Fourth International Publications

The International’s English-language periodicals: World Outlook, Inprecor and their companions, 1958–1994

Italy: Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo

Inprecor no. 55, 8 July 1976 · pp 13-14 · 1,483 words

This article was cut at the top of the page the printed contents gives it, because its headline could not be found in the machine-read text. Its opening may carry the end of the article before it.

Italy

Fi mantesto ae a pogetto politico da vita di Feltine whame un voto com seria anche pii def assasse sirconda OPDUP In spite of the recovery of the DC, the June 20 vote transformed the left into the largest political bloc. Unity around a program can already begin to break up the moderate regroupment around the DC and launch the alternative. The analysis of the vote and the prospects of the PDUP are described in the following communiqué of the Political Bureau. 1. The June 20 vote marks the consolidation of the shift to the left expressed in the divorce referendum of 1974 and the regional elections of 1975; it is especially significant in that this time what was at stake was the assumption of government responsibility. This shift to the left occurred even in the South. Although it must not be forgotten that the vote for the PCI went to a poIftical line that shifted further to the right in the course of the electoral campaign, subjectively this vote nonetheless expressed the will to overturn the Christian Democratic regime, since this is what was at stake. The DC managed to recover compared with the 1975 results. In spite of this, for the first time the Christian

Democrats are not in position to put themselves forward as the absolute arbiter, nor is it possible for them to block important measures in parliament without resorting to the votes of the fascist deputies, In no case could they reassemble a majority on the question of abortion, for example. 2. The advance of the left compared with 1972 has not created the immediate conditions for a left alternative, not only because a 51 percent majority of the vote was not achieved, but also because of the disintegration of the area between the left and the DC, which could have initiated processes of construction of an alternafive majority, as has sometimes been the case on the local level. The unification of the moderate front ground a DC that went into the elections totally bankrupt not only constitutes a parliamentary obstacle to the alternative, but also demonstrates how the failure of the Christian Democratic regime and the end of the credibility of this party and its politicians are not sufficient to establish the conditions for breaking its politically representative character and assembling a new bloc, unless this is accompanied by a line of initiative capable of disintegrating the moderate social bloc, breaking its political representativeness, and assembling a new bloc. This is more essential today than it was in the past. In fact, there is a possibility, and we have already glimpsed some signs, that the coalition of moderate forces assembled in defense of the DC will act as the organizing instrument of a new aggressive bloc in the context of the crisis. The PCI's tactic of tailing after the DC and making proposals for unity has reached its height just at the moment when it could have led to a new majority. What was lacking was programmatic precision, an adequate base in the country, and a lineup not limited solely to the PCI. The historic compromise has thus wound up producing exactly what it did not want, polarization. A situation of stalemate has thus been created. The Christian Democratic regime is finished, but there is no immediate alternative. Within this stalemate, the spontaneous pressures of the crisis remain operative, as do the wildcat initiatives of capital that react on the crisis. Hence, it would be irresponsible of the left to accept this situation. 3. The proposal for an emergency government that would Include almost all the forces in parliament and within which the guiding role of the DC would still be acknowledged, provided only that the DC "renounced" anticommunist prejudice, is fated to produce paralyzing solutions because it ignores reality: the even more purely conservative character of the DC and the content of the alleged "emergency" with respect to social interests. 4. We, on the contrary, reaffirm the left alternative as the only way to confront the crisis of the country, not as a demand for tomorrow nor as a propagandistic

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ITALY proposal, but as a political objective that is realizable after this vote. This immediately requires that the left, although divided on many problems of perspective, assert its own unity against the DC, demand the leadership of the government as the relative majority, define an immediate program that defends the vital interests of the masses and calls for radical transformations of the economic and institutional bases of the country, calls for a confrontation with the secular forces around such a program, and puts pressure on the DC, forcing it into a confrontation and a choice that requires and prepares its break. 30 ANNI DC BASTA! PER IL GOVERNO PROLETART DELLE SINISTRE Exactly because it must break the moderate bloc and construct an alternative social bloc, this initiative must be accompanied by a basic social and political action. 5. The hypothesis of a government of the left cannot be reduced to the dimension of the electoral lineup, as has sometimes been done. In order to advance, a mass movement must be relaunched that is capable of preventing the crisis from being eased, even partially or temporarily, by saddling the working class and the popular layers with the political and economic costs. It is also necessary for this movement to go beyond militant trade-union and economistic limits. Only a struggle that in itself already embodies government oction and the affirmation of power can break up the enemy social front and create an alternative bloc. Finally, it is necessary that there be a basic political initiative aimed at the breakup of the Christian Democracy, at the restructuring of the secular democratic forces. In particular, the role and character of the PSI on the one hand and the construction of a credible force to the left of the PCI on the other must be reconsidered. 14

PDUP Not to take account of the necessity for a deep rethinking that will affect the political lines of all the components of the left would mean to allow an ebb to take shape, as well on a reorganization of the right around the DC, which has already begun. Moreover, this could leod the traditional left, and in particular the PCI, to a gradual process of backsliding. 6. Such critical reflection must also be directed at the new left. The electoral results of the DP do not amount to a defeat, but they are a sign of grave political limits. We have been victims of the "polarization, " but why? Why after many years of work and of significant presence in struggles has not the unity of the left been a real political stimulus capable of reflecting itself in a consistent electoral score? To avoid this question or to approach it on the basis of secondary elements or to outright mystify it by speaking of a process of "purification" of our electoral base would be destructive and would lend a mistaken significance even to the acquisition of new proletarian votes for our list. The discussion must be waged to the hilt, publicly and in a united manner, Many problems are posed: the separation between political line and mass practice, the gradual economistic reduction of the line and practice; bureaucratization and the new development of an old way of conducting politics within the organization; insufficiently combatted minority tendencies. "More unity and more diversity" - this is the objective toward which to orient our search. This process of reflection can be carried forward only within the movement, through the experience of struggle, without confining it to each separate organization or subjecting it to the tactical exigencies of strengthening each organization. In short, it is a search that must be conducted together with all the real protagonist of the movement reached by our political discourse, even if they did not vote for Democrazia Proletaria (unionized workers, Catholics, women, southern masses, etc.). 7. The Political Bureau of the PDUP convokes a Central Committee meeting in Rome on July 3-4 and calls for an open discussion within the party and with the other forces of DP, in particular with AO, taking account of the important steps forward toward a unifary perspective taken during the electoral campaign which have posed new and important themes of discussion on the forms of the process of unification. After June 20, in face of the situation of stalemate and the predictable negative tendencies of the forces of the troditional left, in face of the difficulties of the movement in the grip of crisis, the problem of the formation of a new class-based party is once again posed more urgently, but at the same time it is even less reducible to the sum of the existing groups or to the linear extension of their own heritages of elaboration and experiences, precious as they are.

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