THE BOURGEOISIE,
REFORMISTS. & FAR LEFT
FACE THE JUNE 20
The campaign for the June 20 elections is now fully under way. All the conflicting political forces have set down their orientations, put forward their projects and proposals, and chosen their candidates. This preparatory process has most often been very laborious because of the deep differences that exist within many parties and the difficulty in unraveling some rather intricate knots. Two significant examples, in two opposite camps: The formation of the list of Democrazia Cristiana (DC - Christian Democracy) gave rise to a wo-week, no-holds-barred battle that ended only at the last minute, not without striking developments (in particular regarding the Senate candidacy of Umberto Agnelli, one of the bosses of Fiat) and not without breaks of discipline (in the Lombardy districts the local DC leadership rejected the decision of the central leaders and presented its own list of candidates, confronting the central leaders with an accomplished fact). And Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy) -the united list of the for left - was still not prepared to present a program of its own, even though the drafting of this program was consigned to the PDUP (Partito di Unita Proletaria - Party of Proletarian Unity] and Avanguardia Operaia, to the exclusion of Lotta Continua and the other organizations participating in the slate. The great maneuvers of the bourgeoisie The precipitation of the crisis of political leadership, especially after the elections of June 15 last year, had provoked a process of critical rethinking among all sectors and at all levels of the ruling class, a process which, beyond the sometimes paradoxical forms in which it was expressed, posed crucial questions: Was if possible to establish a new political leadership formula in the short term? Given the irremediable bankruptcy of the centerleft and the impossibility of a conservative bloc that would include the neofascist right, was the prospect of a government in which the Partito Comunista Italiano (PC| - Italian Communist party) would be present an acceptable one? How could the traditional bourgeois parties, primarily the DC, reestablish the necessary dialectical relations with the various social layers they represent, or strive to represent, relations that were being eroded, if not actually broken, with the conse-
ITALY ELECTIONS by LIVIO MAITAN quent isolation of these parties from "civil society, "
to use a Gramscian term that has again become current?
In this article we will not return to the discussions that took place at the congress of the Christian Democracy, which were described in the previous issue of INPRECOR (No.51, May 13.) It may be noted that the attempt at "renovation" sketched out by party secretary
Benigno Zaccagnini had been limited from the very outset. But even the few innovations that could have been introduced were rapidly annuled both by the composition of the new leading bodies (Zaccagnini is in a minority in the leadership; Amintore Fanfani, old boss of the DC, was elected president of the party National Council) and by the political actions taken by the party, such as the bloc with the neofascists on the question of abortion and against the Communist mayor of the city of Naples. On May 20 the DC National Council confirmed its clear rejection not only of the prospect of the "historic compromise" (the DC-PCI bloc proposed by the Communist party), but also of the proposal for a government coalition of national unity, put forward by the PCI as a solution for the immediate period after the elections. Once again, the only possibility that emerged was a new version of the center-left in the form of a special collaboration with the PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano - Italian Socialist party). And as we noted in our previous article, the PSI rejected this proposal. In practice, this means that the Christion Democrats do not intend to alter the status que, hoping that the electoral relationship of forces will allow them to get away with this. In any event, they prefer not to define themselves too clearly; that way they can pick up the greatest number of votes on both the right and the "lefr." The "renovation" was also rather more formal than real on the question of the composition of the slate of candidates, even though Zaccagnini, supported by the "left" tendency in the DC, had made this change of the parliamentary guard one of his main battle cries. There has been some quantitative change (about 40 percent of the DC Senate candidates and 27 percent of the candidates for the lower house are new), but to a large extent this is an almost physiological phenomenon. The key posts remain firmly in the hands of the old leaders
ITALY and cliques, and the usual names head the list of candidates in the most important cities and districts, from Rumor to Andreotti, Gava to Colombo, in spite of the violent attacks from the major bourgeois dailies and weeklies to which these personalities have been subject during past months. As for the "inter-class" composition - that is, the presence on the DC slate of industrialists and trade unionists, intellectuals and big financiers, landed proprietors and representatives of the "new" middle classes — this is no novelty for the Christian Democracy either, and the change is almost exclusively a matter of a shift in the balance between party members and so-called independents. The polemic around the candidacy of Umberto Agnelli has a significance that transcends the specific case. After Umberto's brother Gianni had decided not to be a candidate, Umberto agreed to run as a DC candidate for Senate in the province of Turin. Leaders of the DC "left" like