HODESIA-
Smith and Nkomo during talks in Salisbury
The Contradictions of Nationalism by C. GABRIEL The situation in Zimbabwe makes it one of the hottest spots in Africa today. INPRECOR has already published a number of articles on this. In order that our readers may more closely follow the events in this country, we are furnishing here, as we did in the case of the Portuguese colonies before April 24, 1974, a brief run down on the nationalist political forces. For the precise unfolding of events up to now, we refer our readers to the previous articles of John Blair. Nationalism's first steps toward 1920, when fabulous copper resources were dis- The plan for a Greater Rhodesia had not been new, but covered in what was then northern Rhodesia (Zambia today), the Rhodesian colons found an unexpected economic base for a federation whose institutions would *See especially "Repercussions of the Angelan Civil War, " No. 43, February 5, 1976. 22 cap their right of autonomy from the colonial office and guarantee their supremacy over the African masses. But it was only in 1953 that the Rhodesia-Nyassaland federation saw the light of day. (This federation included the area that now constitutes the states of Rhodesia, called Zimbabwe by the Africans, Zambia, and Malawi, formerly Nyassaland.) Harold Macmilian, British Prime Minister from 1957 to 1962, declared that "the federation was a good idea, but it foundered for two reasons: first, the wind of change that was blowing in Africa with unforeseen force; second, the policy of Huggins (who has since become Lord Malvern) and then of Welensky who acted in such a way that the Federation appeared to the Africans as a symbol of white domination." (The End of the Day, p. 329.) Thus, the "rational" project of British imperialism and the Rhodesian colons quickly clashed with the nationalist movement. At the end of the 1950s most of the Rhodesian political parties were "multiracial" in composition but obviously controlled by whites. Thus, Joshua Nkomo joined the United Federal party (UFP) of Godfrey Huggins, and Ndabaningi Sithole joined the Central African party (CAP) of Garfield Todd. This was a polifical expression of the hopes of a section of the colonists that elements of the African urban petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia could be integrated into the white order as "equal" servants. This set the Rhodesian situation off from those prevailing elsewhere in the region, notably in Angola and South Africa, a fact that was not without consequences for the political trajectory of some indigenous politicions. Nevertheless, some political figures, like Edison Sithole and Dunduza Chisiza, chose a genuinely nationalist road with the creation of the Youth League. In 1957 these men, along with one Robert Chikerema, the president of the Capricorn Society, which was a "multiracial" creation of pro-British liberalism, organized a boycott of the buses in Salisbury to protest against a fare increase. The baycott was a success, and the Youth
League began to grow rapidly, but the hand of white liberalism, Anglicanism, and Fabianism was already on its helm.
On this basis they sought to unify the black movement through a general conference. On September 12, 1957, the date of the "national" holiday of the whites, this conference was held and gave rise to the African National Congress (ANC), with J. Nkomo as president and George Nyandoro, a trade unionist, as secretary.
There was nothing revolutionary about the program of this ANC. It proclaimed itself in favor of political equality and advocated following legal channels. In
1960 the ANC adopted the name National Democratic party (NDP), While in northern Rhodesid and Nyassaland the nationalists challenged the federal framework in order to obtain their independence, in southern Rhodesia the men of the NDP instead acted within the constitutional framework and advanced the slogan "one man, one vote, " seeking the support of "democratic
Great Britain.
The 1953 provisional constitution of the "Rhodesian Federation" expired in 1960, On December 5 of that year a round table conference was held at Lancaster House with the participation of British representatives, Nkomo (from southern Rhodesia), Banda (Nyassaland), and Kenneth Kaunda (northern Rhodesia). By December 12 the conference had reached on impasse, the Africans slamming the door in face of the intransigence of the Rhodesian colons and the old British-imposed pattern of racial discrimination.
