on the opportunist support of parties and forces of the reacfionary right. ... The CP does not support Eanes, but it does not fight the military candidates" (read: Eanies and Pinheiro de Azevedo). (O Diario, daily of the CP,
June 7, 1976.) In addition, the CP participated in all the provisional governments, under both Spinola and
Costa Gomes. It thus was to reap the fruit of the workers' defiance of these governments, which have been incapable of offering even very partial responses to the most basic social problems. To this was added the fact that radicalized layers have grown increasingly suspicious of the policy of putting pressure on the state ap-
paratus, keystone of the CP's strategy. Finally, the bureaucratic methods extensively used by the CP in the trade unions, workers commissions, tenants commissions, and other bodies (popular assemblies, which supported the occupation of municipal headquarters) stimulated anti-CP reactions, which were sometimes reflected in "non-partyism." As the campaign advanced in the context of a polarization of the April 25 versus November 25 type (a polarization fostered by the policy of the CP itself), the call to "make your vote count" Increasingly turned against the CP! Otelo presented himself - and this was partially inherent in the providential aspect of his campaign in the eyes of backward sectors — as the candidate in the best position to beat Eanes. When the latter declared that if a second round were held it "would be between Otelo and me, "Otelo's electoral impact could only grow at the expense of the CP. The "useful vote," linked to the theme of the "left majority," lost its force of conviction. To strengthen the positions of the CP within the perspective of a "leff govemment" no longer inspired much enthusiasm. The CP's refusal to confront Eanes was not simply an expression of government maneuvering. In fact, it falls within an extension of an orientation of support "to the alliance of the people and the armed forces and to the unity of the armed forces in the liberating spirit of April 25 in order to assure democracy and national independence. " (Octávio Pato's statement of principles, Diario de Lisboa, June 11, 1976.) Faced with the hard reality of the facts on June 28, the CP had to draw an initial balance-sheet. The leadership emphasized the effects of the Otelo campaign on its own ranks: "... on a national scale hundreds of thousands of Communist voters did not heed our warnings; they turned toward a misleading candidacy. They are already finding out that the revolutionary process has gained nothing from this candidacy, nor has defense of democratic gains, nor formation of a left government." (Avante, July 1, 1976.) But at the same time the Political Bureau of the CP was compelled to call for a necessary counteroffensive aimed at the layers influenced by the Otelo campaign and at "giving new confidence" to the rank and file: "It (the Political Bureau) . .. calls for attention from all militants so that difficulties are not created with regard to those who, under the effects of a misleading mirage, did not vote for our candidate. ... It warns all militants not to allow themselves to be influenced by the speculation of reaction, which, together with pseudorevolutionary verbiage, is seeking to undermine the morale of our party.* In spite of all this, the CP is compelled to make an addition of the votes for itself, Otelo, and the SP (in the legislative elections) in order to reaffirm the applicability of a "left government." This overall appreciation Indicates the shock suffered by the CP. It shows the CP's desire to engage in a policy of "cooptation." This will above all be expressed in the trade unions, especially since the congress of the
Intersindical (the trade-union federation) is approaching. The repercussions of the defeat of the CP - and the success of Otelo - will certainly not make for happy days for the Soares government, which was counting on a CP policy of collaboration (from the outside) with a "purely SP" government. Against austerity! The Otelo campaign fit into this vacuum left by the policy of the two reformist parties. The campaign had many controdictory and ambiguous aspects ("non-partyism, "initial proclamations of independence of the forces supporting him, explicit reference to the MFApeople alliance in the official declaration of candidacy, support to the constitution, like the CP, etc.). Nevertheless, no sector of the Portuguese or international bourgeoisie gave Carvalho the slightest support; on the contrary! The same is true of the army. His program - despite all its ambiguities and errors — integrated some clear anticapitalist demands and garnered the protest vote of broad layers of workers against the austerity plan of Eanes-Soares. As for the forces supporting him, they are part of the organizated workers movement. All this indicates that a vote for Carvalho could not be excluded on the basis of principle. Moreover, the votes against the offensive of "capitalist recuperation" and for the extension of the gains won by the Portuguese revolution so far were in fact grouped behind Carvalho and Pato. " In oddition, because of the context we have described, under the very effects of the social polarization the objective function of the Carvalho campaign, like its explicit content, appeared more clearly as anticapitalist (see, for example, the economic program published in the last days of the campaign). To be sure, Carvalho picked up votes of varied origin, which reflects the strongly uneven process of development of the Portuguese workers movement. Nevertheless, there is no doubt - and the CP has understood this -that a potential combativity is being manifested to the left of the CP that already heralds a danger for the CP if it pursues a policy of open collaboration with the SP government. This government will have many difficulties implementing its program. Its base of support, the SP itself, threatens to break up rather quickly. The resistance of the workers is being manifested already (public services, metalworkers, etc.). The presidential elections will not correspond to the wishes of the bourgeoisie. Workers struggles, unionization, and government crisis are on the agenda. July 2, 1976 *The next issue of INPRECOR will devote a special article to the Carvalho campaign and the perspectives offered by it.
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