Donnat Cattin and Bodrato revolted against this. However, they proposed not that Agnelli should be excluded from the slate, but only that he be run in the Abruzzi district in the South. In the end, Agnelli was shifted to Rome, but the incident reflected the more general difficulty of leading industrialists' playing a more direct political role. The polemics around this question within the employers' organizations have been quite lively over the past few I mattesto , da vita di feltin «T pii del'assa months. More or less hazy projects for the "renovation" of the apparatuses and political instruments of the ruling class have been drawn up. Some said that the economic employers' organizations like Confindustria (Italian Industrialists Federation) should have taken on the de facto function of a political party, others floated the idea of a sort of bloc between "modern" industrialists and trade unionists against parasitic layers, an idea that was rather arbitrarily characterized as "Peronist" by its opponents. What appeared to everyone as extremely difficult, if not impossible, was the creation of a new bourgeois party able to pick up the torch from a worn-out and discredited Christian Democracy. (As for authoritarian projects of a fascist or putschist type, in the present period they can be aired only by marginal groups or personalities.) The solution that finally prevailed was a more direct political participation by industrialists and other representatives of the ruling classes. These people are divided among three parties: the Republicans (PRI), the Liberals (PLI), and the Christian Democrats. Their participation in the lists of the PLI is traditional. What is interesting is the attempt of the PRI to use them more extensively, an attempt which, although it failed to win Gianni Agnelli to the Republican slate, nevertheless did attract various representatives of industry and finance. The PRI is thus assuming the function played by the Liberals in the immediate postwar period. Sectors of the bourgeoisie thus seem convinced that the PRI, whose leading representative, Ugo La Malfo, has headed up the economics ministry for long and important periods, may turn out to be a useful instrument in a situation in which the contending forces are balanced out. In the event that the workers parties win a majority in the elections, the PRI could play the role of Trojan horse in a popular-front government. For the moment, however, the major role continues to be assigned to the Christian Democracy. In this sense, Umberto Agnelli's choice is eloquent, as are the choices of Stammati, representative of high finance, and the leaders of the Confagricoltura (the organization of landlords and agrarian capitalists). Although all these people had zeroed in on attacking the DC and its regime, when push came to shove they had to recognize that the survival and possible strengthening of the DC was obligatory. Indeed, in face of the existing social and political polarization, the DC must inevitably play out its role as conservative pole and present itself as the number one antagonist of the workers parties. This is the logic by which, in spite of the decisions of the congress, the Christian Democratic electoral battle will be waged much more along the old line of Fanfani than along the "new" line of Zaccagnini. A few words about the neofascists. The Giorgio Almirante leadership, which maintains control over the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MS| - Italian Social Movement) is aiming at a situation in which the strength of the MSI will be indispensable in preventing the workers parties from winning a majority. In this sense, the MSI is continuing to follow a conservative rightist orienta-
tion. But the actions of the "extreme" fascist wing and groups, regardless of who takes the initiative in these actions, are not necessarily in conflict with this project. A situation of great tension - created, for example, by overt attacks, murders, and so on - could be used to fuel a law-and-order psychosis and thus could facilitate the crystallization of a reactionary bloc. The new PCI formula The presentation of its slate of candidates gave, the PCI yet another opportunity to appear as an effectively organized party capable of implementing its policy of broad alliances. Not only did the party of Enrico Berlinguer not offer the unattractive spectacle of squabbling over the choice of candidates as did all the other parties (Democrazia Proletaria included), but it also managed to include a large number of independents on its slate, representatives of various social forces and diverse politico-ideological conceptions. In presenting the list of candidates, the May 18 issue of l'Unito, the PCI daily, wrote: "More than 120 of our candidates are workers, peasants, laborers engaged in production; 150 are intellectuals, teachers, university instructors, and members of the liberal professions; about 50 are small and middle-sized entrepreneurs; 45 are commercial artisans and shopkeepers. " Some of the names on the PCI slate made a sensation, even internationally: Altiero Spinelli, a member of the European Economic Commission who has assumed important tasks in this institution, and Nino Pasti, former air force chief of staff. No less significant is the participation of economists like Luigi Spaventa and of a high-level magistrate like Gennano Guadagno. The Vatican was literally thrown into crisis by the appearance of noted
Catholics on the PCI slate, prestigious intellectuals and journalists like La Valle, Pratesi, and Gozzini.
The orientation of the PCI campaign was set by a report to the Central Committee delivered by Berlinguer. The program presented was eventually approved unanimously.