FOR EVIL TO TRIUMPH ALL IT NEEDS IS FOR GOOD MEN TO BE SILENT Abel Muzorewa From that point on, Banda and Kaunda negotiated separately for independence for Nyassaland and northern Rhodesia (Zambia), while in the case of southern Rhodesia the British govemment concocted a new constitufion. The Africans were granted fifteen seats in a sixtyfive-member parliament. (The black population represents 94% of the total.) The nationalists rejected this. They called for a boycott of parliament and organized their own referendum. But in o referendum held in July 1961 the whites, 77 percent of whom participated, approved the new project by a vote of 41,919 to 21,846. The British government recognized the results of the official referendum and declared the new constitution in effect as of December 6, 1961. This was the Britishmade color-bar constitution that was to become the constitutional basis of the Smith regime. Defeated in the institutional framework in which they had placed too much trust, the Africans saw the Rhodesian Front, a far-right party, come to power. Allegedly enlightened imperialist observers believed Nkomo had made a mistake boycotting parliament, for they saw acceptance of the 1961 constitution as allowing for a stage in the democratization of Rhodesia, an alternative to definitively dividing the two communities. It is nonetheless obvious that such a constitution in no way represented a "stage of democratization, " but rather set up an institutional impasse that was in fact aimed at getting the Africans to collaborate. Nkomo's "sin" was not an excess of radicalism; he chose to fight exclusively on the level of "multiracialism" without attacking the system that was to preside over the maintenance of a state preserving both the property rights of the whites and imperialist domination. In the course of these years the Zimbabwean nationalist movement was essentially urban. The leoders were members of the urban petty bourgeoisie. On the basis of their social origins they believed in formal democracy, international diplomacy, and institutional debate. Just after Nkomo's rejection of the British draft constitution of 1961, when street demonstrations broke out, the peasant masses did nof move. The so-called tribal chiefs collaborated with imperialism to save the countryside from agitation. The coming to power of the Rhodesian Front was to sharpen up the repressive arsenal of the colonists as the white fist of British "democracy" in Rhodesia. They were aided in this by the utter subservience of the traditional chiefs of the countryside to the British policy of indirect rule, which had been worked out by Cecil Rhodes, the Scottish peers who settled in Rhodesia, the Anglican church, and all the British parties. But the collaboration of the chiefs did not serve solely to mainfain order in the countryside. The point was also to have these chiefs, along with the Rhodesian Front, play along with "multiracial Rhodesian action." Thus, in October 1964 the regime organized a five-day-long charade at the end of which 622 traditional chiefs "showed the world" that they stood with Field and lan Smith for the government and "independence. " The same Smith declared: "A referendum is impractical. The Africans of the rural zones are most often illiterate. To ask them to approve of the idea of independence has no meaning for them. Their chiefs, on the other hand, who are in daily contact with them, can perfectly well express their opinions. To organize a referendum would be to publicly question the chiefs' authority and raise the prospect of troubles throughout the country." In December 1962 Britain recognized Nyassaland's right to leave the Rhodesian federation. On March 29, 1963, the same recognition was granted northern Rhodesia. On July 25, 1963, the British porliament put an end to the federation. But this decision, while if permitted the future states of Malawi and Zambia to accede to independence, was nonetheless also the result of pressure from the most troditional sectors of the Rhodesian white colonists, the supporters of the Rhodesian Front, the tobacco planters, and the "beef barons." The direction of this pressure was clearly toward total independence for Rhodesia. On April 13, 1964, lan Smith replaced Field in the post of prime minister. On November 5, 1965, the Rhodesian government, after a fake referendum, proclaimed independence.