The only new element in the report compared with the previous positions of the PCI was the proposal for the period immediately following the elections. The strategy of the historic compromise, Berlinguer said, remains, but in the more immediate future he proposed that Italy be directed by a broad, united government coalition composed of all the democratic and popular parties, including the PCI." Such a coalition government would have to remain in office "for some years" in order to extract the country from "the grip of the crisis." After which everybody would make their own more long-term choices. The aim of this new formula is to provide further guarantees, to even further pacify the decisive sectors of the bourgeoisie. One of the arguments advanced in the discussion of this proposal was that the Christian Democracy would be too weak to tolerate a confrontation with the PCI within a coalition in which the Communists could also rely on the support of the Socialists. Another argument was that if the DC and the PCI make an alliance, all the other parties will be shut out, reduced to the role of spectators, Berlinguer himself sought to oppose both these arguments. First, he said, we are prepared to form a government with the Republicans, Social Democrats, and even the Liberals; the DC will thus have greater room to maneuver and nobody will be excluded. Second, the new proposal appears more concrete in that it does not postpone the solution to the problems to the indefinite future. Finally, Berlinguer accepted, at least implicitly, the traditional thesis of emergency national unity, the inevitable result of which would be an economic restabilization on the basis of the social and political status quo, the much-vaunted reforms being postponed to a later stage. The program approved by the Central Committee clearly falls within the framework of the political project of the historic compromise and of a coalition government of all the "democratic" parties. In this sense, although it odds nothing new, it does further accentuate the PCI's moderate tones and waters down the content of its project. As an example, we may note that the word nationalization was not even used; the capitalists were asked only to "reinvest their profits in Italy and to concentrate all their efforts and initiative capacities in the productive sectors." Moreover, this does not apply exclusively to the small and middle-sized industrialists so fondly regarded by the PCI. A central passage of the program affirms: "Not only the particular social function of the small and middle-sized enterprises must be recognized, but also the freedom of initiative of all private enterprises. These enterprises naturally tend to operate on the basis of market demand with a view toward making a profit. Without ignoring the play of market mechanisms, the policy of programming must attempt to create new incentives for the decisions of the
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Berlinguer & De Martino of the PSI enterprises and to utilize the larger enterprises and emplayers' organizations, through appropriate procedures, in order to attain the goals decided upon in the general interest. " As for political structures, the program repeats the usual litany on the implementation of the constitution of the republic. The title of two of the most Important chapters of the program are illustrative: "For the democratic renovation of the state" and "For an effective executive. " Finally, the international section of the program once again takes up the themes that have now become customary: The renunciation of any struggle for withdrawal from NATO is reaffirmed, and respect for "Italy's international alliances" is proclaimed. The program goes so far as to express the will of the PCI "to contribute to the development of friendly relations between the Italian Republic and the United States" and makes no explicit mention of the Soviet Union! The opening notes of the electoral campaign have already demonstrated that the leaders of the PCI will not be able to escape one difficulty. What will they do if the workers parties win more than 50 percent of the vote and the DC and the other parties reject collaboration? As usual, Berlinguer and company are trying not to respond to this question and are reaffirming their desire for "concord" within the framework of the historic compromise or a national coalition. But the logic of the situation and the pressure from the rank and file are such that on a number of occasions the PCI leaders have been compelled to moderate their unyielding attitude on this point. In responding to a question posed by journalists, Lama, a top PCI trade-union leader, who is far from under the influence of extremist ideas, was compelled to say that in the event that the workers parties win a majority of the vote and that the other parties reject collaboration, *the new majority, even if it is limited, would have to assume all government responsibilities." Around the same time, similar indications, albeit more hazy, came from Berlinguer himself.