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RHODESIA Wilson, who was then British prime minister, called for sanctions, but explained that "in no case would there be a resort to force. " This development was to provoke violent demonstrations in Rhodesia. The repression was merciless. The age of illusions The NDP of Nkomo had been outlawed by the British regime (before Smith) on December 17, 1961. Immedi- -ately after, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by the same Nkomo, was created. In December 1962, after the declaration of a state of emergency, ZAPU was also banned, but the organization remained underground. "Thus, in spite of the changes in name and context caused by government repression, there has been a continuity in the national liberation struggle and its leadership since 1957. " (Interview of G. Nyandoro of ZAPU taken in 1968 by Interview in Depth, Canada.) But in 1963 a split broke out in the leadership. A minority created the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by the Reverend Sithole. On March 17, 1972, after years of mutual anathema, the two groups agreed to establish a joint political council and a unified military command. Nevertheless, the application of this accord remained very delicate for several years. In the meantime, on October 1, 1971, James Chikerema, the vice-president of ZAPU, and George Nyandore, ZAPU's general secretary, split from ZAPU and created FROLIZI, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe. In December 1971 a legal organization emerged in Salisbury. It re-adopted the name ANC and was led by Bishop Muzorewa; it seems to have included some militants of both ZAPU and ZANU. In December 1974, under the pressure of the regimes in the region, a con24 ference was held in Lusaka, Zambia, which regrouped the four organizations - FROLIZI, ZAPU, ZANU, and the ANC - under the heading of the ANC. Nonetheless, several months later, the unified ANC split once again, this time into an ANC-exterior led by Muzorewa and Sithole and an ANC-interior led by Nkomo. This entire imbroglio in the history of the Zimbabwe nationalist movement requires a precise social and political characterization of these groups and leaderships. The analysis of the differences as they have been publicly expressed shows that there are no real strategic disagreements (for example, over real and not merely formal equality, the character of the state that should be built). The conflicts center of the tactics to follow (relations with London, whether a legal organization should be created, etc.). Moreover, the expression of these differences varies a lot over time. Thus, in May 1968 George Nyandoro (of ZAPU) was interviewed on these questions and declared: "The imperialists, particularly the United States, became deeply involved in the promotion of ZANU. This was evidenced by the ZANU leaders themselves, who were offered sums of money from the West if they were successful. " (LSM Information Center, Canada.) But the Nyandoro-Chikerema group, which left ZAPU In October 1971 to create the FROLIZI, was in turn denounced as traitorous, George Silundika of ZAPU declared: "It was obvious that the British neocolonialists were taking advantage of Chikerema's credulousness in order to manipulate the party. " (LSM, interview of November 1972.) In 1968 Nyandoro explained the ZANU split from ZAPU by the fact that "these people" had previously been part of "multiracial" groups. But this did not at all prevent Nyandoro from splitting from ZAPU along with Chikerema, who had been a member of the "multiracial" Capricorn Society, behind which stood the imperialist liberals and churches.
Obviously, the truth lies elsewhere. The successive furns of the various factions are explained by the petty-bourgeois social character of the leadership of the nafionalist movement and by their training by British liberals, missionaries, and Fabians, In 1963 ZAPU accused ZANU of being a rightist and opportunist movement; but in 1975 it was Nkomo, the leader of the ex-ZAPU, who associated himself with the worst bargaining with the Smith regime, suffering the invectives of Sithole and Muzorewa. Too often, nationalism in the British colonies has born the stamp of legalist and institutionalist illusions bolstered by the cultural and political effects of British colonialism. This situation was especially important in Rhodesia since the regime being Fought is regarded as illegal in both international and British law, Thus, beyond the radical and guerrillaist professions of faith, the various groups have always maintained, each in their own way according to the period, a tender attraction for judicial battles, appeals to Britain and the United Nations, and so on, For many years the term used by all the currents in characterizing the Salisbury regime has been "rebel regime. " Rebel against what? Against the British crown! Such behavior has mode these leaderships extremely vulnerable to imperialist pressure, pressure from neocolonial African states, and very often personality conflicts, careerism, and bureaucratization of the external apparatuses. The political inconsistency of these leaderships may be easily measured by a reading of several documents. For example, in the issue of Zimbabwe Review, the organ of the unified ANC, dated March-April 1975, that is, a few weeks before the split into two factions occurred, we read: "Certain ignorant or ill-intentioned people are expressing doubts (us among them - C.G.) about the solidity of unity, for in their minds the ideological differences between ZAPU and ZANU, as well as among the individuals who lead ZAPU, ZANU, and FROLIZI, are incompatible. Certain Zimbabweans, it is true, are professional splitters and have proclaimed themselves and themselves alone the liberators of Zimbabwe. . With the exception of a few borrowed slogans, which can be eliminated in one day, there is no fundamental ideological difference between ZAPU and ZANU. We all share the philosophy of scientific socialism." So there they are, all "scientific socialists, " all scrambling for places at round tables with Vorster, Callaghan, Kissinger, or Waldheim. Already in January 1976 some militants of the ex-ZANU were being attacked, resulting in about 100 dead in Mozambique and fifty-three in Zambia; one of the leaders, Herbert Chipeto, was killed. A specific context The particular character of the regime being fought influences the political course of the nationalist leaderships. In the Portuguese colonies the crudity of the forms of white domination forced the PAIGC, MPLA, and FRELIMO to commit themselves to armed resistance and to seek a real base among the peasantry, which fostered the radicalization of these movements. The present leaderships in Rhodesia are definitively enmeshed into Africon diplomacy, especially that of Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique. A prolonged military crisis, if it finally comes to that, would be much more tightly controlled by the regimes in the region than was the case with the Angolan struggle. These regimes, including those of Mozambique and Tanzania, fear the implications of the uncontrolled development of struggles in Rhodesia, particularly because of the possible reactions of South Africa, with which they are collaborating in Vorster's so-called dialogue, resumed after the South African withdrawal from Angola in April 1976. Although it is difficult to make predictions on this point, it is highly likely that a broad mobilization of the Zimbabwean population would not take the same forms as the Angolan mobilizations. One difference in the two situations is that the Rhodesian colons, unlike the Portuguese, themselves form an army and police. One of the decisive questions in Rhodesia is the land question, and particularly the prospect of recovering the best land, which has been appropriated by the colons. Surprisingly enough, in this part of Africa it is perhaps in the countryside that one must expect the national apparatuses to be outflanked. But more so than in the cities, this development will not be able to occur in a beneficial manner unless it is faken in charge by a homogeneous political leadership offering an anticapitalist perspective. In the immediate future, the point is to take advantage of the embryonic forms of radical!zation that are appearing in Salisbury on the fringes of the big negotiations. But the period opened by the Angolan crisis requires an integrated conception of the building of revolutionary parties in the region. Imperialism commands complex means of integration in this part of Africa, which intensifies the bankruptcy of the perspectives advanced by the ANC, both interior and exterior. Finally, the reconstruction of a bourgeois state in the People's Republic of Angola just after the liberation of the country underscores the gravity of the strategic problems that must be resolved in order to provide a genuinely revolutionary outcome for the national struggle. That is why the building of an anticapitalist vanguard organization in Zimbabwe will necessarily be combined with similar processes, especially in Zambia and South Africa. April 1, 1976
VIETNAM: ELECTIONS AND REUNIFICATION by PIERRE ROUSSET A new National Assembly for the entire country was elected in Vietnam on April 25, 1976, thirty years after the formation of the first Ho Chi Minh government and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, twenty years after the date called for in the Geneva accords, and at the cost of innumerable dead and wounded. This assembly is soon to adopt a constitution. The April 25 elections marked a new stage in the process of reunification that has been under way since the liberation of Saigon about a year ago. That is what was emphasized by Nguyen Huu Tho, president of the National Liberation Front, in a recent interview granted to the journalist Patrice De Beer: "Since April 30, 1975, reunification has been realized in many domains. In some cases, the army for example, it was done immediately. In others it took time. In the educational system, managed by the state in both zones of the country, the reunification of programs and orientations was effected rapidly. As for the status and organization of (administrative) personnel, this could be done only gradually. As far as the economy is concerned, there are two sectors in the North, state and cooperafive, and five sectors in the South, state, cooperative, mixed, private enterprises, and individual enterprises. The r