The PSI is maintaining the general line set down at its last congress. (See INPRECOR, No.51, May 13.) During the last meeting of the Central Committee, PSI secretary Francesco De Martino interpreted the new PCI proposal for a democratic coalition government as an abandoning of the historic compromise and a vindication of the Socialist political project. Regardless of whether this interpretation is valid or not, it is certain that the convergence between the policies of the two workers parties has been further accentuated. In addition, De Martino proposed that in the event of a "slight left majority" and a refusal by all the other parties to participate in a coalition government, it was possible that the PSI would assume government responsibilities. The united far-left slate After some shifting back and forth, the political polemies within the for left and among the broad vanguard on what attitude to take toward the elections of June 20 concluded with the presentation of a single slate to the left of the PCI, the slate of Democrazia Proletaria.(1) This occurred despite the fact that the PDUP had voted (about 70 percent to 30 percent) in favor of the Magri-Rossanda-Pintor tendency, which opposed any accord with Lotta Continua. (This vote was taken not only in the Central Committee, but among the rank and file as well.) The reversal of the PUP's decision was determined on the one hand by strong rank-and-File pressure for unity and on the other hand by fear of a split at such a delicate moment, which would have placed a question mark over the PUP's project of unification with Avanguardia Operaia. Unity was established on the following basis: PDUP and Avanguardia Operaia will remain the sponsoring organizations of Democrazia Proletaria (this designation was used by the two groups during the elections of June 15, 1975); they demand the right to draft the program and oversee the political conduct of the campaign. Candidates of Lotta Continua will be included on the slate (although not members of Lotta Continua's national secretariat), as will candidates of other organizations prepared to support Democrazia Proletaria. (The Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari - GCR, Revolutionary Communist Groups, Italian section of the Fourth International - will be in this second category.) In its presentation of the decision of the Central Committee, il Manifesto, the daily newspaper of the PDUP, insisted on the fact that this was a sort of compromise, concluded mainly in order to avoid a dispersal of the far-left vote; the subordinate role of Lotta Continua in the whole operation was stressed. In fact, Lotta Continua has been assigned 15 percent of the candidates (a proportion not respected in all districhs), for a total of around 90 candidates out of some 700. (As a form of protest, Lotta Continua wanted all Its candidates to be listed together at the end of the slate.) The PDUP and Avanguardia Operaia will make the decisions on the organizations not as strong as Lotta
Continua.(2) The methods used were openly attacked in the pages of the newspaper Lotta Continua when the slate was announced. Commenting on the positive result of the battle for a united far-left slate, the GCR's organ, Bandiera Rossa, which is appearing weekly during the campaign, wrote: "We who posed the necessity for a united far-left presence as long ago as the 1972 elections will be the last to underestimate the value of the united slate. It is of greaf importance that this has been imposed by a genuine rank-and-file movement, not for emotional reasons, but as a political necessity. In addition, we reaffirm the judgment we have already expressed, that the discussion which took place among the formations of the
Rossana Rossanda and Lucio Magri of PDUP far left, with the participation of many cadres and militants of the vanguard, in spite of the inevitable simplifications, permitted crucial problems of workers strategy in this period to be posed. Everyone has an interest in the continuation of this discussion and in its development through new unitary motion after June 20. We are convinced that if this thrust prevails during the coming weeks and if the campaign is conducted in a responsible manner, highlighting in a rigorous but non-sectarian manner the differences between the far left and the reformists, the result will be positive, including in terms of the number of votes won. "Nevertheless, we consider it indispensable to express our evaluation of the manner in which the presentation of a united slate was achieved. First of all, it is a serious limitation, one which the reformists have sought and are still seeking to exploit(3), that the convergence was not realized on the basis of a common political platform and was even presented as a compromise agreement aimed mainly at averting a dispersal of the far-left vote.
"We want to avoid any possible equivocation. In our view the political and theoretical bases for the unification of the for left into a single party, and even for long-term strategic unity, do not exist. But a political agreement on the basis of a platform for this electoral campaign was possible. ... As regards the method used, there was only one legitimate possibility: to establish an accord, on a parity basis, among all the organizations present on a national scale or present in important cities. This would have necessarily meant the creation of unitary bodies representing all the forces in order to conduct the electoral campaign politically and organizationally and the inclusion in the slate of representatives of all organizations prepared to support Democrazia Proletaria. This was not the method that was used. ... The PDUP in particular lent too much priority to its own internal exigencies and sought to make the other groups pay the price for the crisis in its own ranks due to the fact that the solution that was imposed did not correspond to the orientation of the majority of its leadership bodies and its membership. "This critical evaluation will not prevent the militants of the GCR. from fully committing themselves to the campaign in order to make sure that Democrazia Proletaria registers a political success on June 20. We will make the maximum effort and will seek to have the spirit of unity prevail. We will commit ourselves to the construction of united committees of Democrazia Proletaria ar all levels in order to stimulate the campaign, to make sure a concrete alternative to the reformists emerges. A success could create a new situation within both the workers movement and the far left itself and could lay the basis for overcoming the limits and contradictions that have weighed on the political events of the past two months as well." May 22, 1976 FOOTNOTES: 1. As of now, we do not know whether far-left lists independent of Democrazia Proletaria will be presented on a local level. Probably not, In some districts the Partito Operaio Europeo (European Workers party) is present. This outfit is linked to the so-called European Workers Committees, the phantom European branch of the shody Lynn Marcus group in the United States. 2. The GCR were given only three candidates, in Naples, Turin, and Saferno; some GCR candidates were removed at the last minute as a result of internal maneuvering. In the negotiations, the GCR requested twelve candidates, eight of whom were workers recognized as cadres of the workers movement in their factories. 3. The PCI daily newspaper has frequently attacked Democrazia Proletaria as a sort of unprincipled electoral combination, going so far as to devote an editorial signed by the editor-in-chief to this subject.